creditor claim in Alabama

2018Co. , 507 So.2d 915 , 917-18 (Ala. 1987) (indicating that an affidavit that contradicts prior sworn testimony without explanation may be considered a sham affidavit and will not create a genuine issue of material fact), and that, based on that testimony and the admission in IMG and Carter's answer that the August 2010 *1012 transfer was made without consideration, the transfer of the mortgage from IMG to Liberty was fraudulent under § 8-9A-5(a), which states: "A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made if the debtor made the transf

2018Co. , 507 So.2d 915 , 917-18 (Ala. 1987) (indicating that an affidavit that contradicts prior sworn testimony without explanation may be considered a sham affidavit and will not create a genuine issue of material fact), and that, based on that testimony and the admission in IMG and Carter's answer that the August 2010 *1012 transfer was made without consideration, the transfer of the mortgage from IMG to Liberty was fraudulent under § 8-9A-5(a), which states: "A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made if the debtor made the transf

2007In Harper v. Raisin Fertilizer Co. , 158 Ala. 329 , 48 So. 589 (1908), this Court held that the defendant in a fraudulent-transfer action could raise a statute-of-limitations defense that was available to the debtor.

2007In Harper v. Raisin Fertilizer Co. , 158 Ala. 329 , 48 So. 589 (1908), this Court held that the defendant in a fraudulent-transfer action could raise a statute-of-limitations defense that was available to the debtor.

2007HealthSouth supports its position with Jahner v. Jacob , 515 N.W.2d 183 , 185 (N.D. 1994), in which the Supreme Court of North Dakota stated that "the claimant loses her status as a creditor if her claim against the transferor becomes barred by *Page 297 the statute of limitations, a non-claim statute, or other method.

2007HealthSouth argues that "'[w]ithout a debt enforceable against the transferor, a creditor has no claim against the transferee. `"HealthSouth's brief at 14 (quoting Jahner v. Jacob , 515 N.W.2d 183 , 185 (N.D. 1994)).

2007The North Dakota court concluded that "`surely the [Uniform Act] does not contemplate the absurdity of granting such relief where, as here, judgment cannot be obtained against the only party in whom the transferred property could be revested.'" (Quoting Laidley v. Heigho , 326 F.2d 592 , 593-94 (9th Cir.1963).) Other jurisdictions, however, hold that title does not revest in the debtor where a court sets aside a fraudulent transfer.

1997Hullett v. Hood, 109 Ala. 345 , 19 So. 419 (1896).

1997Hullett v. Hood , 109 Ala. 345 , 19 So. 419 (1896).

1986Parker v. Adams, 455 So.2d 880 (Ala.Civ.App.1984).

1916It would therefore seem from the foregoing that while Miller Green was a joint maker of the Edwards’ mortgage, the undisputed evidence shows that he was but a surety for his brother Joe to the extent of approximately $2,500 of the mortgage debt, and upon the payment of same he was under the statute entitled to the transfer that was made to him, or would have been subrogated for the mortgage under section 5394, whether there had been a transfer or not. (3) We do not think that the plaintiff is an innocent purchaser, as the mortgage, upon its face, was a joint one, and the registration of same w

1914We are there cited in the note to our own authority, Hall v. Ala. Terminal Co., 143 Ala. 464 , 39 South. 285 , 2 L.

1884In Osborne v. Noble, 46 Miss. 449 , we find the general rule succinctly stated as follows: “Where the contract is for the personal benefit of the surety, in opposition to the idea of a pledge for the debt, or providing means for its payment, the creditor can claim only such rights and remedies as the surety had.