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65 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2026 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Batson v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2023Second, if the trial court finds this requirement fulfilled, the proponent of the challenge must provide a racially neutral explanation for the challenge.” State v. Bryan, 101 Ohio St.3d 272 , 2004-Ohio-971 , ¶ 106, citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986). 2018“Instead, a defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.” Id. at 170 . {¶10} “‘Second, if the trial court finds [a prima facie case of discrimination], the proponent of the challenge must provide a racially neutral explanation for the challenge.’” Frazier at ¶ 64, quoting Bryan at ¶ 106, citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 - 98. | 3 | 16 |
Hoffman v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2019Arnold recognizes that a trial court should require a witness to answer questions only if “ -12- ‘it clearly appears to the court that [the proponent of the privilege] is mistaken.’ ” Id. at ¶ 45, quoting Hoffman at 486. {¶25} Furthermore, if a trial court commits error in failing to sufficiently delve into a witness’s purported fear of incrimination, an appellate court must still affirm the trial court’s judgment if the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court’s inquiry was harmless. 2017Arnold recognizes that a trial court should require a witness to answer questions only if " 'it clearly appears to the court that [the proponent of the privilege] is mistaken.' " Id. at ¶ 45, quoting Hoffman at 486, 71 S.Ct. 814 . {¶ 22} Furthermore, if a trial court commits error in failing to sufficiently delve into a witness's purported fear of incrimination, an appellate court must still affirm the trial court's judgment if the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court's inquiry was harmless. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Cookgreen2 sentences2019The third and final step requires the trial court to "decide based on all the circumstances, whether the opponent has proved purposeful facial discrimination." Bryan at ¶ 106, citing Batson at 98 . {¶ 76} "The prosecution's race-neutral explanation need not rise to the level of a challenge for cause." State v. Jennings, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-70, 2009-Ohio-6840 , ¶ 18, citing State v. Cook, 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 519 (1992), citing Batson at 96-98 . 2019The third and final step requires the trial court to "decide based on all the circumstances, whether the opponent has proved purposeful facial discrimination." Bryan at ¶ 106, citing Batson at 98 . {¶ 74} "The prosecution's race-neutral explanation need not rise to the level of a challenge for cause." State v. Jennings, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-70, 2009-Ohio-6840 , ¶ 18, citing State v. Cook, 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 519 (1992), citing Batson at 96-98 . | 2 | 2 |
Peck v. Peckgreen2 sentences2019Peck v. Peck, 96 Ohio App.3d 731, 734 (12th Dist.1994). 2019Bergman at ¶ 31 , citing Peck v. Peck, 96 Ohio App.3d 731, 734 , 645 N.E.2d 1300 (12th Dist.1994); Snyder v. Snyder, 2d Dist. | 1 | 12 |
Hernandez v. New Yorkgreen2 sentences2026“At the second step of the -20- inquiry, ‘“the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation.”’” Hawkins at ¶ 10 , quoting Thompson, 2014-Ohio-4751, at ¶ 51 , quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991). 2024“At the second step of the inquiry, ‘“the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation.”’” Hawkins at ¶ 10 , quoting Thompson, 141 Ohio St.3d 254 , 2014-Ohio-4751, at ¶ 51 , quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 (1991). | 1 | 4 |
Johnson v. Californiagreen2 sentences2026“At the first step of the Batson inquiry, the defendant is not required to demonstrate that ‘the challenge was more likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination.’” Hawkins, 2018-Ohio-4649, at ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170-173 (2005). “‘Instead, a defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.’” Id., quoting Johnson at 170 . {¶46} “‘Second, if the trial court finds [a prima facie case of discrimination], the proponent of th 2026“At the first step of the Batson inquiry, the defendant is not required to demonstrate that ‘the challenge was more likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination.’” Hawkins, 2018-Ohio-4649, at ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170-173 (2005). “‘Instead, a defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.’” Id., quoting Johnson at 170 . {¶46} “‘Second, if the trial court finds [a prima facie case of discrimination], the proponent of th | 1 | 3 |
State v. Hawkinsgreen2 sentences2026“At the first step of the Batson inquiry, the defendant is not required to demonstrate that ‘the challenge was more likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination.’” Hawkins, 2018-Ohio-4649, at ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170-173 (2005). “‘Instead, a defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.’” Id., quoting Johnson at 170 . {¶46} “‘Second, if the trial court finds [a prima facie case of discrimination], the proponent of th 2024“At the first step of the Batson inquiry, the defendant is not required to demonstrate that ‘the challenge was more likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination.’” Hawkins, 2018-Ohio-4649, at ¶ 9 , quoting Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 , 170- 173, 125 S.Ct. 2410 (2005). “‘Instead, a defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.’” Id., quoting Johnson at 170 . {¶70} “‘Second, if the trial court finds [a prima facie case of discrimination], the propone | 1 | 2 |
