written notice requirement (California) · Go Syfert
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written notice requirement in California

11 California opinions name it 2 courts 1964–2024 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (8)

CaseFollowedCited
Associated Truck Parts, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 1991 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2012–2015
2 sentences

2015(Associated Truck Parts, Inc. v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 864, 870 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 76 ].) Insurance Code section 11583 “is primarily designed to encourage early payment of damages without fear of admitting liability. [Citation.] The legislative purpose of the written notice requirement is to prevent an injury victim from being lulled into a false sense of complacency about the need to sue because an advance or partial payment by the defendant or his insurer shows their apparent cooperativeness.” (Doe v. Doe 1, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 1191 .) III.

2015(Associated Truck Parts, Inc. v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 864, 870 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 76 ].) Insurance Code section 11583 “is primarily designed to encourage early payment of damages without fear of admitting liability. [Citation.] The legislative purpose of the written notice requirement is to prevent an injury victim from being lulled into a false sense of complacency about the need to sue because an advance or partial payment by the defendant or his insurer shows their apparent cooperativeness.” (Doe v. Doe 1, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 1191 .) III.

22
Doe v. Doe 1green
calctapp · 2012 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015That notification shall not be required if the recipient is represented by an attorney.” Section 11583 “is primarily designed to encourage early payment of damages without fear of admitting liability. [Citation.] The legislative purpose of the written notice requirement is to prevent an injury victim from being *1326 lulled into a false sense of complacency about the need to sue because an advance or partial payment by the defendant or his insurer shows their apparent cooperativeness. [Citation.]” (Doe v. Doe 1 (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1191 [ 146 Cal.Rptr.3d 215 ].) Appellant contends that

2015That notification shall not be required if the recipient is represented by an attorney.” Section 11583 “is primarily designed to encourage early payment of damages without fear of admitting liability. [Citation.] The legislative purpose of the written notice requirement is to prevent an injury victim from being *1326 lulled into a false sense of complacency about the need to sue because an advance or partial payment by the defendant or his insurer shows their apparent cooperativeness. [Citation.]” (Doe v. Doe 1 (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1191 [ 146 Cal.Rptr.3d 215 ].) Appellant contends that

12
In Re Phillip F.green
calctapp · 2000 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024(See, e.g., In re Phillip F. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 250, 258-259 [actual notice of a continued § 366.26 hearing satisfies due process].) As for mother’s statutory claim, she is correct that the juvenile court’s failure to direct the Agency to send a written notice of the hearing did not fully satisfy the requirements of section 294, subdivision (f)(1).

11
Brown v. Greengreen
cal · 1994 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022(Brown, supra, 8 Cal.4th at 818, fn 1 .) 31 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

11
Reveles v. Toyota by the Baygreen
calctapp · 1997 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015(Cf. Reveles v. Toyota by the Bay (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1154 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 543 ], disapproved on other grounds in Gavaldon v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1246, 1261 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 793 , 90 P.3d 752 ] [plaintiff awarded attorney fees under CLRA and other statutes after evidentiary hearing in which trial court found him entitled to judgment on the merits].) The written notice requirement is intended to forestall litigation, by requiring consumer and merchant to attempt to fix the problem before resorting to the courts.

2015(Cf. Reveles v. Toyota by the Bay (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1154 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 543 ], disapproved on other grounds in Gavaldon v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1246, 1261 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 793 , 90 P.3d 752 ] [plaintiff awarded attorney fees under CLRA and other statutes after evidentiary hearing in which trial court found him entitled to judgment on the merits].) The written notice requirement is intended to forestall litigation, by requiring consumer and merchant to attempt to fix the problem before resorting to the courts.

11
Gavaldon v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.green
cal · 2004 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015(Cf. Reveles v. Toyota by the Bay (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1154 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 543 ], disapproved on other grounds in Gavaldon v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1246, 1261 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 793 , 90 P.3d 752 ] [plaintiff awarded attorney fees under CLRA and other statutes after evidentiary hearing in which trial court found him entitled to judgment on the merits].) The written notice requirement is intended to forestall litigation, by requiring consumer and merchant to attempt to fix the problem before resorting to the courts.

2015(Cf. Reveles v. Toyota by the Bay (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1154 [ 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 543 ], disapproved on other grounds in Gavaldon v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1246, 1261 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 793 , 90 P.3d 752 ] [plaintiff awarded attorney fees under CLRA and other statutes after evidentiary hearing in which trial court found him entitled to judgment on the merits].) The written notice requirement is intended to forestall litigation, by requiring consumer and merchant to attempt to fix the problem before resorting to the courts.

11
Malinski v. Wegman's Nursery & Landscaping, Inc.green
calctapp · 1980 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
2 sentences

2012(Malinski v. Wegman’s Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 282, 290 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 287 ].) The legislative purpose of the written notice requirement is to prevent an injury victim from being lulled into a false sense of complacency about the need to sue because an advance or partial payment by the defendant or his insurer shows their apparent cooperativeness.

2012(Malinski v. Wegman’s Nursery & Landscaping, Inc. (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 282, 290 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 287 ].) The legislative purpose of the written notice requirement is to prevent an injury victim from being lulled into a false sense of complacency about the need to sue because an advance or partial payment by the defendant or his insurer shows their apparent cooperativeness.

11
Marcus v. State Bargreen
cal · 1980 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982
2 sentences

1982(See Marcus v. State Bar (1980) 27 Cal.3d 199, 201 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 121 , 611 P.2d 462 ].) Petitioner does not deny that he failed to send to each of the parties the written notice required by rule 955.

