proponent exception in California

2015(See In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314-1315 ; see In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621-622 ; In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 123 ; but see In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147 , 1166 & fn. 7.) “Since the proponent of the exception bears the burden of producing evidence of the existence of a beneficial parental . . . relationship, which is a factual issue, the substantial evidence standard of 8 review is the appropriate one to apply to this component of the juvenile court’s determination.” (In re Bailey J., supra, at p. 1314 .) A juvenile court’s determination whe

2014(See e.g., In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 530-531 [Fourth Dist., Div. 3, follows Sixth Dist.]; In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621-622 [Second Dist., Div. 7, follows (continued) 9 Cal.App.4th 102, 123 (C.B.); In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314 (Bailey J.).) “[T]he substantial evidence test applies to pure findings of fact. [Citations.]” (C.B., supra, at p. 123.) “Since the proponent of the exception bears the burden of producing evidence of the existence of a beneficial parental . . . relationship, which is a factual issue, the substantial evidence standard of rev

2016(In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418-1419 .) On appeal, we employ a hybrid standard of review by applying "the substantial evidence standard of review to the factual issue of the existence of a beneficial parental relationship, and the abuse of discretion standard to the determination of whether there is a compelling reason for finding that termination would be detrimental to the child." (In re Anthony B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 389, 395 .) The reason for this hybrid standard was 18 explained in In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308 , in which the court observed its decisio

2016(See In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314-1315 .) “Since the proponent of the exception bears the burden of producing evidence of the existence of a beneficial parental . . . relationship, which is a factual issue, the substantial evidence standard of review is the appropriate one to apply to this component of the juvenile court’s determination.” (Id. at p. 1314.) In contrast, a juvenile court’s determination whether there is a compelling reason not to terminate parental rights based on a beneficial parent-child relationship is “a ‘quintessentially’ discretionary decision, which c

2013(Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1314-1315.) Since the proponent of the exception bears the burden of producing evidence of the existence of a beneficial parental or sibling relationship, a challenge to a juvenile court’s finding that there is no beneficial relationship amounts to a contention that the “undisputed facts lead to only one conclusion.” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517 , 1529.) Unless the undisputed facts established the existence of a beneficial parental or sibling relationship, a substantial evidence challenge to this component of the juvenile court’s determinati

2013(Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1314-1315.) Since the proponent of the exception bears the burden of producing evidence of the existence of a beneficial parental or sibling relationship, a challenge to a juvenile court’s finding that there is no beneficial relationship amounts to a contention that the “undisputed facts lead to only one conclusion.” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517 , 1529.) Unless the undisputed facts established the existence of a beneficial parental or sibling relationship, a substantial evidence challenge to this component of the juvenile court’s determinati

2015(See In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314-1315 ; see In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621-622 ; In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 123 ; but see In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147 , 1166 & fn. 7.) “Since the proponent of the exception bears the burden of producing evidence of the existence of a beneficial parental . . . relationship, which is a factual issue, the substantial evidence standard of 8 review is the appropriate one to apply to this component of the juvenile court’s determination.” (In re Bailey J., supra, at p. 1314 .) A juvenile court’s determination whe

2014(See e.g., In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 530-531 [Fourth Dist., Div. 3, follows Sixth Dist.]; In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621-622 [Second Dist., Div. 7, follows (continued) 9 Cal.App.4th 102, 123 (C.B.); In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314 (Bailey J.).) “[T]he substantial evidence test applies to pure findings of fact. [Citations.]” (C.B., supra, at p. 123.) “Since the proponent of the exception bears the burden of producing evidence of the existence of a beneficial parental . . . relationship, which is a factual issue, the substantial evidence standard of rev

2023Wimsatt and America Online also involved contractual provisions that designated an exclusive forum for litigation without an express waiver of [a party’s unwaivable] rights ....” (Ibid.) “Those courts nonetheless found the burden of proof rested on the party seeking to enforce the forum selection clause because the clause operated as a waiver of California statutory rights if the court in the designated forum did not apply California law and the law in the forum did not provide equivalent rights.” (Ibid., italics added; see also ibid. [“Here, the forum selection clause has the potential to ope

2023Wimsatt and America Online also involved contractual provisions that designated an exclusive forum for litigation without an express waiver of [a party’s unwaivable] rights ....” (Ibid.) “Those courts nonetheless found the burden of proof rested on the party seeking to enforce the forum selection clause because the clause operated as a waiver of California statutory rights if the court in the designated forum did not apply California law and the law in the forum did not provide equivalent rights.” (Ibid., italics added; see also ibid. [“Here, the forum selection clause has the potential to ope

2006The presumption of innocence The "presumption of innocence" — a "shorthand description of the right of the accused to `remain inactive and secure'" until the People have met their burden of proof — is inherent in the reasonable doubt standard. ( Taylor v. Kentucky (1978) 436 U.S. 478, 483 , 98 S.Ct. 1930 , 56 L.Ed.2d 468 ( Taylor ); see ibid. ["`[T]o say . . . that the opponent of a claim or charge is presumed not to be guilty is to say in another form that the proponent of the claim or charge must evidence it'" in accordance with the requisite burden of proof].) Yet, while the presumption of

