fair and impartial hearing in California

2018Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 442 ] ( Pour Le Bebe ) concluded that '[i]f the Legislature intended to permit an arbitration award to be vacated whenever the prevailing party engages in tactics that might in any way seem unfair, it would not have used the specific examples of fraud and corruption to describe the type of "undue means" it had in mind.' [Citation.] The Pour Le Bebe court noted that the California Law Revision Commission stated in 1960 that ' "[i]t has been held that any conduct which amounts to fraud or which deprives either party of a fair and impartial hearing

2018Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 442 ] ( Pour Le Bebe ) concluded that '[i]f the Legislature intended to permit an arbitration award to be vacated whenever the prevailing party engages in tactics that might in any way seem unfair, it would not have used the specific examples of fraud and corruption to describe the type of "undue means" it had in mind.' [Citation.] The Pour Le Bebe court noted that the California Law Revision Commission stated in 1960 that ' "[i]t has been held that any conduct which amounts to fraud or which deprives either party of a fair and impartial hearing

2024The Hardimans first contend the appraisal–arbitration award must be vacated pursuant to section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(1) because it was procured by Woodlands through “ ‘corruption, fraud or other undue means.’ ” For purposes of section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(1), “fraud” means “extrinsic fraud which denies a party a fair hearing . . . .” (Comerica Bank v. Howsam (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 790, 825 (Comerica Bank).) Similarly, while the standard for “undue means” has not been clearly articulated, “cases suggest the term refers to unfair conduct that ‘ “ ‘deprives either party of a fair and impart

2023Section 1286.2, subdivision (a), requires a court to vacate an arbitration award procured by fraud “perpetrated by either the arbitrator or a party involved.” (Pacific Crown Distributors v. Brotherhood of Teamsters (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1138, 1146-1147 .) “Not every incidence of fraud will be allowed a remedy; vacation of an award will lie only for occurrences of ‘extrinsic’ fraud and not for ‘intrinsic’ fraud’. ‘Extrinsic’ fraud is that conduct which ‘results in depriving either of the parties of a fair and impartial hearing to their substantial prejudice.’” (Id. at p. 1147, fn. omitted; acco

2008The Bockover court likened that process to another case holding that “ ‘participation in a decision by a board member who has read and considered the evidence, or a transcript thereof, even though he was not physically present when the evidence was produced, does not violate the requirements of due process . ..’ ([Cooper v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners (1950) 35 Cal.2d 242 ], 246 [ 217 P.2d 630 ] . . .)” (Bockover v. Perko, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 488 , italics added), and one concluding it was proper to “permitQ an administrative agency, without reading the record, to adopt the proposed

2008The Bockover court likened that process to another case holding that “ ‘participation in a decision by a board member who has read and considered the evidence, or a transcript thereof, even though he was not physically present when the evidence was produced, does not violate the requirements of due process . ..’ ([Cooper v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners (1950) 35 Cal.2d 242 ], 246 [ 217 P.2d 630 ] . . .)” (Bockover v. Perko, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 488 , italics added), and one concluding it was proper to “permitQ an administrative agency, without reading the record, to adopt the proposed

2024The Hardimans first contend the appraisal–arbitration award must be vacated pursuant to section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(1) because it was procured by Woodlands through “ ‘corruption, fraud or other undue means.’ ” For purposes of section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(1), “fraud” means “extrinsic fraud which denies a party a fair hearing . . . .” (Comerica Bank v. Howsam (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 790, 825 (Comerica Bank).) Similarly, while the standard for “undue means” has not been clearly articulated, “cases suggest the term refers to unfair conduct that ‘ “ ‘deprives either party of a fair and impart

2022Though no clear standard has been articulated, cases suggest the term refers to unfair conduct that “‘“deprives either party of a fair and impartial hearing to his substantial prejudice.”’” (Maaso v. Signer (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 362, 371-372 ; Baker Marquart LLP v. Kantor (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 729, 739-741 ; Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess?

2008The Bockover court likened that process to another case holding that “ ‘participation in a decision by a board member who has read and considered the evidence, or a transcript thereof, even though he was not physically present when the evidence was produced, does not violate the requirements of due process . ..’ ([Cooper v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners (1950) 35 Cal.2d 242 ], 246 [ 217 P.2d 630 ] . . .)” (Bockover v. Perko, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 488 , italics added), and one concluding it was proper to “permitQ an administrative agency, without reading the record, to adopt the proposed

2008The Bockover court likened that process to another case holding that “ ‘participation in a decision by a board member who has read and considered the evidence, or a transcript thereof, even though he was not physically present when the evidence was produced, does not violate the requirements of due process . ..’ ([Cooper v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners (1950) 35 Cal.2d 242 ], 246 [ 217 P.2d 630 ] . . .)” (Bockover v. Perko, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 488 , italics added), and one concluding it was proper to “permitQ an administrative agency, without reading the record, to adopt the proposed

1948(Martin v. Board of Supervisors, 135 Cal.App. 96 [ 26 P.2d 843 ] ; Smith v. Foster, 15 F.2d 115 .)” The resolution of revocation in the instant case, adopted without notice or hearing or reception of competent evidence, was inoperative and of no legal force.

