informal hearing in California

2025(In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901 , 910–911 (James F.).) “The guardian ad litem has broad powers: ‘the power to control the lawsuit, including controlling procedural steps necessary to the conduct of the litigation … and controlling trial tactics.’ [Citation.] Because ‘the decisions made can affect the outcome of the dependency proceeding, with a corresponding effect on the parent … the parent has a direct and substantial interest in whether a guardian ad litem is appointed.’ ” (In re Jessica G. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1187 .) “Before appointing a guardian ad litem for a parent in a de

2025(In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901 , 910–911 (James F.).) “The guardian ad litem has broad powers: ‘the power to control the lawsuit, including controlling procedural steps necessary to the conduct of the litigation … and controlling trial tactics.’ [Citation.] Because ‘the decisions made can affect the outcome of the dependency proceeding, with a corresponding effect on the parent … the parent has a direct and substantial interest in whether a guardian ad litem is appointed.’ ” (In re Jessica G. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1187 .) “Before appointing a guardian ad litem for a parent in a de

2021Turning to Patricia the court explained its thinking: “[T]his hearing is to decide the appointment of a guardian ad litem to act on your 4 In In re Sara D., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 661 , the court of appeal held that, before appointing a guardian ad litem for a parent in a dependency proceeding, the juvenile court must hold an informal hearing and provide a parent with an oppourtunity to be heard.

2021Turning to Patricia the court explained its thinking: “[T]his hearing is to decide the appointment of a guardian ad litem to act on your 4 In In re Sara D., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 661 , the court of appeal held that, before appointing a guardian ad litem for a parent in a dependency proceeding, the juvenile court must hold an informal hearing and provide a parent with an oppourtunity to be heard.

2016Morrissey requires only an informal hearing to determine whether reasonable grounds exist for the revocation of PRCS, conducted by "someone not directly involved in the case." ( Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 485 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ; see also People v. Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 894-895, 120 Cal.Rptr. 384 , 533 P.2d 1024 ["a unitary hearing will usually suffice in probation revocation cases"].) These standards were satisfied here.

2016Morrissey requires only an informal hearing to determine whether reasonable grounds exist for the revocation of PRCS, conducted by "someone not directly involved in the case." ( Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 485 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ; see also People v. Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 894-895, 120 Cal.Rptr. 384 , 533 P.2d 1024 ["a unitary hearing will usually suffice in probation revocation cases"].) These standards were satisfied here.

2023(See People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 367 .) As explained by our Supreme Court, “a Marsden hearing is not a full-blown adversarial proceeding, but an informal hearing in which the court ascertains the nature of the defendant’s allegations regarding the defects in counsel’s representation and decides whether the allegations have sufficient substance to 47. warrant counsel’s replacement.” (People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1025 .) Here, the trial court allowed appellant to state his concerns at length and permitted Bryan to respond; after appellant’s conviction, the trial court conc

2022(Id. at pp. 123–124.) These opportunities for defendant to express the grounds for a substitution request are called Marsden hearings. “[A] Marsden hearing is not a full-blown adversarial proceeding, but an informal hearing in which the court ascertains the nature of the defendant’s allegations regarding the defects in counsel’s representation and decides whether the allegations have sufficient substance to warrant counsel’s replacement.” (People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1025 .) “A trial court should grant a defendant’s Marsden motion only when the defendant has made ‘a substantial show

2025(In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901 , 910–911 (James F.).) “The guardian ad litem has broad powers: ‘the power to control the lawsuit, including controlling procedural steps necessary to the conduct of the litigation … and controlling trial tactics.’ [Citation.] Because ‘the decisions made can affect the outcome of the dependency proceeding, with a corresponding effect on the parent … the parent has a direct and substantial interest in whether a guardian ad litem is appointed.’ ” (In re Jessica G. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1187 .) “Before appointing a guardian ad litem for a parent in a de

2025(In re Jessica G. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1186-1187 .) Before appointing a guardian ad litem for a parent in a dependency proceeding, the juvenile court must hold an informal hearing to explain to the parent the purpose and powers of a guardian ad litem and the reasons for believing the parent is incompetent.

