proponent challenge in Texas

2020TRACY - 14 the law.22 Before a prospective juror can be excused for cause on this basis, the law must be explained to him and he must be asked whether he can follow that law regardless of his personal views.23 The proponent of a challenge for cause has the burden of establishing that the challenge is proper, and he does not meet this burden until he has shown that the veniremember understood the requirements of the law and could not overcome his prejudice well enough to follow the law.24 We review a trial court’s ruling on a challenge for cause with considerable deference because the trial jud

2020TRACY - 14 the law.22 Before a prospective juror can be excused for cause on this basis, the law must be explained to him and he must be asked whether he can follow that law regardless of his personal views.23 The proponent of a challenge for cause has the burden of establishing that the challenge is proper, and he does not meet this burden until he has shown that the veniremember understood the requirements of the law and could not overcome his prejudice well enough to follow the law.24 We review a trial court’s ruling on a challenge for cause with considerable deference because the trial jud

2017The standard of review on appeal is whether the trial judge abused his discretion when he overruled a challenge for cause.34 Before a prospective juror may be excused for cause on the basis of bias or prejudice, the law must be explained to him and he must be asked whether he can follow that law regardless of his personal views.35 The proponent of the challenge—in this case, Williams—has the burden to show that the offending venireperson understands the law and cannot overcome his prejudice well enough to follow it.36 In making this determination, we evaluate the voir dire examination of the p

2016The proponent of a challenge for cause must show that even after the applicable law was. explained to a prospective juror, the juror was unable to set aside her personal biases and follow the law. , See Davis, 329 S.W.3d at 807 .

2024The proponent of a challenge for cause has the burden of establishing that the challenge is proper by showing that “the veniremember understood the requirements of the law and could not overcome his prejudice well enough to follow the law.” Id.

2023The proponent of a challenge for cause has the burden of establishing that the challenge is proper by showing that “the veniremember understood the requirements of the law and could not overcome his prejudice well enough to follow the law.” Id.

2007See Lee v. State, 186 S.W.3d 649 , 656 B 57 (Tex. App. C Dallas 2006, pet. ref = d) (concluding that because the record was silent regarding counsel = s reasons for not requesting a continuance, reviewing court refused to find counsel deficient for failing to ask for a continuance to combat the introduction of unexpected incriminating evidence); In re B.T., 154 S.W.3d 200 , 205‑06 (Tex. App. C Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (stating that A [b]y not presenting the issue in a motion for new trial and developing a record of ineffective behavior, the proponent of the claim has a difficult burden to ove

2006It is possible for counsel to have legitimate reasons for his conduct.") (citations omitted); In re B.T., 154 S.W.3d 200, 205-06 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) ("By not presenting the issue in a motion for new trial and developing a record of ineffective behavior, the proponent of the claim has a difficult burden to overcome because the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy."); In re A.J.H., 2004 WL 414093 , at *7 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 2, 2004, no pet.) (mem.op.) ("Appellant has the burden to rebut this presumption by presenting evidence illustrating why

2023“We review a trial court’s ruling on a challenge for cause with considerable deference because the trial judge is in the best position to evaluate a veniremember’s demeanor and responses.” Id. at 295–96 (citing Colburn v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511, 517 (Tex. Crim.

2015The proponent of a challenge for cause has the burden of establishing that the challenge is proper by showing that “the veniremember understood the requirements of the law and could not overcome his prejudice well enough to follow the law.” Id. [23]We review a trial court’s ruling on a challenge for cause “with considerable deference because the trial judge is in the best position to evaluate a veniremember’s demeanor and responses.” Id. at 295–96 (citing Colburn v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511, 517 (Tex.Crim.App.1998)).

2013Sells v. State, 121 S.W.3d 748, 758 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003).

