reasonable belief standard in New York

2020A [*2]plaintiff's unsubstantiated opinion, amounting to no more than a reasonable belief that a violation occurred, is insufficient ( see Kamdem-Quaffo v Pepsico, Inc. , 133 AD3d 825, 826 ; Khan v State Univ. of N.Y.

2020Health Science Ctr. at Brooklyn , 288 AD2d 350, 351 ).

2010The reasonable belief standard is less stringent than the probable cause standard, it is based on an assessment of the totality of circumstances and an officer’s belief, if reasonable, need not be correct (see United States v Lovelock, 170 F3d 339, 343-344 [1999], cert denied 528 US 853 [1999]; United States v Lauter, 57 F3d 212, 215 [1995]).

2007Because defendant refused to stipulate as to the custody of this child and plaintiff admitted that defendant was a fit parent, Supreme Court erred in reaching this issue (see Matter of Alison D. v Virginia M., 77 NY2d at 656-657 ; Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys, 40 NY2d at 547-549 ; Matter of Campbell v Brewster, 9 AI)3d 620, 621 [2004]).

2007Because defendant refused to stipulate as to the custody of this child and plaintiff admitted that defendant was a fit parent, Supreme Court erred in reaching this issue (see Matter of Alison D. v Virginia M., 77 NY2d at 656-657 ; Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys, 40 NY2d at 547-549 ; Matter of Campbell v Brewster, 9 AI)3d 620, 621 [2004]).

1995Applying first the axiom that "a statute is to be construed according to the ordinary meaning of its words” (Sega v State of New York, 60 NY2d 183, 190-191 ), we find nothing in the language of Labor Law § 740 to suggest that anything less than an actual "violation of law, rule or regulation” is required, a conclusion substantially buttressed by the fact that, prior to the enactment of Labor Law § 740 (L 1984, ch 660), three successive efforts to enact a whistleblowers’ statute embodying a reasonable belief standard had failed (see, Leibowitz v Bank Leumi Trust Co., 152 AD2d 169, 175-177 ; Rem

1995Applying first the axiom that "a statute is to be construed according to the ordinary meaning of its words” (Sega v State of New York, 60 NY2d 183, 190-191 ), we find nothing in the language of Labor Law § 740 to suggest that anything less than an actual "violation of law, rule or regulation” is required, a conclusion substantially buttressed by the fact that, prior to the enactment of Labor Law § 740 (L 1984, ch 660), three successive efforts to enact a whistleblowers’ statute embodying a reasonable belief standard had failed (see, Leibowitz v Bank Leumi Trust Co., 152 AD2d 169, 175-177 ; Rem

1995Applying first the axiom that "a statute is to be construed according to the ordinary meaning of its words” (Sega v State of New York, 60 NY2d 183, 190-191 ), we find nothing in the language of Labor Law § 740 to suggest that anything less than an actual "violation of law, rule or regulation” is required, a conclusion substantially buttressed by the fact that, prior to the enactment of Labor Law § 740 (L 1984, ch 660), three successive efforts to enact a whistleblowers’ statute embodying a reasonable belief standard had failed (see, Leibowitz v Bank Leumi Trust Co., 152 AD2d 169, 175-177 ; Rem

1995Applying first the axiom that "a statute is to be construed according to the ordinary meaning of its words” (Sega v State of New York, 60 NY2d 183, 190-191 ), we find nothing in the language of Labor Law § 740 to suggest that anything less than an actual "violation of law, rule or regulation” is required, a conclusion substantially buttressed by the fact that, prior to the enactment of Labor Law § 740 (L 1984, ch 660), three successive efforts to enact a whistleblowers’ statute embodying a reasonable belief standard had failed (see, Leibowitz v Bank Leumi Trust Co., 152 AD2d 169, 175-177 ; Rem

1995Applying first the axiom that "a statute is to be construed according to the ordinary meaning of its words” (Sega v State of New York, 60 NY2d 183, 190-191 ), we find nothing in the language of Labor Law § 740 to suggest that anything less than an actual "violation of law, rule or regulation” is required, a conclusion substantially buttressed by the fact that, prior to the enactment of Labor Law § 740 (L 1984, ch 660), three successive efforts to enact a whistleblowers’ statute embodying a reasonable belief standard had failed (see, Leibowitz v Bank Leumi Trust Co., 152 AD2d 169, 175-177 ; Rem

1995Applying first the axiom that "a statute is to be construed according to the ordinary meaning of its words” (Sega v State of New York, 60 NY2d 183, 190-191 ), we find nothing in the language of Labor Law § 740 to suggest that anything less than an actual "violation of law, rule or regulation” is required, a conclusion substantially buttressed by the fact that, prior to the enactment of Labor Law § 740 (L 1984, ch 660), three successive efforts to enact a whistleblowers’ statute embodying a reasonable belief standard had failed (see, Leibowitz v Bank Leumi Trust Co., 152 AD2d 169, 175-177 ; Rem

1987Co., 243 F Supp 793, 804-805 , supra [emphasis in original].) We adopt the test established in Hammonds: an insurer may persuade a doctor to disclose certain medical secrets of the patient, and a doctor may share such information with the insurer, when the doctor has a reasonable belief that a claim for medical malpractice will be made against him by the patient.

1984While the two concepts are not mutually exclusive, given that the reasonable belief standard set forth in the justification statute (Penal Law, § 35.15) refers to the subjective belief of the defendant (People v Miller, 39 NY2d 543, 548 ; People v Wagman, 99 AD2d 519, 520 ), the failure of the court to properly explain to the jury the concept of extreme emotional disturbance and emphasize that the statutory presumption should not influence and should not prevent consideration of defendant’s justification defense was error.

1984While the two concepts are not mutually exclusive, given that the reasonable belief standard set forth in the justification statute (Penal Law, § 35.15) refers to the subjective belief of the defendant (People v Miller, 39 NY2d 543, 548 ; People v Wagman, 99 AD2d 519, 520 ), the failure of the court to properly explain to the jury the concept of extreme emotional disturbance and emphasize that the statutory presumption should not influence and should not prevent consideration of defendant’s justification defense was error.

1979However, Esposito (supra), in defining "probable cause” applies the reasonable belief principle to those who have committed a crime or are about to do so.