9 Iowa opinions name it 1 courts 1893–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Eure v. Jefferson National Bankgreen2 sentences2010See, e.g., Integra Bank/Pittsburgh, 839 F.Supp. at 329 (stating “a creditor may not claim legal reliance on a signature that was illegally required in the first instance”); Boone Nat’l Sav. & Loan Ass’n, F.A. v. Crouch, 47 S.W.3d 371, 374-76 (Mo.2001) (citing broad equitable principles when permitting defendant to assert an ECOA affirmative defense after the statutory period had run); Eure v. Jefferson Nat’l Bank, 248 Va. 245 , 448 S.E.2d 417, 421 (1994) (holding defendant was entitled to assert an ECOA violation as an affirmative defense to avoid only her liability because to do otherwise wou 2010See, e.g., Integra Bank/Pittsburgh, 839 F. Supp. at 329 (stating “a creditor may not claim legal reliance on a signature that was illegally required in the first instance”); Boone Nat’l Sav. & Loan Ass’n, F.A. v. Crouch, 47 S.W.3d 371 , 374–76 (Mo. 2001) (citing broad equitable principles when permitting defendant to assert an ECOA affirmative defense after the statutory period had run); Eure v. Jefferson Nat’l Bank, 448 S.E.2d 417, 421 (Va. 1994) (holding defendant was entitled to assert an ECOA violation as an affirmative defense to avoid only her liability because to do otherwise would be t | 2 | 2 |
Integra Bank/Pittsburgh v. Freemangreen2 sentences2010See, e.g., Integra Bank/Pittsburgh, 839 F.Supp. at 329 (stating “a creditor may not claim legal reliance on a signature that was illegally required in the first instance”); Boone Nat’l Sav. & Loan Ass’n, F.A. v. Crouch, 47 S.W.3d 371, 374-76 (Mo.2001) (citing broad equitable principles when permitting defendant to assert an ECOA affirmative defense after the statutory period had run); Eure v. Jefferson Nat’l Bank, 248 Va. 245 , 448 S.E.2d 417, 421 (1994) (holding defendant was entitled to assert an ECOA violation as an affirmative defense to avoid only her liability because to do otherwise wou 2010See, e.g., Integra Bank/Pittsburgh, 839 F. Supp. at 329 (stating “a creditor may not claim legal reliance on a signature that was illegally required in the first instance”); Boone Nat’l Sav. & Loan Ass’n, F.A. v. Crouch, 47 S.W.3d 371 , 374–76 (Mo. 2001) (citing broad equitable principles when permitting defendant to assert an ECOA affirmative defense after the statutory period had run); Eure v. Jefferson Nat’l Bank, 448 S.E.2d 417, 421 (Va. 1994) (holding defendant was entitled to assert an ECOA violation as an affirmative defense to avoid only her liability because to do otherwise would be t | 2 | 2 |
Boone National Savings & Loan Ass'n, F.A. v. Crouchgreen2 sentences2010See, e.g., Integra Bank/Pittsburgh, 839 F.Supp. at 329 (stating “a creditor may not claim legal reliance on a signature that was illegally required in the first instance”); Boone Nat’l Sav. & Loan Ass’n, F.A. v. Crouch, 47 S.W.3d 371, 374-76 (Mo.2001) (citing broad equitable principles when permitting defendant to assert an ECOA affirmative defense after the statutory period had run); Eure v. Jefferson Nat’l Bank, 248 Va. 245 , 448 S.E.2d 417, 421 (1994) (holding defendant was entitled to assert an ECOA violation as an affirmative defense to avoid only her liability because to do otherwise wou 2010See, e.g., Integra Bank/Pittsburgh, 839 F. Supp. at 329 (stating “a creditor may not claim legal reliance on a signature that was illegally required in the first instance”); Boone Nat’l Sav. & Loan Ass’n, F.A. v. Crouch, 47 S.W.3d 371 , 374–76 (Mo. 2001) (citing broad equitable principles when permitting defendant to assert an ECOA affirmative defense after the statutory period had run); Eure v. Jefferson Nat’l Bank, 448 S.E.2d 417, 421 (Va. 1994) (holding defendant was entitled to assert an ECOA violation as an affirmative defense to avoid only her liability because to do otherwise would be t | 1 | 2 |
Kellogg v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'ngreen2 sentences1974Men’s Assn., 239 Iowa 196, 213-214 , 29 N.W.2d 559, 568 (1947): “It is a generally accepted principle of law that when a debtor owes a fixed, certain, due, sum of money, commonly called a liquidated debt, the offer of a less sum to the creditor, with a statement or notice that it is in full payment of the obligation, and its acceptance and retention by the creditor do not bar him from collecting the balance of the debt, in the absence of any new or additional consideration. 1974Men’s Assn., 239 Iowa 196, 213-214 , 29 N.W.2d 559, 568 (1947): “It is a generally accepted principle of law that when a debtor owes a fixed, certain, due, sum of money, commonly called a liquidated debt, the offer of a less sum to the creditor, with a statement or notice that it is in full payment of the obligation, and its acceptance and retention by the creditor do not bar him from collecting the balance of the debt, in the absence of any new or additional consideration. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Saunders v. Saunders
