informal inquiry in Texas

2020“If a trial judge has a bona fide doubt about the competency of the defendant, he or she shall conduct an informal inquiry to determine if there is evidence that would support a finding of incompetence.” Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420, 425 (Tex. Crim.

2019Montoya, 291 S.W.3d at 426 . -9- 04-18-00415-CR Discussion In this case, the trial court conducted the first step in the process by conducting an informal inquiry into Carreon’s competency following trial counsel’s filing of a motion requesting a competency evaluation.

2025ANN. art. 46B.004(c)). 4 Criminal Appeals repeated its holding in Turner, stating, “‘[A] trial court must consider only that evidence tending to show incompetency’ and ‘put[] aside all competing indications of competency.’” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 692 ). “[A]t the informal inquiry stage, ‘the standard for requiring a formal competency trial is not a particularly onerous one—whether putting aside the evidence of competency, there is more than a scintilla of evidence that would support a rational finding of fact that the accused is incompetent to stand

2025See id. at 564 . “[T]he correct evidentiary standard at the informal inquiry stage is some evidence—more than none or a scintilla…There must be “some evidence from which it may rationally be inferred not only 1) that the defendant suffers some degree of debilitating mental illness, and that 2) he obstinately refuses to cooperate with counsel to his own apparent detriment, but also that 3) his mental illness is what fuels his obstinacy.” Id. at 564–65 (quoting Turner v. State, 422 S.W.3d 676, 696 (Tex. Crim.

2026“The first step is an informal inquiry; the second step is a formal competency trial.” Id.

2026The trial court’s duty to conduct an informal inquiry is triggered “upon a ‘suggestion’ from any credible source that the defendant may be incompetent.” Id. (quoting TEX.

2013Once such suggestion is made, if the trial judge has a “bona fide doubt” about the competency of the defendant, he “shall conduct an informal inquiry to determine if there is evidence that would support a finding of incompetence.” 4 Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420, 425 (Tex.Crim.App.2009); McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 710 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); see also Tex.Code Crim.

2010See McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 712 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) (noting the appellant’s lucid trial testimony in support of the trial court’s implicit decision to not hold an informal inquiry); Kostura, 292 S.W.3d at 747 (same).

2015In Luna v. State, the informal inquiry was held to be sufficient where the trial court “inquired about the appellant's competency several times during the proceedings.” Luna v. State, 268 S.W.3d 594, 599 (Tex. Crim.

2013An informal inquiry may be satisfied when the trial court poses simple, short questions to the defendant or defense counsel regarding the defendant’s competency—“exhaustive inquisitions are not required.” Coyt-Sowells v. State, No. 14-11-00986-CR, 2013 WL 1499579 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 11, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Luna, 268 S.W.3d at 599–600).

2026See Lindsey, 310 S.W.3d at 188 (citing Fuller v. State, 253 S.W.3d 220, 228 (Tex. Crim.

2012Montoya, 291 S.W.3d at 425 .2 A bona fide doubt is “a real doubt in the judge’s mind as to the defendant’s competency.” Fuller v. State, 253 S.W.3d 220, 228 (Tex. Crirn.

2025See Ex parte Lahood, 401 S.W.3d at 52–53 (discussing the informal inquiry and the procedure to follow if there is evidence of a defendant’s incompetency); see also Tex. Code Crim.

2019See Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 692 (discussing that a formal competency trial is only required if there is some evidence during the informal inquiry “that rationally may lead to a conclusion of incompetency” (quoting Ex parte LaHood, 401 S.W.3d 45 , 52–53 (Tex. Crim.

2025See George v. State, 446 S.W.3d 490, 501 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d).

2024See George v. State, 446 S.W.3d 490, 501 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (noting that during informal inquiry, “the trial court [i]s not required to follow specific protocols”).

2016See Jackson, 391 S.W.3d at 143 (holding no abuse of discretion by trial court in deciding not to conduct, sua sponte, an informal inquiry at sentencing); Lindsey v. State, 310 S.W.3d 186, 190 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010, no pet.) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to initiate an informal inquiry).

2015See Jackson v. State, 391 S.W.3d 139 , 141 n.1 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2012, no pet.) (applying the amended version of the statute to hold that the trial court must conduct an informal hearing if any credible source suggests incompetency).

2025See Rodriguez, 329 S.W.3d at 79 . 7 IV.

2023Id. at 80 .

2026See Gray v. State, 257 S.W.3d 825, 828 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. ref’d); Clark, 592 S.W.3d at 927 (citing Boyett, 545 S.W.3d at 563 ).

