prompt hearing in Connecticut

2008Summary process statutes secure a prompt hearing and final determination.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Young v. Young, 249 Conn. 482, 487 , 733 A.2d 835 (1999). “[Summary process] is preceded by giving the statutorily required notice to quit possession to the tenant. . . .

2008Summary process statutes secure a prompt hearing and final determination.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Young v. Young, 249 Conn. 482, 487 , 733 A.2d 835 (1999). “[Summary process] is preceded by giving the statutorily required notice to quit possession to the tenant. . . .

2022Therefore, the statutes relating to summary pro- cess must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bayer v. Showmo- tion, Inc., 292 Conn. 381, 388 , 973 A.2d 1229 (2009). ‘‘Pursuant to § 47a-15, before a landlord may proceed with a summary process action, except in those situa- tions specifically excluded, the landlord must first deliver a [pretermination] notice to the tenant speci- fying the alleged violations . . . .’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Josephine Towers, L.P. v. Kelly, 199 Conn. App. 829, 836 , 238 A.3d 732 , cert.

2022Therefore, the statutes relating to summary pro- cess must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bayer v. Showmo- tion, Inc., 292 Conn. 381, 388 , 973 A.2d 1229 (2009). ‘‘Pursuant to § 47a-15, before a landlord may proceed with a summary process action, except in those situa- tions specifically excluded, the landlord must first deliver a [pretermination] notice to the tenant speci- fying the alleged violations . . . .’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Josephine Towers, L.P. v. Kelly, 199 Conn. App. 829, 836 , 238 A.3d 732 , cert.

2017Therefore, the statutes relating to *498 summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed. "[B]efore a landlord may pursue its statutory remedy of summary process, the landlord must prove compliance with all of the applicable preconditions set by state and federal law for the termination of the lease." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Housing Authority v. DeRoche , 112 Conn.App. 355 , 361-62, 962 A.2d 904 (2009).

2017Therefore, the statutes relating to *498 summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed. "[B]efore a landlord may pursue its statutory remedy of summary process, the landlord must prove compliance with all of the applicable preconditions set by state and federal law for the termination of the lease." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Housing Authority v. DeRoche , 112 Conn.App. 355 , 361-62, 962 A.2d 904 (2009).

2001"Summary process statutes `secure a prompt hearing and final determination.' CT Page 11783 Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed." Young v. Young , 249 Conn. 482 , 488 , 733 A.2d 835 (1999) citing: Todd v. LaMar , 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 528, 529 , 277 A.2d 724 (1971) and HUD/Barbour-Waverly v. Wilson , 235 Conn. 650 , 658 , 668 A.2d 1309 (1995).

1976"The course of procedure provided by our summary process statutes ( 52-532 through 52-549) clearly shows that their purpose is to secure a prompt hearing and final determination." Id., 529 .

2026Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be nar- rowly construed and strictly followed.” (Internal quota- tion marks omitted.) Housing Authority v. Stevens, 209 Conn. App. 569, 575 , 267 A.3d 927 , cert. denied, 343 Conn. 907 , 273 A.3d 234 (2022).

2025Therefore, the statutes relat- ing to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housing Authority v. Stevens, 209 Conn. App. 569, 575 , 267 A.3d 927 , cert. denied, 343 Conn. 907 , 273 A.3d 234 (2022); see also St.

2013Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 5-6 .

2012Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bristol v. Ocean State Job Lot Stores of Connecticut, Inc., 284 Conn. 1, 5-6 , 931 A.2d 837 (2007).

2001"Summary process statutes `secure a prompt hearing and final determination.' CT Page 11783 Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed." Young v. Young , 249 Conn. 482 , 488 , 733 A.2d 835 (1999) citing: Todd v. LaMar , 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 528, 529 , 277 A.2d 724 (1971) and HUD/Barbour-Waverly v. Wilson , 235 Conn. 650 , 658 , 668 A.2d 1309 (1995).

1999Summary process statutes “secure a prompt hearing and final determination.” Todd v. LaMar, 6 Conn Cir. Ct. 528, 529, 277 A.2d 724 (1971); Henry Knox Sherrill Corp. v. Randall, 33 Conn. Sup. 522 , 358 A.2d 159 (1976).

1993Fermont Division v. Smith, supra 397-398 .

1991Fermont Division v. Smith, supra 397-398 .

