parol evidence rule in Louisiana

1963The case of Wampler v. Wampler, 239 La. 315 , 118 So.2d 423 (1960) is sound authority for the position that when the suit is not between the parties to the contract of assignment of an oil lease, but where the controversy is between one of these parties in whose favor the assignment is given and a third person, “the parol evidence rule is without relevance as it applies only ‘ * * * where the enforcement of an obligation created by the writing is substantially the cause of action.’ ” In that case the court approved the statement of the law as contained in 32 C.J.S.

1963The case of Wampler v. Wampler, 239 La. 315 , 118 So.2d 423 (1960) is sound authority for the position that when the suit is not between the parties to the contract of assignment of an oil lease, but where the controversy is between one of these parties in whose favor the assignment is given and a third person, “the parol evidence rule is without relevance as it applies only ‘ * * * where the enforcement of an obligation created by the writing is substantially the cause of action.’ ” In that case the court approved the statement of the law as contained in 32 C.J.S.

2007Id; see also, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.[ v. Louisiana Minority, Inc.], 522 So.2d 1154 (La.App. 4 Cir.1988); Parlay Enterprises, Inc. v. R-B-Co, Inc. of Bossier, 504 So.2d 660, 661 (La.

1993Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Louisiana Minority, Inc., 522 So.2d 1154, 1157 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988), writ denied, 523 So.2d 1339 (La.1988).

1991The parol evidence rule applies “not only in cases involving contracts which directly affect title to realty but also in others where the litigants merely [seek] to derive benefits growing out of verbal agreements relating to the sale of immovable property.” Hayes, 158 So.2d at 198 .

1966A recent case of Hayes v. Muller, 245 La. 356 , 158 So.2d 191 , sets forth the law applicable in the following words, towit: “And in Ingolia v. Lobrano, 244 La. 241 , 152 So.2d 7 , we held recently, with reference to such statute, that ‘ * * * applicable to the mineral leases and contracts is the same requirement of written testimonial proof that governs the transfer of immovable property.’ In other words the parol evidence rule applies to transactions involving mineral leases, just as it does to those affecting real estate.

1988A well established exception to the parol evidence rule provides that: "Between the parties to an instrument, parol evidence is admissible `to show fraud, mistake, illegality, want or failure of consideration, to explain an ambiguity when such explanation is not inconsistent with the written terms, or to show that the writing is only a part of *868 an entire oral contract between the parties.' " Scafidi v. Johnson, 420 So.2d 1113, 1115 (La.1982), quoting Gulf States Finance Corporation v. Airline Auto Sales, Inc., 248 La. 591 , 181 So.2d 36 (1965).

1988A well established exception to the parol evidence rule provides that: "Between the parties to an instrument, parol evidence is admissible `to show fraud, mistake, illegality, want or failure of consideration, to explain an ambiguity when such explanation is not inconsistent with the written terms, or to show that the writing is only a part of *868 an entire oral contract between the parties.' " Scafidi v. Johnson, 420 So.2d 1113, 1115 (La.1982), quoting Gulf States Finance Corporation v. Airline Auto Sales, Inc., 248 La. 591 , 181 So.2d 36 (1965).

1966A recent case of Hayes v. Muller, 245 La. 356 , 158 So.2d 191 , sets forth the law applicable in the following words, towit: “And in Ingolia v. Lobrano, 244 La. 241 , 152 So.2d 7 , we held recently, with reference to such statute, that ‘ * * * applicable to the mineral leases and contracts is the same requirement of written testimonial proof that governs the transfer of immovable property.’ In other words the parol evidence rule applies to transactions involving mineral leases, just as it does to those affecting real estate.

1966A recent case of Hayes v. Muller, 245 La. 356 , 158 So.2d 191 , sets forth the law applicable in the following words, towit: “And in Ingolia v. Lobrano, 244 La. 241 , 152 So.2d 7 , we held recently, with reference to such statute, that ‘ * * * applicable to the mineral leases and contracts is the same requirement of written testimonial proof that governs the transfer of immovable property.’ In other words the parol evidence rule applies to transactions involving mineral leases, just as it does to those affecting real estate.

1992Burford v. Burford, 541 So.2d 341, 345 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 544 So.2d 401 (La.1989); Levraea v. Franchina, 499 So.2d 264, 265 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1986); Broadway v. Broadway, 417 So.2d 1272, 1275 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 422 So.2d 162 (La.1982).

