proponent claim in Arizona

2026A moving party is entitled to summary judgment “if the facts produced in support of the [nonmovant’s] claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 (1990). ¶10 When Arizona state and local governments control a roadway, they possess a duty to keep that roadway reasonably safe for travel.

2026DISCUSSION ¶23 Summary judgment is appropriate when “the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of the evidence, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 (1990); Ariz. R.

2020“Summary judgment should be granted ‘if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.’” Aranki v. RKP Invs., Inc., 194 Ariz. 206, 208, ¶ 6 (App. 1999) (quoting Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 (1990)).

2020“Summary judgment should be granted ‘if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.’” Aranki v. RKP Invs., Inc., 194 Ariz. 206, 208, ¶ 6 (App. 1999) (quoting Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 (1990)).

2018A JMOL motion should be granted “if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Id. (citation omitted). ¶42 At the close of a party’s case-in-chief, if “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party . . . the court may . . . grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling

2017By its plain language, Rule 50 allows the trial court to enter judgment “with respect to a claim or defense.” See also Salica v. Tucson Heart Hosp.-Carondelet, L.L.C., 224 Ariz. 414, 417, ¶ 11 , 231 P.3d 946 (App. 2010) (holding judgment as a matter of law appropriate where “the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense”) (emphasis added) (quoting A Tumbling-T Ranches, 222 Ariz. at 524, ¶ 14 , 217 P.3d 1220

2024Where cross-motions for summary judgment are filed, “summary judgment in favor of either party is appropriate only ‘if the facts produced in support of the [other party's] claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.’” Andrews v. Blake, 205 Ariz. 236 , 240 ¶ 13 (2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 (1990)).

2021A moving party is entitled to summary judgment “if the facts produced in support of the [nonmovant’s] claim or defense have so little probative value” that “reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Id. ¶ 13 (quoting Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 (1990)).

2017We “view ‘the evidence in a light most favorable to upholding the jury verdict’ and will affirm ‘if any substantial evidence exists permitting reasonable person to reach such a result.’” Id. (quoting Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 192 Ariz. 51, 53, ¶ 13 , 961 P.2d 449, 451 (1998)). ‘[T]he interpretation of a contract is a question of law or at most, a mixed question of law and fact . . . .” United Cal. Bank v. Prudential Ins.

2017We “view ‘the evidence in a light most favorable to upholding the jury verdict’ and will affirm ‘if any substantial evidence exists permitting reasonable person to reach such a result.’” Id. (quoting Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 192 Ariz. 51, 53, ¶ 13 , 961 P.2d 449, 451 (1998)). ‘[T]he interpretation of a contract is a question of law or at most, a mixed question of law and fact . . . .” United Cal. Bank v. Prudential Ins.

2016A defendant is entitled to summary judgment “if the facts produced in support of the [plaintiff’s] claim . . . have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim.” Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 (1990). ¶9 To establish a negligence claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) a duty requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of care; (2) a breach by the defendant of that standard; (3) a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the resulting injury; an

2014P. 56(a); see also Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 , 802 P.2d 1000, 1008 (1990) (Summary judgment is proper “if the facts produced in support of the claim . . . have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim.”). ¶6 “To establish a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) a duty requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of care; (2) a breach by the defendant of that standard; (3) a causal connection between the defendant’s condu

2023See State v. King, 225 Ariz. 87, ¶ 13 (2010). ¶36 The trial court did not abuse its discretion here.

2022When the superior court refuses an instruction, this court must “view the evidence on appeal in the light most favorable to the proponent of the instruction.” State v. Alemeida, 238 Ariz. 77, 78, ¶ 2 (App. 2015); see also State v. King, 225 Ariz. 87, 90, ¶ 13 (2010).

2026“Such a motion should be granted if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Id. (citation modified).

2022During a jury trial, the court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 if the evidence before the jury has “so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Desert Palm Surgical Grp., P.L.C. v. Petta, 236 Ariz. 568, 578, ¶ 25 (App. 2015).

2022When the superior court refuses an instruction, this court must “view the evidence on appeal in the light most favorable to the proponent of the instruction.” State v. Alemeida, 238 Ariz. 77, 78, ¶ 2 (App. 2015); see also State v. King, 225 Ariz. 87, 90, ¶ 13 (2010).

