creditor claim in Indiana

2006Id. (emphasis added); see also Garvin v. Chadwick Realty Corp., 212 Ind. 499, 511 , 9 N.E.2d 268, 273 (Ind.1937).

1922St. 245, said: “Any creditor is entitled to maintain an action to set aside such a fraudulent conveyance (Hills v. Sherwood, 48 Cal. 392 ), but he must be a creditor whose claim has been allowed by the administrator, or is evidenced by a judgment.” In Smith v. Goodrich (1897), 167 Ill. 46 , 47 N. E. 316 , it was held that the holder of an intestate’s note could not maintain an intervening petition to reach a fund realized from the sale of an intestate’s real estate in the hands of a master in chancery for distribution, when the claims evidenced by the note had not been allowed by the court.

1922St. 245, said: “Any creditor is entitled to maintain an action to set aside such a fraudulent conveyance (Hills v. Sherwood, 48 Cal. 392 ), but he must be a creditor whose claim has been allowed by the administrator, or is evidenced by a judgment.” In Smith v. Goodrich (1897), 167 Ill. 46 , 47 N. E. 316 , it was held that the holder of an intestate’s note could not maintain an intervening petition to reach a fund realized from the sale of an intestate’s real estate in the hands of a master in chancery for distribution, when the claims evidenced by the note had not been allowed by the court.

1922In Goodman v. Kopperl (1897), 169 Ill. 136 , 48 N. E. 172 , where the complaint was filed by a creditor whose claim had not been allowed against the estate, it was said: “There are no instances in which resort to a court of equity has been recognized, under our later decisions, before the claim of the creditor has been allowed against the estate by the probate court.” 8.

1922In Goodman v. Kopperl (1897), 169 Ill. 136 , 48 N. E. 172 , where the complaint was filed by a creditor whose claim had not been allowed against the estate, it was said: “There are no instances in which resort to a court of equity has been recognized, under our later decisions, before the claim of the creditor has been allowed against the estate by the probate court.” 8.

1921As said by the court in Isgrigg v. Pauley (1897), 148 Ind. 436 , 47 N. E. 821 : “It is impossible to conceive any logical ground upon which property not subject to the claims of creditors can be held to have been fraudulently conveyed.

1921As said by the court in Isgrigg v. Pauley (1897), 148 Ind. 436 , 47 N. E. 821 : “It is impossible to conceive any logical ground upon which property not subject to the claims of creditors can be held to have been fraudulently conveyed.

1901The statute imposes upon the officers of such a company, as a penalty for a false report, liability for the debts of the company.” In Stokes v. Stickney, 96 N. Y. 323 , the court clearly discriminates between penal and remedial actions: “Since that decision [Merchants Bank v. Bliss, 35 N. Y. 412 ] the subject of actions under that section of the statute has frequently been under the consideration of this court with the uniform conclusion that the actions therein provided for are penal in character, and are not in any respect based upon the theory of affording compensation to the injured party

1901The statute imposes upon the officers of such a company, as a penalty for a false report, liability for the debts of the company.” In Stokes v. Stickney, 96 N. Y. 323 , the court clearly discriminates between penal and remedial actions: “Since that decision [Merchants Bank v. Bliss, 35 N. Y. 412 ] the subject of actions under that section of the statute has frequently been under the consideration of this court with the uniform conclusion that the actions therein provided for are penal in character, and are not in any respect based upon the theory of affording compensation to the injured party

1901The statute imposes upon the officers of such a company, as a penalty for a false report, liability for the debts of the company.” In Stokes v. Stickney, 96 N. Y. 323 , the court clearly discriminates between penal and remedial actions: “Since that decision [Merchants Bank v. Bliss, 35 N. Y. 412 ] the subject of actions under that section of the statute has frequently been under the consideration of this court with the uniform conclusion that the actions therein provided for are penal in character, and are not in any respect based upon the theory of affording compensation to the injured party

1901It is sufficient that the party prosecuting the action should be a creditor when the violation of the law takes place. * * * For these reasons, I am satisfied that the sections ^twelve and thirteen impose a penalty, or a disability in that nature, to which the shorter limitation of three years applies.” In Veeder v. Baker, 83 N. Y. 156 , the court say on p. 160: “That such an action is a penal action, is no longer open to question in this court.

1901The statute imposes upon the officers of such a company, as a penalty for a false report, liability for the debts of the company.” In Stokes v. Stickney, 96 N. Y. 323 , the court clearly discriminates between penal and remedial actions: “Since that decision [Merchants Bank v. Bliss, 35 N. Y. 412 ] the subject of actions under that section of the statute has frequently been under the consideration of this court with the uniform conclusion that the actions therein provided for are penal in character, and are not in any respect based upon the theory of affording compensation to the injured party

1882See Burnett v. Pratt, 22 Pick. 556 ; Constant v. Matteson, 22 Ill. 546 .