2025A. Yes, sir. 6 Assuming, without finding, that Cuevas’s statements were enough to create a suggestion of incompetency, on review of the entire record, we find that the trial court did in fact conduct an informal inquiry into Cuevas’s competency.4 See Gray v. State, 257 S.W.3d 825, 828 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. ref’d) (finding that record demonstrated trial court in fact conducted informal inquiry into defendant’s competency).5 After both sides closed and presented argument, the trial court made the following statement: Mr. Cuevas has brought up an issue regarding possible mental health i

2010Cf. Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 395 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (finding no error in the trial court’s failure to hold an informal inquiry when the court knew the defendant suffered from depression but there was no evidence that he could not understand the proceedings or assist his attorney); see also Williams v. State, Nos. 14-09-00042-CR, 14-09-00043-CR, 2010 WL 3921128 , at *6 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 7, 2010, no pet. h.) (“[E]vidence of impairment does not support a competency inquiry where there is no evidence indicating the defendant is unable to consult with his attorney with a r

2009We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to conduct a formal hearing or jury trial on the matter of Ybarra's competence because the court's informal inquiry did not reveal evidence "that rationally could lead to a determination of incompetency." See Moore , 999 S.W.2d at 393 .

2011This is because a trial court, at the informal inquiry stage, is entitled to consider reports similar to those furnished here in determining if there is any evidence of incompetence. [5] See Luna , 268 S.W.3d at 600 (indicating that psychiatric examinations, even if not necessary for informal inquiry, may be considered by trial court); Lawrence v. State , 169 S.W.3d 319 , 328 n.1 (Tex. App. — Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref’d) (stating that review of any psychological evaluations of defendant constitutes “useful source” of information for trial court in conducting informal inquiry); see also Tex. Co

2011As noted by the trial court, Friedman, in his first report, observed that appellant’s “thinking” was “goal oriented,” “there was no obvious indications of delusional thinking,” and his articulated reasons for refusing to fully participate in the examinations and his “obvious familiarity with the structure and functioning roles of the criminal justice system” suggested to him that appellant “may be competent.” In his second report, Friedman went further with his opinions, stating that appellant was “deliberately difficult and evasive” and “almost certainly . . . competent.” A trial court, at th

2024If a “trial judge finds that there is a suggestion of incompetency, he or she shall conduct an informal inquiry to determine if there is some evidence from any source that would support a finding that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial.” Druery v. State, 412 S.W.3d 523, 538 (Tex. Crim.

2020If a “trial judge finds that there is a suggestion of incompetency, he or she shall conduct an informal inquiry to determine ‘if there is some evidence from any source’ that would support a finding that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial.” Druery v. State, 412 S.W.3d 523, 538 (Tex. Crim.

2023Cf. Hobbs v. State, 359 S.W.3d 919, 925 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (noting that history of mental illness was insufficient “to warrant a competency inquiry absent evidence of a present inability to communicate with his attorney or understand the proceedings”).

2018Hobbs v. State , 359 S.W.3d 919 , 924 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.).

2015Cf. Alcott v. State, 51 S.W.3d 596 , 600–01 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (under the former statutory scheme, bona fide doubt triggered competency inquiry during which the trial court must determine whether there is “some evidence” to support a finding of incompetency so as to trigger a formal competency hearing). 32 See Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 822, §§ 2 & 21(b), p. 1895 & 1901, eff.

2013Cf. Alcott v. State, 51 S.W.3d 596, 600-01 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (under the former statutory scheme, bona fide doubt triggered competency inquiry during which the trial court must determine whether there is "some evidence” to support a finding of incompetency so as to trigger a formal competency hearing). .

2019Moreover, we note that, during the informal inquiry, Appellant did not present any evidence to suggest that he lacked “sufficient present ability to consult with [his] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” or “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against [him].” See id. art. 46B.003(a).

2019Moreover, we note that, during the informal inquiry, Appellant did not present any evidence to suggest that he lacked “sufficient present ability to consult with [his] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” or “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against [him].” See id. art. 46B.003(a).

2016But regardless of whether a party or the trial court is the one to make the *813 suggestion, a trial court is not authorized to initiate an informal inquiry to determine a defendant’s competency unless the evidence of incompetency is sufficient to raise “a bona fide doubt in the mind of the judge regarding whether the defendant is legally competent.” Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420, 425 (Tex.Crim.App.2009); see Gonzales v. State, 313 S.W.3d 840, 841-42 (Tex.Crim.App.2010).

2015But regardless of whether a party or the trial court was the one to make such a suggestion, a trial court was not authorized to initiate an informal inquiry to determine a defendant's competency unless the evidence of incompetency was "sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt in the mind of the judge whether the defendant [was] legally competent." Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420, 425 (Tex.Crim.App.2009); see Gonzales v. State, 313 S.W.3d 840, 841-42 (Tex.Crim.App.2010).

2013In Rojas, the defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred by not conducting an informal inquiry into his competency to stand trial, even though “his conduct at trial was sufficiently bizarre to raise a bona fide doubt as 7 to his competency.” Id. at 772 .