2018State v. Glissendorf , 235 Ariz. 147 , ¶ 7, 329 P.3d 1049 (2014). "[W]hen a trial court refuses a jury instruction, we view the evidence on appeal in the light most favorable to the proponent of the instruction." State v. Almeida , 238 Ariz. 77 , ¶ 2, 356 P.3d 822 (App. 2015). ¶ 22 "[A] defendant is entitled to an adverse-inference instruction when the state loses or destroys evidence that would have been useful to the defense, even if that destruction is innocent." Glissendorf , 235 Ariz. 147 , ¶ 7, 329 P.3d 1049 .

2012“On appeal from a summary judgment, we must determine de novo whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the trial court erred in applying the law.” Bothell v. Two Point Acres, Inc., 192 Ariz. 313, ¶ 8 , 965 P.2d 47, 50 (App.1998).

2012“On appeal from a summary judgment, we must determine de novo whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the trial court erred in applying the law.” Bothell v. Two Point Acres, Inc., 192 Ariz. 313, ¶ 8 , 965 P.2d 47, 50 (App.1998).

2025Comerica Bank v. Mahmoodi, 224 Ariz. 289, 292, ¶ 18 (App. 2010); Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Thruston, 218 Ariz. 112, 117 , ¶¶ 22–23 (App. 2008); see also Orme Sch., 166 Ariz. at 309 (holding that summary judgment is proper “if the facts produced in support of the claim . . . have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim”).

2017See Airfreight, 215 Ariz. at 110, ¶ 19 (“A trial court should only grant a motion for summary judgment ‘if the facts produced in support of the claim . . . have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim . . . .’”) (citation omitted); see also Thruston, 218 Ariz. at 116, ¶ 20 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (party is entitled 19 See Dube, 216 Ariz. at 414, ¶ 19 . 20 Appellants argue that Aviva’s reason that it terminated their contract in an overall effort t

2020Arizona Law Recognizes Navigators’ Equitable Subrogation Claim. ¶13 Judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) should be granted “if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Roberson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 202 Ariz. 286 , 290 ¶ 14 (App. 2002) (quoting Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 (1990)); accord Ariz. R.

2020P. 50(a)(1); see Robertson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 202 Ariz. 286, 290, ¶ 14 (App. 2002) (“The ‘motion should be granted if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.’”) (quoting Orme School v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 (1990)). 3 The parties reached a high/low settlement after the appeal was filed, under which the amount of damages Plaintiffs will receive depends on the outcome of this appeal. 8 HUMPH

2017Appellants also argue the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether arbitration was appropriate, however “a trial court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Brake Masters Sys., Inc. v. Gabbay, 206 Ariz. 360, 365, ¶14 , 78 P.3d 1081, 1086 (App. 2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

2017Appellants also argue the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether arbitration was appropriate, however “a trial court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Brake Masters Sys., Inc. v. Gabbay, 206 Ariz. 360, 365, ¶14 , 78 P.3d 1081, 1086 (App. 2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

2017By its plain language, Rule 50 allows the trial court to enter judgment “with respect to a claim or defense.” See also Salica v. Tucson Heart Hosp.-Carondelet, L.L.C., 224 Ariz. 414, 417, ¶ 11 , 231 P.3d 946 (App. 2010) (holding judgment as a matter of law appropriate where “the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense”) (emphasis added) (quoting A Tumbling-T Ranches, 222 Ariz. at 524, ¶ 14 , 217 P.3d 1220

2017By its plain language, Rule 50 allows the trial court to enter judgment “with respect to a claim or defense.” See also Salica v. Tucson Heart Hosp.-Carondelet, L.L.C., 224 Ariz. 414, 417, ¶ 11 , 231 P.3d 946 (App. 2010) (holding judgment as a matter of law appropriate where “the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense”) (emphasis added) (quoting A Tumbling-T Ranches, 222 Ariz. at 524, ¶ 14 , 217 P.3d 1220

2014Serv., Inc., 199 Ariz. 344 , 347 ¶ 7, 18 P.3d 138, 141 (App. 2001)). ¶15 We agree with the trial court that a hearing was not necessary for Pope to explain any inconsistencies in his affidavit.

2014Serv., Inc., 199 Ariz. 344 , 347 ¶ 7, 18 P.3d 138, 141 (App. 2001)). ¶15 We agree with the trial court that a hearing was not necessary for Pope to explain any inconsistencies in his affidavit.

