occupational disease test in Florida

1995We agree that the JCC erred if he found Malt Brothers responsible under the occupational disease theory of compensability, which uses the last injurious exposure standard, rather than the repeated trauma theory. “[O]ccupational disease theory is derived from section 440.151, Florida Statutes, which provides a doctrinal foundation separate and apart from the repeated trauma and multiple exposure injury theory as delineated in Festa.” City of Orlando v. Lemay, 652 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (citing Festa v. Teleflex, 382 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)); see also Tokyo House, Inc. v. Hsin Chu,

1992Aetna argues that section 440.151, Florida Statutes (1989), provides a more restrictive test for an occupational disease than the test for repetitive trauma set forth in Festa v. Teleflex, Inc., 382 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).

2017The enactment of section 112.18 offered a claim option that allowed qualifying employees to bridge this causation gap. 3 Prior to enactment of the “heart-lung” statute, an occupational disease claim under section 440.151 enjoyed no presumption in favor of the claimant, and the statute was silent with respect to an evidentiary burden of persuasion. 4 However, in the late 1960s, Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, established a presumption in favor- of a claimant in “any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation.” 5 See § 440.26, Fla. Stat. (1965); Deahl v. Uni-Pak Corp., 550 So.2d 1

2017Petersburg Kennel Club, 396 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1981).

1995We agree that the JCC erred if he found Malt Brothers responsible under the occupational disease theory of compensability, which uses the last injurious exposure standard, rather than the repeated trauma theory. “[O]ccupational disease theory is derived from section 440.151, Florida Statutes, which provides a doctrinal foundation separate and apart from the repeated trauma and multiple exposure injury theory as delineated in Festa.” City of Orlando v. Lemay, 652 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (citing Festa v. Teleflex, 382 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)); see also Tokyo House, Inc. v. Hsin Chu,

1991Later, in Wuesthoff Memorial Hospital v. Hurlbert, 548 So.2d 771, 774-75 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), we reaffirmed the above rule, stating: “A specific incident of exposure need not be proven if, as in the case at issue, all elements of the occupational disease test have been proven.” More recently, in Florida Power Corp. v. Stenholm, 511 So.2d 977 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), we observed that “it is not the prolonged nature of the exposure that is determinative ... [of the issue whether the employee was injuriously exposed to a harmful substance], but rather the issue of whether the exposure arose out of an

1991Later, in Wuesthoff Memorial Hospital v. Hurlbert, 548 So.2d 771, 774-75 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), we reaffirmed the above rule, stating: “A specific incident of exposure need not be proven if, as in the case at issue, all elements of the occupational disease test have been proven.” More recently, in Florida Power Corp. v. Stenholm, 511 So.2d 977 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), we observed that “it is not the prolonged nature of the exposure that is determinative ... [of the issue whether the employee was injuriously exposed to a harmful substance], but rather the issue of whether the exposure arose out of an

1982See Weiby, supra, at 1119 ; Potter, supra, at 323 .

1982Thus, as stated in American Beryllium Co. v. Stringer, 392 So.2d 1294 (Fla. 1981), "[I]t is the disability and not the disease which determines the compensability of the claim." That the inability to continue in a particular occupation was a proper factor to consider in an occupational disease claim was explicitly recognized in Ayers at 385 So.2d 1140 .

1971Id. at 236 . . 198 So.2d 324 , 325 (Fla.1967). . 156 So.2d 853 (Fla.1963). . 197 So.2d 819 (Fla.1967). .The Full Commission noted: “If such testimony and evidence can constitute competent substantial evidence for a finding of causal relation in an occupational disease claim, then every such claim would of necessity be work connected since in every case with few exceptions the claimant testified to a contact with some substance which may be found at their employer’s.” .

1971Id. at 236 . . 198 So.2d 324 , 325 (Fla.1967). . 156 So.2d 853 (Fla.1963). . 197 So.2d 819 (Fla.1967). .The Full Commission noted: “If such testimony and evidence can constitute competent substantial evidence for a finding of causal relation in an occupational disease claim, then every such claim would of necessity be work connected since in every case with few exceptions the claimant testified to a contact with some substance which may be found at their employer’s.” .

1971Id. at 236 . . 198 So.2d 324 , 325 (Fla.1967). . 156 So.2d 853 (Fla.1963). . 197 So.2d 819 (Fla.1967). .The Full Commission noted: “If such testimony and evidence can constitute competent substantial evidence for a finding of causal relation in an occupational disease claim, then every such claim would of necessity be work connected since in every case with few exceptions the claimant testified to a contact with some substance which may be found at their employer’s.” .

1971Id. at 236 . . 198 So.2d 324 , 325 (Fla.1967). . 156 So.2d 853 (Fla.1963). . 197 So.2d 819 (Fla.1967). .The Full Commission noted: “If such testimony and evidence can constitute competent substantial evidence for a finding of causal relation in an occupational disease claim, then every such claim would of necessity be work connected since in every case with few exceptions the claimant testified to a contact with some substance which may be found at their employer’s.” .