1948(Martin v. Board of Supervisors, 135 Cal.App. 96 [ 26 P.2d 843 ] ; Smith v. Foster, 15 F.2d 115 .)” The resolution of revocation in the instant case, adopted without notice or hearing or reception of competent evidence, was inoperative and of no legal force.

2024The Hardimans first contend the appraisal–arbitration award must be vacated pursuant to section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(1) because it was procured by Woodlands through “ ‘corruption, fraud or other undue means.’ ” For purposes of section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(1), “fraud” means “extrinsic fraud which denies a party a fair hearing . . . .” (Comerica Bank v. Howsam (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 790, 825 (Comerica Bank).) Similarly, while the standard for “undue means” has not been clearly articulated, “cases suggest the term refers to unfair conduct that ‘ “ ‘deprives either party of a fair and impart

2021(Mission Imports, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 921, 927, fn. 4 .) We need not determine whether review is only by writ petition, since, as we will discuss, we find no merit in Steinbruner’s contention of trial court error. 14 the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.’ [Citation.]” (Gaines v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1081, 1100 .) According to Steinbruner, Judge Schmal erred in denying her motion for a change of venue transferring this action to Sacramento County Superior Court for two reasons: (1) she cannot obtain a fair and impartial

2016ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE SUSPENSIONS, IN GENERAL California has enacted an implied consent statute providing noncriminal sanctions for an individual’s refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test when arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 8 Section 23612, subdivision (a)(1)(A) provides in part: ‘“A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section

2016ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE SUSPENSIONS, IN GENERAL California has enacted an implied consent statute providing noncriminal sanctions for an individual’s refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test when arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 8 Section 23612, subdivision (a)(1)(A) provides in part: ‘“A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section

2016ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE SUSPENSIONS, IN GENERAL California has enacted an implied consent statute providing noncriminal sanctions for an individual’s refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test when arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 8 Section 23612, subdivision (a)(1)(A) provides in part: ‘“A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section

2016ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE SUSPENSIONS, IN GENERAL California has enacted an implied consent statute providing noncriminal sanctions for an individual’s refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test when arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 8 Section 23612, subdivision (a)(1)(A) provides in part: ‘“A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section

2015(Dills v. Redwoods Associates, Ltd. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 888, 890, fn. 1 ; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [points must be supported by citation to legal authority where possible].) We next reject Davis’s argument that Judge Harbin-Forte “violated Davis[’s] rights to a fair and impartial hearing by failing to recuse herself prior to the trial” based on an alleged conflict of interest.

2005Nares, J., and Irion, J., concurred. 1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified. 2 Because a reversal will usually come too late for a patient who appeals a determination of lack of capacity to consent for ECT, this court has previously noted counsel should request a stay of the lower court’s order at the time of filing the appeal (Conservatorship of Waltz (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 722, 734, fn. 15 [ 227 Cal.Rptr. 436 ] (Waltz); Lillian F. v. Superior Court (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 314, 316-317 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 603 ] (Lillian F.)), or upon the filing

2005Nares, J., and Irion, J., concurred. 1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified. 2 Because a reversal will usually come too late for a patient who appeals a determination of lack of capacity to consent for ECT, this court has previously noted counsel should request a stay of the lower court’s order at the time of filing the appeal (Conservatorship of Waltz (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 722, 734, fn. 15 [ 227 Cal.Rptr. 436 ] (Waltz); Lillian F. v. Superior Court (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 314, 316-317 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 603 ] (Lillian F.)), or upon the filing

2005Nares, J., and Irion, J., concurred. 1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified. 2 Because a reversal will usually come too late for a patient who appeals a determination of lack of capacity to consent for ECT, this court has previously noted counsel should request a stay of the lower court’s order at the time of filing the appeal (Conservatorship of Waltz (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 722, 734, fn. 15 [ 227 Cal.Rptr. 436 ] (Waltz); Lillian F. v. Superior Court (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 314, 316-317 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 603 ] (Lillian F.)), or upon the filing

2005Nares, J., and Irion, J., concurred. 1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified. 2 Because a reversal will usually come too late for a patient who appeals a determination of lack of capacity to consent for ECT, this court has previously noted counsel should request a stay of the lower court’s order at the time of filing the appeal (Conservatorship of Waltz (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 722, 734, fn. 15 [ 227 Cal.Rptr. 436 ] (Waltz); Lillian F. v. Superior Court (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 314, 316-317 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 603 ] (Lillian F.)), or upon the filing

