proponent challenge (Ohio) · Go Syfert
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proponent challenge in Ohio

65 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2026 11 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (14)

CaseFollowedCited
Batson v. Kentuckygreen
scotus · 1986 · cited in 16 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2004–2023
2 sentences

2023Second, if the trial court finds this requirement fulfilled, the proponent of the challenge must provide a racially neutral explanation for the challenge.” State v. Bryan, 101 Ohio St.3d 272 , 2004-Ohio-971 , ¶ 106, citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986).

2018“Instead, a defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.” Id. at 170 . {¶10} “‘Second, if the trial court finds [a prima facie case of discrimination], the proponent of the challenge must provide a racially neutral explanation for the challenge.’” Frazier at ¶ 64, quoting Bryan at ¶ 106, citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 - 98.

316
Hoffman v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1951 · cited in 3 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2016–2019
2 sentences

2019Arnold recognizes that a trial court should require a witness to answer questions only if “ -12- ‘it clearly appears to the court that [the proponent of the privilege] is mistaken.’ ” Id. at ¶ 45, quoting Hoffman at 486. {¶25} Furthermore, if a trial court commits error in failing to sufficiently delve into a witness’s purported fear of incrimination, an appellate court must still affirm the trial court’s judgment if the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court’s inquiry was harmless.

2017Arnold recognizes that a trial court should require a witness to answer questions only if " 'it clearly appears to the court that [the proponent of the privilege] is mistaken.' " Id. at ¶ 45, quoting Hoffman at 486, 71 S.Ct. 814 . {¶ 22} Furthermore, if a trial court commits error in failing to sufficiently delve into a witness's purported fear of incrimination, an appellate court must still affirm the trial court's judgment if the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court's inquiry was harmless.

23
State v. Cookgreen
ohio · 1992 · cited in 2 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
2 sentences

2019The third and final step requires the trial court to "decide based on all the circumstances, whether the opponent has proved purposeful facial discrimination." Bryan at ¶ 106, citing Batson at 98 . {¶ 76} "The prosecution's race-neutral explanation need not rise to the level of a challenge for cause." State v. Jennings, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-70, 2009-Ohio-6840 , ¶ 18, citing State v. Cook, 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 519 (1992), citing Batson at 96-98 .

2019The third and final step requires the trial court to "decide based on all the circumstances, whether the opponent has proved purposeful facial discrimination." Bryan at ¶ 106, citing Batson at 98 . {¶ 74} "The prosecution's race-neutral explanation need not rise to the level of a challenge for cause." State v. Jennings, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-70, 2009-Ohio-6840 , ¶ 18, citing State v. Cook, 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 519 (1992), citing Batson at 96-98 .

22
Peck v. Peckgreen
ohioctapp · 1994 · cited in 12 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 1999–2019
2 sentences

2019Peck v. Peck, 96 Ohio App.3d 731, 734 (12th Dist.1994).

2019Bergman at ¶ 31 , citing Peck v. Peck, 96 Ohio App.3d 731, 734 , 645 N.E.2d 1300 (12th Dist.1994); Snyder v. Snyder, 2d Dist.

112
Hernandez v. New Yorkgreen
scotus · 1991 · cited in 4 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2013–2026
2 sentences

2026“At the second step of the -20- inquiry, ‘“the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation.”’” Hawkins at ¶ 10 , quoting Thompson, 2014-Ohio-4751, at ¶ 51 , quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991).

2024“At the second step of the inquiry, ‘“the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation.”’” Hawkins at ¶ 10 , quoting Thompson, 141 Ohio St.3d 254 , 2014-Ohio-4751, at ¶ 51 , quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 (1991).

14
Johnson v. Californiagreen
scotus · 2005 · cited in 3 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2018–2026
2 sentences

2026“At the first step of the Batson inquiry, the defendant is not required to demonstrate that ‘the challenge was more likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination.’” Hawkins, 2018-Ohio-4649, at ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170-173 (2005). “‘Instead, a defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.’” Id., quoting Johnson at 170 . {¶46} “‘Second, if the trial court finds [a prima facie case of discrimination], the proponent of th

2026“At the first step of the Batson inquiry, the defendant is not required to demonstrate that ‘the challenge was more likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination.’” Hawkins, 2018-Ohio-4649, at ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170-173 (2005). “‘Instead, a defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.’” Id., quoting Johnson at 170 . {¶46} “‘Second, if the trial court finds [a prima facie case of discrimination], the proponent of th

