83 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1942–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
The PEOPLE v. Robinsongreen2 sentences2026Lakes cited published opinions for support: People v. Robinson, 46 Ill. 2d 229, 231-32 (1970) (“there is no question that a defendant has a right to a fair and impartial hearing to determine whether” an eyewitness identification was the product of suggestive police procedures); People v. Stiles, 95 Ill. 2025See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 46 Ill. 2d 229, 231-32 (1970) (“there is no question that a defendant has a right to a fair and impartial hearing to determine whether” an eyewitness identification was the product of suggestive police procedures); People v. Stiles, 95 Ill. | 6 | 12 |
Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulationgreen2 sentences2016See Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 95 (“A fair hearing before an administrative agency includes the opportunity to be heard, the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and impartiality in ruling on the evidence.”). ¶ 77 We conclude that petitioner received a fair and impartial hearing in this case and was not denied procedural due process. ¶ 78 2. 2016See Abramson, 153 Ill. 2d at 95 (“A fair hearing before an administrative agency includes the opportunity to be heard, the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and impartiality in ruling on the evidence.”). ¶ 77 We conclude that petitioner received a fair and impartial hearing in this case and was not denied procedural due process. ¶ 78 2. | 4 | 5 |
Kaemmerer v. St. Clair County Electoral Boardgreen2 sentences2015Clair County Electoral Board, 333 Ill. 2014Clair County Electoral Board, 333 Ill. | 3 | 3 |
Golden Egg Club, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Commissiongreen2 sentences2016Moreover, “[a] basic tenet of our jurisprudence is that a person should receive a fair and impartial hearing, with an opportunity to offer evidence and cross-examine witnesses.” Golden Egg Club, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm’n, 124 Ill. 2016Moreover, “[a] basic tenet of our jurisprudence is that a person should receive a fair and impartial hearing, with an opportunity to offer evidence and cross- examine witnesses.” Golden Egg Club, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm’n, 124 Ill. | 2 | 6 |
Gigger v. Board of Fire & Police Commissionersgreen2 sentences2016App. 2d 241, 244 (1970); Gigger v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 23 Ill. 2016App. 2d 241, 244 (1970); Gigger v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 23 Ill. | 2 | 4 |
People v. Stilesgreen2 sentences2026Lakes cited published opinions for support: People v. Robinson, 46 Ill. 2d 229, 231-32 (1970) (“there is no question that a defendant has a right to a fair and impartial hearing to determine whether” an eyewitness identification was the product of suggestive police procedures); People v. Stiles, 95 Ill. 2025See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 46 Ill. 2d 229, 231-32 (1970) (“there is no question that a defendant has a right to a fair and impartial hearing to determine whether” an eyewitness identification was the product of suggestive police procedures); People v. Stiles, 95 Ill. | 2 | 3 |
People v. Fultzgreen2 sentences2026App. 3d 959, 964-65 (1981) (“It is fundamental that a defendant is entitled to a full and fair hearing -6- 1-25-0023 on [a] motion to suppress.”); People v. Fultz, 32 Ill. 2025App. 3d 959, 964-65 (1981) (“It is fundamental that a defendant is entitled to a full and fair hearing on [a] motion to suppress.”); People v. Fultz, 32 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Carrigan v. Board of Fire & Police Commissionersgreen2 sentences2016The hearing shall be as hereinafter provided ***. *** *** The board of fire and police commissioners shall conduct a fair and impartial hearing of the charges, to be commenced within 30 days of the filing thereof, which hearing may be continued from time to time.” 65 ILCS 5/10-2.1-17 (West 2014). ¶ 10 “The statutory 30-day time limit to commence a hearing as provided in section 10-2.1-17 of the Illinois Municipal Code is mandatory, and a failure of the Board to commence a hearing within that time period causes the Board to lose jurisdiction of the case.” Carrigan v. Board of Fire & Police Comm 2016The hearing shall be as hereinafter provided ***. *** *** The board of fire and police commissioners shall conduct a fair and impartial hearing of the charges, to be commenced within 30 days of the filing thereof, which hearing may be continued from time to time.” 65 ILCS 5/10-2.1-17 (West 2014). ¶ 10 “The statutory 30-day time limit to commence a hearing as provided in section 10-2.1-17 of the Illinois Municipal Code is mandatory, and a failure of the Board to commence a hearing within that time period causes the Board to lose jurisdiction of the case.” Carrigan v. Board of -2- Fire & Police | 2 | 2 |