1982(See Marcus v. State Bar (1980) 27 Cal.3d 199, 201 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 121 , 611 P.2d 462 ].) Petitioner does not deny that he failed to send to each of the parties the written notice required by rule 955.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
People v. Felix green
calctapp · 1986
1 sentence

2014(Vickers, at p. 458; People v. Felix (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1168, 1172 .) Here, the written notice of violation adequately advised Bailey that it was his conduct “as set forth in the following attached police reports” which was alleged as the basis for the violation.

12014–2014
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. green
scotus · 1975
1 sentence

2013Pointing out it does not include a written notice requirement to creditors of an estate, they contend the statute violates due process by "unfairly eliminat[ing] legitimate and valuable property rights without giving the Creditor the right and 21 opportunity to be heard." They also argue application of section 366.2 against creditors so as to eliminate a creditors' claim "constitutes a 'taking' of property in the constitutional sense, since the Creditor loses his otherwise enforceable right without any prior notice." Plaintiffs assert that the controlling authority is the United State Supreme

12013–2013
Minsky v. City of Los Angeles green
cal · 1974
1 sentence

2008An Action for Specific Recovery of Money Held by a Public Entity as a Bailee Is Not Subject to the Government Claims Act Section 905 states that the claim presentation requirement applies to “all claims for money or damages against local public entities,” except as specified in the statute. 3 The California Supreme Court in Minsky, supra, 11 Cal.3d 113 , held that an action for specific recovery of money taken from an arrestee and held by the city as a bailee was not a “claim[] for money or damages” within the meaning of the statute.

12008–2008
Durbin v. State Bar green
cal · 1979
2 sentences

1982He seeks to excuse his failure on the grounds, first, that he “substantially” complied with the rule and that actual compliance is not necessary under the authority of Durbin v. State Bar (1979) 23 Cal.3d 461 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 749 , 590 P.2d 876 ].

1982He seeks to excuse his failure on the grounds, first, that he “substantially” complied with the rule and that actual compliance is not necessary under the authority of Durbin v. State Bar (1979) 23 Cal.3d 461 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 749 , 590 P.2d 876 ].

11982–1982
Griffith Co. v. San Diego College for Women green
cal · 1955
2 sentences

1964As all of the evidence in support of the motions to vacate the judgment consisted of written declarations, the applicable rule on appeal is that those affidavits favoring the contention of the prevailing party establish not only the facts stated therein but also facts which reasonably may be inferred therefrom (Waco-Porter Corp. v. Superior Court, 211 Cal.App.2d 559 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 371 ] ; Griffith Co. v. San Diego Col. for Women, 45 Cal.2d 501 [ 289 P.2d 476 , 47 A.L.R.2d 1349 ]).

1964As all of the evidence in support of the motions to vacate the judgment consisted of written declarations, the applicable rule on appeal is that those affidavits favoring the contention of the prevailing party establish not only the facts stated therein but also facts which reasonably may be inferred therefrom (Waco-Porter Corp. v. Superior Court, 211 Cal.App.2d 559 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 371 ] ; Griffith Co. v. San Diego Col. for Women, 45 Cal.2d 501 [ 289 P.2d 476 , 47 A.L.R.2d 1349 ]).

11964–1964
Waco-Porter Corp. v. Superior Court green
calctapp · 1963
2 sentences

1964As all of the evidence in support of the motions to vacate the judgment consisted of written declarations, the applicable rule on appeal is that those affidavits favoring the contention of the prevailing party establish not only the facts stated therein but also facts which reasonably may be inferred therefrom (Waco-Porter Corp. v. Superior Court, 211 Cal.App.2d 559 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 371 ] ; Griffith Co. v. San Diego Col. for Women, 45 Cal.2d 501 [ 289 P.2d 476 , 47 A.L.R.2d 1349 ]).

1964As all of the evidence in support of the motions to vacate the judgment consisted of written declarations, the applicable rule on appeal is that those affidavits favoring the contention of the prevailing party establish not only the facts stated therein but also facts which reasonably may be inferred therefrom (Waco-Porter Corp. v. Superior Court, 211 Cal.App.2d 559 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 371 ] ; Griffith Co. v. San Diego Col. for Women, 45 Cal.2d 501 [ 289 P.2d 476 , 47 A.L.R.2d 1349 ]).

11964–1964

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Insurance Code § 11583 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

NY 525 (1860–2026) CT 41 (1930–2024) TX 40 (1949–2024) AL 32 (1980–2024) IL 29 (1910–2025) FL 24 (1966–2018) OK 21 (1909–2022) PA 16 (1980–2025) GA 14 (1921–2022) NC 12 (1916–2024) HI 11 (1973–2023) ND 11 (1980–2009) MD 11 (1946–2007) MA 11 (1947–2025) MN 11 (1915–2016) CA 11 (1964–2024) UT 10 (1983–2024) OH 10 (1991–2025) TN 9 (1986–2021) VA 9 (1976–2016) SD 7 (1995–2018) MO 7 (1913–2022) NM 7 (1980–2019) LA 7 (1934–2021) MI 6 (1974–2025) CO 6 (1942–2015) KS 6 (1899–2014) ME 6 (1924–2013) NJ 6 (1962–2020) MS 5 (1996–2012) DC 5 (1979–2008) IA 5 (1916–2025) IN 5 (1982–2016) SC 5 (2001–2025) RI 4 (1999–2012) WI 4 (1981–2021) NE 4 (1989–2006) VT 3 (1986–2015) AR 3 (2011–2025) NV 3 (1975–2013) AK 2 (1984–1997) WA 2 (1995–1998) KY 2 (2020–2021) MT 2 (1975–1977)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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