informal hearing in Arizona

1994We discern no rationale for distinguishing between superior courts of different counties for purposes of applying Rule 27.7(e). ‘What is needed [before revoking parole] is an informal hearing structured to assure that the finding of a parole violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the parolee’s behavior.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 484 , 92 S.Ct. at 2602 .

1994We discern no rationale for distinguishing between superior courts of different counties for purposes of applying Rule 27.7(e). ‘What is needed [before revoking parole] is an informal hearing structured to assure that the finding of a parole violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the parolee’s behavior.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 484 , 92 S.Ct. at 2602 .

1976Since it is apparently the informal rule, at least insofar as this record reflects, and contrary to the decisional law of this state (see e. g., State Farm Mutual Insurance Company v. Factory Mutual Insurance Company, 22 Ariz.App. 199, 526 P.2d 406 (1974) and cases cited therein), that there is contribution between solvent joint tortfeasors and/or their insurance carriers, counsel for Mustang inquired as to why his client should pay more than his fair share.

1976Since it is apparently the informal rule, at least insofar as this record reflects, and contrary to the decisional law of this state (see e. g., State Farm Mutual Insurance Company v. Factory Mutual Insurance Company, 22 Ariz.App. 199, 526 P.2d 406 (1974) and cases cited therein), that there is contribution between solvent joint tortfeasors and/or their insurance carriers, counsel for Mustang inquired as to why his client should pay more than his fair share.

1974In Gagnon, in discussing whether it was always essential that the defendant be represented by counsel in connection with the proceedings relating to revocation of probation, the court recognized that this determination may be made by a “case-by-case approach.” The Court further stated: “ * * * But due process is not so rigid as to require that the significant interest in informality, flexibility, and economy must always be sacrificed.” 411 U.S. at 788 , 93 S.Ct. at 1763 , 36 L.Ed.2d at 665 .

1974In Gagnon, in discussing whether it was always essential that the defendant be represented by counsel in connection with the proceedings relating to revocation of probation, the court recognized that this determination may be made by a “case-by-case approach.” The Court further stated: “ * * * But due process is not so rigid as to require that the significant interest in informality, flexibility, and economy must always be sacrificed.” 411 U.S. at 788 , 93 S.Ct. at 1763 , 36 L.Ed.2d at 665 .

1973The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Falcone v. Dantinne, 420 F.2d 1157 (1969), found nothing inherently improper in having a union officer attend and participate in the informal hearing and then act as a trier of fact “ . . . provided there is no element of bias or prejudgment, as we find to be the case here.” 420 F.2d at 1160-61 .

1973The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Falcone v. Dantinne, 420 F.2d 1157 (1969), found nothing inherently improper in having a union officer attend and participate in the informal hearing and then act as a trier of fact “ . . . provided there is no element of bias or prejudgment, as we find to be the case here.” 420 F.2d at 1160-61 .

1973The opinion in 1 CA-CIV 2241 was filed on 1 February 1973 and is entitled Hickox v. Superior Court, 19 Ariz.App. 195 , 505 P.2d 1086 .

1973The opinion in 1 CA-CIV 2241 was filed on 1 February 1973 and is entitled Hickox v. Superior Court, 19 Ariz.App. 195 , 505 P.2d 1086 .

1967Ronan v. Superior Court In And For County of Maricopa, 95 Ariz. 319 , 390 P.2d 109 (1964). *118 After an informal hearing on the petition for writ of certiorari, at which time the County Attorney urged that the witness whose name was sought was a confidential informant, we ordered that the respondent judge direct the County Attorney of Maricopa County to disclose to the petitioner or his attorney the name of the informant and his address and such other additional identifying information, including a description of the automobile which was used at the time of the incident in question, as will e

1967Ronan v. Superior Court In And For County of Maricopa, 95 Ariz. 319 , 390 P.2d 109 (1964). *118 After an informal hearing on the petition for writ of certiorari, at which time the County Attorney urged that the witness whose name was sought was a confidential informant, we ordered that the respondent judge direct the County Attorney of Maricopa County to disclose to the petitioner or his attorney the name of the informant and his address and such other additional identifying information, including a description of the automobile which was used at the time of the incident in question, as will e

1956At the informal hearing before this court petitioner sought to justify such action upon authority of our decision in Kinsey v. State of Arizona, 49 Ariz. 201, 221 , 65 P.2d 1141 , 125 A.L.R. 3 .

1956At the informal hearing before this court petitioner sought to justify such action upon authority of our decision in Kinsey v. State of Arizona, 49 Ariz. 201, 221 , 65 P.2d 1141 , 125 A.L.R. 3 .