written notice claim in Connecticut

2014Section 31-294c (a) provides in pertinent part: ‘‘No proceedings for compensation under the provisions of this chapter shall be maintained unless a written notice of claim for compensation is given within one year from the date of the accident or within three years from the first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease, as the case may be, which caused the personal injury, provided, if death has resulted within two years from the date of the accident or first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease, a dependent or dependents, or the legal representative of the dec

2014Section 31-294c (a) provides in pertinent part: ‘‘No proceedings for compensation under the provisions of this chapter shall be maintained unless a written notice of claim for compensation is given within one year from the date of the accident or within three years from the first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease, as the case may be, which caused the personal injury, provided, if death has resulted within two years from the date of the accident or first manifestation of a symptom of the occupational disease, a dependent or dependents, or the legal representative of the dec

2009Turning first to that text, § 31-294c (b) provides in relevant part that “an employer who fails to contest liability for an alleged injury or death on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving a written notice of claim and who fails to commence payment for the alleged injury or death on or before such twenty-eighth day, shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted the compensability of the alleged injury or death.” We have referred to this statute, or its predecessor, as setting forth a “conclusive presumption.” Harpaz v. Laid-law Transit, Inc., supra, 286 Conn. 105 ; Del Toro v. Stam

2009Turning first to that text, § 31-294c (b) provides in relevant part that “an employer who fails to contest liability for an alleged injury or death on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving a written notice of claim and who fails to commence payment for the alleged injury or death on or before such twenty-eighth day, shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted the compensability of the alleged injury or death.” We have referred to this statute, or its predecessor, as setting forth a “conclusive presumption.” Harpaz v. Laid-law Transit, Inc., supra, 286 Conn. 105 ; Del Toro v. Stam

1956Walsh v. A. Waldron & Sons, 112 Conn. 579, 582 , 153 A. 298 . “[T]he requirement of a written notice of claim for compensation is of the essence of the employee’s right under the Act and a failure to comply with it cannot be waived or avoided upon equitable grounds.” Rehtarchik v. Hoyt-Messinger Corporation, 118 Conn. 315, 319 , 172 A. 353 .

1956Walsh v. A. Waldron & Sons, 112 Conn. 579, 582 , 153 A. 298 . “[T]he requirement of a written notice of claim for compensation is of the essence of the employee’s right under the Act and a failure to comply with it cannot be waived or avoided upon equitable grounds.” Rehtarchik v. Hoyt-Messinger Corporation, 118 Conn. 315, 319 , 172 A. 353 .

2022Section 31-294c (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘No proceedings for compensation under the provisions of this chapter shall be maintained unless a written notice of claim for compensation is given within one year from the date of the accident . . . .’’ Our Supreme Court has explained that ‘‘[f]iling a notice of claim or . . . satisfaction of one of the . . . exceptions [contained in § 31-294c (c)] is a prerequisite that conditions whether the [commission] has subject matter jurisdiction under the [act].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Veilleux v. Complete Interior Systems, Inc., 296 Conn

2022Section 31-294c (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘No proceedings for compensation under the provisions of this chapter shall be maintained unless a written notice of claim for compensation is given within one year from the date of the accident . . . .’’ Our Supreme Court has explained that ‘‘[f]iling a notice of claim or . . . satisfaction of one of the . . . exceptions [contained in § 31-294c (c)] is a prerequisite that conditions whether the [commission] has subject matter jurisdiction under the [act].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Veilleux v. Complete Interior Systems, Inc., 296 Conn

2016Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, an employer who fails to contest liability for an alleged injury or death on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving a written notice of claim and who fails to commence payment for the alleged injury or death on or before such twenty-eighth day, shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted the compensability of the alleged injury or death. " (Emphasis added.) Plainly stated, an employer is required either to file a form 43 or to commence payment of the alleged injury to an employee within twenty-eight days of receiving written notic

2016Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, an employer who fails to contest liability for an alleged injury or death on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving a written notice of claim and who fails to commence payment for the alleged injury or death on or before such twenty-eighth day, shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted the compensability of the alleged injury or death. " (Emphasis added.) Plainly stated, an employer is required either to file a form 43 or to commence payment of the alleged injury to an employee within twenty-eight days of receiving written notic