2025(People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 96 [Marsden hearing is “ ‘not a full-blown adversarial proceeding, but an informal hearing’ ”].) What is required is that a court conduct a hearing in which a defendant is able to “ ‘express the specific reasons why he believe[d] he [was] not being adequately represented by his current counsel.’ ” (People v. Vera, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 979 .) The trial court gave Guan that opportunity, openly asking, “What do you want me to do?” The court then listened and responded to Guan’s comments concerning the evidence presented at trial, the testimony of th

2025(People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 96 [Marsden hearing is “ ‘not a full-blown adversarial proceeding, but an informal hearing’ ”].) What is required is that a court conduct a hearing in which a defendant is able to “ ‘express the specific reasons why he believe[d] he [was] not being adequately represented by his current counsel.’ ” (People v. Vera, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 979 .) The trial court gave Guan that opportunity, openly asking, “What do you want me to do?” The court then listened and responded to Guan’s comments concerning the evidence presented at trial, the testimony of th

2021(Id. at p. 922.) A Marsden hearing “ ‘ “is not a full-blown adversary proceeding, but an informal hearing in which the court ascertains the nature of the defendant’s allegations regarding the defects in 18 counsel’s representation and decides whether the allegations have sufficient substance to warrant counsel’s replacement.” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 803 (Gutierrez).) The court must give the defendant “the opportunity to explain the reasons for desiring a new attorney.” (People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 690 (Smith).) After that, substitution is a matter o

2020(See People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 803 [“‘“a Marsden hearing is not a full-blown adversarial proceeding, but an informal hearing in which the court ascertains the nature of the defendant’s allegations regarding the defects in counsel’s representation and decides whether the allegations have sufficient substance to warrant counsel’s replacement”’”]; People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 96 [same].) Nor did the trial court err in limiting its consideration of Mata’s complaints about Bestard’s representation to instances Mata did not raise in Mata II.

1985(Hough v. McCarthy (1960) 54 Cal.2d 273, 286-287 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 668 , 353 P.2d 276 ]; Fankhauser v. Orr (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 418, 423 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 61 ].) In Fankhauser , a case in which an arresting officer’s section 13353 sworn statement was admitted in evidence at an informal hearing over the licensee’s hearsay objection, this court (Division Two) examined the statutory scheme outline above and concluded that the sworn statement, having been “duly filed” with the DMV under section 13353, was “an official record of the Department within the meaning of Vehicle Code, section 14108.

1985(Hough v. McCarthy (1960) 54 Cal.2d 273, 286-287 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 668 , 353 P.2d 276 ]; Fankhauser v. Orr (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 418, 423 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 61 ].) In Fankhauser , a case in which an arresting officer’s section 13353 sworn statement was admitted in evidence at an informal hearing over the licensee’s hearsay objection, this court (Division Two) examined the statutory scheme outline above and concluded that the sworn statement, having been “duly filed” with the DMV under section 13353, was “an official record of the Department within the meaning of Vehicle Code, section 14108.

2021Governing Law “In a dependency case, a parent who is mentally incompetent must appear by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court. [Citations.] The test [for mental competence] is whether the parent has the capacity to understand the nature or consequences of the proceeding and to assist counsel in preparing the case.” (In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 910 .) Stated another way, “[a] person may be found incompetent if the person was either incapable of understanding the nature and purpose of the proceeding or unable to assist counsel in a rational manner.” (In re M.P. (2013) 217 Cal.App

2020Code, § 1801, subds. (a), (b).) “ ‘[T]he trial court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the parent comes within the requirements of either section.’ ” (M.P., supra, at p. 453.) 11 “Before appointing a guardian ad litem for a parent in a dependency proceeding, the juvenile court must hold an informal hearing at which the parent has an opportunity to be heard. [Citation.] . . .

1968The Hearing Mat Be Informal In Beamon v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 200, 205 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 396 ], the revocation of a driver’s license was upheld following an informal hearing in which the records of DMV were received into evidence showing licensee’s convictions of numerous violations of the Vehicle Code.

1968The Hearing Mat Be Informal In Beamon v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 200, 205 [ 4 Cal.Rptr. 396 ], the revocation of a driver’s license was upheld following an informal hearing in which the records of DMV were received into evidence showing licensee’s convictions of numerous violations of the Vehicle Code.