Maloney v. Maloneygreen2 sentences2019He claims the proportional share 14 method, used by Mr. Nemeth, is more equitable and provides a more accurate calculation of appellee’s separate property. {¶50} “Any property or an interest therein that either spouse owns when the marriage terminates is presumed to be marital property.” Maloney v. Maloney, 160 Ohio App.3d 209 , 2005-Ohio-1368, ¶20 (2d Dist.) The burden of establishing that specific property owned when the marriage terminates is not marital but separate is upon the proponent of the claim. 2019He claims the proportional share 14 method, used by Mr. Nemeth, is more equitable and provides a more accurate calculation of appellee’s separate property. {¶50} “Any property or an interest therein that either spouse owns when the marriage terminates is presumed to be marital property.” Maloney v. Maloney, 160 Ohio App.3d 209 , 2005-Ohio-1368, ¶20 (2d Dist.) The burden of establishing that specific property owned when the marriage terminates is not marital but separate is upon the proponent of the claim. | 1 | 2 |
Cooper v. Cooper, 2007 Ca 76 (9-19-2008)green1 sentence2026As relevant to this appeal, “separate property” includes all real and personal property and any interest in property that is found to 21 be “[a]n inheritance by one spouse by bequest, devise, or descent during the course of the marriage.” R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a)(i). {¶ 54} “The burden of proving that property is separate is on the proponent of the claim to prove by a preponderance of the evidence.” Fiamengo v. Fiamengo, 2016-Ohio- 4720, ¶ 29 (2d Dist.), citing Cooper v. Cooper, 2008-Ohio-4731, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.); accord Bergman v. Bergman, 2013-Ohio-715, ¶ 31 (2d Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
Bergman v. Bergmangreen1 sentence2026As relevant to this appeal, “separate property” includes all real and personal property and any interest in property that is found to 21 be “[a]n inheritance by one spouse by bequest, devise, or descent during the course of the marriage.” R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a)(i). {¶ 54} “The burden of proving that property is separate is on the proponent of the claim to prove by a preponderance of the evidence.” Fiamengo v. Fiamengo, 2016-Ohio- 4720, ¶ 29 (2d Dist.), citing Cooper v. Cooper, 2008-Ohio-4731, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.); accord Bergman v. Bergman, 2013-Ohio-715, ¶ 31 (2d Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
Yaklevich v. Kemp, Schaeffer & Rowe Co.green1 sentence2025Yaklevich, 68 Ohio St.3d at 297 (comparing the elements of malicious prosecution with those of abuse of process claims). {¶61} Further, the Benders did not present evidence that Radmore had an ulterior motive in naming Bender’s parents as defendants in order to obtain something that the court was without power to award. | 1 | 1 |
Favors v. Cuomogreen1 sentence2022See Favors v. Cuomo, 285 F.R.D. 187, 212 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (“once the [legislative] privilege is invoked, the Court should not later allow the proponent of the privilege to strategically waive it to the prejudice of other parties”); Commt. for a Fair & 30 January Term, 2022 Balanced Map v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections, N.D.Ill. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Mayer Morganroth, Raymond J. Donovan, Secretary of Labor v. Frank Fitzsimmonsgreen2 sentences2016A trial court must ensure that the proponent of the privilege provides the basis for asserting the privilege and evidence to support that claim (e.g., personal statements under oath) so that the court may determine whether a direct answer might tend to incriminate the witness, see, e.g., Morganroth at 167, and thus that the witness’s silence is “justified.” Hoffman at 486 ; see also McGorray v. Sutter, 80 Ohio St. 400 , 89 N.E. 10 (1909), paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 47} The trial court’s inquiry into the basis of a witness’s assertion of the privilege is critical, even when the purported 2016A trial court must ensure that the proponent of the privilege provides the basis for asserting the privilege and evidence to support that claim (e.g., personal statements under oath) so that the court may determine whether a direct answer might tend to incriminate the witness, see, e.g., Morganroth, 718 F.2d at 167 , and thus that the witness’s silence is “justified.” Hoffman at 486 ; see also McGorray v. Sutter, 80 Ohio St. 400 , 89 N.E. 10 (1909), paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 47} The trial court’s inquiry into the basis of a witness’s assertion of the privilege is critical, even when th | 1 | 1 |
| McGorray v. Suttergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jaworowski v. Medical Radiation Consultants
green
2 sentences2013Radiation Consultants, 71 Ohio App.3d 320, 327-328 , 594 N.E.2d 9 (2d Dist.1991) To show reversible error, the proponent of the instruction must show both that the trial court’s refusal to give the instruction was an abuse of discretion and that he was prejudiced by the court’s refusal to give the proposed instruction. 2013Radiation Consultants, 71 Ohio App.3d 320, 327-328 , 594 N.E.2d 9 (2d Dist.1991) To show reversible error, the proponent of the instruction must show both that the trial court’s refusal to give the instruction was an abuse of discretion and that he was prejudiced by the court’s refusal to give the proposed instruction. | 6 | 2001–2023 |
State v. Bryan
green
