prompt hearing in California

2022(People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114 ; see also People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1304 (Harris) [trial court implicitly recognized presumption of prejudice after an incident of jury tampering by holding a prompt hearing to explore circumstances and possibility of bias].) 5 In his opening brief, Taylor argues that Juror No. 5’s personal comments “extended for a day and a half of deliberations.” This claim is not supported by the record.

2020As the United States Supreme Court declared in Barker, the state has the duty to bring an accused individual to trial “as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process.” (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 527 ; see Dickey v. Florida (1970) 398 U.S. 30 , 37–38 [“[a]lthough a great many accused persons seek to put off the confrontation as long as possible, the right to a prompt inquiry into criminal charges is fundamental and the duty of the charging authority is to provide a prompt trial,” italics added].) This duty has been recognized in the forced confinement of alleg

2013(See Horn v. County of Ventura (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605, 616 [due process requirements rooted in the constitution, not in statute].) Even under section 14101 a driver whose license is suspended pursuant to a statute making suspension mandatory is entitled to “a prompt hearing before a representative of the DMV if he believes his suspension is based on inaccurate DMV records.” (Pollack v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 380 , fn. omitted.) Wall argues he should have been provided an administrative hearing.

2008(Smith v. Phillips (1982) 455 U.S. 209, 215-216 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 78 , 102 S.Ct. 940 ]; In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 647-648 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 , 889 P.2d 985 ].) The court’s concern that the person making the threat may have been attempting to force a mistrial was neither the controlling consideration in its decision to allow Juror G. to remain on the jury, nor a forbidden consideration.

2008(Smith v. Phillips (1982) 455 U.S. 209, 215-216 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 78 , 102 S.Ct. 940 ]; In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 647-648 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 , 889 P.2d 985 ].) The court’s concern that the person making the threat may have been attempting to force a mistrial was neither the controlling consideration in its decision to allow Juror G. to remain on the jury, nor a forbidden consideration.

2008(Smith v. Phillips (1982) 455 U.S. 209, 215-216 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 78 , 102 S.Ct. 940 ]; In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 647-648 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 , 889 P.2d 985 ].) The court’s concern that the person making the threat may have been attempting to force a mistrial was neither the controlling consideration in its decision to allow Juror G. to remain on the jury, nor a forbidden consideration.

2008(Smith v. Phillips (1982) 455 U.S. 209, 215-216 [ 71 L.Ed.2d 78 , 102 S.Ct. 940 ]; In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 647-648 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 , 889 P.2d 985 ].) The court’s concern that the person making the threat may have been attempting to force a mistrial was neither the controlling consideration in its decision to allow Juror G. to remain on the jury, nor a forbidden consideration.

1987(Arthur v. Superior Court, supra, 62 Cal.2d 404,407.) Section 1211 provides, “When a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, or of the judge at chambers, it may be punished summarily; for which an order must be made, reciting the facts as occurring in such immediate view and presence, adjudging that the person proceeded against is thereby guilty of a contempt, and that he be punished as therein prescribed.” In Morales v. Superior Court, supra, 239 Cal.App.2d 947, counsel failed to appear in court at the scheduled time and the court, as here, treated his absence a

1986See also Anderson v. George (1977) 160 W.Va. 76 [ 233 S.E.2d 407, 409 ] invalidating seizure, without notice or hearing, of abandoned or neglected animals.) Hughes v. Neth, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d 952 involved the forfeiture and disposal of a motorcycle engine bearing a defaced serial number without notice and hearing to the owner.

1986See also Anderson v. George (1977) 160 W.Va. 76 [ 233 S.E.2d 407, 409 ] invalidating seizure, without notice or hearing, of abandoned or neglected animals.) Hughes v. Neth, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d 952 involved the forfeiture and disposal of a motorcycle engine bearing a defaced serial number without notice and hearing to the owner.

1986The court declared the ordinance invalid because it failed to provide reasonable notice and a hearing either before or after seizure: “As a matter of basic fairness, to avoid the incurrence of unnecessary expenses appellant was entitled to a hearing before her animals were seized or, if the circumstances justified a seizure without notice and a hearing, she was entitled to a prompt hearing after the animals were seized.” (Carrera, 63 Cal.App.3d 721, 729.

1986See also Anderson v. George (1977) 160 W.Va. 76 [ 233 S.E.2d 407, 409 ] invalidating seizure, without notice or hearing, of abandoned or neglected animals.) Hughes v. Neth, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d 952 involved the forfeiture and disposal of a motorcycle engine bearing a defaced serial number without notice and hearing to the owner.

