occupational disease claim in Oregon

2019Citing Kepford v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 77 Or App 363 , 713 P2d 625 , rev den, 300 Or 722 (1986), Board Member Weddell expressed the view that, because each work injury occurred while claimant was performing work activities, the injuries are part of claimant’s overall employment conditions to be considered in determining the compensability of the claim. 262 Simi v. LTI Inc. - Lynden Inc. “* * * * * “(C) Any series of traumatic events or occurrences which requires medical services or results in physical disability or death. “(2)(a) The worker must prove that employment conditions were the major con

2018App. 363 , 366, 713 P.2d 625 , rev. den. , 300 Or. 722 , 717 P.2d 630 (1986) (prior work injuries may be considered as part of the overall employment conditions for purposes of an occupational disease claim).

1988To prevail on an occupational disease claim for a preexisting condition, the claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “(1) his work activity and conditions (2) caused a worsening of his underlying disease (3) resulting in an increase in his pain (4) to the extent that it produces disability or requires medical services.” Weller v. Union Carbide, 288 Or 27, 35 , 602 P2d 259 (1979).

1988To prevail on an occupational disease claim for a preexisting condition, the claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “(1) his work activity and conditions (2) caused a worsening of his underlying disease (3) resulting in an increase in his pain (4) to the extent that it produces disability or requires medical services.” Weller v. Union Carbide, 288 Or 27, 35 , 602 P2d 259 (1979).

1995The 1976 shoulder injury is not a material contributing cause of the need for treatment or disability resulting from the conversion reaction.” 6 The Board relied on SAIF v. Hukari, 113 Or App 475, 480 , 833 P2d 1307 , rev den 314 Or 391 (1992), which had held that a claim that “a condition is independently compensable because it was caused by on-the-job stress, regardless of the suddenness of onset or the unexpected nature of the condition, and regardless of whether the condition is mental or physical, must be treated as a claim for an occupational disease under ORS 656.802.” (Emphasis in orig

1995The 1976 shoulder injury is not a material contributing cause of the need for treatment or disability resulting from the conversion reaction.” 6 The Board relied on SAIF v. Hukari, 113 Or App 475, 480 , 833 P2d 1307 , rev den 314 Or 391 (1992), which had held that a claim that “a condition is independently compensable because it was caused by on-the-job stress, regardless of the suddenness of onset or the unexpected nature of the condition, and regardless of whether the condition is mental or physical, must be treated as a claim for an occupational disease under ORS 656.802.” (Emphasis in orig

2011SAIF v. Henwood, 176 Or App 431, 435 , 31 P3d 1096 (2001), rev den, 333 Or 463 (2002).

2011SAIF v. Henwood, 176 Or App 431, 435 , 31 P3d 1096 (2001), rev den, 333 Or 463 (2002).

1983In this case, the Board adopted the following rule: *84 “The rule of law to be applied in claims such as this, where a claimant has filed an occupational disease claim against a single employer, is the rule of James v. SAIF, 290 Or 343 , [ 624 P2d 565 ] (1981), and SAIF v. Gygi, 55 Or App 570 [ 639 P2d 655 , rev den 292 Or 825 ] (1982): whether the claimant’s work conditions, when compared to claimant’s nonemployment exposure, are the major contributing cause of the claimant’s condition.

1983In this case, the Board adopted the following rule: *84 “The rule of law to be applied in claims such as this, where a claimant has filed an occupational disease claim against a single employer, is the rule of James v. SAIF, 290 Or 343 , [ 624 P2d 565 ] (1981), and SAIF v. Gygi, 55 Or App 570 [ 639 P2d 655 , rev den 292 Or 825 ] (1982): whether the claimant’s work conditions, when compared to claimant’s nonemployment exposure, are the major contributing cause of the claimant’s condition.