2006The presumption of innocence The "presumption of innocence" — a "shorthand description of the right of the accused to `remain inactive and secure'" until the People have met their burden of proof — is inherent in the reasonable doubt standard. ( Taylor v. Kentucky (1978) 436 U.S. 478, 483 , 98 S.Ct. 1930 , 56 L.Ed.2d 468 ( Taylor ); see ibid. ["`[T]o say . . . that the opponent of a claim or charge is presumed not to be guilty is to say in another form that the proponent of the claim or charge must evidence it'" in accordance with the requisite burden of proof].) Yet, while the presumption of

2016L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942 , 949.) “[T]he review of an adoption exception incorporates both the substantial evidence and the abuse of discretion standards of review. [Citation.] The . . . juvenile court’s decision whether an adoption exception applies involves two component determinations. ‘Since the proponent of the exception bears the burden of producing evidence of the existence of a beneficial parental or sibling relationship, which is a factual issue, the substantial evidence standard of review is the appropriate one to apply to this component of the juvenile court’s determination.’ [C

2014(See e.g., In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 530-531 [Fourth Dist., Div. 3, follows Sixth Dist.]; In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621-622 [Second Dist., Div. 7, follows (continued) 9 Cal.App.4th 102, 123 (C.B.); In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314 (Bailey J.).) “[T]he substantial evidence test applies to pure findings of fact. [Citations.]” (C.B., supra, at p. 123.) “Since the proponent of the exception bears the burden of producing evidence of the existence of a beneficial parental . . . relationship, which is a factual issue, the substantial evidence standard of rev

2014In Washington Mutual Bank v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 906 , the California Supreme Court set forth the parties’ respective burdens on a choice-of-law question as follows: “if the proponent of the clause [here, Fanuk] demonstrates that the 12 chosen state has a substantial relationship to the parties or their transaction, or that a reasonable basis otherwise exists for the choice of law, the parties’ choice generally will be enforced unless the other side can establish both that the chosen law is contrary to a fundamental policy of California and that California has a materially greater

2012(See Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 881, 899 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 73 ].) The burden thus shifts to Maxim to demonstrate that some California public policy would be impaired by application of Pennsylvania law to this case: “[I]f the proponent of the clause . . . demonstrates that the chosen state has a substantial relationship to the parties or their transaction, or that a reasonable basis otherwise exists for the choice of law, the parties’ choice generally will be enforced unless the other side can establish both that the chosen law is contrary to a fundamenta

2013Moreover, we are not reviewing the merits of a fraud cause of action . . . but rather we are reviewing the merits of a discovery [motion] to determine if [Golden State] will have access to communications between [petitioners] and [their] attorneys to aid [Golden State] in proving its causes of action.” (BP Alaska Exploration, supra, 199 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1262-1263.) Thus, “because section 956 applies where an attorney’s services are sought to enable a party to plan to commit a fraud, the proponent of the exception need only . . . prove a false representation of a material fact, knowledge of it

2013Moreover, we are not reviewing the merits of a fraud cause of action . . . but rather we are reviewing the merits of a discovery [motion] to determine if [Golden State] will have access to communications between [petitioners] and [their] attorneys to aid [Golden State] in proving its causes of action.” (BP Alaska Exploration, supra, 199 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1262-1263.) Thus, “because section 956 applies where an attorney’s services are sought to enable a party to plan to commit a fraud, the proponent of the exception need only . . . prove a false representation of a material fact, knowledge of it

2002(Conservatorship of Geiger, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 135 .) Since someone who flees criminal prosecution has a good reason or motive for doing so, it will be difficult for a proponent of the presumption to prove that it applies in the case of a fugitive from justice.

2002In the case heavily relied upon by the majority in reaching their conclusion that this burden had not been met, Conservatorship of Geiger (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 127, 132 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 252 ], the court set forth the appropriate standard of review, stating, “Normally we are bound by the lower court’s determination of facts based upon substantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts. [Citation.] If different inferences can be drawn from undisputed facts, we must accept the lower court’s inference. [Citation.] However, if the court’s inference is rebutted by clear, positive an

2024Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 859 (Mahan).) The proponent of the claim (here, Anabelle) bears the burden of proof.