2008"The proponent of a challenge for cause has the burden of establishing his challenge is proper. . . . [He] does not meet his burden until he has shown that the venireman understood the requirements of the law and could not overcome his prejudice well enough to follow it." Sells v. State , 121 S.W.3d 748, 759 (Tex. Crim.

2009See Bell v. City of Grand Prairie, 221 S.W.3d 317 , 323 n.4 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) (op. on reh’g); City of Dallas v. Albert, 214 S.W.3d 631 , 636–37 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. filed) (op. on reh’g); see also City of Houston v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 197 S.W.3d 386 , 386–87 (Tex. 2006) (holding that remand is proper to give the proponent of waiver of immunity an opportunity to argue that chapter 271 applies because it applies retroactively); McMahon Contracting, L.P. v. City of Carrollton, 197 S.W.3d 387 (Tex. 2006) (same).

2009See Bell v. City of Grand Prairie, 221 S.W.3d 317 , 323 n. 4 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.) (op. on reh’g); City of Dallas v. Albert, 214 S.W.3d 631, 636-37 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, pet. granted) (op. on reh’g); see also City of Houston v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 197 S.W.3d 386, 386-87 (Tex.2006) (holding that remand is proper to give the proponent of waiver of immunity an opportunity to argue that chapter 271 applies because it applies retroactively); McMahon Contracting, L.P. v. City of Carrollton, 197 S.W.3d 387 (Tex.2006) (same).

2009See Bell v. City of Grand Prairie, 221 S.W.3d 317 , 323 n.4 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) (op. on reh’g); City of Dallas v. Albert, 214 S.W.3d 631 , 636–37 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. filed) (op. on reh’g); see also City of Houston v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 197 S.W.3d 386 , 386–87 (Tex. 2006) (holding that remand is proper to give the proponent of waiver of immunity an opportunity to argue that chapter 271 applies because it applies retroactively); McMahon Contracting, L.P. v. City of Carrollton, 197 S.W.3d 387 (Tex. 2006) (same).

2009See Bell v. City of Grand Prairie, 221 S.W.3d 317 , 323 n. 4 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.) (op. on reh’g); City of Dallas v. Albert, 214 S.W.3d 631, 636-37 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, pet. granted) (op. on reh’g); see also City of Houston v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 197 S.W.3d 386, 386-87 (Tex.2006) (holding that remand is proper to give the proponent of waiver of immunity an opportunity to argue that chapter 271 applies because it applies retroactively); McMahon Contracting, L.P. v. City of Carrollton, 197 S.W.3d 387 (Tex.2006) (same).

2001See id.

2001See id.

2019Gonzales v. State, 353 S.W.3d 826, 832 (Tex. Crim.

2015Gonzales, 353 S.W.3d at 832 .

2018See, e.g., Howard v. State, 941 S.W.2d 102 , 128 n.2 (Tex. Crim.

2002See, e.g., Howard v. State, 941 S.W.2d 102 , 128 n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Harris v. State, 784 S.W.2d 5, 25 (Tex.Crim.App.1989); see also Colella v. State, 915 S.W.2d 834, 846 (Tex.Crim.App.1995)(Clinton, J., dissenting).

2017State v. Johnson, 475 S.W.3d 860, 864 (Tex. Crim.

2017State v. Johnson, 475 S.W.3d 860, 864 (Tex. Crim.

2005See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 , 123 S.Ct. 1690, 1694 , 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003); Freeman v. State, 125 S.W.3d 505, 506-07 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Thompson , 9 S.W.3d at 813-14 .

2005See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 , 123 S.Ct. 1690, 1694 , 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003); Freeman v. State, 125 S.W.3d 505, 506-07 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Thompson , 9 S.W.3d at 813-14 .

2002See, e.g., Howard v. State, 941 S.W.2d 102 , 128 n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Harris v. State, 784 S.W.2d 5, 25 (Tex.Crim.App.1989); see also Colella v. State, 915 S.W.2d 834, 846 (Tex.Crim.App.1995)(Clinton, J., dissenting).

