gross negligence standard in South Carolina

2018We hold that when an exception containing the gross negligence standard applies , that same standard will be read into any other applicable exception. 336 S.C. at 398 , 520 S.E.2d at 155 (emphasis added).

2018We hold that when an exception containing the gross negligence standard applies , that same standard will be read into any other applicable exception. 336 S.C. at 398 , 520 S.E.2d at 155 (emphasis added).

2024See id. at 653, 647 S.E.2d at 197 (holding the circuit court "did not err in declining to apply a gross negligence standard in its review of the exemptions to the waiver of immunity" under the Act when section 15-78-60(25) did not apply because the plaintiff made no claim the defendant breached a duty to protect her from physical harm). 3.

2018We held the trial court did not err in refusing to read the gross negligence standard into subsections (1), (2), and (3) because subsection (12) had " no applicability " to the case and because subsection (25) was " similarly inapplicable ." Id. at 653 , 647 S.E.2d at 197 (emphasis added).

2025See Repko v. Cnty. of Georgetown, 424 S.C. 494, 507 , 818 S.E.2d 743, 750 (2018) ("[I]n order for the gross negligence standard from one immunity provision to be read into an immunity provision that does not contain a gross negligence standard, the immunity provision containing the gross negligence standard must first apply to the case.").1 1 Because we hold Dillon County was immune pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, we have not addressed McLeod's remaining argument that the circuit court erred by finding the applicable statute of limitations also barred her claims.

2025See Repko v. Cnty. of Georgetown, 424 S.C. 494, 507 , 818 S.E.2d 743, 750 (2018) ("[I]n order for the gross negligence standard from one immunity provision to be read into an immunity provision that does not contain a gross negligence standard, the immunity provision containing the gross negligence standard must first apply to the case.").1 1 Because we hold Dillon County was immune pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, we have not addressed McLeod's remaining argument that the circuit court erred by finding the applicable statute of limitations also barred her claims.

2006I, 330 S.C. 447, 463 , 499 S.E.2d 238, 246 (Ct.App.1998) (when an action is brought alleging gross negligence by a governmental entity pursuant to an exception contained in Section 15-78-60, all other applicable exceptions must be read in light of the exception containing the gross negligence standard), cert, granted on other grounds, April 8, 1999.

2006I, 330 S.C. 447, 463 , 499 S.E.2d 238, 246 (Ct.App.1998) (when an action is brought alleging gross negligence by a governmental entity pursuant to an exception contained in Section 15-78-60, all other applicable exceptions must be read in light of the exception containing the gross negligence standard), cert, granted on other grounds, April 8, 1999.

2025See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613 , 518 AFFIRMED.2 WILLIAMS, C.J., and THOMAS and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

2011See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc. , 335 S.C. 598, 613 , 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (noting an appellate court does not have to address issues when the disposition of a prior issue is dispositive).

2006Duncan v. Hampton County School Dist. #2, 335 S.C. 535 , 517 S.E.2d 449 (1999) (reading discretionary immunity exception in light of exception to immunity in which governmental entity exercises its duty in a grossly negligent manner, such that discretionary immunity will not protect the government if it exercises that discretion in a grossly negligent manner); Etheredge v. Richland School Dist.

2006Duncan v. Hampton County School Dist. #2, 335 S.C. 535 , 517 S.E.2d 449 (1999) (reading discretionary immunity exception in light of exception to immunity in which governmental entity exercises its duty in a grossly negligent manner, such that discretionary immunity will not protect the government if it exercises that discretion in a grossly negligent manner); Etheredge v. Richland School Dist.

2018Repko also argues Proctor v. Department of Health & Environmental Control , 368 S.C. 279 , 628 S.E.2d 496 (Ct. App. 2006), supports his argument that the gross negligence standard of subsection 15-78-60(12) should be read into the other subsections simply because the County pled subsection (12).

2018Repko also argues Proctor v. Department of Health & Environmental Control , 368 S.C. 279 , 628 S.E.2d 496 (Ct. App. 2006), supports his argument that the gross negligence standard of subsection 15-78-60(12) should be read into the other subsections simply because the County pled subsection (12).

2018Repko argues Jones v. Lott , 387 S.C. 339 , 692 S.E.2d 900 (2010), stands for the proposition that when a governmental entity simply pleads an immunity provision containing a gross negligence standard, the gross negligence standard must be read into all other immunity subsections.

2018Repko argues Jones v. Lott , 387 S.C. 339 , 692 S.E.2d 900 (2010), stands for the proposition that when a governmental entity simply pleads an immunity provision containing a gross negligence standard, the gross negligence standard must be read into all other immunity subsections.