2025During claimant’s closing argument, claimant stated: 1 ORS 656.802 provides, in relevant part: “(2)(a) The worker must prove that employment conditions were the major contributing cause of the disease. “(b) If the occupational disease claim is based on the worsening of a preexisting disease or condition pursuant to ORS 656.005(7), the worker must prove that employment conditions were the major contributing cause of the combined condition and pathological worsening of the disease.” Nonprecedential Memo Op: 338 Or App 155 (2025) 157 “So, your honor, that essentially, is my argument indicating wh

2025During claimant’s closing argument, claimant stated: 1 ORS 656.802 provides, in relevant part: “(2)(a) The worker must prove that employment conditions were the major contributing cause of the disease. “(b) If the occupational disease claim is based on the worsening of a preexisting disease or condition pursuant to ORS 656.005(7), the worker must prove that employment conditions were the major contributing cause of the combined condition and pathological worsening of the disease.” Nonprecedential Memo Op: 338 Or App 155 (2025) 157 “So, your honor, that essentially, is my argument indicating wh

2020Claimant asserted that, although working conditions at Treske were not the major contributing cause of his injury, Treske was still liable for his current rotator cuff condition by virtue of the “last injurious exposure rule” (LIER), applicable to occupational disease claims under Inkley v. Forest Fiber Products Co., 288 Or 337 , 605 P2d 1175 (1980).

2020Claimant asserted that, although working conditions at Treske were not the major contributing cause of his injury, Treske was still liable for his current rotator cuff condition by virtue of the “last injurious exposure rule” (LIER), applicable to occupational disease claims under Inkley v. Forest Fiber Products Co., 288 Or 337 , 605 P2d 1175 (1980).

2003We held that, in order for the statute of limitations for an occupational disease claim to begin to run, an employer or insurer “must affirmatively show that [claimant] was told * * * that [his occupational disease] was caused by or arose out of his employment.” Id. at 121 .

1981Claimant was well within the statutory time for filing an occupational disease claim on July 30, 1979, based on the facts in this case.” In Templeton , we held that the claimant had timely filed an occupational disease claim even though he had suffered from shoulder and neck problems for about two years before filing because, while the record disclosed "[Tjhat during this period he had been told by doctors that there was a relationship between his work and his physical difficulties, [it] fails to disclose any evidence that any doctor at any time prior to the filing of the claim specifically to

1997See ORS 656.265; ORS 656.807.” That view is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Runft v. SAIF, 303 Or 493 , 739 P2d 12 (1987).

1997See ORS 656.265; ORS 656.807.” That view is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Runft v. SAIF, 303 Or 493 , 739 P2d 12 (1987).

1995The 1976 shoulder injury is not a material contributing cause of the need for treatment or disability resulting from the conversion reaction.” 6 The Board relied on SAIF v. Hukari, 113 Or App 475, 480 , 833 P2d 1307 , rev den 314 Or 391 (1992), which had held that a claim that “a condition is independently compensable because it was caused by on-the-job stress, regardless of the suddenness of onset or the unexpected nature of the condition, and regardless of whether the condition is mental or physical, must be treated as a claim for an occupational disease under ORS 656.802.” (Emphasis in orig

1995The 1976 shoulder injury is not a material contributing cause of the need for treatment or disability resulting from the conversion reaction.” 6 The Board relied on SAIF v. Hukari, 113 Or App 475, 480 , 833 P2d 1307 , rev den 314 Or 391 (1992), which had held that a claim that “a condition is independently compensable because it was caused by on-the-job stress, regardless of the suddenness of onset or the unexpected nature of the condition, and regardless of whether the condition is mental or physical, must be treated as a claim for an occupational disease under ORS 656.802.” (Emphasis in orig

1994Schiele v. Hobart Corporation, 284 Or 483 , 587 P2d 1010 (1978), involved an occupational disease claim by a meat wrapper who suffered nausea, dizziness, choking, coughing, and loss of breath.

1994Schiele v. Hobart Corporation, 284 Or 483 , 587 P2d 1010 (1978), involved an occupational disease claim by a meat wrapper who suffered nausea, dizziness, choking, coughing, and loss of breath.

1988That rule, as it applies to an occupational disease claim, was stated by this court, Boise Cascade Corp. v. Starbuck, 296 Or 238, 241 , 675 P2d 1044 (1984), as follows: “In Oregon, as in most states, the last injurious exposure rule arose in an occupational disease context.

