burden of rebutting presumption in Washington

2025The party challenging the community property status has the burden of rebutting this presumption that “can be overcome only by clear and convincing proof that the transaction falls within the scope of a separate property exception.” Id. at 19-20 .

2023“All property acquired during a marriage is presumptively community property, 12 No. 84133-5-I/13 regardless of how title is held.” Id. at 876 (quoting Dean v. Lehman, 143 Wn.2d 12, 19 , 18 P.3d 523 (2001)); RCW 26.16.030. “‘The burden of rebutting this presumption is on the party challenging the asset’s community property status, and can be overcome only by clear and convincing proof that the transaction falls within the scope of a separate property exception.’” Kile, 186 Wn.

2021Dean v. Lehman, 143 Wn.2d 12, 19 , 18 P.3d 523 (2001). 10 No. 36605-7-III In Marriage of Jones “The burden of rebutting this presumption is on the party challenging the asset’s community property status, and ‘can be overcome only by clear and convincing proof that the transaction falls within the scope of a separate property exception.’” Id. at 19-20 (citations omitted) (quoting Estate of Madsen v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 97 Wn.2d 792, 796 , 650 P.2d 196 (1982), overruled in part on other grounds by Aetna Life Ins. v. Wadsworth, 102 Wn.2d 652, 659-60 , 689 P.2d 46 (1984)).

2021Dean v. Lehman, 143 Wn.2d 12, 19 , 18 P.3d 523 (2001). 10 No. 36605-7-III In Marriage of Jones “The burden of rebutting this presumption is on the party challenging the asset’s community property status, and ‘can be overcome only by clear and convincing proof that the transaction falls within the scope of a separate property exception.’” Id. at 19-20 (citations omitted) (quoting Estate of Madsen v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 97 Wn.2d 792, 796 , 650 P.2d 196 (1982), overruled in part on other grounds by Aetna Life Ins. v. Wadsworth, 102 Wn.2d 652, 659-60 , 689 P.2d 46 (1984)).

2021Dean v. Lehman, 143 Wn.2d 12, 19 , 18 P.3d 523 (2001). 10 No. 36605-7-III In Marriage of Jones “The burden of rebutting this presumption is on the party challenging the asset’s community property status, and ‘can be overcome only by clear and convincing proof that the transaction falls within the scope of a separate property exception.’” Id. at 19-20 (citations omitted) (quoting Estate of Madsen v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 97 Wn.2d 792, 796 , 650 P.2d 196 (1982), overruled in part on other grounds by Aetna Life Ins. v. Wadsworth, 102 Wn.2d 652, 659-60 , 689 P.2d 46 (1984)).

2021Dean v. Lehman, 143 Wn.2d 12, 19 , 18 P.3d 523 (2001). 10 No. 36605-7-III In Marriage of Jones “The burden of rebutting this presumption is on the party challenging the asset’s community property status, and ‘can be overcome only by clear and convincing proof that the transaction falls within the scope of a separate property exception.’” Id. at 19-20 (citations omitted) (quoting Estate of Madsen v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 97 Wn.2d 792, 796 , 650 P.2d 196 (1982), overruled in part on other grounds by Aetna Life Ins. v. Wadsworth, 102 Wn.2d 652, 659-60 , 689 P.2d 46 (1984)).

2023“A party challenging the competency of a child witness has the burden of rebutting that presumption with evidence indicating that the child is . . . incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts, or incapable of relating facts truly.” State v. S.J.W., 170 Wn.2d 92, 102 , 239 P.3d 568 (2010). 5 The notice of appeal has not been designated as part of the record on appeal. 12 No. 38809-3-III State v. Carney Our review is limited to determining if the challenged findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether those findings support the trial court’s conclusions of law.

2015In Washington, all persons are presumed competent to testify regardless of their age.7 The party challenging the competency of a child witness bears the burden of rebutting this presumption with evidence establishing one of the statutory grounds for incompetency set forth in RCW 5.60.050, including an inability "of receiving just impressions of the facts, respecting which they are 7 State v. S.J.W., 170 Wn.2d 92, 102 , 239 P.3d 568 (2010).

2015Molsness, 84 Wn.

2004Molsness v. City of Walla Walla, 84 Wn.

