prompt hearing in Illinois

1991App. 3d at 922-23 , 510 N.E.2d at 617 .) In so holding, the Trainor court commented that the time frame specified in the statute reflected the legislature’s determination of what constitutes a prompt hearing for due process requirements, and that the only appropriate remedy for noncompliance with this rule was to require the rescission of the motorist’s suspension. 156 Ill.

1991App. 3d at 922-23 , 510 N.E.2d at 617 .) In so holding, the Trainor court commented that the time frame specified in the statute reflected the legislature’s determination of what constitutes a prompt hearing for due process requirements, and that the only appropriate remedy for noncompliance with this rule was to require the rescission of the motorist’s suspension. 156 Ill.

2009See Schaefer, 154 Ill. 2d at 261 , 609 N.E.2d at 334 ; Eidel, 319 Ill.

2009See Schaefer, 154 Ill.2d at 261 , 182 Ill.Dec. 26 , 609 N.E.2d at 334 ; Eidel, 319 Ill.App.3d at 505 , 253 Ill.Dec. 613 , 745 N.E.2d at 745 .

2003Lyon , 335 Ill.

2003Lyon, 335 Ill.

2002Only that right can possibly save the credible-evidence standard from unconstitutionality. “[B]eing placed on the State register of suspected child abusers implicates a [f]ederal liberty interest.” Cavaretta, 277 Ill.

2002Only that right can possibly save the credible-evidence standard from unconstitutionality. "[B]eing placed on the State register of suspected child abusers implicates a [f]ederal liberty interest." Cavaretta , 277 Ill.

1989A presuspension hearing is not constitutionally mandated. ( Mackey v. Montrym (1979), 443 U.S. 1 , 61 L.Ed.2d 321 , 99 S.Ct. 2612 .) A driver is entitled to a prompt hearing within 30 days of request (Ill.

1989Ed. 2d 321 , 99 S. Ct. 2612 .) A driver is entitled to a prompt hearing within 30 days of request (Ill.

2025This 8 No. 1-25-1502B interpretation gives effect to the legislature’s intent while providing clarity for future defendants in a similar situation to Anderson: a defendant who remains in physical custody despite the court’s order of release pending trial with conditions is entitled to a prompt hearing on the reason for his continued detention, but that same defendant must refrain from committing a new felony or Class A misdemeanor during the time between that initial order of release and their trial date, regardless of his physical location, or he risks the court revoking his release. ¶ 21 And

2025App. 3d 714 , 718 (2007), and People v. Virgin, 302 Ill.

2025In People v. Guillermo, 2016 IL App (1st) 151799, ¶¶ 15-19 , the First District rejected the principle espoused in Moreland that the absence of confirmation of the summary suspension rendered the petition “not ripe for adjudication.” The court stated: “Because there is no requirement [in the Code] that the [Secretary] file a confirmation with the circuit court within a specific time period, we cannot conclude that the [Secretary’s] failure to send a prompt confirmation of the suspension prevented the circuit court from holding a timely hearing on the defendant’s petition to rescind.

2024CONCLUSION ¶ 15 For the reasons stated, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment and remand with directions that the court promptly set the case for hearing to address the defendant’s pretrial release. ¶ 16 Reversed and remanded with directions. 8 People v. Challans, 2024 IL App (5th) 240353 Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Christian County, No. 24-CM- 16; the Hon.

2022No party was prejudiced by the minimal delay, and none of the following concerns were compromised: “the policy of the Act to keep the minor in parental custody, the constitutional requirement of a prompt hearing for any detention[, or] the unavailability of bail in the juvenile court.” Id. -4- 2022 IL App (2d) 210675 ¶ 14 Under the totality of the circumstances presented in this case, we find that the court did not err in denying respondent’s motion to vacate its temporary custody order on the ground that it was heard minutes beyond the statutory time limit. ¶ 15 III.

