Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
17 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1961–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Office State Prosecutor v. Judicial Watch, Inc.green2 sentences2013After receiving notice from the parties that the redacted records have been produced to Plaintiff, the Court shall schedule a prompt hearing, including if necessary an evidentiary hearing, to resolve such claims." As to the appealability of the Circuit Court's interlocutory order, see State Prosecutor v. Judicial Watch, 356 Md. 118, 126-128 , 737 A.2d 592, 597 (1999) ("[A]n order under this [Public Information] Act,” requiring a governmental custodian to disclose public records, "is an injunction”); Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 12 — 303(3)(i) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings A 2013After receiving notice from the parties that the redacted records have been produced to Plaintiff, the Court shall schedule a prompt hearing, including if necessary an evidentiary hearing, to resolve such claims." As to the appealability of the Circuit Court's interlocutory order, see State Prosecutor v. Judicial Watch, 356 Md. 118, 126-128 , 737 A.2d 592, 597 (1999) ("[A]n order under this [Public Information] Act,” requiring a governmental custodian to disclose public records, "is an injunction”); Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 12 — 303(3)(i) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings A | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Browngreen1 sentence2013See Brown v. Brown, 463 N.E.2d 310, 313 (Ind.Ct.App.1984) (“A prompt hearing is especially essential in a custody case where the parties are dueling for a child’s affections and the longer a delay, the more chance one party has to influence the child.”). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Kaela C.green2 sentences2008There we stated that in order "to protect a party's right to have a matter heard by a judge, Rule 11-111(c) requires that `upon the filing of exceptions,' the trial judge must hold `a prompt hearing' on those exceptions." Id. at 474, 906 A.2d at 939-40 (emphasis in original). 2008There we stated that in order "to protect a party's right to have a matter heard by a judge, Rule 11-111(c) requires that upon the filing of exceptions,’ the trial judge must hold ‘a prompt hearing’ on those exceptions.” Id. at 474, 906 A.2d at 939-40 (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
Morrissey v. Brewergreen2 sentences1993See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 484 , 92 S.Ct. at 2602 , 33 L.Ed.2d at 496 . 1993See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 484 , 92 S.Ct. at 2602 , 33 L.Ed.2d at 496 . | 1 | 1 |
Gerstein v. Pughgreen2 sentences1978See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 114 , 95 S. Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); and see Note, 5 U.Balt.L.Rev. 322 (1976). 1978See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 114 , 95 S. Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); and see Note, 5 U.Balt.L.Rev. 322 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Muhl v. Magan
green
2 sentences2011According to AFCO, the circuit court erred in ruling that the July 13, 2009 Order was not final and appealable because once “thirty days passed without a hearing, [it was] fully and finally denied [its] unconditional, statutory right to a prompt hearing.” It relies, primarily, on Muhl v. Magan, 313 Md. 462 , 545 A.2d 1321 (1988), for this argument. 2011According to AFCO, the circuit court erred in ruling that the July 13, 2009 Order was not final and appealable because once “thirty days passed without a hearing, [it was] fully and finally denied [its] unconditional, statutory right to a prompt hearing.” It relies, primarily, on Muhl v. Magan, 313 Md. 462 , 545 A.2d 1321 (1988), for this argument. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Matter of Jackson
neutral
2 sentences2006The import of this provision was iterated by the Court of Special Appeals in Matter of Jackson, 22 Md.App. 108 , 321 A.2d 827 (1974), where Ms. Jackson filed exceptions to a master’s findings and recommendations pursuant to Rule 908(e)(2), the predecessor to Rule ll-lll(c). 2006The import of this provision was iterated by the Court of Special Appeals in Matter of Jackson, 22 Md.App. 108 , 321 A.2d 827 (1974), where Ms. Jackson filed exceptions to a master’s findings and recommendations pursuant to Rule 908(e)(2), the predecessor to Rule ll-lll(c). | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Cochran v. Anderson
green
2 sentences2010Id. at 614 , 535 A.2d 955 (emphasis added). 2010Id. at 614 , 535 A.2d 955 (emphasis added). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Knoche v. State
neutral
2 sentences2009“Proceedings in the Tax Court are governed by [T-G sections] 13-514 to 13-529, which provide a party with the procedural rights to a prompt hearing, to appear before the Tax Court pro se or represented by counsel, to introduce evidence, subpoena witnesses, and conduct depositions, and to submit certain fact issues for resolution by a jury.” Knoche v. State, 171 Md.App. 209, 218 , 908 A.2d 1247 (2006). 2009“Proceedings in the Tax Court are governed by [T-G sections] 13-514 to 13-529, which provide a party with the procedural rights to a prompt hearing, to appear before the Tax Court pro se or represented by counsel, to introduce evidence, subpoena witnesses, and conduct depositions, and to submit certain fact issues for resolution by a jury.” Knoche v. State, 171 Md.App. 209, 218 , 908 A.2d 1247 (2006). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
In Re Keith W.