2016Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, an employer who fails to contest liability for an alleged injury or death on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving a written notice of claim and who fails to commence payment for the alleged injury or death on or before such twenty-eighth day, shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted the compensability of the alleged injury or death. " (Emphasis added.) Plainly stated, an employer is required either to file a form 43 or to commence payment of the alleged injury to an employee within twenty-eight days of receiving written notic

2016Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, an employer who fails to contest liability for an alleged injury or death on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving a written notice of claim and who fails to commence payment for the alleged injury or death on or before such twenty-eighth day, shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted the compensability of the alleged injury or death. " (Emphasis added.) Plainly stated, an employer is required either to file a form 43 or to commence payment of the alleged injury to an employee within twenty-eight days of receiving written notic

1934Farmer v. Bieber-Goodman Corporation, 118 Conn. 299 , 172 Atl. 95 .

1934Farmer v. Bieber-Goodman Corporation, 118 Conn. 299 , 172 Atl. 95 .

2024This is particularly so given that the written notice requirement is part and parcel of the legislature’s apparent intention to provide maximum notice to the public of the proceedings of minor parties that might affect the election ballot, rendering actual notice to the town clerk ultimately irrelevant.15 See Tim- ber Trails Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 222 Conn. 374 , 378–80, 610 A.2d 617 (1992) (failure to file copy of text of proposed zoning amendment with town clerk, as required by General Statutes § 8-3 (a), was not excused by newspaper publication of amend- ment or fact that ob

2024This is particularly so given that the written notice requirement is part and parcel of the legislature’s apparent intention to provide maximum notice to the public of the proceedings of minor parties that might affect the election ballot, rendering actual notice to the town clerk ultimately irrelevant.15 See Tim- ber Trails Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 222 Conn. 374 , 378–80, 610 A.2d 617 (1992) (failure to file copy of text of proposed zoning amendment with town clerk, as required by General Statutes § 8-3 (a), was not excused by newspaper publication of amend- ment or fact that ob

2022Co., 275 Conn. 408, 418 , 880 A.2d 882 (2005). 11 Pursuant to § 31-294c (a), the language of which was in effect when the plaintiff mailed the form 30C to the defendant on December 12, 2017, a written notice of claim mailed by an employee not employed by the state or a municipality to an employer must be sent by certified mail.

2022Co., 275 Conn. 408, 418 , 880 A.2d 882 (2005). 11 Pursuant to § 31-294c (a), the language of which was in effect when the plaintiff mailed the form 30C to the defendant on December 12, 2017, a written notice of claim mailed by an employee not employed by the state or a municipality to an employer must be sent by certified mail.

2019Finally, the fifth sentence sets forth the consequences to an employer who neither timely pays nor timely contests liability: "Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, an employer who fails to contest liability for an alleged injury or death on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving a written notice of claim and who fails to commence payment for the alleged injury or death on or before such twenty-eighth day, shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted the compensability of the alleged injury or death." ' " (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted.) Dubrosky v. Boehringer Ing

2019Finally, the fifth sentence sets forth the consequences to an employer who neither timely pays nor timely contests liability: "Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, an employer who fails to contest liability for an alleged injury or death on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving a written notice of claim and who fails to commence payment for the alleged injury or death on or before such twenty-eighth day, shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted the compensability of the alleged injury or death." ' " (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted.) Dubrosky v. Boehringer Ing

2019"Although a claimant need not prove that his heart disease is causally connected to his employment in order to qualify for benefits pursuant to § 7-433c, he must prove that he satisfies the jurisdictional threshold set forth in § 31-294c (a), which requires that a claimant provide his employer a written notice of claim for compensation ... within one year from the date of the accident ... which caused the personal injury ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carter v. Clinton , 304 Conn. 571 , 578-79, 41 A.3d 296 (2012). *734 "[C]ompliance with [ § 31-294c ] is essential to maintaining a c

