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27 California opinions name it 2 courts 1887–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Jasmon O.green1 sentence2022D.Del., 2022) 706 __B.R. ___, ___ [ 2022 WL 840996 , p. 9] [“if a creditor has a claim, whether that claim be disputed, contingent, or unliquidated, it must file a proof of claim”].) Without citing any legal authority, SwiftAir suggests it 13 Basso (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 758, 760 ; see In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 413 [“Normally the involuntary dismissal of an appeal leaves the judgment intact.”]; County of Sacramento v. Rawat (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 858 , 869 [“In general, the unqualified dismissal of an appeal leaves the trial court’s judgment or order standing, as if no appeal had been | 1 | 1 |
City of Santa Paula v. Narulagreen1 sentence2022D.Del., 2022) 706 __B.R. ___, ___ [ 2022 WL 840996 , p. 9] [“if a creditor has a claim, whether that claim be disputed, contingent, or unliquidated, it must file a proof of claim”].) Without citing any legal authority, SwiftAir suggests it 13 Basso (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 758, 760 ; see In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 413 [“Normally the involuntary dismissal of an appeal leaves the judgment intact.”]; County of Sacramento v. Rawat (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 858 , 869 [“In general, the unqualified dismissal of an appeal leaves the trial court’s judgment or order standing, as if no appeal had been | 1 | 1 |
Rogers v. Nguyen (In re Ribal)green1 sentence2022(See Conservatorship of Ribal (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 519, 526 [on appeal from a postjudgment order awarding attorneys’ fees after the previous appeal resulted in affirmance of the judgment, the appellant could not challenge the merits of the judgment]; Narula, at p. 488 [on appeal from a postjudgment order awarding attorneys’ fees, the appellants were “barred . . . from challenging the validity of prior judgments”].) Because that is SwiftAir’s only could not file a proof of claim because “it had already been judicially determined [i.e., by the trial court in this case] that SwiftAir had no clai | 1 | 1 |
Mojtahedi v. Vargasgreen1 sentence2021As explained in Mojtahedi v. Vargas (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 974, 976 (Mojtahedi), an attorney charging lien is only effective if the attorney has filed an independent action to establish the lien’s amount and enforceability. | 1 | 1 |
Dobler v. Arluk Medical Center Industrial Group, Inc.green2 sentences2007Initially, we note “[a] creditor’s cláim may be deemed rejected at the creditor’s option if the personal representative or court has refused or neglected to act on the claim within 30 days after the claim was filed.” (Dobler v. Arluk Medical Center Industrial Group, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 530, 536 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 478 ], italics added, citing Prob. 2007Initially, we note “[a] creditor’s cláim may be deemed rejected at the creditor’s option if the personal representative or court has refused or neglected to act on the claim within 30 days after the claim was filed.” (Dobler v. Arluk Medical Center Industrial Group, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 530, 536 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 478 ], italics added, citing Prob. | 1 | 1 |
Ticonic National Bank v. Spraguegreen2 sentences1995Assn. (1943) 22 Cal.2d 474, 490 [ 139 P.2d 321 ].) As the United States Supreme Court explained in Ticonic Bank v. Sprague (1938) 303 U.S. 406, 411 [ 82 L.Ed. 926, 930 , 58 S.Ct. 612 ], while interest accruing after a bank insolvency is generally not allowed, “interest is proper where the ideal of equality is served, and so a creditor whose claim has been erroneously disallowed is entitled on its allowance to interest on his dividends from the time a ratable amount was paid other creditors.” Class 5 policyholders who received interim payments had the benefit of the use of that money. 1995Assn. (1943) 22 Cal.2d 474, 490 [ 139 P.2d 321 ].) As the United States Supreme Court explained in Ticonic Bank v. Sprague (1938) 303 U.S. 406, 411 [ 82 L.Ed. 926, 930 , 58 S.Ct. 612 ], while interest accruing after a bank insolvency is generally not allowed, “interest is proper where the ideal of equality is served, and so a creditor whose claim has been erroneously disallowed is entitled on its allowance to interest on his dividends from the time a ratable amount was paid other creditors.” Class 5 policyholders who received interim payments had the benefit of the use of that money. | 1 | 1 |
Allen v. Cal. Mut. Bldg & Loan Ass'ngreen2 sentences1995Assn. (1943) 22 Cal.2d 474, 490 [ 139 P.2d 321 ].) As the United States Supreme Court explained in Ticonic Bank v. Sprague (1938) 303 U.S. 406, 411 [ 82 L.Ed. 926, 930 , 58 S.Ct. 612 ], while interest accruing after a bank insolvency is generally not allowed, “interest is proper where the ideal of equality is served, and so a creditor whose claim has been erroneously disallowed is entitled on its allowance to interest on his dividends from the time a ratable amount was paid other creditors.” Class 5 policyholders who received interim payments had the benefit of the use of that money. 1995Assn. (1943) 22 Cal.2d 474, 490 [ 139 P.2d 321 ].) As the United States Supreme Court explained in Ticonic Bank v. Sprague (1938) 303 U.S. 406, 411 [ 82 L.Ed. 926, 930 , 58 S.Ct. 612 ], while interest accruing after a bank insolvency is generally not allowed, “interest is proper where the ideal of equality is served, and so a creditor whose claim has been erroneously disallowed is entitled on its allowance to interest on his dividends from the time a ratable amount was paid other creditors.” Class 5 policyholders who received interim payments had the benefit of the use of that money. | 1 | 1 |
Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitzgreen2 sentences1995In Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 104, 110-111 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 901 ], a pleading case, the plaintiff alleged that defendant attorneys had undertaken, “on behalf of their clients, to assist in securing loans from various persons, including plaintiff, for the benefit of [the clients],” that the attorneys, without fraudulent intent, had prepared for their clients a misleading letter concerning the status of their clients’ partnership, that the attorneys knew the letter would be shown to the plaintiff and intended it to influence the plaintiff’s conduct, and tha 1995In Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 104, 110-111 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 901 ], a pleading case, the plaintiff alleged that defendant attorneys had undertaken, “on behalf of their clients, to assist in securing loans from various persons, including plaintiff, for the benefit of [the clients],” that the attorneys, without fraudulent intent, had prepared for their clients a misleading letter concerning the status of their clients’ partnership, that the attorneys knew the letter would be shown to the plaintiff and intended it to influence the plaintiff’s conduct, and tha | 1 | 1 |
Sanders v. Magillgreen2 sentences1992(Sanders v. Magill (1937) 9 Cal.2d 145, 150 [ 70 P.2d 159 ].) 5 Lassleben as a surety therefore acquired and was entitled to enforce the rights to interest and attorney fees provided by the note. *723 Flojo’s final argument is that we cannot allow the enforcement of the 4 percent increase in interest rates because such would be usurious. 1992(Sanders v. Magill (1937) 9 Cal.2d 145, 150 [ 70 P.2d 159 ].) 5 Lassleben as a surety therefore acquired and was entitled to enforce the rights to interest and attorney fees provided by the note. *723 Flojo’s final argument is that we cannot allow the enforcement of the 4 percent increase in interest rates because such would be usurious. | 1 | 1 |
| Daniels v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Curtis v. City of Sacramento
green
2 sentences1913In Curtis v. City of Sacramento, 70 Cal. 412 , [ 11 Pac. 748 ], the court said that “if the debtor promises to pay the debt when he is able, or by installments, etc., the creditor can claim nothing more than the promise gives him.” In Rodgers v. Byers, 127 Cal. 528 , [ 60 Pac. 42 ], the defendant, being indebted to plaintiff, wrote to plaintiff before action was barred, saying, “I will liquidate that note as soon as I can get the money. . . . 1913In Curtis v. City of Sacramento, 70 Cal. 412 , [ 11 Pac. 748 ], the court said that “if the debtor promises to pay the debt when he is able, or by installments, etc., the creditor can claim nothing more than the promise gives him.” In Rodgers v. Byers, 127 Cal. 528 , [ 60 Pac. 42 ], the defendant, being indebted to plaintiff, wrote to plaintiff before action was barred, saying, “I will liquidate that note as soon as I can get the money. . . . | 2 | 1900–1913 |
Atempa v. Pedrazzani
green
2 sentences2026Accordingly, records offered to support the argument that James did not file a creditor claim against Victor’s estate “are not ‘necessary, helpful, or relevant’ to the resolution of the appeal.” (Atempa v. Pedrazzani (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 809, 819 .) We therefore deny Rita’s request for judicial notice. 6 against Victor after his death,” but does not acknowledge that James’s only surviving claim subject to the judgment against Rita at issue here is James’s non-monetary claim to invalidate the 2009 trust under section 17200. 2026Accordingly, records offered to support the argument that James did not file a creditor claim against Victor’s estate “are not ‘necessary, helpful, or relevant’ to the resolution of the appeal.” (Atempa v. Pedrazzani (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 809, 819 .) We therefore deny Rita’s request for judicial notice. 6 against Victor after his death,” but does not acknowledge that James’s only surviving claim subject to the judgment against Rita at issue here is James’s non-monetary claim to invalidate the 2009 trust under section 17200. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Potter v. Alliance United Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence2025(Mejia, at p. 664; Potter, at pp. 903-904.) Under section 3439.04, subdivision (a)(1), actual fraud is shown where the debtor made the transfer with “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor.” Alternatively, under section 3439.05, subdivision (a), at issue here, “a transfer is constructively fraudulent when a debtor makes a transfer or incurs an obligation ‘without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation and the debtor was insolvent at that time or the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.’ [Ci | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Baxter v. Cal. State Teachers' Ret. Sys.