1994(Cf. Estate of Di Grazia (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 681, 684-685 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 621 ], and §§ 170.3, subd. (d), and 170.5, subd. (f).) Background On December 20, 1993, defendant Perkins’s attorney filed a challenge for cause (§§ 170.1, subd. (a)(6), 170.3, subd. (c)(1)) 2 in which he declared under oath that “the Honorable Richard Flier is prejudiced against the interests of my client so that a fair and impartial hearing or trial before said judge cannot be obtained.” The declaration further explained that Mr. Perkins was of African-American descent and that on October 21, 1993, during a plea and

1994(Cf. Estate of Di Grazia (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 681, 684-685 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 621 ], and §§ 170.3, subd. (d), and 170.5, subd. (f).) Background On December 20, 1993, defendant Perkins’s attorney filed a challenge for cause (§§ 170.1, subd. (a)(6), 170.3, subd. (c)(1)) 2 in which he declared under oath that “the Honorable Richard Flier is prejudiced against the interests of my client so that a fair and impartial hearing or trial before said judge cannot be obtained.” The declaration further explained that Mr. Perkins was of African-American descent and that on October 21, 1993, during a plea and

1993(Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com. (1990) 50 Cal.3d 370, 376 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 569 , 787 P.2d 976 ].) 7 Ill ALR contends that the State Board’s action deprived it of a fair and impartial hearing and the opportunity to present evidence for the agency’s consideration.

1993(Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com. (1990) 50 Cal.3d 370, 376 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 569 , 787 P.2d 976 ].) 7 Ill ALR contends that the State Board’s action deprived it of a fair and impartial hearing and the opportunity to present evidence for the agency’s consideration.

1986(Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 633 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 393 ].) “Extrinsic” fraud is that conduct which “results in depriving either of the parties of a fair and impartial hearing to their substantial prejudice.” (Stockwell v. Equitable F. & M.

1986(Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 633 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 393 ].) “Extrinsic” fraud is that conduct which “results in depriving either of the parties of a fair and impartial hearing to their substantial prejudice.” (Stockwell v. Equitable F. & M.

1985(Cf. Caveness v. State Personnel Bd. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 617, 628-629 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 54 ].) Appellant next argues that he was denied a fair and impartial hearing because (1) he was not given adequate notice that he was charged with “theft” of state property, and (2) he was prohibited from cross-examining one of the Department’s investigators regarding “that witness’ motivations and the reasons for his conclusion” that he disbelieved appellant.

1985(Cf. Caveness v. State Personnel Bd. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 617, 628-629 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 54 ].) Appellant next argues that he was denied a fair and impartial hearing because (1) he was not given adequate notice that he was charged with “theft” of state property, and (2) he was prohibited from cross-examining one of the Department’s investigators regarding “that witness’ motivations and the reasons for his conclusion” that he disbelieved appellant.

1978(Briggs v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. 336, 342-345 [ 10 P.2d 1003 ].) California Code of Civil Procedure section 170, subdivision 5 reads in pertinent part: “No justice or judge shall sit or act as such in any action or proceeding: When it is made to appear probable that, by reason of bias or prejudice of such justice or judge a fair and impartial trial cannot be had before him.” Disqualification is required by this section when it appears “probable” by reason of evidence of bias or prejudice a “fair and impartial trial” cannot be had before the challenged judge; or in the context of this procee

1978(Briggs v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. 336, 342-345 [ 10 P.2d 1003 ].) California Code of Civil Procedure section 170, subdivision 5 reads in pertinent part: “No justice or judge shall sit or act as such in any action or proceeding: When it is made to appear probable that, by reason of bias or prejudice of such justice or judge a fair and impartial trial cannot be had before him.” Disqualification is required by this section when it appears “probable” by reason of evidence of bias or prejudice a “fair and impartial trial” cannot be had before the challenged judge; or in the context of this procee

1976In response to an analogous argument previously made by petitioner, however, we determined that although prior conduct cannot establish culpability in a current matter, the local committee and the disciplinary board may consider a petitioner’s past disciplinary record in deciding the appropriate sanctions to be imposed in an instant case. {Schullman v. State Bar, supra, 10 Cal.3d 526, 538 .) As this court has repeatedly stated, habitual disregard by an attorney of his clients’ interests is grounds for disbarment under Business and Professions Code sections 6103 and 6106. {Ridley v. State Bar (

1976In response to an analogous argument previously made by petitioner, however, we determined that although prior conduct cannot establish culpability in a current matter, the local committee and the disciplinary board may consider a petitioner’s past disciplinary record in deciding the appropriate sanctions to be imposed in an instant case. {Schullman v. State Bar, supra, 10 Cal.3d 526, 538 .) As this court has repeatedly stated, habitual disregard by an attorney of his clients’ interests is grounds for disbarment under Business and Professions Code sections 6103 and 6106. {Ridley v. State Bar (