11 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1931–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wilzig v. Sisselmangreen1 sentence2024Super. at 124 (quoting Wilzig v. Sisselman, 209 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Ee v. Omgrgreen1 sentence2017See DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 502 (2005) (“[A] legislative enactment patterned after a statute of another state is ordinarily adopted with the prior constructions placed on it by the highest court of the parent jurisdiction.” (quoting Oswin v. Shaw, 129 N.J. 290, 309 (1992))); E.E. v. O.M.G.R., 420 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Anand v. National Republic Bank of Chicagogreen1 sentence2017In re Bundles, 856 F.2d 815, 824-25 (7th Cir. 1988); Anand v. Nat'l Republic Bank, 239 B.R. 511, 517 (Bankr. | 1 | 1 |
In the Matter of Donald Eugene Bundles, Debtor-Appellant. In Re Donald Eugene Bundles v. William J. Baker, Indiana National Bank and James C. Wellsgreen1 sentence2017In re Bundles, 856 F.2d 815, 824-25 (7th Cir. 1988); Anand v. Nat'l Republic Bank, 239 B.R. 511, 517 (Bankr. | 1 | 1 |
Oswin v. Shawred1 sentence2017See DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 502 (2005) (“[A] legislative enactment patterned after a statute of another state is ordinarily adopted with the prior constructions placed on it by the highest court of the parent jurisdiction.” (quoting Oswin v. Shaw, 129 N.J. 290, 309 (1992))); E.E. v. O.M.G.R., 420 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
DiProspero v. Penngreen1 sentence2017See DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 502 (2005) (“[A] legislative enactment patterned after a statute of another state is ordinarily adopted with the prior constructions placed on it by the highest court of the parent jurisdiction.” (quoting Oswin v. Shaw, 129 N.J. 290, 309 (1992))); E.E. v. O.M.G.R., 420 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutorgreen1 sentence2017Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)). 5 A-4888-15T1 Entry of judgment in a Special Civil Part matter is governed by Rule 6:6-3(a), which provides, in pertinent part: If the plaintiff's claim against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that can by computation be made certain, the clerk on request of the plaintiff and on affidavit setting forth a particular statement of the items of the claim, the amounts and dates, the calculated amount of interest, the payments or credits, if any, the net amount due, and the name of the original creditor if the claim was acquired by assignment, shal | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
New Jersey Realty Concepts, LLC v. John Mavroudis
green
1 sentence2024Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 14A:14 - 2(1)(a), a custodial receiver may be appointed "in the Superior Court by . . . a creditor whose claim is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain." N.J.S.A. 14A:14-1(b) defines a creditor as "the holder of any claim, of whatever character, against a corporation, whether secured or unsecured, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, absolute or contingent." Grounds for the appointment of a statutory receiver are: "(a) the corporation is insolvent"; "(b) the corporation has suspended its ordinary business for lack of funds"; o | 1 | 2024–2024 |
David E. v. Financial Resources, Inc.
green
2 sentences2017"Unlike the rules governing default judgments in other civil cases, R. 4:43-2, the rules governing default judgments in the Special Civil Part, R. 6:6-3(c), do not specifically require that a defendant receive notice of a proof hearing." Siwiec, supra, 375 N.J. 2017"Unlike the rules governing default judgments in other civil cases, R. 4:43-2, the rules governing default judgments in the Special Civil Part, R. 6:6-3(c), do not specifically require that a defendant receive notice of a proof hearing." Siwiec, supra, 375 N.J. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Washington National Bank v. Beatty
green
1 sentence1994N.J.S.A. 25:2-7; Washington Nat'l Bank v. Beatty, 77 N.J. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Montgomery v. Armstrong
green
1 sentence1941Eq. 540 ); but I feel I must follow the conclusion reached by this court in Montgomery v. Armstrong, supra. But complainant contends that even though it does not hold a judgment which is a lien on property in this state, it acquired a lien on the securities in question under its writ of sequestration and thus comes within that provision of R.S. 25:2-15 which gives to a creditor whose claim is a lien on property fraudulently transferred, the right to have such transfer set aside. | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Kocher v. Kocher
neutral
1 sentence1941Rep. 139 ; Kocher v. Kocher, 56 N.J. | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Trustees of Sea Isle City Realty Co. v. First National Bank
green
1 sentence1940Trustees of Sea Isle City Realty Co. v. First National Bank, 87 N.J. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Oakley v. Pound
neutral
1 sentence1933"The real ground for not sustaining the bill of a general creditor for relief against the fraudulent disposition of his debtor's property is, that the debt is no charge or lien upon the property of the debtor." Oakley v. Pound, 14 N.J. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
United Stores Realty Corp. v. Asea
neutral
1 sentence1931P.L. 1919 p. 500; United Stores Realty Corp. v. Asea, 102 N.J. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Kinkead v. Ryan
green
1 sentence1931Ibid. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.