2 sentences2023Second, if the trial court finds this requirement fulfilled, the proponent of the challenge must provide a racially neutral explanation for the challenge.” State v. Bryan, 101 Ohio St.3d 272 , 2004-Ohio-971 , ¶ 106, citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986). 2019Second, if the trial court finds this requirement fulfilled, the proponent of the challenge must provide a racially neutral explanation for the challenge." State v. Bryan, 101 Ohio St.3d 272 , 2004-Ohio-971 , ¶ 106, citing Batson at 96- 98. | 5 | 2017–2023 |
State v. Thompson (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2026“At the second step of the -20- inquiry, ‘“the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation.”’” Hawkins at ¶ 10 , quoting Thompson, 2014-Ohio-4751, at ¶ 51 , quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991). 2024“At the second step of the inquiry, ‘“the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation.”’” Hawkins at ¶ 10 , quoting Thompson, 141 Ohio St.3d 254 , 2014-Ohio-4751, at ¶ 51 , quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 (1991). | 3 | 2018–2026 |
State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley
green
2 sentences2024Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley, 2008-Ohio-1770 , paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 15} In Goodyear, the court of appeals crafted a “settlement privilege,” holding that statements made in furtherance of settlement are privileged and protected from third-party discovery. 2024Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley, 2008-Ohio-1770 , paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 15} In Goodyear, the court of appeals crafted a “settlement privilege,” holding that statements made in furtherance of settlement are privileged and protected from third-party discovery. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Murphy v. Carrollton Manufacturing Co.
green
2 sentences2010Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 585, 591 , 575 N.E.2d 828 . {¶ 58} To show reversible error, the proponent of the error must make a two-part showing. 2010Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 585, 591 , 575 N.E.2d 828 . {¶ 58} To show reversible error, the proponent of the error must make a two-part showing. | 2 | 2010–2014 |
Mayer v. Mayer
green
2 sentences2013Mercer No. 10-97-13, 1998 WL 856923 (Dec. 7, 1998), citing Mayer v. Mayer, 110 Ohio App.3d 233, 236 , 673 N.E.2d 981 (3d Dist. 1996); R.C. 3105.171(H). {¶ 31} The burden of proof that specific property is not marital but separate is upon the proponent of the claim to prove by a preponderance of the evidence. 2013Mercer No. 10-97-13, 1998 WL 856923 (Dec. 7, 1998), citing Mayer v. Mayer, 110 Ohio App.3d 233, 236 , 673 N.E.2d 981 (3d Dist. 1996); R.C. 3105.171(H). {¶ 31} The burden of proof that specific property is not marital but separate is upon the proponent of the claim to prove by a preponderance of the evidence. | 2 | 2011–2013 |
State v. Hill
green
2 sentences2011“To make a prima facie case of such purposeful discrimination, an accused must demonstrate: (a) that members of a recognized racial group were peremptorily challenged; and (b) that the facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used the peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on account of their race.” (Internal citations and quotations omitted.) State v. Hill (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 433, 444-445 . {¶8} “Second, if the trial court finds this requirement fulfilled, the proponent of the challenge must provide a racially neutral explanation for the challenge. 2006Id. at 445 . | 2 | 2006–2011 |
Tanson Holdings, Inc. v. Darke County Board of Revision
neutral
2 sentences1997Bd. of Revision (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 687 , 660 N.E.2d 1216 , as authority for its contention that the rebuttable presumption that sale price reflects true value cannot be used until the proponent of the presumption has established that the sale was conducted at arm’s length. 1997Bd. of Revision (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 687 , 660 N.E.2d 1216 , as authority for its contention that the rebuttable presumption that sale price reflects true value cannot be used until the proponent of the presumption has established that the sale was conducted at arm’s length. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Parusel v. Ewry, Unpublished Decision (1-30-2004)
neutral
1 sentence2023Alternatively, they argue that the prospective jurors should have been excused for cause based on subdivision (D), “based on a reasonable suspicion of prejudice against the Curleys.” Id., p. 14. {¶ 19} “The right to examine prospective jurors on their voir dire is granted to litigants in order to enable them to select a jury composed of men and women qualified and competent to judge and determine, without bias, prejudice, or partiality, facts in issue.” Dowd-Feder v. Truesdell, 130 Ohio St. 530, 533 , 200 N.E. 762 (1936). “[W]hen the statute states that the validity of the challenge is to be t | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Dowd-Feder, Inc. v. Truesdell
green
2 sentences2023Alternatively, they argue that the prospective jurors should have been excused for cause based on subdivision (D), “based on a reasonable suspicion of prejudice against the Curleys.” Id., p. 14. {¶ 19} “The right to examine prospective jurors on their voir dire is granted to litigants in order to enable them to select a jury composed of men and women qualified and competent to judge and determine, without bias, prejudice, or partiality, facts in issue.” Dowd-Feder v. Truesdell, 130 Ohio St. 530, 533 , 200 N.E. 762 (1936). “[W]hen the statute states that the validity of the challenge is to be t 2023Alternatively, they argue that the prospective jurors should have been excused for cause based on subdivision (D), “based on a reasonable suspicion of prejudice against the Curleys.” Id., p. 14. {¶ 19} “The right to examine prospective jurors on their voir dire is granted to litigants in order to enable them to select a jury composed of men and women qualified and competent to judge and determine, without bias, prejudice, or partiality, facts in issue.” Dowd-Feder v. Truesdell, 130 Ohio St. 530, 533 , 200 N.E. 762 (1936). “[W]hen the statute states that the validity of the challenge is to be t | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Hill v. Lockhart