green
1 sentence2024(Baxter, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 361 .) This means that Stead, as of that date, had to “exercise of reasonable diligence” in discovering its claim to any of SNB’s monies deposited in the Reserve Fund. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Shelley v. Basso
green
1 sentence2022D.Del., 2022) 706 __B.R. ___, ___ [ 2022 WL 840996 , p. 9] [“if a creditor has a claim, whether that claim be disputed, contingent, or unliquidated, it must file a proof of claim”].) Without citing any legal authority, SwiftAir suggests it 13 Basso (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 758, 760 ; see In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 413 [“Normally the involuntary dismissal of an appeal leaves the judgment intact.”]; County of Sacramento v. Rawat (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 858 , 869 [“In general, the unqualified dismissal of an appeal leaves the trial court’s judgment or order standing, as if no appeal had been | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Byrne v. Laura
green
1 sentence2021(Byrne, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 1061 .) Flo filed a creditor claim against Skip’s estate, and then filed suit after her claim was denied. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Arluk Medical Center Industrial Group, Inc. v. Dobler
green
1 sentence2021Code, § 19400; Arluk, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1331–1335.) But nothing in the statutory scheme suggests that a trustee’s transfer of trust assets to a named beneficiary can be ruled void because of a pending creditor claim. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Wilkison v. Wiederkehr
green
1 sentence2016As relevant here, "claim" means "a demand for payment for any of the following, whether due, not due, accrued or not accrued, or contingent, and whether liquidated or unliquidated: [¶] (1) Liability of the decedent, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise." (§ 9000, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) A "creditor" means "a person who may have a claim against estate property." (Id., subd. (c).) The failure to file timely a creditor claim as provided bars that claim. (§ 9002, subd. (b).) 11 In ruling petitioners were required to file a creditor's claim under section 9000, the court principally | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Morrison v. Land
green
1 sentence2016As relevant here, "claim" means "a demand for payment for any of the following, whether due, not due, accrued or not accrued, or contingent, and whether liquidated or unliquidated: [¶] (1) Liability of the decedent, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise." (§ 9000, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) A "creditor" means "a person who may have a claim against estate property." (Id., subd. (c).) The failure to file timely a creditor claim as provided bars that claim. (§ 9002, subd. (b).) 11 In ruling petitioners were required to file a creditor's claim under section 9000, the court principally | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Ingalls v. Bell
green
1 sentence2015Moreover, we also reject Tung’s related contention that Charter is barred from holding him personally liable under the guaranty for Resolvent’s debt absent evidence that Charter filed a proper creditor claim against Resolvent in the bankruptcy 8 proceedings. “[A]fter a default by the principal, . . . the creditor may pursue an independent action against the surety without the need of any prior collection effort, by suit or otherwise, against the principal.” (Impac Imported Parts & Accessories Corp. v. Rattray (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 792, 796-797 , citing Ingalls v. Bell, supra, 43 Cal.App.2d at p | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Impac Imported Parts & Accessories Corp. v. Rattray
green
1 sentence2015Moreover, we also reject Tung’s related contention that Charter is barred from holding him personally liable under the guaranty for Resolvent’s debt absent evidence that Charter filed a proper creditor claim against Resolvent in the bankruptcy 8 proceedings. “[A]fter a default by the principal, . . . the creditor may pursue an independent action against the surety without the need of any prior collection effort, by suit or otherwise, against the principal.” (Impac Imported Parts & Accessories Corp. v. Rattray (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 792, 796-797 , citing Ingalls v. Bell, supra, 43 Cal.App.2d at p | 1 | 2015–2015 |
In Re Marriage of Arceneaux
green
1 sentence2013"A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness." (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133 .) Seychelle does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence pertaining to any of the other factors set forth in section 3439.04, subdivision (b). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Susan Cummings v. Lawrence B. Cummings
green
2 sentences2003Cummings v. Cummings, supra, 244 F.3d 1263 confirms that the state court’s concurrent jurisdiction over family law matters does not relieve the creditor from the requirement of obtaining relief from the automatic stay to pursue a core proceeding in state court. 2003Cummings v. Cummings, supra, 244 F.3d 1263 confirms that the state court’s concurrent jurisdiction over family law matters does not relieve the creditor from the requirement of obtaining relief from the automatic stay to pursue a core proceeding in state court. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Lind v. O. N. Johnson Co.
