fair and impartial hearing in Pennsylvania

2025Whether the trial court deprived Mother of due process by conducting proceedings marked by cumulative error— including expressing skepticism toward her religious motivations, mischaracterizing standardized test evidence, and openly disagreeing with Pennsylvania’s homeschool statute—and by denying admission pro hac vice to her chosen counsel, thereby infringing her constitutional right to a fair and impartial hearing and to counsel of choice, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, Judicial Inquiry and Review Bd. of Supreme Court of Pennsylvania v. Fink, 532 A.2d 358 (Pa. 1987), Un

2025Whether the trial court deprived Mother of due process by conducting proceedings marked by cumulative error— including expressing skepticism toward her religious motivations, mischaracterizing standardized test evidence, and openly disagreeing with Pennsylvania’s homeschool statute—and by denying admission pro hac vice to her chosen counsel, thereby infringing her constitutional right to a fair and impartial hearing and to counsel of choice, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, Judicial Inquiry and Review Bd. of Supreme Court of Pennsylvania v. Fink, 532 A.2d 358 (Pa. 1987), Un

2020Welfare, 796 A.2d 1020 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002)). “[DHS’s] regulations afford every person receiving medical assistance the right to appeal from a [DHS] action and to have a hearing.” Id. (citing 55 Pa. Code § 275.1 (a)(2)).7 “An appellant has the right to appear in person at the hearing and present evidence on his own behalf.” Id. (citing 55 Pa. Code § 275.3 (a)).8 We concluded that DHS provided Recipient with notice and an opportunity to be heard on the relevant issues and that ALJ Lewis afforded him the right to a fair and impartial hearing on relevant matters when his “father testified, presente

2020Welfare, 796 A.2d 1020 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002)). “[DHS’s] regulations afford every person receiving medical assistance the right to appeal from a [DHS] action and to have a hearing.” Id. (citing 55 Pa. Code § 275.1 (a)(2)).7 “An appellant has the right to appear in person at the hearing and present evidence on his own behalf.” Id. (citing 55 Pa. Code § 275.3 (a)).8 We concluded that DHS provided Recipient with notice and an opportunity to be heard on the relevant issues and that ALJ Lewis afforded him the right to a fair and impartial hearing on relevant matters when his “father testified, presente

2018(Id. ¶¶ 2, 29-32, 36.) He sought “Monetary Relief For The Cruel And Unusuable [sic] Punishment Caused By The Named Defendants.” (Id. ¶ 2.)1 Mr. Caraballo further avers that immunity defenses were not available because Defendants’ actions were not justified by the Department’s policies and because Defendants’ conduct constituted a “Crime, Actual Fraud, Actual Malice, or Willfull [sic] Misconduct.” (Id. ¶¶ 3, 29 (citing Petula v. Mellody, 631 A.2d 762 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993) (addressing governmental immunity under the act commonly referred to as the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. C.S.

2016These are bedrock principles of law that judges are sworn to uphold, In re Griego, 2008-NMSC-020 , 143 N.M. 698, 703-04 , 181 P.3d 690, 695-96 .

2016These are bedrock principles of law that judges are sworn to uphold, In re Griego, 2008-NMSC-020 , 143 N.M. 698, 703-04 , 181 P.3d 690, 695-96 .

2013Gow, 763 A.2d at 531 .

2007Even with the support of these assumptions, however, appellant’s claim must fail because appellant fails to plead how Professor Nelson corrupted The Compass disciplinary procedure “by unfairly biasing the judicial process against the Plaintiff and disrupting the requirement of a fair and impartial hearing.” Id.

2007Appellant argues that Professor Nelson, as part of her employment contract with Allegheny, “failed to follow and/or uphold the college policies and procedures by unfairly biasing the judicial process against the Plaintiff and disrupting the requirement of a fair and impartial hearing.” Id. ¶ 17 For the sake of argument, we will accept appellant’s assertion that she was a third-party beneficiary of any existing employment contract.

1999In City of Philadelphia v. Public Utility Commission, 676 A.2d 1298 (Pa.Cmwlth.), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 546 Pa. 657 , 684 A.2d 558 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1155 , 117 S.Ct. 1334 , 137 L.Ed.2d 494 (1997), we held that the Consent Decree at issue here violated due process rights because, “[b]y entering into the consent decree agreement not to allocate costs to SEPTA, the PUC has prejudged [the matter thereby depriving] those parties of their due process rights to a full and fair hearing.” Id. at 1307, note 16. 11 Even though we agree with the Township that the PUC cannot

1999In City of Philadelphia v. Public Utility Commission, 676 A.2d 1298 (Pa.Cmwlth.), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 546 Pa. 657 , 684 A.2d 558 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1155 , 117 S.Ct. 1334 , 137 L.Ed.2d 494 (1997), we held that the Consent Decree at issue here violated due process rights because, “[b]y entering into the consent decree agreement not to allocate costs to SEPTA, the PUC has prejudged [the matter thereby depriving] those parties of their due process rights to a full and fair hearing.” Id. at 1307, note 16. 11 Even though we agree with the Township that the PUC cannot

1999In City of Philadelphia v. Public Utility Commission, 676 A.2d 1298 (Pa.Cmwlth.), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 546 Pa. 657 , 684 A.2d 558 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1155 , 117 S.Ct. 1334 , 137 L.Ed.2d 494 (1997), we held that the Consent Decree at issue here violated due process rights because, “[b]y entering into the consent decree agreement not to allocate costs to SEPTA, the PUC has prejudged [the matter thereby depriving] those parties of their due process rights to a full and fair hearing.” Id. at 1307, note 16. 11 Even though we agree with the Township that the PUC cannot