2018The following factors continue to guide the trial court's determination of a child witness's competency: "(1) an understanding of the obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand;(2)the mental capacity at the time of the occurrence concerning which he is to testify, to receive an accurate impression of it; (3) a memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of the occurrence;(4) the capacity to express in words his memory of the occurrence; and (5) the capacity to understand simple questions about it." In re Dependency of A.E.P., 135 Wn.2d 208, 223 , 956 P.2d 297 (1998), quotin

2018The following factors continue to guide the trial court's determination of a child witness's competency: "(1) an understanding of the obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand;(2)the mental capacity at the time of the occurrence concerning which he is to testify, to receive an accurate impression of it; (3) a memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of the occurrence;(4) the capacity to express in words his memory of the occurrence; and (5) the capacity to understand simple questions about it." In re Dependency of A.E.P., 135 Wn.2d 208, 223 , 956 P.2d 297 (1998), quotin

2014In such a situation, “ ‘it is appropriate for the directors to bear the burden of rebutting a presumption of control, because they have greater access to the relevant information.’ ” Wilson, 288 S.W.3d at 289 (quoting Grant, 901 P.2d at 818 ).

2014In such a situation, "'it is appropriate for the directors to bear the burden of rebutting a presumption of control, because they have greater access to the relevant information.'" Wilson. 288 S.W.3d at 289 (quoting Grant, 901 P.2d at 818 ).

2014In such a situation, “ ‘it is appropriate for the directors to bear the burden of rebutting a presumption of control, because they have greater access to the relevant information.’ ” Wilson, 288 S.W.3d at 289 (quoting Grant, 901 P.2d at 818 ).

2014In such a situation, "'it is appropriate for the directors to bear the burden of rebutting a presumption of control, because they have greater access to the relevant information.'" Wilson. 288 S.W.3d at 289 (quoting Grant, 901 P.2d at 818 ).

2011Chaussee, 60 Wash.App. at 510 , 803 P.2d 1339 .

2011Chaussee, 60 Wash.App. at 510 , 803 P.2d 1339 .

2001The burden of rebutting this presumption is on the party challenging the asset’s community property status, In re Estate of Smith, 73 Wn.2d 629, 631 , 440 P.2d 179 (1968) (citing Rustad v. Rustad, 61 Wn.2d 176 , 377 P.2d 414 (1963)), and “can be overcome only by clear and convincing proof that the transaction falls within the scope of a separate property exception.” Estate of Madsen v. Comm’r, 97 Wn.2d 792, 796 , 650 P.2d 196 (1982), overruled in part on other grounds by Aetna Life Ins. v. Wadsworth, 102 Wn.2d 652, 659-60 , 689 P.2d 46 (1984).

2001The burden of rebutting this presumption is on the party challenging the asset’s community property status, In re Estate of Smith, 73 Wn.2d 629, 631 , 440 P.2d 179 (1968) (citing Rustad v. Rustad, 61 Wn.2d 176 , 377 P.2d 414 (1963)), and “can be overcome only by clear and convincing proof that the transaction falls within the scope of a separate property exception.” Estate of Madsen v. Comm’r, 97 Wn.2d 792, 796 , 650 P.2d 196 (1982), overruled in part on other grounds by Aetna Life Ins. v. Wadsworth, 102 Wn.2d 652, 659-60 , 689 P.2d 46 (1984).

2001The burden of rebutting this presumption is on the party challenging the asset’s community property status, In re Estate of Smith, 73 Wn.2d 629, 631 , 440 P.2d 179 (1968) (citing Rustad v. Rustad, 61 Wn.2d 176 , 377 P.2d 414 (1963)), and “can be overcome only by clear and convincing proof that the transaction falls within the scope of a separate property exception.” Estate of Madsen v. Comm’r, 97 Wn.2d 792, 796 , 650 P.2d 196 (1982), overruled in part on other grounds by Aetna Life Ins. v. Wadsworth, 102 Wn.2d 652, 659-60 , 689 P.2d 46 (1984).

2001The burden of rebutting this presumption is on the party challenging the asset’s community property status, In re Estate of Smith, 73 Wn.2d 629, 631 , 440 P.2d 179 (1968) (citing Rustad v. Rustad, 61 Wn.2d 176 , 377 P.2d 414 (1963)), and “can be overcome only by clear and convincing proof that the transaction falls within the scope of a separate property exception.” Estate of Madsen v. Comm’r, 97 Wn.2d 792, 796 , 650 P.2d 196 (1982), overruled in part on other grounds by Aetna Life Ins. v. Wadsworth, 102 Wn.2d 652, 659-60 , 689 P.2d 46 (1984).

