proponent challenge in South Carolina

2026See id. ("[T]he second step . . . requires the proponent of the challenge to provide a race neutral explanation for the challenge."); id. at 22, 754 S.E.2d at 265 ("The explanation . . . may not be so general or vague that it deprives the opponent of the challenge of the ability to meet the burden to show, or the trial court the ability to determine whether, the reason given is pretextual.").

2025See Giles, 407 S.C. at 18 , 754 S.E.2d at 263 (holding that the second step of the Batson analysis requires the proponent of the challenge to provide a gender-neutral explanation for the challenge); id. at 21-22 , 754 S.E.2d at 265 (finding the explanation for the second step of the Batson test must "be clear and reasonably specific such that the opponent of the challenge has a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext in the reason given and the trial court to fulfill its duty to assess the plausibility of the reason in light of all the evidence"); State v. Wright, 354 S.C. 48, 55 , 57

2026See id. ("[T]he second step . . . requires the proponent of the challenge to provide a race neutral explanation for the challenge."); id. at 22, 754 S.E.2d at 265 ("The explanation . . . may not be so general or vague that it deprives the opponent of the challenge of the ability to meet the burden to show, or the trial court the ability to determine whether, the reason given is pretextual.").

2016Id. (internal citation omitted).

2025Third, the trial court determined the State met its burden to prove Pollock's reasoning was mere pretext because the State demonstrated Pollock's explanation was "fundamentally implausible." See Edwards, 384 S.C. at 508-09 , 682 S.E.2d at 823 (finding that in the third step of the Batson analysis, "[t]he opponent must show the race or gender-neutral explanation was mere pretext, which is generally established by showing the party did not strike a similarly situated member of another race or gender"); id. ("Under some circumstances, the explanation given by the proponent may be so fundamentally

2025Third, the trial court determined the State met its burden to prove Pollock's reasoning was mere pretext because the State demonstrated Pollock's explanation was "fundamentally implausible." See Edwards, 384 S.C. at 508-09 , 682 S.E.2d at 823 (finding that in the third step of the Batson analysis, "[t]he opponent must show the race or gender-neutral explanation was mere pretext, which is generally established by showing the party did not strike a similarly situated member of another race or gender"); id. ("Under some circumstances, the explanation given by the proponent may be so fundamentally

2025See Giles, 407 S.C. at 18 , 754 S.E.2d at 263 (holding that the second step of the Batson analysis requires the proponent of the challenge to provide a gender-neutral explanation for the challenge); id. at 21-22 , 754 S.E.2d at 265 (finding the explanation for the second step of the Batson test must "be clear and reasonably specific such that the opponent of the challenge has a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext in the reason given and the trial court to fulfill its duty to assess the plausibility of the reason in light of all the evidence"); State v. Wright, 354 S.C. 48, 55 , 57

2025See Giles, 407 S.C. at 18 , 754 S.E.2d at 263 (holding that the second step of the Batson analysis requires the proponent of the challenge to provide a gender-neutral explanation for the challenge); id. at 21-22 , 754 S.E.2d at 265 (finding the explanation for the second step of the Batson test must "be clear and reasonably specific such that the opponent of the challenge has a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext in the reason given and the trial court to fulfill its duty to assess the plausibility of the reason in light of all the evidence"); State v. Wright, 354 S.C. 48, 55 , 57

2025Third, the trial court determined the State met its burden to prove Pollock's reasoning was mere pretext because the State demonstrated Pollock's explanation was "fundamentally implausible." See Edwards, 384 S.C. at 508-09 , 682 S.E.2d at 823 (finding that in the third step of the Batson analysis, "[t]he opponent must show the race or gender-neutral explanation was mere pretext, which is generally established by showing the party did not strike a similarly situated member of another race or gender"); id. ("Under some circumstances, the explanation given by the proponent may be so fundamentally

2025Third, the trial court determined the State met its burden to prove Pollock's reasoning was mere pretext because the State demonstrated Pollock's explanation was "fundamentally implausible." See Edwards, 384 S.C. at 508-09 , 682 S.E.2d at 823 (finding that in the third step of the Batson analysis, "[t]he opponent must show the race or gender-neutral explanation was mere pretext, which is generally established by showing the party did not strike a similarly situated member of another race or gender"); id. ("Under some circumstances, the explanation given by the proponent may be so fundamentally

2021See Giles, 407 S.C. at 21–22, 754 S.E.2d at 265 (stating that explanation provided by the proponent of the challenge does not have to be persuasive or even plausible, but it must be "clear and reasonably specific" to allow the opponent of the strike a chance to show pretext and to allow the court to evaluate the strike); id. at 22 , 754 S.E.2d at 265 ("Reasonable specificity is necessary because comparison to other members of the venire for purposes of a disparate treatment analysis, which is often used at the third step of the Batson process to determine if purposeful discrimination has occur

2021See Giles, 407 S.C. at 21–22, 754 S.E.2d at 265 (stating that explanation provided by the proponent of the challenge does not have to be persuasive or even plausible, but it must be "clear and reasonably specific" to allow the opponent of the strike a chance to show pretext and to allow the court to evaluate the strike); id. at 22 , 754 S.E.2d at 265 ("Reasonable specificity is necessary because comparison to other members of the venire for purposes of a disparate treatment analysis, which is often used at the third step of the Batson process to determine if purposeful discrimination has occur

1997While “[m]erely denying a discriminatory motive” is insufficient, State v. Watts, 320 S.C. 377, 380 , 465 S.E.2d 359, 362 (Ct.App.1995), the proponent of the strike need only present race or gender neutral *452 reasons.

1997While “[m]erely denying a discriminatory motive” is insufficient, State v. Watts, 320 S.C. 377, 380 , 465 S.E.2d 359, 362 (Ct.App.1995), the proponent of the strike need only present race or gender neutral *452 reasons.

1997Under step two, the proponent of the challenge does “not have any burden of presenting reasonably specific, legitimate explanations for the strikes.” State v. Easler, 322 S.C. 333, 350 , 471 S.E.2d 745, 755 (Ct.App.1996) (citations omitted).

1997Under step two, the proponent of the challenge does “not have any burden of presenting reasonably specific, legitimate explanations for the strikes.” State v. Easler, 322 S.C. 333, 350 , 471 S.E.2d 745, 755 (Ct.App.1996) (citations omitted).