1992Roundhouse Construction Corp. v. Telesco Mason's Supply, Inc., 168 Conn. 371 , vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), on remand, 170 Conn. 155 , cert. den. 429 U.S. 889 1976), holds that constitutional due process requires notice and a prompt hearing must be accorded persons affected by mechanic's liens.

1991Moreover, our Supreme Court in Roundhouse took into account the remedial intent of the mechanic's lien law ( 168 Conn. at page 385 ) and still found that the high interest in protecting such lienor's right could not supersede the constitutional right to a hearing at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner by those affected by the lien.

2025Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housing Authority v. Stevens, supra, 209 Conn. App. 575 ; see also Sullivan v. Lazzari, 135 Conn. App. 831 , 836 n.5, 43 A.3d 750 (relief available in summary process 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 13 Housing Authority v. Cyr action is possession of premises), cert. denied, 305 Conn. 925 , 47 A.3d 884 (2012); Oxford House at Yale v. Gilligan, 125 Conn. App. 464, 471 , 10 A.3d 52 (2010) (summary process aimed at deciding simple quest

2025Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housing Authority v. Stevens, supra, 209 Conn. App. 575 ; see also Sullivan v. Lazzari, 135 Conn. App. 831 , 836 n.5, 43 A.3d 750 (relief available in summary process 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 13 Housing Authority v. Cyr action is possession of premises), cert. denied, 305 Conn. 925 , 47 A.3d 884 (2012); Oxford House at Yale v. Gilligan, 125 Conn. App. 464, 471 , 10 A.3d 52 (2010) (summary process aimed at deciding simple quest

2022Therefore, the statutes relating to summary pro- cess must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bayer v. Showmo- tion, Inc., 292 Conn. 381, 388 , 973 A.2d 1229 (2009). ‘‘Pursuant to § 47a-15, before a landlord may proceed with a summary process action, except in those situa- tions specifically excluded, the landlord must first deliver a [pretermination] notice to the tenant speci- fying the alleged violations . . . .’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Josephine Towers, L.P. v. Kelly, 199 Conn. App. 829, 836 , 238 A.3d 732 , cert.

2022In fact, the constitutional right to a prompt hearing on a motion to discharge a notice of lis pendens was not recognized by our Supreme Court until its decision in Kukanskis v. Griffith, 180 Conn. 501 , 430 A.2d 21 (1980), which was decided seven years after Preved- ini.12 Finally, in Prevedini, the only issue on appeal was the court’s stay order.

2022In fact, the constitutional right to a prompt hearing on a motion to discharge a notice of lis pendens was not recognized by our Supreme Court until its decision in Kukanskis v. Griffith, 180 Conn. 501 , 430 A.2d 21 (1980), which was decided seven years after Preved- ini.12 Finally, in Prevedini, the only issue on appeal was the court’s stay order.

2021Therefore, the statutes relating to summary pro- cess must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Karl, 128 Conn. App. 805 , 808–809, 18 A.3d 685 , cert. denied, 302 Conn. 909 , 23 A.3d 1249 (2011).

2021Therefore, the statutes relating to summary pro- cess must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Karl, 128 Conn. App. 805 , 808–809, 18 A.3d 685 , cert. denied, 302 Conn. 909 , 23 A.3d 1249 (2011).

2021Therefore, the statutes relating to summary pro- cess must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Karl, 128 Conn. App. 805 , 808–809, 18 A.3d 685 , cert. denied, 302 Conn. 909 , 23 A.3d 1249 (2011).

2015Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Waterbury Twin, LLC v. Renal Treatment Centers– Northeast, Inc., 292 Conn. 459, 466 , 974 A.2d 626 (2009).

2015Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Waterbury Twin, LLC v. Renal Treatment Centers– Northeast, Inc., 292 Conn. 459, 466 , 974 A.2d 626 (2009).

2011Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) HUD/Willow Street Apartments v. Gonzalez, 68 Conn. App. 638, 642-43 , 792 A.2d 165 (2002). “[E]quitable defenses . . . implicating the right to possession are available in a summary process proceeding.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 225 Conn. 771, 777 , 627 A.2d 386 (1993).

2011Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) HUD/Willow Street Apartments v. Gonzalez, 68 Conn. App. 638, 642-43 , 792 A.2d 165 (2002). “[E]quitable defenses . . . implicating the right to possession are available in a summary process proceeding.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 225 Conn. 771, 777 , 627 A.2d 386 (1993).

2011Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) HUD/Willow Street Apartments v. Gonzalez, 68 Conn. App. 638, 642-43 , 792 A.2d 165 (2002). “[E]quitable defenses . . . implicating the right to possession are available in a summary process proceeding.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 225 Conn. 771, 777 , 627 A.2d 386 (1993).