1988That rule, as it applies to an occupational disease claim, was stated by this court, Boise Cascade Corp. v. Starbuck, 296 Or 238, 241 , 675 P2d 1044 (1984), as follows: “In Oregon, as in most states, the last injurious exposure rule arose in an occupational disease context.

1984We therefore hold that the employer was aware of the injury in this case, and claimant is not barred by her failure to make her claim within 180 days. 3 Affirmed as to Scott Wetzel; reversed and remanded for acceptance of the occupational disease claim as to SAIF. 1 ORS 656.807(1) provides: “(1) Except as otherwise limited for silicosis, asbestosis and asbestos-related diseases, all occupational disease claims shall be void unless a claim is filed with the insurer or self-insured employer within five years after the last exposure in employment subject to the Workers’ Compensation Law and withi

1980We find nothing in the statutory scheme which warrants such a conclusion.” 25 Or App at 31 .

1980In Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., 270 Or 694, 700-701 , 530 P2d 53 (1974), we stated the twofold "rationale behind the enactment of a statute of ultimate repose” such as the five-year provision of this statute: "* * * In general, there are usually two reasons which are advanced as justification for the imposition of such statutes.

1980In Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., 270 Or 694, 700-701 , 530 P2d 53 (1974), we stated the twofold "rationale behind the enactment of a statute of ultimate repose” such as the five-year provision of this statute: "* * * In general, there are usually two reasons which are advanced as justification for the imposition of such statutes.

2025“We review the board’s legal conclusions for legal error and its determinations on factual issues for substantial evidence, which includes substantial reasoning.” Luton v. Willamette Valley Rehabilitation Center, 272 Or App 487, 490 , 356 P3d 150 (2015) (citing ORS 183.482(8) and Cummings v. SAIF Corp, 197 Or App 312, 318 , 105 P3d 875 (2005)).

2025“We review the board’s legal conclusions for legal error and its determinations on factual issues for substantial evidence, which includes substantial reasoning.” Luton v. Willamette Valley Rehabilitation Center, 272 Or App 487, 490 , 356 P3d 150 (2015) (citing ORS 183.482(8) and Cummings v. SAIF Corp, 197 Or App 312, 318 , 105 P3d 875 (2005)).

2025“We review the board’s legal conclusions for legal error and its determinations on factual issues for substantial evidence, which includes substantial reasoning.” Luton v. Willamette Valley Rehabilitation Center, 272 Or App 487, 490 , 356 P3d 150 (2015) (citing ORS 183.482(8) and Cummings v. SAIF Corp, 197 Or App 312, 318 , 105 P3d 875 (2005)).

2025“We review the board’s legal conclusions for legal error and its determinations on factual issues for substantial evidence, which includes substantial reasoning.” Luton v. Willamette Valley Rehabilitation Center, 272 Or App 487, 490 , 356 P3d 150 (2015) (citing ORS 183.482(8) and Cummings v. SAIF Corp, 197 Or App 312, 318 , 105 P3d 875 (2005)).

2022On judicial review, claimant does not dispute that claim preclusion is applicable in the workers’ compensation context, see Drews v. EBI Companies, 310 Or 134, 142 , 795 P2d 531 (1990) (so holding), but asserts for several reasons that the board erred in rejecting the occupational disease claim based on claim preclusion.

2022On judicial review, claimant does not dispute that claim preclusion is applicable in the workers’ compensation context, see Drews v. EBI Companies, 310 Or 134, 142 , 795 P2d 531 (1990) (so holding), but asserts for several reasons that the board erred in rejecting the occupational disease claim based on claim preclusion.