green
2 sentences2001For these reasons, such delays undermine “the overriding goal of Maryland’s juvenile statutory scheme ... to rehabilitate and treat delinquent juveniles so that they become useful and productive members of society.” In re Keith W., 310 Md. 99, 106 , 527 A.2d 35 (1987); see also Md.Code (1973, 1998 Repl.Vol., 2000 Supp.), § 3-802 of the Cts. & Jud. 2001For these reasons, such delays undermine “the overriding goal of Maryland’s juvenile statutory scheme ... to rehabilitate and treat delinquent juveniles so that they become useful and productive members of society.” In re Keith W., 310 Md. 99, 106 , 527 A.2d 35 (1987); see also Md.Code (1973, 1998 Repl.Vol., 2000 Supp.), § 3-802 of the Cts. & Jud. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Kosmas v. State
green
2 sentences2001Because we conclude that the damage in the form of prejudice to the defendant transcended the curative effect of the instruction, we reverse...." Kosmas, 316 Md. at 594 , 560 A.2d. at 1141 . 2001Because we conclude that the damage in the form of prejudice to the defendant transcended the curative effect of the instruction, we reverse...." Kosmas, 316 Md. at 594 , 560 A.2d. at 1141 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
United States v. Billy Sunday Tyler
green
1 sentence1983United States v. Tyler, 605 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1979). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View
green
2 sentences1976Recognizing that a garnishment under the Wisconsin statute “may as a practical matter drive a wage-earning family to the wall,” the Court concluded that, because no extraordinary circumstances justified the scheme, “absent notice and a prior hearing . . . this prejudgment garnishment procedure violates the fundamental principles of due process.” Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra, 395 U. S. at 341-42 , 89 S. Ct. at 1822-23 . 1976Recognizing that a garnishment under the Wisconsin statute “may as a practical matter drive a wage-earning family to the wall,” the Court concluded that, because no extraordinary circumstances justified the scheme, “absent notice and a prior hearing . . . this prejudgment garnishment procedure violates the fundamental principles of due process.” Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra, 395 U. S. at 341-42 , 89 S. Ct. at 1822-23 . | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.
green
2 sentences1976Grant Co., supra, 416 U. S. at 614 , 94 S. Ct. at 1903-04 , it was not clear whether, under the statute, the debtor in Sniadach could immediately challenge the garnishment and obtain a prompt hearing to determine, at least preliminarily, its merits. 1976Grant Co., supra, 416 U. S. at 614 , 94 S. Ct. at 1903-04 , it was not clear whether, under the statute, the debtor in Sniadach could immediately challenge the garnishment and obtain a prompt hearing to determine, at least preliminarily, its merits. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Village Books, Inc. v. State's Attorney for Prince George's County
neutral
2 sentences1975The Court found that statute was constitutionally valid because it did provide for a prompt hearing on the issue of obscenity and was therefore not an infringement of First Amendment rights. 1 See also Village Books v. State’s Attorney, 269 Md. 748 , 310 A. 2d 48 (1973) cert. denied, 418 U. S. 930 , 94 S. Ct. 3220 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1169 (1974), reinstating and reaffirming Village Books v. State’s Attorney, 263 Md. 76 , 282 A. 2d 126 (1971). 1975The Court found that statute was constitutionally valid because it did provide for a prompt hearing on the issue of obscenity and was therefore not an infringement of First Amendment rights. 1 See also Village Books v. State’s Attorney, 269 Md. 748 , 310 A. 2d 48 (1973) cert. denied, 418 U. S. 930 , 94 S. Ct. 3220 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1169 (1974), reinstating and reaffirming Village Books v. State’s Attorney, 263 Md. 76 , 282 A. 2d 126 (1971). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Village Books, Inc. v. State's Attorney
green
2 sentences1975The Court found that statute was constitutionally valid because it did provide for a prompt hearing on the issue of obscenity and was therefore not an infringement of First Amendment rights. 1 See also Village Books v. State’s Attorney, 269 Md. 748 , 310 A. 2d 48 (1973) cert. denied, 418 U. S. 930 , 94 S. Ct. 3220 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1169 (1974), reinstating and reaffirming Village Books v. State’s Attorney, 263 Md. 76 , 282 A. 2d 126 (1971). 1975The Court found that statute was constitutionally valid because it did provide for a prompt hearing on the issue of obscenity and was therefore not an infringement of First Amendment rights. 1 See also Village Books v. State’s Attorney, 269 Md. 748 , 310 A. 2d 48 (1973) cert. denied, 418 U. S. 930 , 94 S. Ct. 3220 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1169 (1974), reinstating and reaffirming Village Books v. State’s Attorney, 263 Md. 76 , 282 A. 2d 126 (1971). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Village Books, Inc., Et Al. v. Marshall, State's Attorney for Prince Georges County
neutral
2 sentences1975The Court found that statute was constitutionally valid because it did provide for a prompt hearing on the issue of obscenity and was therefore not an infringement of First Amendment rights. 1 See also Village Books v. State’s Attorney, 269 Md. 748 , 310 A. 2d 48 (1973) cert. denied, 418 U. S. 930 , 94 S. Ct. 3220 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1169 (1974), reinstating and reaffirming Village Books v. State’s Attorney, 263 Md. 76 , 282 A. 2d 126 (1971). 1975The Court found that statute was constitutionally valid because it did provide for a prompt hearing on the issue of obscenity and was therefore not an infringement of First Amendment rights. 1 See also Village Books v. State’s Attorney, 269 Md. 748 , 310 A. 2d 48 (1973) cert. denied, 418 U. S. 930 , 94 S. Ct. 3220 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1169 (1974), reinstating and reaffirming Village Books v. State’s Attorney, 263 Md. 76 , 282 A. 2d 126 (1971). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Snyder v. Cearfoss
green
2 sentences1961I It is true that said Section 594 states that motions for new trials in criminal cases shall be heard within ten days, and, while this provision should be followed by the trial courts when possible and practical, we consider it directory, and not mandatory, compare Snyder v. Cearfoss, 186 Md. 360, 370 , 46 A. 2d 607 ; hence, the failure to hear the motion for a new trial within ten days, alone, is not a ground for relief under the P. C. 1961I It is true that said Section 594 states that motions for new trials in criminal cases shall be heard within ten days, and, while this provision should be followed by the trial courts when possible and practical, we consider it directory, and not mandatory, compare Snyder v. Cearfoss, 186 Md. 360, 370 , 46 A. 2d 607 ; hence, the failure to hear the motion for a new trial within ten days, alone, is not a ground for relief under the P. C. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.