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13 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Urie v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2019In Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170-71 (1949), the Supreme Court held that a worker’s occupational disease claim did not accrue for purposes of limitations until manifestation of the disease. 2019In Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170-71 (1949), the Supreme Court held that a worker’s occupational disease claim did not accrue for purposes of limitations until manifestation of the disease. | 2 | 2 |
Foble v. Knefelygreen2 sentences2019Foble, 176 Md. at 486 . 2019Foble, 176 Md. at 486 . | 1 | 3 |
Babcock & Wilcox, Inc. v. Steinergreen2 sentences1989See, e.g., Shifflett v. Powhattan Mining Co., 293 Md. 198, 200-01 , 442 A.2d 980, 982 (1982) (“asbestosis cases are unlike claims arising out of industrial accidents, in which some disability ordinarily is manifest at the time of the accidental injury or relatively soon thereafter”); Babcock & Wilcox, Inc. v. Steiner, 258 Md. 468, 474 , 265 A.2d 871, 875 (1970) (“asbestosis, like other pulmonary dust diseases, is insidious in its onset”); Foble v. Knefely, 176 Md. 474, 486 , 6 A.2d 48, 53 (1939) (“an occupational disease ... is ordinarily slow and insidious in its approach”). 1989See, e.g., Shifflett v. Powhattan Mining Co., 293 Md. 198, 200-01 , 442 A.2d 980, 982 (1982) (“asbestosis cases are unlike claims arising out of industrial accidents, in which some disability ordinarily is manifest at the time of the accidental injury or relatively soon thereafter”); Babcock & Wilcox, Inc. v. Steiner, 258 Md. 468, 474 , 265 A.2d 871, 875 (1970) (“asbestosis, like other pulmonary dust diseases, is insidious in its onset”); Foble v. Knefely, 176 Md. 474, 486 , 6 A.2d 48, 53 (1939) (“an occupational disease ... is ordinarily slow and insidious in its approach”). | 1 | 1 |
Shifflett v. Powhattan Mining Co.green2 sentences1989See, e.g., Shifflett v. Powhattan Mining Co., 293 Md. 198, 200-01 , 442 A.2d 980, 982 (1982) (“asbestosis cases are unlike claims arising out of industrial accidents, in which some disability ordinarily is manifest at the time of the accidental injury or relatively soon thereafter”); Babcock & Wilcox, Inc. v. Steiner, 258 Md. 468, 474 , 265 A.2d 871, 875 (1970) (“asbestosis, like other pulmonary dust diseases, is insidious in its onset”); Foble v. Knefely, 176 Md. 474, 486 , 6 A.2d 48, 53 (1939) (“an occupational disease ... is ordinarily slow and insidious in its approach”). 1989See, e.g., Shifflett v. Powhattan Mining Co., 293 Md. 198, 200-01 , 442 A.2d 980, 982 (1982) (“asbestosis cases are unlike claims arising out of industrial accidents, in which some disability ordinarily is manifest at the time of the accidental injury or relatively soon thereafter”); Babcock & Wilcox, Inc. v. Steiner, 258 Md. 468, 474 , 265 A.2d 871, 875 (1970) (“asbestosis, like other pulmonary dust diseases, is insidious in its onset”); Foble v. Knefely, 176 Md. 474, 486 , 6 A.2d 48, 53 (1939) (“an occupational disease ... is ordinarily slow and insidious in its approach”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lettering Unlimited v. Guy
green
2 sentences2019In Lettering Unlimited, 321 Md. at 311 , we recognized that “ordinary or usual job-related repetitive trauma” can form the basis of an occupational disease claim, which is wholly consistent with our historical characterization of the “slow and insidious” nature of occupational diseases. 2019In Lettering Unlimited, 321 Md. at 311 , we recognized that “ordinary or usual job-related repetitive trauma” can form the basis of an occupational disease claim, which is wholly consistent with our historical characterization of the “slow and insidious” nature of occupational diseases. | 4 | 1992–2019 |
Means v. Baltimore County
green
2 sentences2018Id. at 664 , 689 A.2d 1238 . 2018Id. at 664 , 689 A.2d 1238 . | 3 | 1998–2018 |
King v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PRINCE GEORGE'S CTY.
