prompt claim in New Jersey

2006The purpose of the twenty-day statutory period is to afford a prompt hearing on the question whether the individual's commitment is warranted. "[I]nvoluntary commitment ... is a profound and dramatic curtailment of a person's liberty. ..." In re Commitment of D.M., 285 N.J.Super. 481, 486 , 667 A. 2d 385 (App. Div.1995), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 377 , 676 A. 2d 1092 (1996); see Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1809 , 60 L.Ed. 2d 323, 331 (1979).

2006This interference with individual liberty is justified by the state's interest in confining and treating "an individual [who] is likely to pose a danger to self or others or property by reason of mental illness." In re Commitment of S.L., 94 N.J. 128, 138 , 462 A. 2d 1252 (1983).

2006This interference with individual liberty is justified by the state's interest in confining and treating "an individual [who] is likely to pose a danger to self or others or property by reason of mental illness." In re Commitment of S.L., 94 N.J. 128, 138 , 462 A. 2d 1252 (1983).

2006The purpose of the twenty-day statutory period is to afford a prompt hearing on the question whether the individual's commitment is warranted. "[I]nvoluntary commitment ... is a profound and dramatic curtailment of a person's liberty. ..." In re Commitment of D.M., 285 N.J.Super. 481, 486 , 667 A. 2d 385 (App. Div.1995), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 377 , 676 A. 2d 1092 (1996); see Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1809 , 60 L.Ed. 2d 323, 331 (1979).

2006The purpose of the twenty-day statutory period is to afford a prompt hearing on the question whether the individual's commitment is warranted. "[I]nvoluntary commitment ... is a profound and dramatic curtailment of a person's liberty. ..." In re Commitment of D.M., 285 N.J.Super. 481, 486 , 667 A. 2d 385 (App. Div.1995), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 377 , 676 A. 2d 1092 (1996); see Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1809 , 60 L.Ed. 2d 323, 331 (1979).

1999See also Smith v. United States, 577 F. 2d 1025 (5th Cir.1978) (in the absence of a showing of prejudice the prisoner's remedy for a late parole hearing is an order entitling him to a prompt hearing); Bryant v. Grinner, 563 F. 2d 871 (7th Cir.1977) (where there is no indication in the record that the Government delayed a parole hearing in order to obtain an advantage or to prejudice the inmate, the appropriate remedy for failure to schedule a timely hearing is to order that a hearing be held).

1994Co. of Hartford, 115 N.J. 628, 629-30 , 560 A. 2d 670 (1989).] The Court, however, applied its ruling to "a severely limited class of causally-related medical conditions, namely, those whose insidious nature is such that their recurrence after an extended period of apparent cure is probable." Id. at 630 , 560 A. 2d 670 , quoting Zupo, supra, 98 N.J. at 33 , 483 A. 2d 811 .

1994Co. of Hartford, 115 N.J. 628, 629-30 , 560 A. 2d 670 (1989).] The Court, however, applied its ruling to "a severely limited class of causally-related medical conditions, namely, those whose insidious nature is such that their recurrence after an extended period of apparent cure is probable." Id. at 630 , 560 A. 2d 670 , quoting Zupo, supra, 98 N.J. at 33 , 483 A. 2d 811 .

1984PER CURIAM On certification granted, 97 N.J. 584 (1984), we have reviewed the Appellate Division's holding that "when a carrier has made [personal injury protection benefits] payments in connection with a compensable injury and is chargeable with knowledge at the time of its last payment that the injury will probably require future treatment, then the `two-year after *32 payment' provision of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13.1 will not bar an action brought within a reasonable time after rejection of a prompt claim for payment of additional medical expenses for such treatment." Zupo v. CNA Ins.

1984PER CURIAM On certification granted, 97 N.J. 584 (1984), we have reviewed the Appellate Division’s holding that “when a carrier has made [personal injury protection benefits] payments in connection with a compensable injury and is chargeable with knowledge at the time of its last payment that the injury will probably require future treatment, then the ‘two-year after payment’ provision of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13.1 will not bar an action brought within a reasonable time after rejection of a prompt claim for payment of additional medical expenses for such treatment.” Zupo v. CNA Ins.

1971The Supreme Court vacated his sentence on the ground that a defendant's right to a speedy trial is a fundamental *61 one, and there is a concomitant duty on the part of the prosecuting authorities to provide such a prompt inquiry. 398 U.S. at 38 , 90 S.Ct. 1564 .

1971The Supreme Court vacated his sentence on the ground that a defendant's right to a speedy trial is a fundamental *61 one, and there is a concomitant duty on the part of the prosecuting authorities to provide such a prompt inquiry. 398 U.S. at 38 , 90 S.Ct. 1564 .

1955Pa. 1943); Garrison v. Johnston, 104 F. 2 d 128 (9 th Circ., 1939); United States ex rel.

1955In the case of United States v. Gray, supra , the court said: "The grand jury has a right to find an indictment against any person against whom sufficient evidence is presented to it, and *209 is not limited to considering cases only of those persons who have been bound over to the grand jury by a committing magistrate." The real purpose of a preliminary hearing before a United States commissioner is to prevent a person from being held in custody without a prompt hearing." See also O'Grady v. Hiatt, 52 F. Supp. 213 ( D.C.

1955In the case of United States v. Gray, supra , the court said: "The grand jury has a right to find an indictment against any person against whom sufficient evidence is presented to it, and *209 is not limited to considering cases only of those persons who have been bound over to the grand jury by a committing magistrate." The real purpose of a preliminary hearing before a United States commissioner is to prevent a person from being held in custody without a prompt hearing." See also O'Grady v. Hiatt, 52 F. Supp. 213 ( D.C.