2021Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 508, 522-523 [statutory penalty is less likely to violate due process where the statute gives the adjudicator discretion in determining the amount of the penalty].) To prevail on their facial challenge, the Lents must show not only that the Commission has the potential to impose penalties large enough to violate due process under the informal hearing procedures of section 30821, but (under the standard more lenient to them) that in the generality or the great majority of cases the Commission’s imposition of a fine would violate due process.

2021Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 508, 522-523 [statutory penalty is less likely to violate due process where the statute gives the adjudicator discretion in determining the amount of the penalty].) To prevail on their facial challenge, the Lents must show not only that the Commission has the potential to impose penalties large enough to violate due process under the informal hearing procedures of section 30821, but (under the standard more lenient to them) that in the generality or the great majority of cases the Commission’s imposition of a fine would violate due process.

1985As pointed out in People v. Chi Ko Wong, supra, a fitness hearing does not involve an adjudication of guilt and does not directly result in confinement or other punishment; its sole purpose “is to determine ‘whether [the] best interest of the child and of society would be served by the retention of the juvenile court authority over him or whether the juvenile, under all the circumstances, should be transferred to be tried as an adult.’” (Id., at p. 718, quoting State v. Piche (1968) 74 Wn.2d 9, 14 [ 442 P.2d 632 ].) This purpose, the court declared, “may best be effectuated by the sound exerci

1985As pointed out in People v. Chi Ko Wong, supra, a fitness hearing does not involve an adjudication of guilt and does not directly result in confinement or other punishment; its sole purpose “is to determine ‘whether [the] best interest of the child and of society would be served by the retention of the juvenile court authority over him or whether the juvenile, under all the circumstances, should be transferred to be tried as an adult.’” (Id., at p. 718, quoting State v. Piche (1968) 74 Wn.2d 9, 14 [ 442 P.2d 632 ].) This purpose, the court declared, “may best be effectuated by the sound exerci

2024Mother said she understood what a subpoena was and how to issue one, agreed she would not receive special treatment, admitted she did not know the rules of evidence but said she could 4 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 . “‘“[A] Marsden hearing is not a full-blown adversarial proceeding, but an informal hearing in which the court ascertains the nature of the defendant’s allegations regarding the defects in counsel’s representation and decides whether the allegations have sufficient substance to warrant counsel’s replacement.”’” (People v. Orey (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 529 , 568.) 6 research a

2021(People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 603 .) “‘[A] Marsden hearing is not a full-blown adversarial proceeding, but an informal hearing in which the court ascertains the nature of the defendant’s allegations regarding the defects in counsel’s representation and decides whether the allegations have sufficient substance to warrant counsel’s replacement.’” (People v. Alfaro 2007) 41 Cal.4th 1277, 1320 .) A Marsden hearing provides the defendant a confidential forum in which to present complaints about counsel’s performance (Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 126 ) and provides appointed counsel the o

2016Morrissey requires only an informal hearing to determine whether reasonable grounds exist for the revocation of PRCS, conducted by "someone not directly involved in the case." ( Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 485 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ; see also People v. Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 894-895, 120 Cal.Rptr. 384 , 533 P.2d 1024 ["a unitary hearing will usually suffice in probation revocation cases"].) These standards were satisfied here.

2016Morrissey requires only an informal hearing to determine whether reasonable grounds exist for the revocation of PRCS, conducted by "someone not directly involved in the case." ( Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 485 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ; see also People v. Coleman, supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 894-895, 120 Cal.Rptr. 384 , 533 P.2d 1024 ["a unitary hearing will usually suffice in probation revocation cases"].) These standards were satisfied here.

