prompt hearing in District of Columbia

2012In Dobson v. United States, 711 A.2d 78, 83 (D.C.1998), this court summarized the applicable legal standard: Section 23-110 (c) states: Unless the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the prosecuting authority, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues, and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto.

2001“In light of the foregoing provision, there is a presumption that a trial court presented with a § 23-110 motion alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel should conduct a hearing.” Dobson v. United States, 711 A.2d 78, 83 (D.C.1998) (citations omitted).

1993See Gaston v. United States, 535 A.2d 893, 898 (D.C.1988); D.C.Code § 23-110(c) (Repl.1989).

1990"There is a presumption that a trial court presented with a § 23-110 motion should conduct a hearing.” Gaston v. United States, 535 A.2d 893 (D.C.1988).

2020See, e.g., Bethea v. United States, 170 A.3d 192, 193 (D.C. 2017) (reversing and remanding where trial court failed to hold a “hearing” pursuant to D.C.

2020Code § 23-110 (c) (“Unless the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall . . . grant a prompt hearing thereon”), we have said that a hearing is not required when the motion is “capable of resolution on the existing record[.]” Fields v. United States, 698 A.2d 485, 489 (D.C. 1997).

2015Id. at 119 (concluding that the trial court’s prompt instruction that testimony “bears absolutely no relationship” to the case following errant testimony was sufficient); see also Bennett v. United States, 597 A.2d 24, 27 (D.C.1991) .(noting that prejudice to appellant is diminished when, after a motion for a mistrial, the trial court instructs the jury to ignore the prejudicial testimony). 14 Moreover, the government presented a substantial quantity of compelling evidence to support its charges.

2015Id. at 119 (concluding that the trial court’s prompt instruction that testimony “bears absolutely no relationship” to the case following errant testimony was sufficient); see also Bennett v. United States, 597 A.2d 24, 27 (D.C.1991) .(noting that prejudice to appellant is diminished when, after a motion for a mistrial, the trial court instructs the jury to ignore the prejudicial testimony). 14 Moreover, the government presented a substantial quantity of compelling evidence to support its charges.

2015Lucas, supra, 102 A.3d at 283 (considering the “strength of the government’s case” in concluding that an errant prosecutorial comment did not substantially prejudice the defendant).

2015Lucas, supra, 102 A.3d at 283 (considering the “strength of the government’s case” in concluding that an errant prosecutorial comment did not substantially prejudice the defendant).

2013We also note, but need not address, the government’s argument that Rule 120 "arguably became unenforceable” after the enactment of the Incompetent Defendants Criminal Commitment Act of 2004, now codified at D.C.Code §§ 24-531.01 — 24-531.13 (2012), which, as the Superior Court stated in proposing to delete the Rule, "established a comprehensive framework for mental examinations of defendants, and ... obviated the need for a separate rule[.]” Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Notice of Proposed Amendments to Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure 47-1 and 120 (January 30, 2013), a

2006While the decision whether to hold a hearing is committed to the trial court’s discretion, see Little v. United States, 748 A.2d 920, 922 (D.C.2000), the scope of that discretion is thus quite narrow.

2005In this case, however, a delay of over three years undoubtedly has "impair[ed] the [trial court's] ability to make an informed assessment of [the prosecutor's] reasons." Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Henkel, 689 A.2d 1224, 1228 (D.C.1997) (holding that a Batson challenge must be made before the jury is empaneled, since a prompt hearing is "essential if a Batson issue is to be addressed in an effective and meaningful manner").

2005In this case, however, a delay of over three years undoubtedly has “impair[ed] the [trial court’s] ability to make an informed assessment of [the prosecutor’s] reasons.” Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Henkel, 689 A.2d 1224, 1228 (D.C.1997) (holding that a Batson challenge must be made before the jury is empaneled, since a prompt hearing is “essential if a Batson issue is to be addressed in an effective and meaningful manner”).

1992D.C.Code § 23-110(c) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Session v. United States, 381 A.2d 1, 2 (D.C.1977).

1991See Ramsey v. United States, 569 A.2d 142 (D.C.1990), cited by the majority.) The mandate of § 23-110 is clear: "[u]nless the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the prosecuting authority, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues, and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto." D.C.Code § 23-110 (1989 Repl.).