2011Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) HUD/Willow Street Apartments v. Gonzalez, 68 Conn. App. 638, 642-43 , 792 A.2d 165 (2002). “[E]quitable defenses . . . implicating the right to possession are available in a summary process proceeding.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 225 Conn. 771, 777 , 627 A.2d 386 (1993).

2009Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Young v. Young, 249 Conn. 482, 487-88 , 733 A.2d 835 (1999); Marrinan v. Hamer, 5 Conn. App. 101, 103 , 497 A.2d 67 (1985).

2009Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Young v. Young, 249 Conn. 482, 487-88 , 733 A.2d 835 (1999); Marrinan v. Hamer, 5 Conn. App. 101, 103 , 497 A.2d 67 (1985).

2001"Summary process statutes `secure a prompt hearing and final determination.' CT Page 11783 Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed." Young v. Young , 249 Conn. 482 , 488 , 733 A.2d 835 (1999) citing: Todd v. LaMar , 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 528, 529 , 277 A.2d 724 (1971) and HUD/Barbour-Waverly v. Wilson , 235 Conn. 650 , 658 , 668 A.2d 1309 (1995).

2001"Summary process statutes `secure a prompt hearing and final determination.' CT Page 11783 Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed." Young v. Young , 249 Conn. 482 , 488 , 733 A.2d 835 (1999) citing: Todd v. LaMar , 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 528, 529 , 277 A.2d 724 (1971) and HUD/Barbour-Waverly v. Wilson , 235 Conn. 650 , 658 , 668 A.2d 1309 (1995).

1999Summary process statutes “secure a prompt hearing and final determination.” Todd v. LaMar, 6 Conn Cir. Ct. 528, 529, 277 A.2d 724 (1971); Henry Knox Sherrill Corp. v. Randall, 33 Conn. Sup. 522 , 358 A.2d 159 (1976).

1999Summary process statutes “secure a prompt hearing and final determination.” Todd v. LaMar, 6 Conn Cir. Ct. 528, 529, 277 A.2d 724 (1971); Henry Knox Sherrill Corp. v. Randall, 33 Conn. Sup. 522 , 358 A.2d 159 (1976).

1999Fattibene v. Kealey , 18 Conn. App. 344 (1999) provides the defendant with no support.

1996“Under § 16-262f [a], a public service company may seek appointment of a receiver of the rents upon the ‘default of the owner, agent, lessor or manager of a residential dwelling who is billed directly . . . for utility service furnished to such building . . . .’The section requires an immediate judicial order ‘to show cause why a receiver should not be appointed,’ and a prompt hearing [within seventy-two hours], whose ‘sole purpose . . . shall be to determine whether there is [an amount] due and owing between the owner, agent, lessor, or manager and the . . . utility.’ ” Southern Connecticut G

1996“Under § 16-262f [a], a public service company may seek appointment of a receiver of the rents upon the ‘default of the owner, agent, lessor or manager of a residential dwelling who is billed directly . . . for utility service furnished to such building . . . .’The section requires an immediate judicial order ‘to show cause why a receiver should not be appointed,’ and a prompt hearing [within seventy-two hours], whose ‘sole purpose . . . shall be to determine whether there is [an amount] due and owing between the owner, agent, lessor, or manager and the . . . utility.’ ” Southern Connecticut G

1992Roundhouse Construction Corp. v. Telesco Mason's Supply, Inc., 168 Conn. 371 , vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), on remand, 170 Conn. 155 , cert. den. 429 U.S. 889 1976), holds that constitutional due process requires notice and a prompt hearing must be accorded persons affected by mechanic's liens.

1992Roundhouse Construction Corp. v. Telesco Mason's Supply, Inc., 168 Conn. 371 , vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), on remand, 170 Conn. 155 , cert. den. 429 U.S. 889 1976), holds that constitutional due process requires notice and a prompt hearing must be accorded persons affected by mechanic's liens.

1991CT Page 10320 In General Electric Supply Co. v. SNETCO, 185 Conn. 583 (1981) in which a general contractor sought to contest a subcontractor's mechanic's lien, the court, noting that the subcontractor had a year, under 49-39 , to start a foreclosure action, and that the general contractor could only obtain a hearing under 49-37 (a) after posting bond, stated, by way of dicta, that "defendants have made out a strong prima facie case that our statute may operate to deprive a general contractor of a prompt hearing. . . .