green
2 sentences2021Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 524 , 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992). {¶9} In his 2020 Crim.R. 32.1 motion, Harris sought to withdraw his guilty plea to sexual imposition on the ground that the plea had been the unknowing and unintelligent product of his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. 2021Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 524 , 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992). {¶9} In his 2020 Crim.R. 32.1 motion, Harris sought to withdraw his guilty plea to sexual imposition on the ground that the plea had been the unknowing and unintelligent product of his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2021The proponent of a claim that a guilty plea was the unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent product of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness bears the burden of demonstrating that counsel’s performance was deficient in the sense that it was not reasonable under the circumstances, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 687- 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and that there was a reasonable probability that, but for that deficiency, he would not have pled guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial. 2021The proponent of a claim that a guilty plea was the unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent product of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness bears the burden of demonstrating that counsel’s performance was deficient in the sense that it was not reasonable under the circumstances, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 687- 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and that there was a reasonable probability that, but for that deficiency, he would not have pled guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Xie
green
2 sentences2021Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 524 , 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992). {¶9} In his 2020 Crim.R. 32.1 motion, Harris sought to withdraw his guilty plea to sexual imposition on the ground that the plea had been the unknowing and unintelligent product of his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. 2021Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 524 , 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992). {¶9} In his 2020 Crim.R. 32.1 motion, Harris sought to withdraw his guilty plea to sexual imposition on the ground that the plea had been the unknowing and unintelligent product of his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Umbaugh v. Stinson
neutral
1 sentence2020Greene No. 2019-CA-62, 2020-Ohio-3299, ¶ 11 . {¶ 15} The trial court here determined that the settlement proceeds were Diana’s separate property as compensation for her “physical injury” solely because the settlement agreement stated that the settlement was to resolve a case involving Diana’s “physical sickness.” The court refused to consider any other evidence, citing contract law that provides that if the language of a contract is plain and unambiguous, a court cannot consider extrinsic evidence. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Youssef v. Parr, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018Montgomery No. 19704, 2004-Ohio-259 , 2004 WL 102591 , ¶ 21, quoting Youssef v. Parr, Inc. , 69 Ohio App.3d 679 , 591 N.E.2d 762 (8th Dist.1990). *995 {¶ 79} We have held that, to show reversible error in refusing to give proposed instructions, "the proponent of the error must make a two part showing. 2018Montgomery No. 19704, 2004-Ohio-259 , 2004 WL 102591 , ¶ 21, quoting Youssef v. Parr, Inc. , 69 Ohio App.3d 679 , 591 N.E.2d 762 (8th Dist.1990). *995 {¶ 79} We have held that, to show reversible error in refusing to give proposed instructions, "the proponent of the error must make a two part showing. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Fisher v. Fisher, Unpublished Decision (12-23-2004)
green
1 sentence2018Montgomery No. 20398, 2004-Ohio-7255 , 2004 WL 3561214 , ¶ 9, citing Peck v. Peck , 96 Ohio App.3d 731 , 645 N.E.2d 1300 (12th Dist. 1994). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Walker v. Conrad, Unpublished Decision (1-23-2004)
green
1 sentence2018Montgomery No. 19704, 2004-Ohio-259 , 2004 WL 102591 , ¶ 21, quoting Youssef v. Parr, Inc. , 69 Ohio App.3d 679 , 591 N.E.2d 762 (8th Dist.1990). *995 {¶ 79} We have held that, to show reversible error in refusing to give proposed instructions, "the proponent of the error must make a two part showing. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Were green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Murphy green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Davis v. Jacobs green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Powell green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Rinaldi v. City View N. R. Ctr., Unpublished Decision (12-1-2005) green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Pesek v. University Neurologists Ass'n green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Nelson v. Ford Motor Co. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Feterle v. Huettner green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| State v. Scott green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.