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5 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1966–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Joseph P. J. Charettegreen1 sentence1982The author notes that this is also a problem with adopting a gross negligence standard: “any inquiry into the mental state of the prosecutor is, of course, a difficult one, and the precise point at which an impropriety becomes gross negligence is difficult to isolate.” Id. at 131 (footnotes omitted). 12 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Carroll Leppogreen1 sentence1982See U. S. v. Leppo, *241 641 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1981). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Pottergreen2 sentences1980Accordingly, we believe that retrial should be barred when there is found to have been prosecutorial misconduct “intended to provoke mistrial requests,” . that is to say, when the prosecuting lawyer, judged by an objective standard, must be deemed to have been substantially certain that a mistrial would be declared as a result of his questions to witnesses or other conduct at trial. 478 Pa. at 267 , 386 A.2d at 925 (footnote and citation omitted). 1980Accordingly, we believe that retrial should be barred when there is found to have been prosecutorial misconduct “intended to provoke mistrial requests,” . that is to say, when the prosecuting lawyer, judged by an objective standard, must be deemed to have been substantially certain that a mistrial would be declared as a result of his questions to witnesses or other conduct at trial. 478 Pa. at 267 , 386 A.2d at 925 (footnote and citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sherk v. County of Dauphin
green
1 sentence2026It first cites to Sherk, 614 A.2d 226 , in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania interpreted a specific “medical-professional liability” exception to sovereign immunity, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(2),14 in pari materia with Section 114 of the Mental Health Procedures Act,15 50 P.S. § 7114, which provides immunity to certain mental healthcare providers absent a showing of willful misconduct or gross negligence. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Bloom v. DuBois Regional Medical Center
green
1 sentence1994In Bloom v. DuBois Regional Medical Center, 409 Pa.Superior Ct. 83, 597 A.2d 671 (1991), the Superior Court addressed, among other issues, what the gross negligence standard means in the context of a breach of a statutorily imposed liability in a lawsuit seeking to hold a psychiatrist hable in tort for the negligent release of a mental patient. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc.
green
1 sentence1966Prior to the decision in Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., supra, the conflict of laws or “choice of laws” question in such a case was clear. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.