burden of rebutting presumption in Delaware

2022Control Bd., 492 A.2d 1242, 1246 (Del. 1985). 15 Hoover v. State, 958 A.2d 816, 821 (Del. 2008). 16 Sierra v. Dep’t of Servs. for Child., Youth & their Families, 238 A.3d 142 , 151, 155–56 (Del. 2020). 17 Hoover, 958 A.2d at 821 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). 18 Monceaux v. State, 51 A.3d 474, 477 (Del. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 5 Delaware courts practice constitutional avoidance.

2022Control Bd., 492 A.2d 1242, 1246 (Del. 1985). 15 Hoover v. State, 958 A.2d 816, 821 (Del. 2008). 16 Sierra v. Dep’t of Servs. for Child., Youth & their Families, 238 A.3d 142 , 151, 155–56 (Del. 2020). 17 Hoover, 958 A.2d at 821 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). 18 Monceaux v. State, 51 A.3d 474, 477 (Del. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 5 Delaware courts practice constitutional avoidance.

2022See also ASARCO Inc., 490 U.S. at 616 (the basic inquiry for Article III standing is whether the party “alleges personal injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”). 156 But see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2 (“Although ‘imminence’ is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond the breaking point . . .”). 157 This conclusion is dependent upon Higgin’s status as an active candidate in the affected election and renders consideration of his and the remaining Plaintiffs’ other standing arguments based on their

2022See also ASARCO Inc., 490 U.S. at 616 (the basic inquiry for Article III standing is whether the party “alleges personal injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”). 156 But see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2 (“Although ‘imminence’ is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond the breaking point . . .”). 157 This conclusion is dependent upon Higgin’s status as an active candidate in the affected election and renders consideration of his and the remaining Plaintiffs’ other standing arguments based on their

2022See generally supra note 1. 4 ANALYSIS The principles of statutory interpretation govern the extent to which the Court may resolve Defendant’s constitutional challenge.11 “The goal of statutory construction is to determine and give effect to legislative intent.”12 The Court construes a statute according to its plain meaning.13 “If the statute . . . is unambiguous,” then “the literal meaning of [its] words” controls.14 “Enactments of the Delaware General Assembly are presumed to be constitutional.”15 The challenger bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by “clear and convincing evidence

2022See generally supra note 1. 4 ANALYSIS The principles of statutory interpretation govern the extent to which the Court may resolve Defendant’s constitutional challenge.11 “The goal of statutory construction is to determine and give effect to legislative intent.”12 The Court construes a statute according to its plain meaning.13 “If the statute . . . is unambiguous,” then “the literal meaning of [its] words” controls.14 “Enactments of the Delaware General Assembly are presumed to be constitutional.”15 The challenger bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by “clear and convincing evidence

2022See generally supra note 1. 4 ANALYSIS The principles of statutory interpretation govern the extent to which the Court may resolve Defendant’s constitutional challenge.11 “The goal of statutory construction is to determine and give effect to legislative intent.”12 The Court construes a statute according to its plain meaning.13 “If the statute . . . is unambiguous,” then “the literal meaning of [its] words” controls.14 “Enactments of the Delaware General Assembly are presumed to be constitutional.”15 The challenger bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by “clear and convincing evidence

2022Control Bd., 492 A.2d 1242, 1246 (Del. 1985). 15 Hoover v. State, 958 A.2d 816, 821 (Del. 2008). 16 Sierra v. Dep’t of Servs. for Child., Youth & their Families, 238 A.3d 142 , 151, 155–56 (Del. 2020). 17 Hoover, 958 A.2d at 821 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). 18 Monceaux v. State, 51 A.3d 474, 477 (Del. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 5 Delaware courts practice constitutional avoidance.

2022Control Bd., 492 A.2d 1242, 1246 (Del. 1985). 15 Hoover v. State, 958 A.2d 816, 821 (Del. 2008). 16 Sierra v. Dep’t of Servs. for Child., Youth & their Families, 238 A.3d 142 , 151, 155–56 (Del. 2020). 17 Hoover, 958 A.2d at 821 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). 18 Monceaux v. State, 51 A.3d 474, 477 (Del. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 5 Delaware courts practice constitutional avoidance.

2020The only residential use permitted in AR-1 zoned land is “[d]etached single-family dwellings on individual lots.”84 Subject to conditions, HR-1 zoning permits multifamily dwellings, townhouses, rooming, boarding, and lodging houses, as well as hotels, motels or motor lodges, as well as lesser uses.85 The RPC overlay permits clustering of dwellings beyond what would be permitted otherwise.86 “Zoning is a legislative action presumed to be valid unless it is clearly shown to be arbitrary and capricious because it is not reasonably related to the public health, safety, or welfare.”87 A party chall

2018Super xxx, 1992). 14 Brown v. State, 721 A.2d 1263, 1265 (Del. 1998). 15 Matter 0f$2500. 00 U.S. Currency, 2018 WL 5117805 , at * 3 (Del.

2018Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009) (citation and internal quotations omitted). 111 Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 981 (Del.

2018Section 4784 was enacted by our Legislature in an attempt to “cripple the trafficking and sale of illegal drugs.”13 In a civil forfeiture proceeding, “the State has the initial burden of proving probable cause [for the institution of forfeiture] and if this is met, the petitioner has the burden of rebutting that presumption of forfeiture.”14 The State is required to demonstrate that there are reasonable grounds for belief of guilt, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion, and that the money was furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for illegal substanc

2018Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009) (citation and internal quotations omitted). 111 Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 981 (Del.

2017Standard of Review of County Council Rezoning Decisions When a final zoning authority considers a rezoning application, the court will “usually presume” that the decision is valid “unless clearly shown to be arbitrary and capricious because it is not reasonably related to the public health, safety, or welfare.”27 The burden of rebutting the presumption of validity and of showing that a rezoning decision is arbitrary and capricious is on those challenging the decision.28 The role of the court in reviewing a zoning decision is narrow and focused, with the purpose being “to determine whether [Cou

2017Standard of Review of County Council Rezoning Decisions When a final zoning authority considers a rezoning application, the court will “usually presume” that the decision is valid “unless clearly shown to be arbitrary and capricious because it is not reasonably related to the public health, safety, or welfare.”27 The burden of rebutting the presumption of validity and of showing that a rezoning decision is arbitrary and capricious is on those challenging the decision.28 The role of the court in reviewing a zoning decision is narrow and focused, with the purpose being “to determine whether [Cou

1989McQuail v. Shell Oil Co., Del.Supr., 183 A.2d 572, 579 (1962).

1975Compare Holden v. State, Del.Supr., 305 A.2d 320 (1973).