2010See also Rojas v. State, 228 S.W.3d 770 (Tex.App.BAmarillo 2007, no pet.) (no abuse of discretion in failing to conduct further informal inquiry or to appoint an expert to evaluate defendant when he made comments during voir dire and throughout trial, engaged in non-responsive answers on the stand and expressed view that police conspired to frame him). 8 Finding no abuse of discretion here in the trial court’s failure to initiate an informal inquiry, we overrule appellant’s sole point of error, and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

2012See Montoya, 291 S.W.3d at 423 (abrogating Greene); see also Kostura v. State, 292 S.W.3d 744 , 747–48 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.], 2009, no pet.) (recognizing abrogation). 3 We need not and do not consider appellant’s argument that his due-process rights and right to a fair trial were violated by the trial court’s decision not to pursue an additional informal inquiry. 9 retained counsel should be allowed to withdraw from a case.

2010See McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 712 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) (noting the appellant’s lucid trial testimony in support of the trial court’s implicit decision to not hold an informal inquiry); Kostura, 292 S.W.3d at 747 (same).

2017See Ex parte LaHood, 401 S.W.3d at 52 -53 & n.5, citing Sisco v. State, 599 S.W.2d 607, 613 (Tex. Crim.

2014See id. art. 46B.004(c-1).

2016See id. (holding evidence of past emotional issues did not trigger informal inquiry); Montoya, 291 S.W.3d at 425 (stating “[w]e have held that instances of depression are not an indication of incompetency and that past mental-health issues raise the issue of incompetency only if there is evidence of recent severe mental illness, at least moderate retardation, or bizarre acts by the defendant”); Hobbs v. State, 359 S.W.3d 919, 925 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (holding that “[n]either appellant’s history of mental illness nor the fact that appellant may have been on psychiatric

2015See Moore v. State, supra, at 395 (the defendant’s propensity toward depression is not proof of his inability to communicate with counsel or understand proceedings); Lahood v. State, supra, at 619 (no abuse of discretion in failing to sua sponte inquire into defendant’s competency despite outbursts during trial, requests for medicine, comments concerning “psych meds”, history of mental problems, and claim of difficulty understanding proceedings); Rice v. State, 991 S.W.2d 953, 957 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref’d) (a competency test is not whether a defendant labored under a mental, behav

2022Greene v. State, 225 S.W.3d 324, 329 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, pet. ref’d) (wherein the reviewing court held that the trial court should have engaged in an informal inquiry sua sponte upon hearing the defendant testify about taking “kick boxing,” being “influenced by the Japanese, the Koreans,” biting one “cop” because another officer told 2 This differs from the test applicable to mandating a formal inquiry into competency; that requires “some evidence,” i.e., more than none or a scintilla, of incompetency.

2019Appellant also argues that an informal inquiry was required in this case because “[t]he facts surrounding Appellant’s case are similar” to the facts of Greene v. State, where the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the trial court 10 erred by failing to conduct an informal inquiry. 225 S.W.3d 324, 329 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2007, no pet.).

2021See Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 695 ; see, e.g., Lindsey v. State, 310 S.W.3d 186, 189 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010, no pet.) (concluding that the trial court’s duty to conduct an informal inquiry on a suggestion of incompetence was not triggered when the appellant’s few responses indicated he understood the proceedings); see also Sanchez v. State, No. 04- 20-00379-CR, 2021 WL 1199052 , at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 31, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding the same).

2016See Jackson, 391 S.W.3d at 143 (holding no abuse of discretion by trial court in deciding not to conduct, sua sponte, an informal inquiry at sentencing); Lindsey v. State, 310 S.W.3d 186, 190 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010, no pet.) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to initiate an informal inquiry).

2025If a formal competency proceeding results in a finding of competency, “the trial court is not obliged to revisit the issue later absent a material change of circumstances suggesting that the defendant’s mental status has deteriorated.” Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 693 ; Learning v. State, 227 S.W.3d 245, 250 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.) (“To justify a second competency hearing, defense counsel would have had to offer new evidence of a change in [appellant]’s mental condition since the first competency hearing.”).

2015Cf. Hobbs v. State, 359 S.W.3d 919, 925 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (noting that history of mental illness and being on psychiatric medications are insufficient "to warrant a competency inquiry absent evidence of a present inability to communicate with his attorney or understand the proceedings"); Learning v. State, 227 S.W.3d 245, 250 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.) (explaining that to be entitled to second competency hearing after being deemed competent, "defense counsel would have had to offer new evidence of a change in . . . mental condition since the first compet

2024A. Standard of Review “We review a trial court’s failure to conduct an informal inquiry into appellant’s competency for an abuse of discretion.” Lindsey v. State, 544 S.W.3d 14, 21 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d).

2024A. Standard of Review “We review a trial court’s failure to conduct an informal inquiry into appellant’s competency for an abuse of discretion.” Lindsey v. State, 544 S.W.3d 14, 21 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d).