2008In a dependency case, a parent who is mentally incompetent must appear through a guardian ad litem, to whom the parent yields management and control of the litigation. ( In re Daniel S. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 903, 912 , 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 646 ; In re Sara D. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 661, 665-667 , 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 909 .) Before appointing a guardian ad litem for a parent in a dependency proceeding, however, the juvenile court must hold an informal hearing at which the purpose and powers of a guardian ad litem and the reasons for believing the parent incompetent are explained to the parent and, if the p

2008In a dependency case, a parent who is mentally incompetent must appear through a guardian ad litem, to whom the parent yields management and control of the litigation. ( In re Daniel S. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 903, 912 , 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 646 ; In re Sara D. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 661, 665-667 , 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 909 .) Before appointing a guardian ad litem for a parent in a dependency proceeding, however, the juvenile court must hold an informal hearing at which the purpose and powers of a guardian ad litem and the reasons for believing the parent incompetent are explained to the parent and, if the p

2021Appellant’s claim that the Marsden hearing was procedurally flawed due to the lack of a renewed inquiry necessarily fails as well. 12 Appellant also contends the trial court erred in failing to inquire about (1) the need for an attorney to assist appellant in articulating his reasons; (2) the number of meetings Donde had with appellant and her investigation of the case; (3) how Donde felt about appellant claiming she called him the N word; and (4) what appellant meant when he said Donde looked at him “wrong.” It is well settled that “ ‘a Marsden hearing is not a full- blown adversarial proceed

2021(People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 603 .) “‘[A] Marsden hearing is not a full-blown adversarial proceeding, but an informal hearing in which the court ascertains the nature of the defendant’s allegations regarding the defects in counsel’s representation and decides whether the allegations have sufficient substance to warrant counsel’s replacement.’” (People v. Alfaro 2007) 41 Cal.4th 1277, 1320 .) A Marsden hearing provides the defendant a confidential forum in which to present complaints about counsel’s performance (Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 126 ) and provides appointed counsel the o

1985(Hough v. McCarthy (1960) 54 Cal.2d 273, 286-287 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 668 , 353 P.2d 276 ]; Fankhauser v. Orr (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 418, 423 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 61 ].) In Fankhauser , a case in which an arresting officer’s section 13353 sworn statement was admitted in evidence at an informal hearing over the licensee’s hearsay objection, this court (Division Two) examined the statutory scheme outline above and concluded that the sworn statement, having been “duly filed” with the DMV under section 13353, was “an official record of the Department within the meaning of Vehicle Code, section 14108.

1985(Hough v. McCarthy (1960) 54 Cal.2d 273, 286-287 [ 5 Cal.Rptr. 668 , 353 P.2d 276 ]; Fankhauser v. Orr (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 418, 423 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 61 ].) In Fankhauser , a case in which an arresting officer’s section 13353 sworn statement was admitted in evidence at an informal hearing over the licensee’s hearsay objection, this court (Division Two) examined the statutory scheme outline above and concluded that the sworn statement, having been “duly filed” with the DMV under section 13353, was “an official record of the Department within the meaning of Vehicle Code, section 14108.

2023(See People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 367 .) As explained by our Supreme Court, “a Marsden hearing is not a full-blown adversarial proceeding, but an informal hearing in which the court ascertains the nature of the defendant’s allegations regarding the defects in counsel’s representation and decides whether the allegations have sufficient substance to 47. warrant counsel’s replacement.” (People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1025 .) Here, the trial court allowed appellant to state his concerns at length and permitted Bryan to respond; after appellant’s conviction, the trial court conc

2004(See People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 367 , 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93 , 21 P.3d 769 ( Silva ).) As we have said, "a Marsden hearing is not a full-blown adversarial proceeding, but an informal hearing in which the court ascertains the nature of the defendant's allegations regarding the defects in counsel's representation and decides whether the allegations have sufficient substance to warrant counsel's replacement." ( People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1025 , 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594 , 938 P.2d 388 .) Defendant additionally argues that the trial court relied on an incorrect standard in ruling on t

2022A defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the appointed counsel is not providing adequate representation or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 599 .) Thus, the trial court is obligated not merely to inquire into a possible conflict of interest, but to act in response to what its inquiry discovers.

2015(People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 599 (Taylor).) A defendant seeking substitution of appointed counsel is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that counsel “is not 7 providing adequate representation or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result.” (Ibid.) The Marsden hearing is an informal hearing for the trial court to decide whether the defendant’s grievances have “sufficient substance” to warrant counsel’s replacement.