2024Decision of the Court support of the claim . . . have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim.” Warne Invs., Ltd. v. Higgins, 219 Ariz. 186 , 194 ¶ 33 (App. 2008). ¶20 Where, as here, the court submits the matter to the jury after denying a motion for JMOL, a party may file a post-verdict “motion for judgment as a matter of law and may include an alternative or joint request for a new trial under Rule 59.” Ariz. R.

2023Judgment under Rule 50 is appropriate when “the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Warne Invs., Ltd. v. Higgins, 219 Ariz. 186, 194, ¶ 33 (App. 2008).

2023We will uphold a grant of 9 LITMATH v. US FIRE Decision of the Court JMOL if “the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Jones, 240 Ariz. at 72 ¶ 28 (quoting Felder v. Physiotherapy Assocs., 215 Ariz. 154 , 162 ¶ 36 (App. 2007)). ¶28 Bad faith insurance claims derive from the duty of good faith and fair dealing.

2016We will uphold the ruling unless “the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Felder v. Physiotherapy Assocs., 215 Ariz. 154 , 162 ¶ 36, 158 P.3d 877, 885 (App. 2007).

2013P. 50(a) (setting forth the requirements for a motion for judgment as a matter of law and indicating such a motion may be granted where “a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that pai’ty on that issue”); Gemstar Ltd. v. Ernst & Young, 185 Ariz. 493, 505 , 917 P.2d 222, 234 (1996) (noting that a “directed verdict is appropriate if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conc

2013P. 50(a) (setting forth the requirements for a motion for judgment as a matter of law and indicating such a motion may be granted where “a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that pai’ty on that issue”); Gemstar Ltd. v. Ernst & Young, 185 Ariz. 493, 505 , 917 P.2d 222, 234 (1996) (noting that a “directed verdict is appropriate if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conc

2006In slip-and-fall cases, however, “the mere occurrence of a fall on the business premises is insufficient to prove negligence on the part of the proprietor.” Preuss v. Sambo’s of Ariz., Inc., 130 Ariz. 288, 289 , 635 P.2d 1210, 1211 (1981).

2006In slip-and-fall cases, however, “the mere occurrence of a fall on the business premises is insufficient to prove negligence on the part of the proprietor.” Preuss v. Sambo’s of Ariz., Inc., 130 Ariz. 288, 289 , 635 P.2d 1210, 1211 (1981).

2022See Stephens v. Bashas’ Inc., 186 Ariz. 427, 430 (App. 1996).

2022See Stephens v. Bashas’ Inc., 186 Ariz. 427, 430 (App. 1996). 99 Cents therefore was obligated to exercise reasonable care to make its premises safe for her use.

2017See Airfreight, 215 Ariz. at 110, ¶ 19 (“A trial court should only grant a motion for summary judgment ‘if the facts produced in support of the claim . . . have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim . . . .’”) (citation omitted); see also Thruston, 218 Ariz. at 116, ¶ 20 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (party is entitled 19 See Dube, 216 Ariz. at 414, ¶ 19 . 20 Appellants argue that Aviva’s reason that it terminated their contract in an overall effort t

2016Ltd. v. Evergreen Air Ctr., Inc., 215 Ariz. 103, 110, ¶ 19 (App. 2007) (quoting Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 (1990)). ¶11 On appeal, we review summary judgment and questions of law de novo, see Andress v. City of Chandler, 198 Ariz. 112, 114, ¶¶ 5, 7 (App. 2000), including the application of issue preclusion which is a question of law, see Campbell v. SZL Properties, Ltd., 204 Ariz. 221, 223, ¶ 8 (App. 2003) 5 VAZIRANI et al. v. ANNEXUS et al.

2013If the evidence would allow “a jury to resolve a material issue in favor of either party, summary judgment is improper.” United Bank of Ariz. v. Allyn, 167 Ariz. 191, 195 , 805 P.2d 1012, 1016 (App.1990). ¶ 10 In reviewing a summary judgment, our task is to determine de novo whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the trial court incorrectly applied the law.

2013If the evidence would allow “a jury to resolve a material issue in favor of either party, summary judgment is improper.” United Bank of Ariz. v. Allyn, 167 Ariz. 191, 195 , 805 P.2d 1012, 1016 (App.1990). ¶ 10 In reviewing a summary judgment, our task is to determine de novo whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the trial court incorrectly applied the law.