2019"Although a claimant need not prove that his heart disease is causally connected to his employment in order to qualify for benefits pursuant to § 7-433c, he must prove that he satisfies the jurisdictional threshold set forth in § 31-294c (a), which requires that a claimant provide his employer a written notice of claim for compensation ... within one year from the date of the accident ... which caused the personal injury ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carter v. Clinton , 304 Conn. 571 , 578-79, 41 A.3d 296 (2012). *734 "[C]ompliance with [ § 31-294c ] is essential to maintaining a c

2016See, e.g., Izikson v. Protein Science Corp., 156 Conn. App. 700 , 708, 115 A.3d 55 (2015); Wikander v. Asbury Automotive Group/David McDavid Acura, 137 Conn. App. 665, 670 , 50 A.3d 901 (2012).

2016See, e.g., Izikson v. Protein Science Corp., 156 Conn. App. 700 , 708, 115 A.3d 55 (2015); Wikander v. Asbury Automotive Group/David McDavid Acura, 137 Conn. App. 665, 670 , 50 A.3d 901 (2012).

2015The commissioner shall forthwith, upon the filing of the motion and of the transcript of the evidence, give notice to the adverse party or parties.’’ 7 General Statutes § 31-294c (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Whenever liabil- ity to pay compensation is contested by the employer, he shall file with the commissioner, on or before the twenty-eighth day after he has received a written notice of claim, a notice in accord with a form prescribed by the chairman of the Workers’ Compensation Commission stating that the right to compensation is contested, the name of the claimant, the name of the emp

2015The commissioner shall forthwith, upon the filing of the motion and of the transcript of the evidence, give notice to the adverse party or parties.’’ 7 General Statutes § 31-294c (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Whenever liabil- ity to pay compensation is contested by the employer, he shall file with the commissioner, on or before the twenty-eighth day after he has received a written notice of claim, a notice in accord with a form prescribed by the chairman of the Workers’ Compensation Commission stating that the right to compensation is contested, the name of the claimant, the name of the emp

2015The benefits provided by this section shall be in lieu of any other benefits which such policeman or fireman or his dependents may be entitled to receive from his municipal employer under the provisions of chapter 568 or the municipal or state retirement system under which he is covered, except as provided by this section, as a result of any condition or impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart disease resulting in his death or his temporary or permanent, total or partial disability. . . .’’ 7 General Statutes § 31-294c (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘No proceedings for compensati

2015The benefits provided by this section shall be in lieu of any other benefits which such policeman or fireman or his dependents may be entitled to receive from his municipal employer under the provisions of chapter 568 or the municipal or state retirement system under which he is covered, except as provided by this section, as a result of any condition or impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart disease resulting in his death or his temporary or permanent, total or partial disability. . . .’’ 7 General Statutes § 31-294c (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘No proceedings for compensati

2012In construing predecessor statutes to § 31-294c, the Superior Court concluded that “[t]he fact that a written notice of claim was not required to fulfill the requirements of [General Statutes (Rev. to 1972)] § 31-294 [the predecessor to § 31-294c] did not relieve the employer from the burdens imposed by the provisions of [General Statutes (Rev. to 1972)] § 31-297 (b) [the predecessor to § 31-294c [b]) after a written notice of claim was furnished.” DeLeon v. Jacob Bros., Inc., 38 Conn. Sup. 331 , 337, 446 A.2d 831 (1981).

2012In construing predecessor statutes to § 31-294c, the Superior Court concluded that “[t]he fact that a written notice of claim was not required to fulfill the requirements of [General Statutes (Rev. to 1972)] § 31-294 [the predecessor to § 31-294c] did not relieve the employer from the burdens imposed by the provisions of [General Statutes (Rev. to 1972)] § 31-297 (b) [the predecessor to § 31-294c [b]) after a written notice of claim was furnished.” DeLeon v. Jacob Bros., Inc., 38 Conn. Sup. 331 , 337, 446 A.2d 831 (1981).

2010Co., supra, 70 Conn. App. 726 , after a motion for reconsideration was granted. 8 The plaintiff in Murphy also had failed to comply with a provision providing: “If claim is made or suit is brought against the insured, the insured shall immediately forward to the company every demand, notice, summons, or other process received by him or his representative.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Murphy, supra, 206 Conn. 411 . 9 We note that the plaintiffs proffered no evidence that Shannon had any actual or apparent authority to waive the written notice requirement.