1982However, this court in Broadway v. Broadway, 417 So.2d 1272 (La.App. 1st Cir.1982), in interpreting La.Civ.Code arts. 2236, 2238, and 2276, held that the parol evidence rule does not apply where the controversy is between those parties to the act of sale who were on the same side and whose interest was identical.

2018In Dawson v. Dawson , 610 So.2d 917 , 919 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1992), the first circuit held that the parol evidence rule does not apply in cases in which "the writing is collateral to the issue involved and the action is not based upon the writing." Thus, whether a document that purported to be a cash sale was actually a donation was collateral to the act of sale when the issue before the court was whether the property purportedly sold was characterized as community or separate property.

2018In Dawson v. Dawson , 610 So.2d 917 , 919 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1992), the first circuit held that the parol evidence rule does not apply in cases in which "the writing is collateral to the issue involved and the action is not based upon the writing." Thus, whether a document that purported to be a cash sale was actually a donation was collateral to the act of sale when the issue before the court was whether the property purportedly sold was characterized as community or separate property.

2012Rentals, Inc., 382 So.2d 238, 243 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 385 So.2d 785 (La.1980).

1983Hobbs v. Central Equipment Rentals, Inc., 382 So.2d 238 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1980).

1992Burford v. Burford, 541 So.2d 341, 345 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 544 So.2d 401 (La.1989); Levraea v. Franchina, 499 So.2d 264, 265 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1986); Broadway v. Broadway, 417 So.2d 1272, 1275 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 422 So.2d 162 (La.1982).

1989Levraea v. Franchina, supra .

1988See Whitten v. Whitten, 303 So.2d 238 (La.App. 2d Cir.1974); Walker v. Wilson, 294 So.2d 891 (La.App. 2d Cir.1974); Ducote v. Stark, 87 So.2d 770 (La.App. 2d Cir.1956); Williams v. Collier, 249 So.2d 298 (La.App. 1st Cir.1971), writ refused, 252 So.2d 669 (La.1971); Brumfield, supra .

1986See Brumfield v. Brumfield, 457 So.2d 763 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984).

1985See Cosey v. Cosey, 376 So.2d 486 (La.1979), as discussed in Mitchell, supra. In our review of the equity of the trial court's partition, we do not adjudicate title to the Feazel home.

1983The trial court admitted parol evidence and overruled the exception of no cause, however, reasoning that "the parol evidence rule does not bind parties who did not sign the authentic act." This holding stems from the perhaps too broad language in Cosey v. Cosey, 376 So.2d 486 (La.1979), and the trial court's failure to recognize that the rule of the Ceromi -type cases is the rule of CC Art. 2440, while the rule of the Cosey -type cases is the rule of CC 2276, which admits of some exceptions.

1960Evidence § 862 and Richard v. Cain, 168 La. 608 , 122 So. 866 , which holds that the parol evidence rule is inapplicable in a controversy between parties on the same side of the instrument or their privies and that a joint owner of property had the right to show by parol that his co-owner received the entire proceeds of the sale of the property notwithstanding the recitals contained in the authentic act.

1960Evidence § 862 and Richard v. Cain, 168 La. 608 , 122 So. 866 , which holds that the parol evidence rule is inapplicable in a controversy between parties on the same side of the instrument or their privies and that a joint owner of property had the right to show by parol that his co-owner received the entire proceeds of the sale of the property notwithstanding the recitals contained in the authentic act.

1970Gulf States Finance Corp. v. Airline Auto Sales, Inc., 248 La. 591 , 181 So.2d 36 (1965); Dorvin-Huddleston Developments, Inc. v. United Services, Inc., 207 So.2d 225 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1968); Capizzo v. Traders and General Insurance Company, 191 So.2d 183 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1966); Snow-White Roofs, Inc. v. Boucher, 182 So.2d 846 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1966).

1969It may not be contended for example, that, as between the parties to an instrument parol evidence is incompetent to show fraud, mistake, illegality, want or failure of consideration, to explain an ambiguity when such explanation is not inconsistent with the written terms, or to show that the writing is only a part of an entire oral contract between the parties.’ ” This same general rule and exception was stated in Capizzo v. Traders & General Insurance Company, 191 So.2d 183, 187 (La.App.3rd Cir. 1966) as follows: “[2,3] The general rule is that when the provisions of a written contract are cl