13
State v. Hawkinsgreen
ohioctapp · 2018 · cited in 2 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2024–2026
2 sentences

2026“At the first step of the Batson inquiry, the defendant is not required to demonstrate that ‘the challenge was more likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination.’” Hawkins, 2018-Ohio-4649, at ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170-173 (2005). “‘Instead, a defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.’” Id., quoting Johnson at 170 . {¶46} “‘Second, if the trial court finds [a prima facie case of discrimination], the proponent of th

2024“At the first step of the Batson inquiry, the defendant is not required to demonstrate that ‘the challenge was more likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination.’” Hawkins, 2018-Ohio-4649, at ¶ 9 , quoting Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 , 170- 173, 125 S.Ct. 2410 (2005). “‘Instead, a defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.’” Id., quoting Johnson at 170 . {¶70} “‘Second, if the trial court finds [a prima facie case of discrimination], the propone

12
Maloney v. Maloneygreen
ohioctapp · 2005 · cited in 2 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2018–2019
2 sentences

2019He claims the proportional share 14 method, used by Mr. Nemeth, is more equitable and provides a more accurate calculation of appellee’s separate property. {¶50} “Any property or an interest therein that either spouse owns when the marriage terminates is presumed to be marital property.” Maloney v. Maloney, 160 Ohio App.3d 209 , 2005-Ohio-1368, ¶20 (2d Dist.) The burden of establishing that specific property owned when the marriage terminates is not marital but separate is upon the proponent of the claim.

2019He claims the proportional share 14 method, used by Mr. Nemeth, is more equitable and provides a more accurate calculation of appellee’s separate property. {¶50} “Any property or an interest therein that either spouse owns when the marriage terminates is presumed to be marital property.” Maloney v. Maloney, 160 Ohio App.3d 209 , 2005-Ohio-1368, ¶20 (2d Dist.) The burden of establishing that specific property owned when the marriage terminates is not marital but separate is upon the proponent of the claim.

12
Cooper v. Cooper, 2007 Ca 76 (9-19-2008)green
ohioctapp · 2008 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026As relevant to this appeal, “separate property” includes all real and personal property and any interest in property that is found to 21 be “[a]n inheritance by one spouse by bequest, devise, or descent during the course of the marriage.” R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a)(i). {¶ 54} “The burden of proving that property is separate is on the proponent of the claim to prove by a preponderance of the evidence.” Fiamengo v. Fiamengo, 2016-Ohio- 4720, ¶ 29 (2d Dist.), citing Cooper v. Cooper, 2008-Ohio-4731, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.); accord Bergman v. Bergman, 2013-Ohio-715, ¶ 31 (2d Dist.).

11
Bergman v. Bergmangreen
ohioctapp · 2013 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026As relevant to this appeal, “separate property” includes all real and personal property and any interest in property that is found to 21 be “[a]n inheritance by one spouse by bequest, devise, or descent during the course of the marriage.” R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a)(i). {¶ 54} “The burden of proving that property is separate is on the proponent of the claim to prove by a preponderance of the evidence.” Fiamengo v. Fiamengo, 2016-Ohio- 4720, ¶ 29 (2d Dist.), citing Cooper v. Cooper, 2008-Ohio-4731, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.); accord Bergman v. Bergman, 2013-Ohio-715, ¶ 31 (2d Dist.).

11
Yaklevich v. Kemp, Schaeffer & Rowe Co.green
ohio · 1994 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025Yaklevich, 68 Ohio St.3d at 297 (comparing the elements of malicious prosecution with those of abuse of process claims). {¶61} Further, the Benders did not present evidence that Radmore had an ulterior motive in naming Bender’s parents as defendants in order to obtain something that the court was without power to award.

11
Favors v. Cuomogreen
nyed · 2012 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022See Favors v. Cuomo, 285 F.R.D. 187, 212 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (“once the [legislative] privilege is invoked, the Court should not later allow the proponent of the privilege to strategically waive it to the prejudice of other parties”); Commt. for a Fair & 30 January Term, 2022 Balanced Map v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections, N.D.Ill.