2022CONCLUSION ¶ 16 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County. ¶ 17 Affirmed. -5- 2022 IL App (2d) 210675 No. 2-21-0675 Cite as: In re E.C.-F., 2022 IL App (2d) 210675 Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County, Nos. 21-JA-126, 21-JA-127; the Hon.

2022No party was prejudiced by the minimal delay, and none of the following concerns were compromised: “the policy of the Act to keep the minor in parental custody, the constitutional requirement of a prompt hearing for any detention[, or] the unavailability of bail in the juvenile court.” Id. -4- 2022 IL App (2d) 210675 ¶ 14 Under the totality of the circumstances presented in this case, we find that the court did not err in denying respondent’s motion to vacate its temporary custody order on the ground that it was heard minutes beyond the statutory time limit. ¶ 15 III.

2011See People v. Fitterer, 322 Ill.App.3d 820, 821-24 , 256 Ill.Dec. 121 , 751 N.E.2d 174 (2001) (Secretary confirmed the defendant's suspension 72 days after the defendant's arrest and 33 days after the defendant filed his petition to rescind); Madden, 273 Ill.App.3d at 114-16 , 209 Ill.Dec. 940 , 652 N.E.2d 480 (confirmation given 63 days after the defendant's arrest and 36 days after the defendant filed his petition to rescind).

2011See People v. Fitterer, 322 Ill.App.3d 820, 821-24 , 256 Ill.Dec. 121 , 751 N.E.2d 174 (2001) (Secretary confirmed the defendant's suspension 72 days after the defendant's arrest and 33 days after the defendant filed his petition to rescind); Madden, 273 Ill.App.3d at 114-16 , 209 Ill.Dec. 940 , 652 N.E.2d 480 (confirmation given 63 days after the defendant's arrest and 36 days after the defendant filed his petition to rescind).

2009In support of this argument, plaintiff cites our supreme court’s decision in Lyon v. Department of Children & Family Services, 209 Ill. 2d 264 (2004).

2009In support of this argument, plaintiff cites our supreme court's decision in Lyon v. Department of Children & Family Services, 209 Ill.2d 264 , 282 Ill.Dec. 799 , 807 N.E.2d 423 (2004).

2006Section 103 — 5(d) of the Code [citation] requires a discharge if speedy trial provisions are not met, but when other statutory or constitutional requirements for a prompt hearing are not accompanied by provisions for sanctions, no dismissal or imposition of other sanction has been required. [Citations.] Ordering a discharge here for tardiness in holding the fitness hearing is neither appropriate nor required.” Durham, 142 Ill.

1996We note that defendants have not responded to this argument, contending, without citation to authority, that "there is no justification for advancing legal arguments previously made and rejected by the circuit court.” Defendants ignore well-settled law that a reviewing court is "not bound to accept the reasons given by a circuit court for its judgment and the judgment may be sustained upon any ground warranted, regardless of whether the circuit court relied upon such ground and regardless of whether the reason given by the circuit court was correct.” Messenger v. Edgar, 157 Ill. 2d 162, 177 ,

1996We note that defendants have not responded to this argument, contending, without citation to authority, that "there is no justification for advancing legal arguments previously made and rejected by the circuit court.” Defendants ignore well-settled law that a reviewing court is "not bound to accept the reasons given by a circuit court for its judgment and the judgment may be sustained upon any ground warranted, regardless of whether the circuit court relied upon such ground and regardless of whether the reason given by the circuit court was correct.” Messenger v. Edgar, 157 Ill. 2d 162, 177 ,

1995This court reversed a summary judgment entered in violation of a circuit court rule which required 10 days’ notice of hearing on a motion for such relief in Scoby v. Vulcan-Hart Corp. (1989), 188 Ill.