Turcol v. Pension Board of Trustees of Matteson Police Pension Fundgreen2 sentences2010“An individual challenging the impartiality of an administrative tribunal must overcome a presumption that those serving in such tribunals are fair and honest.” Turcol v. Pension Board of Trustees of Matteson 19 1-08-1212 Police Pension Fund, 359 Ill. 2010“An individual challenging the impartiality of an administrative tribunal must overcome a presumption that those serving in such tribunals are fair and honest.” Turcol v. Pension Board of Trustees of Matteson Police Pension Fund, 359 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Anderson v. Human Rights Commissiongreen2 sentences2005Anderson v. Human Rights Comm’n , 314 Ill. 2005Anderson v. Human Rights Comm'n, 314 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Abandonment of Wells Located in Illinoisgreen2 sentences2005"In a proceeding where a person's right or interest in life, liberty, or property is affected, due process requires that the person be served with adequate notice, be apprised of a definite charge, and be afforded an opportunity to defend that interest in a fair and impartial hearing that is appropriate to the nature of the case." In re Abandonment of Wells located in Illinois by Eva Lovene Leavell , 343 Ill. 2005“In a proceeding where a person’s right or interest in life, liberty, or property is affected, due process requires that the person be served with adequate notice, be apprised of a definite charge, and be afforded an opportunity to defend that interest in a fair and impartial hearing that is appropriate to the nature of the case.” In re Abandonment of Wells located in Illinois by Eva Lovene Leavell, 343 Ill. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Robinsongreen2 sentences2011See Robinson, 18 Ill.App.3d at 807 , 310 N.E.2d 652 ("it is universally held that a judge who, before hearing a criminal case expresses conviction that the accused is guilty, cannot give that accused a fair and impartial hearing, and is thereby disqualified to sit as a trial judge"). ¶ 24 Next, we lack jurisdiction to review the portion of the court's October 21, 2008, order denying defendants' motion for summary judgment as to count II. 2011See Robinson, 18 Ill.App.3d at 807 , 310 N.E.2d 652 ("it is universally held that a judge who, before hearing a criminal case expresses conviction that the accused is guilty, cannot give that accused a fair and impartial hearing, and is thereby disqualified to sit as a trial judge"). ¶ 24 Next, we lack jurisdiction to review the portion of the court's October 21, 2008, order denying defendants' motion for summary judgment as to count II. | 1 | 2 |
Black Hawk Motor Transit Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commissiongreen2 sentences2003If an abuse of discretion is found, the reviewing court must then determine “whether the result was injurious or prejudicial to appellant’s right to a fair and impartial hearing.” Black Hawk Motor Transit Co., 383 Ill. at 66 , 48 N.E.2d at 346 . 2003If an abuse of discretion is found, the reviewing court must then determine “whether the result was injurious or prejudicial to appellant’s right to a fair and impartial hearing.” Black Hawk Motor Transit Co., 383 Ill. at 66 , 48 N.E.2d at 346 . | 1 | 2 |
First National Bank v. Kascsakgreen2 sentences2003In re Estate of Hecht, 63 Ill.App.3d 539, 540 , 20 Ill.Dec. 254 , 379 N.E.2d 1322, 1324 (1978). 2003In re Estate of Hecht, 63 Ill.App.3d 539, 540 , 20 Ill.Dec. 254 , 379 N.E.2d 1322, 1324 (1978). | 1 | 2 |
Mank v. BD. OF FIRE AND POLICE COMMRS.green2 sentences1979Because of the closeness of the relationship between the charging party and one of the members of the commission and because of the judgmental factors involved, this court does not believe that the requirements for a fair and impartial hearing before a disinterested board were satisfied by the Board when one of the commissioners was closely related to the person bringing the charges.” 7 Ill. 1977(Stryker v. Village of Oak Park, 62 Ill. 2d 523, 533 (1976); Mank v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 7 Ill. | 1 | 2 |
Arvia v. Madigangreen1 sentence2025As for his suggestion that he was deprived of a fair and impartial hearing before the Commission, Gibson fails to provide any legal or evidentiary support to overcome the presumption that the Commission was “objective and capable of judging the controversy fairly.” Cannici v. Village of Melrose Park, 2019 IL App (1st) 181422, ¶ 57 ; see Arvia 209 Ill. 2d at 541 (“[W]ithout a showing to the contrary, state administrators are assumed to be individuals of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.” (Internal qu | 1 | 1 |
People v. Smithgreen1 sentence2023It is well settled that if a suppression hearing is held, a defendant has “a right to a fair and impartial hearing to determine whether an eyewitness's identification was the product of undue or suggestive police procedures.” - 25 - No. 1-18-1821 People v. Smith, 362 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Board of Trustees of the Morton Grove Firefighters' Pension Fundgreen1 sentence2012App. 3d 563, 571 (2007); see Williams v. Board of Trustees of the Morton Grove Firefighters’ Pension Fund, 398 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
SMRJ, INC. v. Russellgreen1 sentence2012Bias ¶ 32 Next, plaintiff contends that he was not provided a fair and impartial hearing because Dr. Rose was biased against plaintiff’s “style of medicine,” thereby infecting the actions of the entire Disciplinary Board and the Director. ¶ 33 In order to demonstrate bias or prejudice, a claimant must “show[ ] in the record that the administrative proceedings were either tainted by dishonesty or contained an unacceptable risk of bias.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) SMRJ, Inc. v. Russell, 378 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. DeJesusgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shango v. Jurichgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rouse v. Judges of Circuit Court of Cook Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Yadro v. Bowlinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stryker v. Village of Oak Parkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stamp v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Carroll