1984The right to a prompt inquiry into criminal charges, however, is fundamental and the duty of the charging authority is to provide a prompt trial, (Strunk v. United States, supra, 412 U.S. 434, 437 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 56, 60 ]; Dickey v. Florida, supra, 398 U.S. at pp. 37-38 [26 L.Ed.2d at pp. 31-32].) While the ongoing prosecutions in New York served to justify delay in bringing defendant to trial until late 1979 (see People v. Bradford (1976) 17 Cal.3d 8, 20 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 549 P.2d 1225 ]), the delay thereafter was attributable to the People’s intentional decision to leave the indictment pend

1984The right to a prompt inquiry into criminal charges, however, is fundamental and the duty of the charging authority is to provide a prompt trial, (Strunk v. United States, supra, 412 U.S. 434, 437 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 56, 60 ]; Dickey v. Florida, supra, 398 U.S. at pp. 37-38 [26 L.Ed.2d at pp. 31-32].) While the ongoing prosecutions in New York served to justify delay in bringing defendant to trial until late 1979 (see People v. Bradford (1976) 17 Cal.3d 8, 20 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 549 P.2d 1225 ]), the delay thereafter was attributable to the People’s intentional decision to leave the indictment pend

1984The right to a prompt inquiry into criminal charges, however, is fundamental and the duty of the charging authority is to provide a prompt trial, (Strunk v. United States, supra, 412 U.S. 434, 437 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 56, 60 ]; Dickey v. Florida, supra, 398 U.S. at pp. 37-38 [26 L.Ed.2d at pp. 31-32].) While the ongoing prosecutions in New York served to justify delay in bringing defendant to trial until late 1979 (see People v. Bradford (1976) 17 Cal.3d 8, 20 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 549 P.2d 1225 ]), the delay thereafter was attributable to the People’s intentional decision to leave the indictment pend

1984The right to a prompt inquiry into criminal charges, however, is fundamental and the duty of the charging authority is to provide a prompt trial, (Strunk v. United States, supra, 412 U.S. 434, 437 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 56, 60 ]; Dickey v. Florida, supra, 398 U.S. at pp. 37-38 [26 L.Ed.2d at pp. 31-32].) While the ongoing prosecutions in New York served to justify delay in bringing defendant to trial until late 1979 (see People v. Bradford (1976) 17 Cal.3d 8, 20 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 549 P.2d 1225 ]), the delay thereafter was attributable to the People’s intentional decision to leave the indictment pend

1980“Ultimately, we can never know what would have happened had competent representation been provided, for even seemingly hopeless cases may take unexpected turns in the hands of effective counsel.” (Cooper v. Fitzharris, supra, 586 F.2d at p. 1339 (conc, and dis. opn. of Hufstedler, J.).) How can the court divine what might have happened if counsel had conducted a prompt inquiry into his client’s mental status or a thorough investigation of the prosecution’s witnesses or careful legal research into matters of discovery and procedure?

1980"Ultimately, we can never know what would have happened had competent representation been provided, for even seemingly hopeless cases may take unexpected turns in the hands of effective counsel." ( Cooper v. Fitzharris, supra, 586 F.2d at p. 1339 (conc. and dis. opn. of Hufstedler, J.).) How can the court divine what might have happened if counsel had conducted a prompt inquiry into his client's mental status or a thorough investigation of the prosecution's witnesses or careful legal research into matters of discovery and procedure?

1965(Barlin v. Barlin, 156 Cal.App.2d 143, 145 [ 319 P.2d 87 ].) Judgment affirmed.

1965(Barlin v. Barlin, 156 Cal.App.2d 143, 145 [ 319 P.2d 87 ].) Judgment affirmed.

1957(White v. Red Mountain Fruit Co., 186 Cal. 335, 343 [ 199 P. 318 ]; Miller v. Lee, 66 Cal.App.2d 778, 785-786 [ 153 P.2d 190 ]; Winchell v. Lorenzen, 123 Cal.App.2d 704, 711 [ 267 P.2d 398 ].) It is only when the conduct consists of a wilful or persistent effort to place before the jury clearly incompetent evidence that prejudicial error is created.

1957(White v. Red Mountain Fruit Co., 186 Cal. 335, 343 [ 199 P. 318 ]; Miller v. Lee, 66 Cal.App.2d 778, 785-786 [ 153 P.2d 190 ]; Winchell v. Lorenzen, 123 Cal.App.2d 704, 711 [ 267 P.2d 398 ].) It is only when the conduct consists of a wilful or persistent effort to place before the jury clearly incompetent evidence that prejudicial error is created.

1957(White v. Red Mountain Fruit Co., 186 Cal. 335, 343 [ 199 P. 318 ]; Miller v. Lee, 66 Cal.App.2d 778, 785-786 [ 153 P.2d 190 ]; Winchell v. Lorenzen, 123 Cal.App.2d 704, 711 [ 267 P.2d 398 ].) It is only when the conduct consists of a wilful or persistent effort to place before the jury clearly incompetent evidence that prejudicial error is created.

1957(White v. Red Mountain Fruit Co., 186 Cal. 335, 343 [ 199 P. 318 ]; Miller v. Lee, 66 Cal.App.2d 778, 785-786 [ 153 P.2d 190 ]; Winchell v. Lorenzen, 123 Cal.App.2d 704, 711 [ 267 P.2d 398 ].) It is only when the conduct consists of a wilful or persistent effort to place before the jury clearly incompetent evidence that prejudicial error is created.