11
In Re Mayer Morganroth, Raymond J. Donovan, Secretary of Labor v. Frank Fitzsimmonsgreen
ca6 · 1983 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016A trial court must ensure that the proponent of the privilege provides the basis for asserting the privilege and evidence to support that claim (e.g., personal statements under oath) so that the court may determine whether a direct answer might tend to incriminate the witness, see, e.g., Morganroth at 167, and thus that the witness’s silence is “justified.” Hoffman at 486 ; see also McGorray v. Sutter, 80 Ohio St. 400 , 89 N.E. 10 (1909), paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 47} The trial court’s inquiry into the basis of a witness’s assertion of the privilege is critical, even when the purported

2016A trial court must ensure that the proponent of the privilege provides the basis for asserting the privilege and evidence to support that claim (e.g., personal statements under oath) so that the court may determine whether a direct answer might tend to incriminate the witness, see, e.g., Morganroth, 718 F.2d at 167 , and thus that the witness’s silence is “justified.” Hoffman at 486 ; see also McGorray v. Sutter, 80 Ohio St. 400 , 89 N.E. 10 (1909), paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 47} The trial court’s inquiry into the basis of a witness’s assertion of the privilege is critical, even when th

11
McGorray v. Suttergreen
ohio · 1909 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (26)

CaseCitedYears
Jaworowski v. Medical Radiation Consultants green
ohioctapp · 1991
2 sentences

2013Radiation Consultants, 71 Ohio App.3d 320, 327-328 , 594 N.E.2d 9 (2d Dist.1991) To show reversible error, the proponent of the instruction must show both that the trial court’s refusal to give the instruction was an abuse of discretion and that he was prejudiced by the court’s refusal to give the proposed instruction.

2013Radiation Consultants, 71 Ohio App.3d 320, 327-328 , 594 N.E.2d 9 (2d Dist.1991) To show reversible error, the proponent of the instruction must show both that the trial court’s refusal to give the instruction was an abuse of discretion and that he was prejudiced by the court’s refusal to give the proposed instruction.

62001–2023
State v. Bryan green
ohio · 2004
2 sentences

2023Second, if the trial court finds this requirement fulfilled, the proponent of the challenge must provide a racially neutral explanation for the challenge.” State v. Bryan, 101 Ohio St.3d 272 , 2004-Ohio-971 , ¶ 106, citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986).

2019Second, if the trial court finds this requirement fulfilled, the proponent of the challenge must provide a racially neutral explanation for the challenge." State v. Bryan, 101 Ohio St.3d 272 , 2004-Ohio-971 , ¶ 106, citing Batson at 96- 98.

52017–2023
State v. Thompson (Slip Opinion) green
ohio · 2014
2 sentences

2026“At the second step of the -20- inquiry, ‘“the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation.”’” Hawkins at ¶ 10 , quoting Thompson, 2014-Ohio-4751, at ¶ 51 , quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991).

2024“At the second step of the inquiry, ‘“the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation.”’” Hawkins at ¶ 10 , quoting Thompson, 141 Ohio St.3d 254 , 2014-Ohio-4751, at ¶ 51 , quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 (1991).

32018–2026
State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley green
ohio · 2008
2 sentences

2024Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley, 2008-Ohio-1770 , paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 15} In Goodyear, the court of appeals crafted a “settlement privilege,” holding that statements made in furtherance of settlement are privileged and protected from third-party discovery.

2024Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley, 2008-Ohio-1770 , paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 15} In Goodyear, the court of appeals crafted a “settlement privilege,” holding that statements made in furtherance of settlement are privileged and protected from third-party discovery.

22024–2024
Murphy v. Carrollton Manufacturing Co. green
ohio · 1991
2 sentences

2010Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 585, 591 , 575 N.E.2d 828 . {¶ 58} To show reversible error, the proponent of the error must make a two-part showing.

2010Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 585, 591 , 575 N.E.2d 828 . {¶ 58} To show reversible error, the proponent of the error must make a two-part showing.

22010–2014
Mayer v. Mayer green
ohioctapp · 1996
2 sentences

2013Mercer No. 10-97-13, 1998 WL 856923 (Dec. 7, 1998), citing Mayer v. Mayer, 110 Ohio App.3d 233, 236 , 673 N.E.2d 981 (3d Dist. 1996); R.C. 3105.171(H). {¶ 31} The burden of proof that specific property is not marital but separate is upon the proponent of the claim to prove by a preponderance of the evidence.

2013Mercer No. 10-97-13, 1998 WL 856923 (Dec. 7, 1998), citing Mayer v. Mayer, 110 Ohio App.3d 233, 236 , 673 N.E.2d 981 (3d Dist. 1996); R.C. 3105.171(H). {¶ 31} The burden of proof that specific property is not marital but separate is upon the proponent of the claim to prove by a preponderance of the evidence.