green
2 sentences2005See People v. Robinson, 46 Ill. 2d 229, 231-32 , 263 N.E.2d 57 (1970); People v. Carroll, 260 Ill. 2005See People v. Robinson, 46 Ill. 2d 229, 231-32 , 263 N.E.2d 57 (1970); People v. Carroll, 260 Ill. | 4 | 2005–2005 |
Smith v. Department of Registration & Education
green
2 sentences1976It is beyond dispute that “[a] dministrative as well as judicial proceedings are governed by the fundamental principles and requirements of due process of law.” (Brown v. Air Pollution Control Board, 37 Ill. 2d 450, 454 ; Ellis v. Illinois Commerce Com., 44 Ill. 2d 438 .) In such proceedings, “[t] he object of this constitutional safeguard is to preserve the personal and property rights of a person against the arbitrary action of public officials.” (People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 147 .) “Due process of law presupposes a fair and impartial hearing before a fair and impartial tribunal.” (Smi 1976It is beyond dispute that "[a]dministrative as well as judicial proceedings are governed by the fundamental principles and requirements of due process of law." ( Brown v. Air Pollution Control Board, 37 Ill.2d 450, 454 ; Ellis v. Illinois Commerce Com., 44 Ill.2d 438 .) In such proceedings, "[t]he object of this constitutional safeguard is to preserve the personal and property rights of a person against the arbitrary action of public officials." ( People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 147 .) "Due process of law presupposes a fair and impartial hearing before a fair and impartial tribunal." ( Smit | 4 | 1960–1990 |
Brown v. Air Pollution Control Board
green
2 sentences1992Ed. 2d 18, 33 , 96 S. Ct. 893, 902 .) Despite the flexibility built into this concept, it is clear that certain minimal guarantees must always be provided. “ ‘Among the guarantees without which there would be an absence of procedural due process are reasonable notice, the right to examine witnesses, to testify, to present witnesses, and to be represented by counsel.’ ” (Brown v. Air Pollution Control Board (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 450, 454 , quoting Yiannopoulos v. Robinson (7th Cir. 1957), 247 F.2d 655, 657 .) These protections ensure that a fair trial is provided to its participants, for due proce 1976It is beyond dispute that “[a] dministrative as well as judicial proceedings are governed by the fundamental principles and requirements of due process of law.” (Brown v. Air Pollution Control Board, 37 Ill. 2d 450, 454 ; Ellis v. Illinois Commerce Com., 44 Ill. 2d 438 .) In such proceedings, “[t] he object of this constitutional safeguard is to preserve the personal and property rights of a person against the arbitrary action of public officials.” (People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 147 .) “Due process of law presupposes a fair and impartial hearing before a fair and impartial tribunal.” (Smi | 3 | 1976–1992 |
Knolls Condominium Ass'n v. Harms
green
2 sentences2011Because specific provisions control over more general provisions in the interpretation of legislative intent ( Knolls, 202 Ill.2d at 459 , 269 Ill.Dec. 464 , 781 N.E.2d 261 ), we conclude that the only reasonable interpretation of section 10-2.1-17 is that (1) the village president and corporate authorities discharge a police chief who is appointed by ordinance and (2) the Commissioners discharge rank-and-file police officers. ¶56 Our interpretation of section 10-2.1-17 is consistent with the automatic reversion provision of section 10-2.1-4. 2011Because specific provisions control over more general provisions in the interpretation of legislative intent ( Knolls, 202 Ill.2d at 459 , 269 Ill.Dec. 464 , 781 N.E.2d 261 ), we conclude that the only reasonable interpretation of section 10-2.1-17 is that (1) the village president and corporate authorities discharge a police chief who is appointed by ordinance and (2) the Commissioners discharge rank-and-file police officers. ¶56 Our interpretation of section 10-2.1-17 is consistent with the automatic reversion provision of section 10-2.1-4. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Balmoral Racing Club, Inc. v. Illinois Racing Board
green
2 sentences2010Balmoral Racing Club, Inc., 151 Ill. 2d at 408 . 2010Balmoral Racing Club, Inc., 151 Ill. 2d at 408 . | 2 | 2010–2010 |
The PEOPLE v. Smith
green
2 sentences2001Construing section 114 — 5(d) liberally to protect defendant’s right to a fair and impartial hearing (see Smith, 28 Ill. 2d at 447 ), we find that the trial judge erred by failing to transfer defendant’s substitution motion to another judge, as the statute requires. 2001Construing section 114–5(d) liberally to protect defendant’s right to a fair and impartial hearing (see Smith , 28 Ill. 2d at 447 ), we find that the trial judge erred by failing to transfer defendant’s substitution motion to another judge, as the statute requires. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
The People v. Blumenshine
green