2018Dep't of Transp. v. First Carolina Corp. of S.C., 372 S.C. 295, 301 , 641 S.E.2d 903, 907 (2007) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review." (brackets omitted) (quoting Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71 , 3 The record does not indicate the ultimate outcome of that CDV charge or whether the December 5 hearing on that charge occurred as scheduled.

2018Dep't of Transp. v. First Carolina Corp. of S.C., 372 S.C. 295, 301 , 641 S.E.2d 903, 907 (2007) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review." (brackets omitted) (quoting Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71 , 3 The record does not indicate the ultimate outcome of that CDV charge or whether the December 5 hearing on that charge occurred as scheduled.

2015Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 422 , 526 S.E.2d 716, 724 (2000) (stating imposing preservation requirements on the appellant is meant to enable the lower court to rule properly after it has considered all relevant facts, law, and arguments, and noting that the purpose of an appeal is to determine whether the trial court erroneously acted or failed to act, and when appellant's contentions are not presented or passed upon by the trial court, such contentions will not be considered on appeal); id. ("If the losing party has raised an issue in the lower court, but the court fails to rule upon it, the part

2015Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 422 , 526 S.E.2d 716, 724 (2000) (stating imposing preservation requirements on the appellant is meant to enable the lower court to rule properly after it has considered all relevant facts, law, and arguments, and noting that the purpose of an appeal is to determine whether the trial court erroneously acted or failed to act, and when appellant's contentions are not presented or passed upon by the trial court, such contentions will not be considered on appeal); id. ("If the losing party has raised an issue in the lower court, but the court fails to rule upon it, the part

2015See Pikaart, 393 S.C. at 324 , 713 S.E.2d at 273 ("A matter may not be presented for the first time on appeal; rather, it must have been both raised to and ruled upon by the court below.").

2015See Pikaart, 393 S.C. at 324 , 713 S.E.2d at 273 ("A matter may not be presented for the first time on appeal; rather, it must have been both raised to and ruled upon by the court below.").

2008As to the issue of whether the master erred in finding that the gross negligence exception in the statute of repose was inapplicable Bradley v. Doe , 374 S.C. 622, 625 , 649 S.E.2d 153, 155 (Ct. App. 2007) (“Once the party moving for summary judgment meets the initial burden of showing an absence of evidentiary support for the opponent’s case, the opponent cannot simply rest on mere allegations or denials contained in the pleadings.

2008As to the issue of whether the master erred in finding that the gross negligence exception in the statute of repose was inapplicable Bradley v. Doe , 374 S.C. 622, 625 , 649 S.E.2d 153, 155 (Ct. App. 2007) (“Once the party moving for summary judgment meets the initial burden of showing an absence of evidentiary support for the opponent’s case, the opponent cannot simply rest on mere allegations or denials contained in the pleadings.

2007Stiles v. Onorato, 318 S.C. 297, 300 , 457 S.E.2d 601, 602 (1995).

2007Stiles v. Onorato, 318 S.C. 297, 300 , 457 S.E.2d 601, 602 (1995).

2006Staubes v. City of Folly Beach, 339 S.C. 406 , 417 529 S.E.2d 543, 548 (2000) (quoting Steinke v. SC Dep’t of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation, 336 S.C. 373 , 398, 520 S.E.2d 142 , 155 (1999)).

2006Staubes v. City of Folly Beach, 339 S.C. 406 , 417 529 S.E.2d 543, 548 (2000) (quoting Steinke v. SC Dep’t of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation, 336 S.C. 373 , 398, 520 S.E.2d 142 , 155 (1999)).

2002See ML-Lee Acquisition Fund, L.P. v. Deloitte & Touche, 327 S.C. 238 , 489 S.E.2d 470 (1997) (holding an unappealed ruling becomes the law of the case and precludes further consideration of the issue on appeal); cf. Kolster v. City of El Paso, 972 S.W.2d 58 (Tex.1998) (observing the trial court erroneously determined that ordinary negligence, rather than recklessness, was the proper standard under a Texas statute addressing the liability of emergency vehicle operators for accidents where the statute provided drivers were not exempted for "reckless” conduct; the appellate court stated it would,

2002See ML-Lee Acquisition Fund, L.P. v. Deloitte & Touche, 327 S.C. 238 , 489 S.E.2d 470 (1997) (holding an unappealed ruling becomes the law of the case and precludes further consideration of the issue on appeal); cf. Kolster v. City of El Paso, 972 S.W.2d 58 (Tex.1998) (observing the trial court erroneously determined that ordinary negligence, rather than recklessness, was the proper standard under a Texas statute addressing the liability of emergency vehicle operators for accidents where the statute provided drivers were not exempted for "reckless” conduct; the appellate court stated it would,