green
2 sentences2019In determining that the trial court did not err in finding that Guy’s carpal tunnel syndrome was a compensable occupational disease, we stated that, “[w]hile ordinary or usual job-related repetitive 4 We have also defined “employment” in the context of LE § 9-502(d)(1)(i) as “mean[ing] the profession or general occupation in which the person is engaged.” King v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s Cty., 354 Md. 369 , 381–82 (1999). 15 trauma cannot predicate a claim for accidental injury, it might form the basis for an occupational disease claim.” Id. at 311 (quoting R. 2019In determining that the trial court did not err in finding that Guy’s carpal tunnel syndrome was a compensable occupational disease, we stated that, “[w]hile ordinary or usual job-related repetitive 4 We have also defined “employment” in the context of LE § 9-502(d)(1)(i) as “mean[ing] the profession or general occupation in which the person is engaged.” King v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s Cty., 354 Md. 369 , 381–82 (1999). 15 trauma cannot predicate a claim for accidental injury, it might form the basis for an occupational disease claim.” Id. at 311 (quoting R. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Industrial Accident Commission
green
2 sentences2019The Supreme Court explained: There is no suggestion that Urie should have known he had silicosis at any earlier date. ‘It follows that no specific date of contact with the substance can be charged with being the date of injury, inasmuch as the injurious consequences of the exposure are the product of a period of time rather than a point of time; consequently the afflicted employee can be held to be ‘injured’ only when the accumulated effects of the deleterious substance manifest themselves * * *.’ Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 124 Cal.App. 378, 381 , 12 P.2d 107 2019The Supreme Court explained: There is no suggestion that Urie should have known he had silicosis at any earlier date. ‘It follows that no specific date of contact with the substance can be charged with being the date of injury, inasmuch as the injurious consequences of the exposure are the product of a period of time rather than a point of time; consequently the afflicted employee can be held to be ‘injured’ only when the accumulated effects of the deleterious substance manifest themselves * * *.’ Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 124 Cal.App. 378, 381 , 12 P.2d 107 | 2 | 2019–2019 |
James v. General Motors Corp.
green
2 sentences1995Id. at 486 , 538 A.2d 782 . 1995Id. at 486 , 538 A.2d 782 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Montgomery County v. McDonald
green
2 sentences1992As the Court said in Montgomery Co. v. McDonald, 317 Md. 466, 474 , 564 A.2d 797 (1989), “[I]ncremental onset of an occupational disease is the rule rather than the exception.” We perceive no facts alleged by appellant which would permit the fact finder to conclude that appellant’s condition developed over a period of time as in Lettering (seven years intermittent employment) or that the condition was a special incidence of appellant’s duties as a jumper. 1992As the Court said in Montgomery Co. v. McDonald, 317 Md. 466, 474 , 564 A.2d 797 (1989), “[I]ncremental onset of an occupational disease is the rule rather than the exception.” We perceive no facts alleged by appellant which would permit the fact finder to conclude that appellant’s condition developed over a period of time as in Lettering (seven years intermittent employment) or that the condition was a special incidence of appellant’s duties as a jumper. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Zentz v. Peters & Taylor, Inc.
green
2 sentences1985We were wrong and to that extent we overrule Zentz v. Peters, 11 Md.App. at 8 , 272 A.2d at 434 . 1985We were wrong and to that extent we overrule Zentz v. Peters, 11 Md.App. at 8 , 272 A.2d at 434 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Big Savage Refractories Corp. v. Geary
green
2 sentences1983Corp. v. Geary, 209 Md. 362, 366 , 121 A.2d 212 (1956), the Court said that "Heart trouble is not an occupational disease.” That case involved an occupational disease claim for silicosis filed by a clay miner who also suffered from cardiac disease, which appeared to be the actual disabling factor. 1983Corp. v. Geary, 209 Md. 362, 366 , 121 A.2d 212 (1956), the Court said that "Heart trouble is not an occupational disease.” That case involved an occupational disease claim for silicosis filed by a clay miner who also suffered from cardiac disease, which appeared to be the actual disabling factor. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.