11 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Morrissey v. Brewergreen2 sentences2011Given that inherent flexibility, Morrissey established minimum due process requirements for probation revocation proceedings, including “an informal hearing structured to assure that the finding of a [probation] violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the parolee’s behavior.” Id. at 484 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 . 2011Given that inherent flexibility, Morrissey established minimum due process requirements for probation revocation proceedings, including “an informal hearing structured to assure that the finding of a [probation] violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the parolee’s behavior.” Id. at 484 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 . | 2 | 4 |
Baca v. Highlands Universitygreen2 sentences2019Davis, 1989-NMCA-023 , ¶¶ 12-17; see also Baca v. Highlands Univ., 1992-NMSC-010 , ¶ 7, 113 N.M. 170 , 824 P.2d 310 (interpreting the predecessor statute, NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-54(D) (1989), which was redesignated as Section 52-1-54(E)). {24} Davis does not, however, support Worker’s argument that he is entitled to fee- shifting under Section 52-1-54(E). 2019Davis, 1989-NMCA-023 , ¶¶ 12-17; see also Baca v. Highlands Univ., 1992-NMSC-010 , ¶ 7, 113 N.M. 170 , 824 P.2d 310 (interpreting the predecessor statute, NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-54(D) (1989), which was redesignated as Section 52-1-54(E)). {24} Davis does not, however, support Worker’s argument that he is entitled to fee- shifting under Section 52-1-54(E). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Guthriegreen2 sentences2014See Guthrie, 2011-NMSC-014, ¶ 11 (establishing a minimum due process standard to exist in the context of a probation revocation hearing that includes an informal hearing where “[t]he parolee must have an opportunity to be heard and to show, if he can, that he did not violate the conditions [ofprobation], or, ifhe did, that circumstances in mitigation suggest that the violation does not warrant revocation” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {24} We recognize that a full evidentiary hearing is not required in every case that involves a conditional liberty interest. 2014See Guthrie, 2011-NMSC-014, ¶ 11 (establishing a minimum due process standard to exist in the context of a probation revocation hearing that includes an informal hearing where “[t]he parolee must have an opportunity to be heard and to show, if he can, that he did not violate the conditions [of probation], or, if he did, that circumstances in mitigation suggest that the violation does not warrant revocation” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {24} We recognize that a full evidentiary hearing is not required in every case that involves a conditional liberty interest. | 2 | 2 |
Baber v. Desert Sun Motorsgreen2 sentences2019Section 52-1-54(E) authorizes an attorney fee award (but not fee-shifting) where the worker ultimately recovers compensation in excess of what the employer proposes in an offer of settlement: “In all case where compensation . . . is refused and the claimant thereafter collects compensation through proceedings before the [WCA] or courts in an amount in excess of the amount offered in writing by an employer five business days or more prior to the informal hearing before the administration, the compensation to be paid the attorney for the claimant shall be fixed by the [WCJ.]” A Section 52-1-54(F 2019Section 52-1-54(E) authorizes an attorney fee award (but not fee-shifting) where the worker ultimately recovers compensation in excess of what the employer proposes in an offer of settlement: “In all case where compensation . . . is refused and the claimant thereafter collects compensation through proceedings before the [WCA] or courts in an amount in excess of the amount offered in writing by an employer five business days or more prior to the informal hearing before the administration, the compensation to be paid the attorney for the claimant shall be fixed by the [WCJ.]” A Section 52-1-54(F | 1 | 1 |
State v. Romerogreen1 sentence2015Instead, he 9 confirms that the district court held an informal hearing on May 21, 2015 “at which 10 representatives of New Mexico Gas Company and Public Service Company of New 11 Mexico [(PNM)] testified[, and t]he hearing was continued to August 12, 2015.” [MIO 12 3] He also recognizes that the district court held a status hearing and heard testimony 13 from another representative from PNM on August 12, 2015, and the district court 14 issued a written order regarding the utility lines on September 4, 2015. [MIO 3-4] 15 {5} Despite these hearings and the September 4, 2015 order, in which the | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sanchezgreen2 sentences2003See State v. Sanchez, 109 N.M. 718, 719 , 790 P.2d 515, 516 (Ct.App.1990); see also NMSA 1978, § 31-21-15(B) (1989). 2003See State v. Sanchez, 109 N.M. 718, 719 , 790 P.2d 515, 516 (Ct.App.1990); see also NMSA 1978, § 31-21-15(B) (1989). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mathews v. Eldridge
green
2 sentences2001Citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), the court concluded that “there is no deprivation of due process rights where a claimant has been accorded an opportunity to be heard through the informal hearing and affirmatively waived her right to a subsequent formal hearing” through a written acceptance of the recommended resolutions. 2001Citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), the court concluded that “there is no deprivation of due process rights where a claimant has been accorded an opportunity to be heard through the informal hearing and affirmatively waived her right to a subsequent formal hearing” through a written acceptance of the recommended resolutions. | 2 | 1989–2001 |
Rivera v. Flint Energy
green
1 sentence2019Section 52-1-54(E) authorizes an attorney fee award (but not fee-shifting) where the worker ultimately recovers compensation in excess of what the employer proposes in an offer of settlement: “In all case where compensation . . . is refused and the claimant thereafter collects compensation through proceedings before the [WCA] or courts in an amount in excess of the amount offered in writing by an employer five business days or more prior to the informal hearing before the administration, the compensation to be paid the attorney for the claimant shall be fixed by the [WCJ.]” A Section 52-1-54(F | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Thornton v. Gamble
green
1 sentence2015Instead, he 9 confirms that the district court held an informal hearing on May 21, 2015 “at which 10 representatives of New Mexico Gas Company and Public Service Company of New 11 Mexico [(PNM)] testified[, and t]he hearing was continued to August 12, 2015.” [MIO 12 3] He also recognizes that the district court held a status hearing and heard testimony 13 from another representative from PNM on August 12, 2015, and the district court 14 issued a written order regarding the utility lines on September 4, 2015. [MIO 3-4] 15 {5} Despite these hearings and the September 4, 2015 order, in which the | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Armijo v. Save 'N Gain
green
2 sentences2001Armijo, 108 N.M. at 284 , 771 P.2d at 992 . 2001Armijo, 108 N.M. at 284 , 771 P.2d at 992 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
McCoy v. New Mexico Real Estate Commission
green
2 sentences1988McCoy v. New Mexico Real Estate Comm’n, 94 N.M. 602 , 614 P.2d 14 (1980). 1988McCoy v. New Mexico Real Estate Comm’n, 94 N.M. 602 , 614 P.2d 14 (1980). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Conwell v. City of Albuquerque
green
2 sentences1988While we could consider the disposition of this case on that basis, see Conwell v. City of Albuquerque, 97 N.M. 136 , 637 P.2d 567 (1981) (while a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of an administrative decision-maker, it may correct the decision-maker's misapplication of the law), we choose to rest our decision on the Board's own assumption that Subsection (B) applied. [3] [Commissioner] ELLIOTT: Now, it is your understanding that this commission cannot act in an informal hearing, or is this commission considering your rates today? 1988While we could consider the disposition of this case on that basis, see Conwell v. City of Albuquerque, 97 N.M. 136 , 637 P.2d 567 (1981) (while a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of an administrative decision-maker, it may correct the decision-maker's misapplication of the law), we choose to rest our decision on the Board's own assumption that Subsection (B) applied. [3] [Commissioner] ELLIOTT: Now, it is your understanding that this commission cannot act in an informal hearing, or is this commission considering your rates today? | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.