22011–2013
State v. Hill green
ohio · 1995
2 sentences

2011“To make a prima facie case of such purposeful discrimination, an accused must demonstrate: (a) that members of a recognized racial group were peremptorily challenged; and (b) that the facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used the peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on account of their race.” (Internal citations and quotations omitted.) State v. Hill (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 433, 444-445 . {¶8} “Second, if the trial court finds this requirement fulfilled, the proponent of the challenge must provide a racially neutral explanation for the challenge.

2006Id. at 445 .

22006–2011
Tanson Holdings, Inc. v. Darke County Board of Revision neutral
ohio · 1996
2 sentences

1997Bd. of Revision (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 687 , 660 N.E.2d 1216 , as authority for its contention that the rebuttable presumption that sale price reflects true value cannot be used until the proponent of the presumption has established that the sale was conducted at arm’s length.

1997Bd. of Revision (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 687 , 660 N.E.2d 1216 , as authority for its contention that the rebuttable presumption that sale price reflects true value cannot be used until the proponent of the presumption has established that the sale was conducted at arm’s length.

21997–1997
Parusel v. Ewry, Unpublished Decision (1-30-2004) neutral
ohioctapp · 2004
1 sentence

2023Alternatively, they argue that the prospective jurors should have been excused for cause based on subdivision (D), “based on a reasonable suspicion of prejudice against the Curleys.” Id., p. 14. {¶ 19} “The right to examine prospective jurors on their voir dire is granted to litigants in order to enable them to select a jury composed of men and women qualified and competent to judge and determine, without bias, prejudice, or partiality, facts in issue.” Dowd-Feder v. Truesdell, 130 Ohio St. 530, 533 , 200 N.E. 762 (1936). “[W]hen the statute states that the validity of the challenge is to be t

12023–2023
Dowd-Feder, Inc. v. Truesdell green
ohio · 1936
2 sentences

2023Alternatively, they argue that the prospective jurors should have been excused for cause based on subdivision (D), “based on a reasonable suspicion of prejudice against the Curleys.” Id., p. 14. {¶ 19} “The right to examine prospective jurors on their voir dire is granted to litigants in order to enable them to select a jury composed of men and women qualified and competent to judge and determine, without bias, prejudice, or partiality, facts in issue.” Dowd-Feder v. Truesdell, 130 Ohio St. 530, 533 , 200 N.E. 762 (1936). “[W]hen the statute states that the validity of the challenge is to be t

2023Alternatively, they argue that the prospective jurors should have been excused for cause based on subdivision (D), “based on a reasonable suspicion of prejudice against the Curleys.” Id., p. 14. {¶ 19} “The right to examine prospective jurors on their voir dire is granted to litigants in order to enable them to select a jury composed of men and women qualified and competent to judge and determine, without bias, prejudice, or partiality, facts in issue.” Dowd-Feder v. Truesdell, 130 Ohio St. 530, 533 , 200 N.E. 762 (1936). “[W]hen the statute states that the validity of the challenge is to be t

12023–2023
Hill v. Lockhart green
scotus · 1985
2 sentences

2021Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 524 , 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992). {¶9} In his 2020 Crim.R. 32.1 motion, Harris sought to withdraw his guilty plea to sexual imposition on the ground that the plea had been the unknowing and unintelligent product of his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.

2021Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 524 , 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992). {¶9} In his 2020 Crim.R. 32.1 motion, Harris sought to withdraw his guilty plea to sexual imposition on the ground that the plea had been the unknowing and unintelligent product of his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.

12021–2021
Strickland v. Washington green
scotus · 1984
2 sentences

2021The proponent of a claim that a guilty plea was the unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent product of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness bears the burden of demonstrating that counsel’s performance was deficient in the sense that it was not reasonable under the circumstances, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 687- 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and that there was a reasonable probability that, but for that deficiency, he would not have pled guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial.

2021The proponent of a claim that a guilty plea was the unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent product of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness bears the burden of demonstrating that counsel’s performance was deficient in the sense that it was not reasonable under the circumstances, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 687- 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and that there was a reasonable probability that, but for that deficiency, he would not have pled guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial.

12021–2021
State v. Xie green
ohio · 1992
2 sentences

2021Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 524 , 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992). {¶9} In his 2020 Crim.R. 32.1 motion, Harris sought to withdraw his guilty plea to sexual imposition on the ground that the plea had been the unknowing and unintelligent product of his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.

2021Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 524 , 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992). {¶9} In his 2020 Crim.R. 32.1 motion, Harris sought to withdraw his guilty plea to sexual imposition on the ground that the plea had been the unknowing and unintelligent product of his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.

