occupational disease claim in New York

2025The WCB reasoned that the claim was "untimely on its face" and that "the claimant in the death claim must comply with WCL 28." The WCB also rejected claimant's assertion "that WCL 28 does not apply to Article 8-A claims" and concluded that "the Board Panel is constrained . . . to find that Article 8-A does not apply to this death [*3]claim." Finally, the WCB rejected claimant's argument that "disallowance of the claim is premature" because "this is not an occupational disease claim," and concluded that because "the claim was not filed within two years of the decedent's death, the claim is disa

2025The WCB reasoned that the claim was "untimely on its face" and that "the claimant in the death claim must comply with WCL 28." The WCB also rejected claimant's assertion "that WCL 28 does not apply to Article 8-A claims" and concluded that "the Board Panel is constrained . . . to find that Article 8-A does not apply to this death [*3]claim." Finally, the WCB rejected claimant's argument that "disallowance of the claim is premature" because "this is not an occupational disease claim," and concluded that because "the claim was not filed within two years of the decedent's death, the claim is disa

2021As two thirds of claimant's average weekly wages on the date of disablement was $801.32, and there was no dispute as to whether "the degree of disability finding in [the occupational disease claim] represented an overall degree of disability finding," the Board determined that the concurrent awards could not exceed that "total disability rate." Suffering "separate injuries during successive employments does not alter the fact that [claimant] remains partially disabled" and, under the circumstances present here, directing concurrent awards up to the statutory cap would "result in an accumulatio

2017Corp., 122 AD3d 1048 , 1049 [2014]).

2000“Where, as here, an occupational disease claim is based on the aggravation of a preexisting condition, this Court has long recognized the distinction between the aggravation of a previously active disabling condition and the aggravation of a condition which was previously dormant and not disabling [citation omitted]” (Matter of Cocco v New York City Dept. of Transp., 266 AD2d 634 ).

1999Where, as here, an occupational disease claim is based on the aggravation of a preexisting condition, this Court has long recognized the distinction between the aggravation of a previously active disabling condition and the aggravation of a condition which was previously dormant and not disabling (see, Matter of Perez v Pearl-Wick Corp., 56 AD2d 239, 241 ).

1999“To be compensable, the preexisting condition must be dormant and nondisabling and some distinctive feature of the employment must cause disability by activating the condition” (Matter of Hollander v Valor Clothers, 91 AD2d 731, 732 ).

1999Preservation & Dev., 84 NY2d 129, 136 ).

1990As for the occupational disease claim, the medical report of the carrier’s consultant provides substantial evidence that job stress did not trigger the attack or cause the development of early coronary artery disease (see, Matter of McMicking v City of Niagara Falls, 114 AD2d 593 ).

1990While claimant’s physician opined that the heart attack was caused by both physical work and job stress, the Board was free, in the exercise of its fact-finding powers, to resolve any conflicts in medical opinion (see, Matter of Curtis v Adirondack Trailways, 146 AD2d 900, 901 ).

1963Nevertheless, no appeal was taken even to the board from this decision nor was any question raised as to the propriety thereof, although several continuation orders were issued in the interim, until April, 1960 when the carrier requested the board to consider whether claimant’s condition could be properly classified as an occupational disease under the rule established in Matter of Detenbeck v. General Motors Corp. ( 309 N. Y. 558 ).

1962Our decision in Matter of Slawinski (supra), although without opinion, necessarily rejected the- statutory constructions approved by the Appellate Division in the present case, and meant as to an occupational disease claim that the employee’s right to compensation and the employer’s corresponding liability accrue no later than the date when the illness requires medical attention.