2 sentences1973Although in a similar situation the conviction has been vacated (People v. Blumenshine, 42 Ill.2d 508 , 250 N.E.2d 152 ) “and its reinstatement made dependent upon the results of a new hearing on the identification question we find that in view of all the circumstances of this case justice would be better served if the cause were reversed and remanded for a complete new trial.” People v. Robinson, 46 Ill.2d 229, 233-234 , 263 N.E.2d 57, 59 . 1973Although in a similar situation the conviction has been vacated (People v. Blumenshine, 42 Ill.2d 508 , 250 N.E.2d 152 ) “and its reinstatement made dependent upon the results of a new hearing on the identification question we find that in view of all the circumstances of this case justice would be better served if the cause were reversed and remanded for a complete new trial.” People v. Robinson, 46 Ill.2d 229, 233-234 , 263 N.E.2d 57, 59 . | 2 | 1970–1973 |
Dombrowski v. City of Chicago
green
1 sentence2025We have “a duty to examine the procedural methods that were employed at [the] administrative hearing to ensure that it was a fair and impartial hearing.” Id. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Barron v. City of Chicago
green
1 sentence2025The statute further provides that the Board “shall conduct a fair and impartial hearing of the charges, to be commenced within 30 days of the filing thereof, which hearing may be continued from time to time.” Id. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Cannici v. The Village of Melrose Park
green
1 sentence2025As for his suggestion that he was deprived of a fair and impartial hearing before the Commission, Gibson fails to provide any legal or evidentiary support to overcome the presumption that the Commission was “objective and capable of judging the controversy fairly.” Cannici v. Village of Melrose Park, 2019 IL App (1st) 181422, ¶ 57 ; see Arvia 209 Ill. 2d at 541 (“[W]ithout a showing to the contrary, state administrators are assumed to be individuals of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.” (Internal qu | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Alcantar v. Peoples Gas Light and Coke Co.
green
2 sentences2009Williams responded in relevant part by citing In re Estate of Hoellen, 367 Ill.App.3d 240 , 305 Ill.Dec. 182 , 854 N.E.2d 774 (2006), Alcantar v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 288 Ill.App.3d 644 , 224 Ill.Dec. 372 , 681 N.E.2d 993 (1997), and People v. Damnitz, 269 Ill.App.3d 51 , 206 Ill.Dec. 460 , 645 N.E.2d 465 (1994), for the proposition that a motion for substitution of judge for cause must make a threshold showing of prejudice to warrant transfer to another judge for hearing. 2009Williams responded in relevant part by citing In re Estate of Hoellen, 367 Ill.App.3d 240 , 305 Ill.Dec. 182 , 854 N.E.2d 774 (2006), Alcantar v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 288 Ill.App.3d 644 , 224 Ill.Dec. 372 , 681 N.E.2d 993 (1997), and People v. Damnitz, 269 Ill.App.3d 51 , 206 Ill.Dec. 460 , 645 N.E.2d 465 (1994), for the proposition that a motion for substitution of judge for cause must make a threshold showing of prejudice to warrant transfer to another judge for hearing. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| People v. Damnitz green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| In Re Estate of Hoellen green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| People v. Colon neutral | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Westby v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Easter House v. Department of Children & Family Services green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| The People v. Dennis green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Andrew Peter Yiannopoulos v. Robert H. Robinson, District Director of Immigration, U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Seets green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Mathews v. Eldridge green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Stanley M. Pariser, M.D. v. Christian Health Care Systems, Inc. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Hortonville Joint School District No. 1 v. Hortonville Education Ass'n green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Grissom v. Board of Education green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Head-On Collision Line, Inc. v. Kirk green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Chambers v. Industrial Commission green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Interstate Contractors v. Industrial Commission green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Piotrowski v. State Police Merit Board green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Presbyterian Church of Carlyle v. St. Louis Union Trust Co. green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| American Home Assurance Co. v. Northwest Industries, Inc. green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Marut v. Costello green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Anderson v. City of Wheaton green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Rosewood Corp. v. Transamerica Insurance green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Gilliland v. Board of Education red | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Ellis v. Illinois Commerce Commission green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| The People v. Belcastro green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| People v. Jashunsky green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Fish v. McGann green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| People v. Bickham green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Rutledge v. Department of Registration & Education green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| State Ex Rel. Conley v. Parks neutral | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.