1999In City of Philadelphia v. Public Utility Commission, 676 A.2d 1298 (Pa.Cmwlth.), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 546 Pa. 657 , 684 A.2d 558 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1155 , 117 S.Ct. 1334 , 137 L.Ed.2d 494 (1997), we held that the Consent Decree at issue here violated due process rights because, “[b]y entering into the consent decree agreement not to allocate costs to SEPTA, the PUC has prejudged [the matter thereby depriving] those parties of their due process rights to a full and fair hearing.” Id. at 1307, note 16. 11 Even though we agree with the Township that the PUC cannot

1983The school board and then the Secretary of Education (Secretary) sustained the suspension (later converted to termination), but we reversed in Occhipinti v. Board of School Directors of the Old Forge School District, 48 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 56 , 408 A.2d 1189 (1979), since Occhipinti had been denied a fair and impartial hearing. 1 The Secretary subsequently remanded the matter to the school board for a proper hearing on Occhipinti’s dismissal.

1983The school board and then the Secretary of Education (Secretary) sustained the suspension (later converted to termination), but we reversed in Occhipinti v. Board of School Directors of the Old Forge School District, 48 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 56 , 408 A.2d 1189 (1979), since Occhipinti had been denied a fair and impartial hearing. 1 The Secretary subsequently remanded the matter to the school board for a proper hearing on Occhipinti’s dismissal.

1982The Board, while arguing that its decision is supported by substantial evidence, concedes that Claimant did not receive a fair and impartial hearing because she was not given the necessary assistance or advice and submits that a remand of this case for new evi-dentiary hearings is appropriate pursuant to the decision of this Court in Hoffman v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 60 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 108 , 430 A.2d 1036 (1981).

1982The Board, while arguing that its decision is supported by substantial evidence, concedes that Claimant did not receive a fair and impartial hearing because she was not given the necessary assistance or advice and submits that a remand of this case for new evi-dentiary hearings is appropriate pursuant to the decision of this Court in Hoffman v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 60 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 108 , 430 A.2d 1036 (1981).

1981GRC also claims that its due process rights were violated by an impermissible commingling of “advocacy” and adjudicative functions, citing Horn v. Township of Hilltown, 461 Pa. 745 , 337 A.2d 858 (1975).

1981GRC also claims that its due process rights were violated by an impermissible commingling of “advocacy” and adjudicative functions, citing Horn v. Township of Hilltown, 461 Pa. 745 , 337 A.2d 858 (1975).

1972That professional organizations must extend to their members the protections of procedural due process is without question: Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 .

1972Where a voluntary association’s constitution and bylaws give it jurisdiction over an internal dispute, a court will only inquire to see if the organization acted in good faith, affording a fair and impartial hearing in accordance with its constitution and bylaws: Maloney v. United Mine Workers of America, 308 Pa. 251, 257 ; Lodge No. 19, Svete Ime Isusovo v. Svi Sveti, 323 Pa. 292, 294-95 .

1972Where a voluntary association’s constitution and bylaws give it jurisdiction over an internal dispute, a court will only inquire to see if the organization acted in good faith, affording a fair and impartial hearing in accordance with its constitution and bylaws: Maloney v. United Mine Workers of America, 308 Pa. 251, 257 ; Lodge No. 19, Svete Ime Isusovo v. Svi Sveti, 323 Pa. 292, 294-95 .

1970In Josephson v. Planning Board, 151 Conn. 489 , John Denham, a member of the Stamford planning board, participated in a decision to make a change in the master plan which was a prerequisite to reclassification of a fifteen-acre parcel.

1967That case further holds that ‘the state cannot, by issuing only annual licenses, ingeniously thwart these precious rights.’ Quoting Craven v. Bierring, supra [ 222 Iowa 613 , 269 N.W. 801 ], the opinion also states, ‘once an annual license is issued to a dentist “unless he has violated some of the provisions of the statute applicable to his profession, he is entitled to a renewal of his license as a matter of right” ’.

1967That case further holds that ‘the state cannot, by issuing only annual licenses, ingeniously thwart these precious rights.’ Quoting Craven v. Bierring, supra [ 222 Iowa 613 , 269 N.W. 801 ], the opinion also states, ‘once an annual license is issued to a dentist “unless he has violated some of the provisions of the statute applicable to his profession, he is entitled to a renewal of his license as a matter of right” ’.

1967This is a privilege or right, ‘which cannot be denied or abridged in any manner except after due notice and a fair and impartial hearing before an unbiased tribunal.’ Gilchrist v. Bierring, Iowa, 14 N.W. 2d 724, 732 , decided by this court June 6, 1944.

1962In Spruce Hill Township School District v. Bryner, 148 Pa. Superior Ct. 549 , 25 A. 2d 745 , it was contended that the school teacher did not have a fair and impartial hearing because one of the directors had testified that, when the directors voted to bring the charges against the teacher, he was of the opinion that the teacher should be dismissed.

1962In Spruce Hill Township School District v. Bryner, 148 Pa. Superior Ct. 549 , 25 A. 2d 745 , it was contended that the school teacher did not have a fair and impartial hearing because one of the directors had testified that, when the directors voted to bring the charges against the teacher, he was of the opinion that the teacher should be dismissed.

1952Biglow v. Ashe, 348 Pa. 409, 410 , 35 A. 2d 340 , where a relator alleged that he had been deprived of a fair and impartial hearing before the Board.

1952Biglow v. Ashe, 348 Pa. 409, 410 , 35 A. 2d 340 , where a relator alleged that he had been deprived of a fair and impartial hearing before the Board.