2000Hurd, 69 Wn.

2000Hurd, 69 Wash. App. at 50 , 848 P.2d 185 ; Pearson-Maines, 70 Wash.App. at 868 , 855 P.2d 1210 ; Deschamps, 77 Wash. 514 , 137 P. 1009 .

2025State v. Vazquez, 198 Wn.2d 239 , 248, 494 P.3d 424 (2021). “‘Prejudice exists if there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.’” State v. Lopez, 190 Wn.2d 104, 116 , 410 P.3d 1117 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Estes, 188 Wn.2d at 458). 2.

2025State v. Vazquez, 198 Wn.2d 239 , 248, 494 P.3d 424 (2021). “‘Prejudice exists if there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.’” State v. Lopez, 190 Wn.2d 104, 116 , 410 P.3d 1117 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Estes, 188 Wn.2d at 458). 2.

2025State v. Vazquez, 198 Wn.2d 239 , 248, 494 P.3d 424 (2021). “‘Prejudice exists if there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.’” State v. Lopez, 190 Wn.2d 104, 116 , 410 P.3d 1117 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Estes, 188 Wn.2d at 458). 2.

2024State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 33 , 246 P.3d 1260 (2011).

2024State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 33 , 246 P.3d 1260 (2011).

2023“All property acquired during a marriage is presumptively community property, 12 No. 84133-5-I/13 regardless of how title is held.” Id. at 876 (quoting Dean v. Lehman, 143 Wn.2d 12, 19 , 18 P.3d 523 (2001)); RCW 26.16.030. “‘The burden of rebutting this presumption is on the party challenging the asset’s community property status, and can be overcome only by clear and convincing proof that the transaction falls within the scope of a separate property exception.’” Kile, 186 Wn.

2020He quotes In re Marriage of Chumbley for the proposition that “[p]roperty acquired during marriage has the same character as the funds used to purchase it.”3° But the Chumbley court was analyzing a stock purchase,31 which is legally and substantively different than a purchase of real property acquired by a down payment combined with a loan secured by a 25 In re Estate of Bor.qhi, 167 Wn.2d 480, 483-84 , 219 P.3d 932 (2009) (citing Harry M.

2020He quotes In re Marriage of Chumbley for the proposition that “[p]roperty acquired during marriage has the same character as the funds used to purchase it.”3° But the Chumbley court was analyzing a stock purchase,31 which is legally and substantively different than a purchase of real property acquired by a down payment combined with a loan secured by a 25 In re Estate of Bor.qhi, 167 Wn.2d 480, 483-84 , 219 P.3d 932 (2009) (citing Harry M.

2018The following factors continue to guide the trial court's determination of a child witness's competency: "(1) an understanding of the obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand;(2)the mental capacity at the time of the occurrence concerning which he is to testify, to receive an accurate impression of it; (3) a memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of the occurrence;(4) the capacity to express in words his memory of the occurrence; and (5) the capacity to understand simple questions about it." In re Dependency of A.E.P., 135 Wn.2d 208, 223 , 956 P.2d 297 (1998), quotin

2018The following factors continue to guide the trial court's determination of a child witness's competency: "(1) an understanding of the obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand;(2)the mental capacity at the time of the occurrence concerning which he is to testify, to receive an accurate impression of it; (3) a memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of the occurrence;(4) the capacity to express in words his memory of the occurrence; and (5) the capacity to understand simple questions about it." In re Dependency of A.E.P., 135 Wn.2d 208, 223 , 956 P.2d 297 (1998), quotin

2017McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 336 ; State v. McLean, 178 Wn.

2016App. at 876 (quoting Dean v. Lehman, 143 Wn.2d 12, 19 , 18 P.3d 523 (2001)). 78 ]d (quoting Dean, 143 Wn.2d at 19-20 ). 79 In re Marriage of Schwarz. 192 Wn.

2015In re Marriage of Zahm, 91 Wn.

2013A court will hold a witness competent if the witness understands the nature of the oath and is capable of giving a correct account ofwhat he or she has seen and heard.6 Washington courts presume the competency of every witness to testify.7 Any witness not able to receive just impressions of the facts or to relate them truly is not competent to testify.8 This prohibition applies "only to those with no comprehension at all, not to those with merely limited comprehension"9 and to those with an "inability to distinguish between right and wrong."10 The party challenging the competency of a witness