2007A trial court should only grant a motion for summary judgment “if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Orme Sch., 166 Ariz. at 309 , 802 P.2d at 1008 . ¶ 20 AFX argues “Evergreen’s fraud and bad faith made the contractual limitation of damages unenforceable,” relying on Long Island Lighting Co. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 646 F.Supp. 1442, 1458 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), and 15 Grace McLane Giesel, Corbi

2007A trial 7 Accordingly, we need not address AFX’s argument that the release clause is unenforceable as a matter of public policy and void because Evergreen breached the settlement agreement. 12 court should only grant a motion for summary judgment “if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Orme Sch., 166 Ariz. at 309 , 802 P.2d at 1008 . ¶20 AFX argues “Evergreen’s fraud and bad faith made the contra

2007Although the court must consider the applicable burden of proof, see id. at 308-09 , 802 P.2d at 1007-08 , the fact-finder determines credibility, weighs the evidence, and draws appropriate inferences from the evidence, Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Ridgely, 214 Ariz. 440, ¶ 19 , 153 P.3d 1069, 1073 (App.2007). ¶ 31 Cardenas, Rath, and Mt.

2007Although the court must consider the applicable burden of proof, see id. at 308-09 , 802 P.2d at 1007-08 , the fact-finder determines credibility, weighs the evidence, and draws appropriate inferences from the evidence, Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Ridgely, 214 Ariz. 440, ¶ 19 , 153 P.3d 1069, 1073 (App.2007). ¶ 31 Cardenas, Rath, and Mt.

2006We review that ruling de novo. 8 See Crackel, 208 Ariz. 252, ¶20 , 92 P.3d at 890 ; Monaco v. HealthPartners of S. Ariz., 196 Ariz. 299, ¶ 6 , 995 P.2d 735, 738 (App. 1999). ¶24 A trial court should grant a motion for JMOL “if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little *111 probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 , 802 P.2d 1000, 1008 (1990).

2006We review that ruling de novo. 8 See Crackel, 208 Ariz. 252, ¶20 , 92 P.3d at 890 ; Monaco v. HealthPartners of S. Ariz., 196 Ariz. 299, ¶ 6 , 995 P.2d 735, 738 (App. 1999). ¶24 A trial court should grant a motion for JMOL “if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little *111 probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 , 802 P.2d 1000, 1008 (1990).

1991See Orme School v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 , 802 P.2d 1000, 1008 (1990) ("Either motion should be granted if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.") In a defamation case, if the factual dispute concerns actual malice, the trial court's summary judgment inquiry is "whether the evidence in the record could support a reasonable jury finding either that the plaintiff has shown actual malice by clear

1991See Orme School v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 , 802 P.2d 1000, 1008 (1990) ("Either motion should be granted if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.") In a defamation case, if the factual dispute concerns actual malice, the trial court's summary judgment inquiry is "whether the evidence in the record could support a reasonable jury finding either that the plaintiff has shown actual malice by clear

1994The motion was properly granted if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Celia Barr, “factually, ‘reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim.’” Riley, Hoggatt & Suagee, P.C. v. English, 177 Ariz. 10, 12 , 864 P.2d 1042, 1044 (1993), quoting Orme School v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 , 802 P.2d 1000, 1008 (1990); see Ariz.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

1994The motion was properly granted if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Celia Barr, “factually, ‘reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim.’” Riley, Hoggatt & Suagee, P.C. v. English, 177 Ariz. 10, 12 , 864 P.2d 1042, 1044 (1993), quoting Orme School v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 , 802 P.2d 1000, 1008 (1990); see Ariz.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

2015“We will uphold the ruling unless ‘the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.’” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).

2014We will uphold the court’s denial unless “the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.” Id. at 28, ¶ 6 , 270 P.3d at 855 (quoting A Tumbling-T Ranches v. Flood Control Dist. of Maricopa Cnty., 222 Ariz. 515, 524, ¶ 14 , 217 P.3d 1220, 1229 (App. 2009)).

2026P. 56(a); accord Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91 , 94–5 ¶ 5 (App. 2011). “[I]f the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense[,]” then the superior court should grant summary judgment.