1994Ed. 2d 694 , 103 S. Ct. 3043 ; In re Robinson (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 126 ; In re Splett (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 225 ; People v. Lang (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 407 ; In re Stephenson (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 544 .) Statutes involving involuntary admission procedures are therefore construed narrowly unless such a construction would require "the performance of an empty formality.” (In re Splett, 143 Ill. 2d at 232 ; see also Estate of Johnson v. Condell Memorial Hospital (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 496, 507 .) Section 5 — 2—4(e) assures insanity acquittees that they may seek a prompt hearing from the circuit court to deter

1994Ed. 2d 694 , 103 S. Ct. 3043 ; In re Robinson (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 126 ; In re Splett (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 225 ; People v. Lang (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 407 ; In re Stephenson (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 544 .) Statutes involving involuntary admission procedures are therefore construed narrowly unless such a construction would require "the performance of an empty formality.” (In re Splett, 143 Ill. 2d at 232 ; see also Estate of Johnson v. Condell Memorial Hospital (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 496, 507 .) Section 5 — 2—4(e) assures insanity acquittees that they may seek a prompt hearing from the circuit court to deter

1994(See Foucha v. Louisiana (1992), 504 U.S. 71 , 118 L.

1994(See Foucha v. Louisiana (1992), 504 U.S. 71 , 118 L.

1994Ed. 2d 694 , 103 S. Ct. 3043 ; In re Robinson (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 126 ; In re Splett (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 225 ; People v. Lang (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 407 ; In re Stephenson (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 544 .) Statutes involving involuntary admission procedures are therefore construed narrowly unless such a construction would require "the performance of an empty formality.” (In re Splett, 143 Ill. 2d at 232 ; see also Estate of Johnson v. Condell Memorial Hospital (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 496, 507 .) Section 5 — 2—4(e) assures insanity acquittees that they may seek a prompt hearing from the circuit court to deter

1994Ed. 2d 694 , 103 S. Ct. 3043 ; In re Robinson (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 126 ; In re Splett (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 225 ; People v. Lang (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 407 ; In re Stephenson (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 544 .) Statutes involving involuntary admission procedures are therefore construed narrowly unless such a construction would require "the performance of an empty formality.” (In re Splett, 143 Ill. 2d at 232 ; see also Estate of Johnson v. Condell Memorial Hospital (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 496, 507 .) Section 5 — 2—4(e) assures insanity acquittees that they may seek a prompt hearing from the circuit court to deter

1994Ed. 2d 694 , 103 S. Ct. 3043 ; In re Robinson (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 126 ; In re Splett (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 225 ; People v. Lang (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 407 ; In re Stephenson (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 544 .) Statutes involving involuntary admission procedures are therefore construed narrowly unless such a construction would require "the performance of an empty formality.” (In re Splett, 143 Ill. 2d at 232 ; see also Estate of Johnson v. Condell Memorial Hospital (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 496, 507 .) Section 5 — 2—4(e) assures insanity acquittees that they may seek a prompt hearing from the circuit court to deter

1994The criteria for applying this exception include: "(1) the public nature of the question, (2) the desirability of an authoritative determination for the purpose of guiding public officers, and (3) the likelihood that the question will generally recur.” (In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 257 .) The liberty interest of insanity acquittees in seeking a prompt hearing is clearly of public concern.

1994Ed. 2d 694 , 103 S. Ct. 3043 ; In re Robinson (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 126 ; In re Splett (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 225 ; People v. Lang (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 407 ; In re Stephenson (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 544 .) Statutes involving involuntary admission procedures are therefore construed narrowly unless such a construction would require "the performance of an empty formality.” (In re Splett, 143 Ill. 2d at 232 ; see also Estate of Johnson v. Condell Memorial Hospital (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 496, 507 .) Section 5 — 2—4(e) assures insanity acquittees that they may seek a prompt hearing from the circuit court to deter

1991Ed. 2d 62, 66 , 85 S. Ct. 1187, 1191 .) In arguing that plaintiff’s constitutional right to a prompt hearing has not been violated, the Board asserts that plaintiff made no demand for trial and acquiesced to and benefitted from the delay.

1990Therefore, he argues, section 114 — 1(e) is contrary to article I, section 7, of the Illinois Constitution, which provides for a prompt preliminary hearing, and to that extent it is unconstitutional and void, citing In re Tingle (1977), 52 Ill.