green
1 sentence1997Johnson Co., supra, 282 N.W. at p. 666 .) In Lind , the statute in question provided that a creditor whose claim has matured may have a fraudulent conveyance (or transfer) set aside to the extent necessary to satisfy his claim or he may disregard the conveyance and levy or attach the property. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Provident Mutual Building & Loan Ass'n v. Shaffer
green
1 sentence1976Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v Shaffer (1905) 2 CA 216, 83 P 274 , again in a situation more favorable to the creditor than the rule made it appear. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Katz v. A. J. Ruhlman & Co.
green
2 sentences1967Ruhlman & Co. (1945) 69 Cal.App.2d 541 [ 159 P.2d 426 ], In Katz , however, the former executor who negotiated the compromise settlement of claims which the creditor and the estate had against each other and who informed the representative of the creditor that no claim need be filed with the estate, was an attorney who had for several years also been the legal adviser and attorney for the creditor’s representative. 1967Ruhlman & Co. (1945) 69 Cal.App.2d 541 [ 159 P.2d 426 ], In Katz , however, the former executor who negotiated the compromise settlement of claims which the creditor and the estate had against each other and who informed the representative of the creditor that no claim need be filed with the estate, was an attorney who had for several years also been the legal adviser and attorney for the creditor’s representative. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Santa Rosa Bank v. White
green
2 sentences1959In Santa Rosa Bank v. White, 139 Cal. 703 [ 73 P. 577 ], it was held that the provision to the exception contained in section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act, “unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy, ’ ’ does not contemplate constructive notice to the creditor; but the term “actual knowledge” is used as explanatory of the word “notice,” and actual knowledge is required in order to exclude the creditor from the exception. 1959In Santa Rosa Bank v. White, 139 Cal. 703 [ 73 P. 577 ], it was held that the provision to the exception contained in section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act, “unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy, ’ ’ does not contemplate constructive notice to the creditor; but the term “actual knowledge” is used as explanatory of the word “notice,” and actual knowledge is required in order to exclude the creditor from the exception. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Newman v. Tootle-Campbell Dry Goods Co.
neutral
2 sentences1943(Newman v. Tootle-Campbell Dry Goods Co., 174 Mo.App. 528 [ 160 S.W. 825 ].) In the instant ease the debtor indicated that he did not intend to discontinue business entirely. 1943(Newman v. Tootle-Campbell Dry Goods Co., 174 Mo.App. 528 [ 160 S.W. 825 ].) In the instant ease the debtor indicated that he did not intend to discontinue business entirely. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Adams v. Bell
green
1 sentence1940(Adams v. Bell, 5 Cal. (2d) 697 [ 56 Pac. (2d) 208 ]; Chalmers v. Sheehy, 132 Cal. 459 [ 64 Pac. 709 , 84 Am. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Lynch v. Cunningham
green
2 sentences1940(Lynch v. Cunningham, 131 Cal. App. 164 [ 21 Pac. (2d) 154, 973 ].) A creditor whose claim arises out of a tort is entitled, upon recovering judgment, to have a fraudulent conveyance set aside. 1940(Lynch v. Cunningham, 131 Cal. App. 164 [ 21 Pac. (2d) 154, 973 ].) A creditor whose claim arises out of a tort is entitled, upon recovering judgment, to have a fraudulent conveyance set aside. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Chalmers v. Sheehy
green
2 sentences1940(Adams v. Bell, 5 Cal. (2d) 697 [ 56 Pac. (2d) 208 ]; Chalmers v. Sheehy, 132 Cal. 459 [ 64 Pac. 709 , 84 Am. 1940(Adams v. Bell, 5 Cal. (2d) 697 [ 56 Pac. (2d) 208 ]; Chalmers v. Sheehy, 132 Cal. 459 [ 64 Pac. 709 , 84 Am. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| Rodgers v. Byers green | 1 | 1913–1913 |
| Schuessler v. Dudley neutral | 1 | 1907–1907 |
| Richeson v. Crawford neutral | 1 | 1907–1907 |
| Collins v. McWalters neutral | 1 | 1903–1903 |
| People v. Haren neutral | 1 | 1903–1903 |
| McMinn v. Whelan green | 1 | 1896–1896 |
| Ohm v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1896–1896 |
| Lidderdale v. Robinson neutral | 1 | 1887–1887 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.