2022Claimant’s primary argument is, in essence, that, because a new/omitted medical condition claim may be brought at any time, ORS 656.262(7)(a); Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc. v. Bonham, 176 Or App 490 , 32 P3d 899 (2001), rev den, 334 Or 75 (2002) (ORS 656.262(7)(a) bars application of the rules of claim preclusion to a new medical condition claim.) and therefore is not subject to claim preclusion, an occupational disease claim based on the same conditions previously litigated in a new/omitted medical condition claim can be litigated separately from the new/omitted medical condition c

2022Claimant’s primary argument is, in essence, that, because a new/omitted medical condition claim may be brought at any time, ORS 656.262(7)(a); Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc. v. Bonham, 176 Or App 490 , 32 P3d 899 (2001), rev den, 334 Or 75 (2002) (ORS 656.262(7)(a) bars application of the rules of claim preclusion to a new medical condition claim.) and therefore is not subject to claim preclusion, an occupational disease claim based on the same conditions previously litigated in a new/omitted medical condition claim can be litigated separately from the new/omitted medical condition c

2021City of Eugene v. McCann, 248 Or App 527, 529 , 273 P3d 348 (2012).

2021City of Eugene v. McCann, 248 Or App 527, 529 , 273 P3d 348 (2012).

2020SAIF v. Dunn, 297 Or App 206, 217 , 439 P3d 1011 , rev den, 365 Or 557 (2019).

2020SAIF v. Dunn, 297 Or App 206, 217 , 439 P3d 1011 , rev den, 365 Or 557 (2019).

2020The board concluded, applying Gilkey v. SAIF, 113 Or App 314 , 832 P2d 1252 , rev den, 314 Or 573 (1992), that claimant’s prior disputed claim settlement (DCS) under ORS 656.289(4) with his previous employer, in which he stipulated that his shoulder condition was not compensably related to his work for that employer, precluded him from contending, in this proceeding involving an occupational disease claim against a different employer, that that employment contributed to his claimed occupational disease.

2020The board concluded, applying Gilkey v. SAIF, 113 Or App 314 , 832 P2d 1252 , rev den, 314 Or 573 (1992), that claimant’s prior disputed claim settlement (DCS) under ORS 656.289(4) with his previous employer, in which he stipulated that his shoulder condition was not compensably related to his work for that employer, precluded him from contending, in this proceeding involving an occupational disease claim against a different employer, that that employment contributed to his claimed occupational disease.

2019App. 144 , 146, 194 P.3d 854 (2008), we overturned SAIF's denial of an occupational disease claim for an infection requiring amputation of the claimant's toe.

2019Waste Management v. Pruitt , 224 Or.

2018DiBrito v. SAIF , 319 Or. 244 , 248, 875 P.2d 459 (1994) ("[I]n reviewing the record of a workers' compensation claim, the Board's first task is to determine which provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law are applicable."); see Clark v. Erdman Meat Packing , 88 Or.App. 1 , 4-5, 744 P.2d 255 (1987), rev. den. , 305 Or. 102 , 750 P.2d 496 (1988) ; O'Neal v. Sisters of Providence , 22 Or.App. 9 , 12-13, 537 P.2d 580 (1975) (ultimate decision as to compensability turns on whether the claimant's condition is properly characterized as an injury or an *390 occupational disease).

2018DiBrito v. SAIF , 319 Or. 244 , 248, 875 P.2d 459 (1994) ("[I]n reviewing the record of a workers' compensation claim, the Board's first task is to determine which provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law are applicable."); see Clark v. Erdman Meat Packing , 88 Or.App. 1 , 4-5, 744 P.2d 255 (1987), rev. den. , 305 Or. 102 , 750 P.2d 496 (1988) ; O'Neal v. Sisters of Providence , 22 Or.App. 9 , 12-13, 537 P.2d 580 (1975) (ultimate decision as to compensability turns on whether the claimant's condition is properly characterized as an injury or an *390 occupational disease).

2013Plaintiff’s claim for benefits was denied because of what Defendant proved in the hearing before the ALJ and not because of what Plaintiff failed to prove at that hearing.” (Emphases in original.) Defendant also addressed Article I, section 10, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Smothers, 332 Or 83 , arguing that the court’s holding in that case was not applicable because Smothers addressed an occupational disease claim, whereas plaintiff had filed an injury claim governed by “a different standard of proof’ than that applicable to occupational disease claims.