2021(Id. at p. 922.) A Marsden hearing “ ‘ “is not a full-blown adversary proceeding, but an informal hearing in which the court ascertains the nature of the defendant’s allegations regarding the defects in 18 counsel’s representation and decides whether the allegations have sufficient substance to warrant counsel’s replacement.” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 803 (Gutierrez).) The court must give the defendant “the opportunity to explain the reasons for desiring a new attorney.” (People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 690 (Smith).) After that, substitution is a matter o

2013The court is entitled to accept counsel’s explanation of his conduct and is not obliged to inquire, sua sponte, into the actual efficacy of his efforts. ( Smith, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 696-697; People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 436 .) 8 In any event, defendant’s complaints relate to trial tactics and strategy and, under the circumstances of this case, do not constitute the type of “irreconcilable conflict” that indicates defense counsel’s representation was inadequate.

2014Proc., § 373, subd. (c); see Briggs v. Briggs (1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 312, 318 .) “The statutes regarding appointment of guardians ad litem were enacted to protect minors and insane and incompetent persons — not to preclude them from their legal rights.” (Briggs, at p. 319; see § 372.) Before a guardian ad litem may be appointed to represent a parent in a dependency proceeding, due process requires notice to the affected parent and at least an informal hearing.

2004Proc., § 372.) The appointment of a guardian ad litem for a parent in a dependency proceeding is significant because the effect of such an appointment is to remove the control of litigation from the parent. ( In re Jessica G. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1186-1187 , 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 714 .) Consequently, the parent's due process rights must be protected before a guardian ad litem is appointed. ( In re Sara D. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 661, 667-668 , 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 909 .) Those rights are satisfied if the parent consents to the appointment of a guardian ad litem or, if the parent does not consent, th

1994“Probation revocation hearings and criminal trials serve different public interests, and different concerns may shape the People’s pursuit of revocation and conviction.” (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 347 [ 272 Cal.Rptr. 767 , 795 P.2d 1223 , 2 A.L.R.5th 995 ].) As the United States Supreme Court has emphasized, “. . . there are critical differences between criminal trials and probation or parole revocation hearings, and both society and the probationer or parolee have stakes in preserving these differences.” (Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, 411 U.S. 778, 788-789 [ 36 L.Ed.2d 656,

1994“Probation revocation hearings and criminal trials serve different public interests, and different concerns may shape the People’s pursuit of revocation and conviction.” (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 347 [ 272 Cal.Rptr. 767 , 795 P.2d 1223 , 2 A.L.R.5th 995 ].) As the United States Supreme Court has emphasized, “. . . there are critical differences between criminal trials and probation or parole revocation hearings, and both society and the probationer or parolee have stakes in preserving these differences.” (Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, 411 U.S. 778, 788-789 [ 36 L.Ed.2d 656,

2007G., supra, at pp. 33-34, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 872 .) [5] Due Process The parent's due process rights are satisfied if the parent consents to the appointment of a guardian ad litem or, if the parent does not consent, the court holds an informal hearing in which the parent has an opportunity to explain why a guardian ad litem is not required. ( Enrique G., supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 683 , 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 724 ; Daniel S., supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 912 , 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 646 .) It has been held that at the informal hearing, the court or the parent's attorney must explain the purpose of a guardian ad li

2007G., supra, at pp. 33-34, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 872 .) [5] Due Process The parent's due process rights are satisfied if the parent consents to the appointment of a guardian ad litem or, if the parent does not consent, the court holds an informal hearing in which the parent has an opportunity to explain why a guardian ad litem is not required. ( Enrique G., supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 683 , 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 724 ; Daniel S., supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 912 , 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 646 .) It has been held that at the informal hearing, the court or the parent's attorney must explain the purpose of a guardian ad li

1987(Id., at p. 62.) The court in Fallís similarly held that “in an informal hearing the statement should be and is sufficient prima facie evidence of any matter as to which there is no conflicting evidence.” ( 264 Cal.App.2d 373, 379 .) The court, however, found that a bare legal conclusion in the statement as to reasonable cause for the arrest was not sufficient evidence, alone, to overcome contrary testimony in that case.

1982In Fallis v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, supra, 264 Cal.App.2d 373 (Fourth Dist., Div. One, the same appellate court that decided August), the reviewing court was again faced with an informal hearing before a DMV hearing officer at which the licensee Fallis appeared without counsel.