12021–2021
Umbaugh v. Stinson neutral
ohioctapp · 2020
1 sentence

2020Greene No. 2019-CA-62, 2020-Ohio-3299, ¶ 11 . {¶ 15} The trial court here determined that the settlement proceeds were Diana’s separate property as compensation for her “physical injury” solely because the settlement agreement stated that the settlement was to resolve a case involving Diana’s “physical sickness.” The court refused to consider any other evidence, citing contract law that provides that if the language of a contract is plain and unambiguous, a court cannot consider extrinsic evidence.

12020–2020
Youssef v. Parr, Inc. green
ohioctapp · 1990
2 sentences

2018Montgomery No. 19704, 2004-Ohio-259 , 2004 WL 102591 , ¶ 21, quoting Youssef v. Parr, Inc. , 69 Ohio App.3d 679 , 591 N.E.2d 762 (8th Dist.1990). *995 {¶ 79} We have held that, to show reversible error in refusing to give proposed instructions, "the proponent of the error must make a two part showing.

2018Montgomery No. 19704, 2004-Ohio-259 , 2004 WL 102591 , ¶ 21, quoting Youssef v. Parr, Inc. , 69 Ohio App.3d 679 , 591 N.E.2d 762 (8th Dist.1990). *995 {¶ 79} We have held that, to show reversible error in refusing to give proposed instructions, "the proponent of the error must make a two part showing.

12018–2018
Fisher v. Fisher, Unpublished Decision (12-23-2004) green
ohioctapp · 2004
1 sentence

2018Montgomery No. 20398, 2004-Ohio-7255 , 2004 WL 3561214 , ¶ 9, citing Peck v. Peck , 96 Ohio App.3d 731 , 645 N.E.2d 1300 (12th Dist. 1994).

12018–2018
Walker v. Conrad, Unpublished Decision (1-23-2004) green
ohioctapp · 2004
1 sentence

2018Montgomery No. 19704, 2004-Ohio-259 , 2004 WL 102591 , ¶ 21, quoting Youssef v. Parr, Inc. , 69 Ohio App.3d 679 , 591 N.E.2d 762 (8th Dist.1990). *995 {¶ 79} We have held that, to show reversible error in refusing to give proposed instructions, "the proponent of the error must make a two part showing.

12018–2018
State v. Were green
ohio · 2008
12011–2011
State v. Murphy green
ohio · 2001
12010–2010
Davis v. Jacobs green
ohioctapp · 1998
12007–2007
State v. Powell green
ohioctapp · 1993
12007–2007
Rinaldi v. City View N. R. Ctr., Unpublished Decision (12-1-2005) green
ohioctapp · 2005
12006–2006
Pesek v. University Neurologists Ass'n green
ohio · 2000
12002–2002
Nelson v. Ford Motor Co. green
ohioctapp · 2001
12002–2002
Feterle v. Huettner green
ohio · 1971
12002–2002
State v. Scott green
ohioctapp · 1987
12000–2000

Statutes the citing opinions construe

OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 3105.171 (9) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2941.25 (6) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.22 (5) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.01 (5) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2925.03 (5) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2925.11 (5) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.03 (5) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.05 (4) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2925.01 (4) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.04 (4) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.05 (4) OH § Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.14 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

AZ 309 (1980–2026) VA 214 (1992–2026) TX 158 (1988–2025) OH 65 (1997–2026) MO 64 (1968–2025) NY 64 (1895–2026) CA 52 (1915–2026) KY 28 (2002–2025) MI 28 (1975–2025) NV 24 (1998–2021) IL 22 (1887–2025) WA 19 (1975–2023) PA 19 (1985–2025) FL 18 (1971–2023) CO 12 (1986–2025) SC 11 (1997–2026) NM 10 (1985–2025) OR 10 (1984–2025) MD 7 (1992–2019) CT 7 (2000–2021) TN 6 (1939–2021) IN 6 (1986–2019) MN 6 (1986–1991) DC 6 (1980–2025) MA 6 (1997–2016) WY 5 (1979–1982) VT 5 (2024–2026) DE 5 (1989–2022) AR 4 (2002–2025) RI 4 (2001–2007) ID 4 (1960–2023) MS 4 (1990–2010) GA 3 (2014–2024) ND 3 (1929–2012) NC 3 (2002–2011) SD 2 (1917–2004) NJ 2 (1993–1995) VI 2 (2012–2017) LA 2 (1975–1996) WI 2 (2006–2011) OK 2 (1992–1993) AL 2 (1982–2011) NE 2 (2023–2024)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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