written notice requirement in Florida

2000See Jenkins, 714 So.2d at 563 ; Baiton v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 661 So.2d 313 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). [2] In contrast, the Second District has concluded that the written notice requirement applies to all claims brought under the Whistle-Blower Act, whether based on subsection 448.102(1), (2), or (3).

1998Similarly, if the employee brings a lawsuit against the employer alleging a violation of subsection 448.102(1), the employee may not recover `if he failed to notify the employer about the illegal activity, policy, or practice as required by s. 448.102(1).' Id. § 448.103(1)(c) [emphasis in original] [footnote omitted]. *562 This written notice requirement only applies to subsection 448.102(1).

2004Therefore, "it follows that any manner of submitting a written notice of the claim to the agency involved that sufficiently describes or identifies the occurrence so that the agency may investigate it, satisfies the statute." Franklin v. Palm Beach County, 534 So.2d 828, 830 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Smart v. Monge, 667 So.2d 957 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

2004All notices of hearing shall specify each motion or other matter to be heard The trial court relied on Gulf Landings Ass'n v. Hershberger, 845 So.2d 344 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), and Diaz v. Bowen, 832 So.2d 200 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), in concluding that parties must attach supporting affidavits to a motion for fees and costs, reasoning that without supporting affidavits in support of the motion, the other party would be unable to prepare for hearing.

2004All notices of hearing shall specify each motion or other matter to be heard The trial court relied on Gulf Landings Ass'n v. Hershberger, 845 So.2d 344 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), and Diaz v. Bowen, 832 So.2d 200 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), in concluding that parties must attach supporting affidavits to a motion for fees and costs, reasoning that without supporting affidavits in support of the motion, the other party would be unable to prepare for hearing.

2000See McEowen v. Jones Chem., Inc., 745 So.2d 991 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Judd v. Englewood Community Hosp., 739 So.2d 627 (Fla. 2d DCA *564 1999); Potomac Systems, 683 So.2d at 182 .

1999A *503 claim for actionable fraud requires proof of "an intentional material misrepresentation upon which the other party relies to his detriment." Lance v. Wade, 457 So.2d 1008 (Fla.1984).

1992Massey v. State, 589 So.2d 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).

1983The district court certified the following question: May a plaintiff maintain an action to recover damages from a state agency or subdivision, pursuant to section 768.28(6), Florida Statutes (1977), if he notified the appropriate agency but failed to present a written notice of claim to the Department of Insurance, which has no interest or role in the proceedings other than to report claims to the legislature, and no prejudice resulted? 419 So.2d at 809 .

1980Thames v. Melvin, 365 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).

1979Since the defendant likewise did not conclusively establish either (a) that the written notice requirement had been waived, Ramagli Realty Co. v. Speier, 110 So.2d 71 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959), cf. Thompson v. Gross, 353 So.2d 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); (b) that it had not in fact breached the agreement by interfering with the plaintiff’s ability to perform, Gulf American Land Corp. v. Wain, 166 So.2d 763 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964); or (c) that the plaintiff had sustained no damages as a result of the alleged breach, we conclude that summary judgment was inappropriately entered, Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40 (F

1979In Hutchins v. Mills, 363 So.2d 818 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied 368 So.2d 1368 (Fla. 1979), that court upheld the provisions of questioned statute stating: F.S. 768.28(6) is analogous to Section 95.241, Florida Statutes 1973, now revised, which required a written notice of claim to be given a municipality within ninety days of the occurrence or discovery *76 of certain injuries as a prerequisite to the maintenance of an action against the municipality for those injuries.

1979Since the defendant likewise did not conclusively establish either (a) that the written notice requirement had been waived, Ramagli Realty Co. v. Speier, 110 So.2d 71 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959), cf. Thompson v. Gross, 353 So.2d 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); (b) that it had not in fact breached the agreement by interfering with the plaintiff’s ability to perform, Gulf American Land Corp. v. Wain, 166 So.2d 763 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964); or (c) that the plaintiff had sustained no damages as a result of the alleged breach, we conclude that summary judgment was inappropriately entered, Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40 (F

1979Since the defendant likewise did not conclusively establish either (a) that the written notice requirement had been waived, Ramagli Realty Co. v. Speier, 110 So.2d 71 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959), cf. Thompson v. Gross, 353 So.2d 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); (b) that it had not in fact breached the agreement by interfering with the plaintiff’s ability to perform, Gulf American Land Corp. v. Wain, 166 So.2d 763 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964); or (c) that the plaintiff had sustained no damages as a result of the alleged breach, we conclude that summary judgment was inappropriately entered, Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40 (F

1979Since the defendant likewise did not conclusively establish either (a) that the written notice requirement had been waived, Ramagli Realty Co. v. Speier, 110 So.2d 71 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959), cf. Thompson v. Gross, 353 So.2d 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); (b) that it had not in fact breached the agreement by interfering with the plaintiff’s ability to perform, Gulf American Land Corp. v. Wain, 166 So.2d 763 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964); or (c) that the plaintiff had sustained no damages as a result of the alleged breach, we conclude that summary judgment was inappropriately entered, Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40 (F

1978In Rabinowitz v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 178 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1965), the Supreme Court held that a municipality may waive or be estopped to assert the benefit of claim notice statutes such as Section 95.241, Florida Statutes 1973.