2021I, § 7, subd. (a).) “The concept of equal treatment under the laws means that persons similarly situated regarding the legitimate purpose of the law should receive like treatment.” (People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th 399, 408 .) 9 When, as here, an alleged equal protection violation is not based on “race, gender, or some other criteria calling for heightened scrutiny,” the proponent of the claim must establish both “that (1) the state has adopted a classification that treats two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner, and (2) the classification does not bear a rational relatio

2021Based on the “prevalence of deaths caused by motor vehicle accidents” and the “ ‘highly important governmental interest’ ” in “deter[ing] . . . driving under the influence of alcohol” ( Munoz, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at pp. 160-161), the courts have uniformly found a rational basis exists for the Legislature to treat defendants who commit murders with vehicles differently than defendants who commit murders with other instrumentalities (see id. at p. 162; People v. Wolfe (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 673, 690 (Wolfe) [“We hold that the Legislature’s charging scheme is rationally related to a legitimate g

2021I, § 7, subd. (a).) “The concept of equal treatment under the laws means that persons similarly situated regarding the legitimate purpose of the law should receive like treatment.” (People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th 399, 408 .) 9 When, as here, an alleged equal protection violation is not based on “race, gender, or some other criteria calling for heightened scrutiny,” the proponent of the claim must establish both “that (1) the state has adopted a classification that treats two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner, and (2) the classification does not bear a rational relatio

2017Where a third party is *845 present, no presumption of confidentiality obtains, and the usual allocation of burden of proof, resting with the proponent of the privilege, applies in determining whether confidentiality was preserved under § 952.” (Sony, supra, 229 F.R.D. at p. 634 ; see Raytheon Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 683, 688 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 425 ] [‘“the presence of third parties does not destroy confidentiality if the disclosure was reasonably necessary to accomplish the client’s purpose in consulting counsel” (italics added)].) ‘“It is appropriate that the proponent of th

2017Where a third party is *845 present, no presumption of confidentiality obtains, and the usual allocation of burden of proof, resting with the proponent of the privilege, applies in determining whether confidentiality was preserved under § 952.” (Sony, supra, 229 F.R.D. at p. 634 ; see Raytheon Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 683, 688 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 425 ] [‘“the presence of third parties does not destroy confidentiality if the disclosure was reasonably necessary to accomplish the client’s purpose in consulting counsel” (italics added)].) ‘“It is appropriate that the proponent of th

2017Where a third party is *845 present, no presumption of confidentiality obtains, and the usual allocation of burden of proof, resting with the proponent of the privilege, applies in determining whether confidentiality was preserved under § 952.” (Sony, supra, 229 F.R.D. at p. 634 ; see Raytheon Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 683, 688 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 425 ] [‘“the presence of third parties does not destroy confidentiality if the disclosure was reasonably necessary to accomplish the client’s purpose in consulting counsel” (italics added)].) ‘“It is appropriate that the proponent of th

2017Where a third party is *845 present, no presumption of confidentiality obtains, and the usual allocation of burden of proof, resting with the proponent of the privilege, applies in determining whether confidentiality was preserved under § 952.” (Sony, supra, 229 F.R.D. at p. 634 ; see Raytheon Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 683, 688 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 425 ] [‘“the presence of third parties does not destroy confidentiality if the disclosure was reasonably necessary to accomplish the client’s purpose in consulting counsel” (italics added)].) ‘“It is appropriate that the proponent of th

2016Such a pension right may not be destroyed, once vested, without impairing a contractual obligation of the employing public entity. [Citation.]” (Betts v. Board of Administration of Public Employees’ Retirement System (1978) 21 Cal.3d 859, 863 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 158 , 582 P.2d 614 ].) To support a claim that a public employee’s pension rights have been impaired, the proponent of that claim must present “a factual record disclosing . . . present, specific and substantial impairment of [the] contract . . . .” (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch.

2016Such a pension right may not be destroyed, once vested, without impairing a contractual obligation of the employing public entity. [Citation.]” (Betts v. Board of Administration of Public Employees’ Retirement System (1978) 21 Cal.3d 859, 863 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 158 , 582 P.2d 614 ].) To support a claim that a public employee’s pension rights have been impaired, the proponent of that claim must present “a factual record disclosing . . . present, specific and substantial impairment of [the] contract . . . .” (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch.

2016Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 241 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 239 , 583 P.2d 1281 ] (Amador Valley).) *140 The County asserts: “Provisions that confer a pension benefit and establish a means to pay for that benefit create vested, contractual rights not only to continuation of benefits, but also to continuation of the funding.” To support this broad statement, the County cites cases in which the government canceled or reduced the actual payment for the pension benefit.

2016Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 241 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 239 , 583 P.2d 1281 ] (Amador Valley).) *140 The County asserts: “Provisions that confer a pension benefit and establish a means to pay for that benefit create vested, contractual rights not only to continuation of benefits, but also to continuation of the funding.” To support this broad statement, the County cites cases in which the government canceled or reduced the actual payment for the pension benefit.

2015(See Hodges v. Yarian, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 985 [rejecting statutory exception invoked against apartment owner because there was no showing “that the ‘person(s)’ he would hold responsible ‘knew or should have known’ of his presence on the premises as a ‘peace officer.’ ”].) As a proponent of the exception to the firefighter’s rule, Ferreira bore the burden of producing evidence to raise a triable issue of fact.