green
2 sentences1947She is not a creditor nor her claim a debt within the purview of said section.” Other decisions rejecting the exemptions against alimony, under statutes of the character noted in the citations just preceding are: Saunders v. Saunders, 243 Wis. 94 , 9 N. W. 2d 629, 630 ; Montgomery v. Montgomery, 1946, 80 App. D. 1947She is not a creditor nor her claim a debt within the purview of said section.” Other decisions rejecting the exemptions against alimony, under statutes of the character noted in the citations just preceding are: Saunders v. Saunders, 243 Wis. 94 , 9 N. W. 2d 629, 630 ; Montgomery v. Montgomery, 1946, 80 App. D. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Monck v. Monck
green
2 sentences1947C. 344, 153 F. 2d 634, 635 ; Rankins v. Rankins, 1942, 52 Cal. App. 2d 231 , 126 P. 2d 125 ; Monck v. Monck, 184 App. Div. 656 , 172 N. Y. 1947C. 344, 153 F. 2d 634, 635 ; Rankins v. Rankins, 1942, 52 Cal. App. 2d 231 , 126 P. 2d 125 ; Monck v. Monck, 184 App. Div. 656 , 172 N. Y. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Montgomery v. Montgomery
green
1 sentence1947C. 344, 153 F. 2d 634, 635 ; Rankins v. Rankins, 1942, 52 Cal. App. 2d 231 , 126 P. 2d 125 ; Monck v. Monck, 184 App. Div. 656 , 172 N. Y. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Rankins v. Rankins
green
2 sentences1947C. 344, 153 F. 2d 634, 635 ; Rankins v. Rankins, 1942, 52 Cal. App. 2d 231 , 126 P. 2d 125 ; Monck v. Monck, 184 App. Div. 656 , 172 N. Y. 1947C. 344, 153 F. 2d 634, 635 ; Rankins v. Rankins, 1942, 52 Cal. App. 2d 231 , 126 P. 2d 125 ; Monck v. Monck, 184 App. Div. 656 , 172 N. Y. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
J.T. Enterline Son v. Andrew
neutral
1 sentence1935Under various circumstances and by agreement or intendment it may operate as a payment.” In Enterline & Son v. Andrew, 211 Iowa 176 , at page 177, 231 N. W. 416 , 417, we find: "A cheek may be received as conditional payment, or it may be accepted as full payment and in extinguishment of the original indebtedness.” In McFarland v. Howell, 162 Iowa 110 , at page 116, 143 N. W. 860, 862 , the court said: "The general rule is that when a check is received by the creditor there is no presumption that he takes it in payment, but, on the contrary, the implication is that it is only to be regarded as | 1 | 1935–1935 |
McFarland v. Howell
neutral
2 sentences1935Under various circumstances and by agreement or intendment it may operate as a payment.” In Enterline & Son v. Andrew, 211 Iowa 176 , at page 177, 231 N. W. 416 , 417, we find: "A cheek may be received as conditional payment, or it may be accepted as full payment and in extinguishment of the original indebtedness.” In McFarland v. Howell, 162 Iowa 110 , at page 116, 143 N. W. 860, 862 , the court said: "The general rule is that when a check is received by the creditor there is no presumption that he takes it in payment, but, on the contrary, the implication is that it is only to be regarded as 1935Under various circumstances and by agreement or intendment it may operate as a payment.” In Enterline & Son v. Andrew, 211 Iowa 176 , at page 177, 231 N. W. 416 , 417, we find: "A cheek may be received as conditional payment, or it may be accepted as full payment and in extinguishment of the original indebtedness.” In McFarland v. Howell, 162 Iowa 110 , at page 116, 143 N. W. 860, 862 , the court said: "The general rule is that when a check is received by the creditor there is no presumption that he takes it in payment, but, on the contrary, the implication is that it is only to be regarded as | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Heuser v. Sharman
green
1 sentence1929“It has always been held that a party who, on his own motion, discharges the debt of another, without any agreement with either the debtor or creditor in relation to how he shall be reimbursed, is regarded as a mere volunteer, or, as some of the cases express it, an intermeddler, and is not entitled to the benefit of the mortgage or collateral security held by the creditor. * * * But now it is held by many of the courts that, where a third person pays the debt at the instance of the debtor, and upon an agreement or understanding with the debtor that he shall be entitled to the benefit of the s | 1 | 1929–1929 |
National Life Insurance v. Ayres
green
1 sentence1929Co. v. Ayres, 111 Iowa 200 . | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Gregory Co. v. Cale
green
2 sentences1925Gregory Co. v. Cale, 115 Minn. 508 ( 133 N. W. 75 ). 1925Gregory Co. v. Cale, 115 Minn. 508 ( 133 N. W. 75 ). | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Potter v. Brentlinger
neutral
1 sentence1904Potter v. Brentlinger, 117 Iowa, 536. — Affirmed. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Crippen v. Chappel
green
1 sentence1893Crippen v. Chappel, 35 Kan. 495 , 11 Pac. | 1 | 1893–1893 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.