1991See Ramsey v. United States, 569 A.2d 142 (D.C.1990), cited by the majority.) The mandate of § 23-110 is clear: “[ujnless the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the prosecuting authority, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues, and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto.” D.C.Code § 23-110 (1989 Repl.).

1988We have held that this provision does not entitle a prisoner to a hearing if the motion (1) is "`palpably incredible' (though not merely `improbable')," or (2) "fails to state a claim," i.e., the assertions, even if true, would not entitle the prisoner to relief under § 23-110, or (3) is "`vague and conclusory,'" i.e., the "prisoner does not present a factual foundation in some detail." Pettaway v. United States, 390 A.2d 981, 984 (D.C.1978); accord, Gregg v. United States, 395 A.2d 36, 39 (D.C.1978).

1988We have held that this provision does not entitle a prisoner to a hearing if the motion (1) is “ ‘palpably incredible’ (though not merely ‘improbable’),” or (2) “fails to state a claim,” i.e., the assertions, even if true, would not entitle the prisoner to relief under § 23-110, or (3) is “ ‘vague and conclu-sory,” ’ i.e., the “prisoner does not present a factual foundation in some detail.” Pettaway v. United States, 390 A.2d 981, 984 (D.C.1978); accord, Gregg v. United States, 395 A.2d 36, 39 (D.C.1978).

1988We have held that this provision does not entitle a prisoner to a hearing if the motion (1) is "`palpably incredible' (though not merely `improbable')," or (2) "fails to state a claim," i.e., the assertions, even if true, would not entitle the prisoner to relief under § 23-110, or (3) is "`vague and conclusory,'" i.e., the "prisoner does not present a factual foundation in some detail." Pettaway v. United States, 390 A.2d 981, 984 (D.C.1978); accord, Gregg v. United States, 395 A.2d 36, 39 (D.C.1978).

1988We have held that this provision does not entitle a prisoner to a hearing if the motion (1) is “ ‘palpably incredible’ (though not merely ‘improbable’),” or (2) “fails to state a claim,” i.e., the assertions, even if true, would not entitle the prisoner to relief under § 23-110, or (3) is “ ‘vague and conclu-sory,” ’ i.e., the “prisoner does not present a factual foundation in some detail.” Pettaway v. United States, 390 A.2d 981, 984 (D.C.1978); accord, Gregg v. United States, 395 A.2d 36, 39 (D.C.1978).

1979While we are aware that an inappropriately argued missing witness inference may be correctable and the prejudice dispelled in certain circumstances by the trial court promptly instructing the jury to disregard the remarks, see Conyers v. United States, supra at 312; Pennewell v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 332, 333 , 353 F.2d 870, 871 (1965); Smith v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 22, 23 , 336 F.2d 941, 942 (1964), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1017 , 87 S.Ct. 736 , 17 L.Ed.2d 554 (1967), we find that the instructions given in this case were insufficient to attenuate the prejudice.

1979While we are aware that an inappropriately argued missing witness inference may be correctable and the prejudice dispelled in certain circumstances by the trial court promptly instructing the jury to disregard the remarks, see Conyers v. United States, supra at 312; Pennewell v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 332, 333 , 353 F.2d 870, 871 (1965); Smith v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 22, 23 , 336 F.2d 941, 942 (1964), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1017 , 87 S.Ct. 736 , 17 L.Ed.2d 554 (1967), we find that the instructions given in this case were insufficient to attenuate the prejudice.

1979While we are aware that an inappropriately argued missing witness inference may be correctable and the prejudice dispelled in certain circumstances by the trial court promptly instructing the jury to disregard the remarks, see Conyers v. United States, supra at 312; Pennewell v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 332, 333 , 353 F.2d 870, 871 (1965); Smith v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 22, 23 , 336 F.2d 941, 942 (1964), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1017 , 87 S.Ct. 736 , 17 L.Ed.2d 554 (1967), we find that the instructions given in this case were insufficient to attenuate the prejudice.

1979While we are aware that an inappropriately argued missing witness inference may be correctable and the prejudice dispelled in certain circumstances by the trial court promptly instructing the jury to disregard the remarks, see Conyers v. United States, supra at 312; Pennewell v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 332, 333 , 353 F.2d 870, 871 (1965); Smith v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 22, 23 , 336 F.2d 941, 942 (1964), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1017 , 87 S.Ct. 736 , 17 L.Ed.2d 554 (1967), we find that the instructions given in this case were insufficient to attenuate the prejudice.