2010Therefore, even though it is undisputed that the plaintiff was required to file his claim within one year of the time of injury, it is not clear whether hypertension should be treated as a traditional accidental injury or as a repetitive trauma injury and, in either case, what constitutes the date of injury for purposes of triggering the commencement of that one year period. [10] Because the language of § 31-294c provides no guidance as to when the one year limitation period begins to run on a claim brought pursuant to § 7-433c, to answer that question, we "apply our well established process o

2010Therefore, even though it is undisputed that the plaintiff was required to file his claim within one year of the time of injury, it is not clear whether hypertension should be treated as a traditional accidental injury or as a repetitive trauma injury and, in either case, what constitutes the date of injury for purposes of triggering the commencement of that one year period. [10] Because the language of § 31-294c provides no guidance as to when the one year limitation period begins to run on a claim brought pursuant to § 7-433c, to answer that question, we "apply our well established process o

2009Turning first to that text, § 31-294c (b) provides in relevant part that “an employer who fails to contest liability for an alleged injury or death on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving a written notice of claim and who fails to commence payment for the alleged injury or death on or before such twenty-eighth day, shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted the compensability of the alleged injury or death.” We have referred to this statute, or its predecessor, as setting forth a “conclusive presumption.” Harpaz v. Laid-law Transit, Inc., supra, 286 Conn. 105 ; Del Toro v. Stam

2009Turning first to that text, § 31-294c (b) provides in relevant part that “an employer who fails to contest liability for an alleged injury or death on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving a written notice of claim and who fails to commence payment for the alleged injury or death on or before such twenty-eighth day, shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted the compensability of the alleged injury or death.” We have referred to this statute, or its predecessor, as setting forth a “conclusive presumption.” Harpaz v. Laid-law Transit, Inc., supra, 286 Conn. 105 ; Del Toro v. Stam

2009Turning first to that text, § 31-294c (b) provides in relevant part that “an employer who fails to contest liability for an alleged injury or death on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving a written notice of claim and who fails to commence payment for the alleged injury or death on or before such twenty-eighth day, shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted the compensability of the alleged injury or death.” We have referred to this statute, or its predecessor, as setting forth a “conclusive presumption.” Harpaz v. Laid-law Transit, Inc., supra, 286 Conn. 105 ; Del Toro v. Stam

2009Turning first to that text, § 31-294c (b) provides in relevant part that “an employer who fails to contest liability for an alleged injury or death on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving a written notice of claim and who fails to commence payment for the alleged injury or death on or before such twenty-eighth day, shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted the compensability of the alleged injury or death.” We have referred to this statute, or its predecessor, as setting forth a “conclusive presumption.” Harpaz v. Laid-law Transit, Inc., supra, 286 Conn. 105 ; Del Toro v. Stam

2003Although we repeatedly have observed that our workers’ compensation “legislation is remedial in nature . . . and . . . should be broadly construed to accomplish its humanitarian purpose”; (citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted) Dubois v. General Dynamics Corp., 222 Conn. 62, 67 , 607 A.2d 431 (1992); the written notice required under § 31-294c (a) nevertheless must “reasonably inform the employer that the employee [or dependent] is claiming or proposes to claim compensation under the [Workers’ Compensation] Act . . . .” Rehtarchik v. Hoyt-Messinger Corp., 118 Conn. 315, 317 , 172

2003Although we repeatedly have observed that our workers’ compensation “legislation is remedial in nature . . . and . . . should be broadly construed to accomplish its humanitarian purpose”; (citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted) Dubois v. General Dynamics Corp., 222 Conn. 62, 67 , 607 A.2d 431 (1992); the written notice required under § 31-294c (a) nevertheless must “reasonably inform the employer that the employee [or dependent] is claiming or proposes to claim compensation under the [Workers’ Compensation] Act . . . .” Rehtarchik v. Hoyt-Messinger Corp., 118 Conn. 315, 317 , 172