1992Harris v. State, 784 S.W.2d 5, 25 (Tex.Crim.App.1989).

1995Hernandez v. State, 757 S.W.2d 744, 753 (Tex.Cr.App.1988) (plurality opinion).

1995Hernandez v. State, 757 S.W.2d 744, 753 (Tex.Cr.App. 1988) (plurality opinion).

2009See Bell v. City of Grand Prairie, 221 S.W.3d 317 , 323 n.4 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) (op. on reh’g); City of Dallas v. Albert, 214 S.W.3d 631 , 636–37 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. filed) (op. on reh’g); see also City of Houston v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 197 S.W.3d 386 , 386–87 (Tex. 2006) (holding that remand is proper to give the proponent of waiver of immunity an opportunity to argue that chapter 271 applies because it applies retroactively); McMahon Contracting, L.P. v. City of Carrollton, 197 S.W.3d 387 (Tex. 2006) (same).

2009See Bell v. City of Grand Prairie, 221 S.W.3d 317 , 323 n. 4 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.) (op. on reh’g); City of Dallas v. Albert, 214 S.W.3d 631, 636-37 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, pet. granted) (op. on reh’g); see also City of Houston v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 197 S.W.3d 386, 386-87 (Tex.2006) (holding that remand is proper to give the proponent of waiver of immunity an opportunity to argue that chapter 271 applies because it applies retroactively); McMahon Contracting, L.P. v. City of Carrollton, 197 S.W.3d 387 (Tex.2006) (same).

2002Id.

2001Purkett v. Elem , 514 U.S. 765, 767 , 115 S.Ct. 1769 , 131 L.Ed.2d 834, 839 (1995).

2024In general, “[t]he failure to make a timely objection waives the right to challenge the jury’s qualifications.” Collum v. State, 96 S.W.3d 361, 366 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.) (citing Mayo v. State, 4 S.W.3d 9, 12 (Tex. Crim.

2024In general, “[t]he failure to make a timely objection waives the right to challenge the jury’s qualifications.” Collum v. State, 96 S.W.3d 361, 366 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.) (citing Mayo v. State, 4 S.W.3d 9, 12 (Tex. Crim.

2023The proponent of a claim of bias must demonstrate a “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). “[T]he terms ‘bias’ and ‘prejudice’ do not encompass all unfavorable rulings towards an individual or her case, but instead must ‘connote a favorable or unfavorable disposition or opinion that is somehow wrongful or inappropriate, either because it is undeserved, or because it rests upon knowledge that the subject ought not to possess …, or because it is excessive in degree.’” Abdygapparova v. State, 243 S.W.3d 1

2023The proponent of a claim of bias must demonstrate a “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). “[T]he terms ‘bias’ and ‘prejudice’ do not encompass all unfavorable rulings towards an individual or her case, but instead must ‘connote a favorable or unfavorable disposition or opinion that is somehow wrongful or inappropriate, either because it is undeserved, or because it rests upon knowledge that the subject ought not to possess …, or because it is excessive in degree.’” Abdygapparova v. State, 243 S.W.3d 1

2023The proponent of a claim of bias must demonstrate a “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). “[T]he terms ‘bias’ and ‘prejudice’ do not encompass all unfavorable rulings towards an individual or her case, but instead must ‘connote a favorable or unfavorable disposition or opinion that is somehow wrongful or inappropriate, either because it is undeserved, or because it rests upon knowledge that the subject ought not to possess …, or because it is excessive in degree.’” Abdygapparova v. State, 243 S.W.3d 1

2022In other circumstances, however, the pleadings alone will not establish the merit of such a plea. 22Vernco Constr., Inc. v. Nelson, 460 S.W.3d 145, 149 (Tex. 2015); Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226 ; see also Alamo Heights Indep.

2017App. 2010); see also Smith v. State, 297 S.W.3d 260, 268 (Tex. Crim.