399 New York opinions name it 18 courts 1906–2026 38 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Berger-Vespa v. Rondack Building Inspectors, Inc.green2 sentences2025Inspectors Inc. , 293 AD2d 838, 840 [3d Dept 2002]). 2025Inspectors Inc. , 293 AD2d 838, 840 [3d Dept 2002]). | 12 | 12 |
Sabo v. Delmangreen2 sentences2025Notably, while the parol evidence rule forbids proof of extrinsic evidence to contradict or vary the terms of a written instrument, it generally has no application in a suit brought where there are claims of fraud in the execution of an agreement or to rescind a contract on the grounds that a party was fraudulently induced to execute the same ( Danann Realty Corp. v Harris , 5 NY2d 317, 320 [1959]; Sabo v Delman , 3 NY2d 155, 161 [1957]; Adams v Gillig , 199 NY 314, 318 [1910]; Berger-Vespa v Rondack Bldg. 2025To put it another way, where the complaint states a cause of action for fraud, the parol evidence rule is not a bar to showing the fraud — either in the inducement or in the execution — despite an omnibus statement that the written instrument embodies the whole agreement, or that no representations have been made" (internal citations omitted).]; Sabo at 161 ["The provision to which we above referred — that no verbal undertakings or conditions not contained in the writing were to be binding on either party — sometimes termed a merger clause, merely furnishes another reason for applying the paro | 11 | 17 |
Adams v. . Gilliggreen2 sentences2025Notably, while the parol evidence rule forbids proof of extrinsic evidence to contradict or vary the terms of a written instrument, it generally has no application in a suit brought where there are claims of fraud in the execution of an agreement or to rescind a contract on the grounds that a party was fraudulently induced to execute the same ( Danann Realty Corp. v Harris , 5 NY2d 317, 320 [1959]; Sabo v Delman , 3 NY2d 155, 161 [1957]; Adams v Gillig , 199 NY 314, 318 [1910]; Berger-Vespa v Rondack Bldg. 2025Notably, while the parol evidence rule forbids proof of extrinsic evidence to contradict or vary the terms of a written instrument, it generally has no application in a suit brought where there are claims of fraud in the execution of an agreement or to rescind a contract on the grounds that a party was fraudulently induced to execute the same ( Danann Realty Corp. v Harris , 5 NY2d 317, 320 [1959]; Sabo v Delman , 3 NY2d 155, 161 [1957]; Adams v Gillig , 199 NY 314, 318 [1910]; Berger-Vespa v Rondack Bldg. | 11 | 12 |
Marine Midland Bank-Southern v. Thurlowgreen2 sentences2026Under the parol evidence rule, "where the parties have reduced their agreement to an integrated writing," courts may not consider extrinsic evidence of "prior or contemporaneous negotiations between the parties offered to contradict or modify the terms of their writing" (<i>Marine Midland Bank-S. v Thurlow</i>, 53 NY2d 381, 387 ; <i>see</i> <i>Transcan Sys., Inc. v Seldat Distrib., Inc.</i>, 209 AD3d 911, 913 ). 2026Under the parol evidence rule, "where the parties have reduced their agreement to an integrated writing," courts may not consider extrinsic evidence of "prior or contemporaneous negotiations between the parties offered to contradict or modify the terms of their writing" ( Marine Midland Bank-S. v Thurlow , 53 NY2d 381, 387; see Transcan Sys., Inc. v Seldat Distrib., Inc. , 209 AD3d 911, 913). | 9 | 27 |
Jarecki v. Shung Moo Louiegreen2 sentences2025"The purpose of a merger clause is to require the full application of the parol evidence rule in order to bar the introduction of extrinsic evidence to alter, vary or contradict the terms of the writing" ( Jarecki v Shung Moo Louie , 95 NY2d 665, 669 [2001] [citation omitted]). 2024"The purpose of a merger clause is to require the full application of the parol evidence rule in order to bar the introduction of extrinsic evidence to alter, vary or contradict the terms of the writing" ( Jarecki v Shung Moo Louie , 95 NY2d 665, 669 [2001] [citation omitted]). | 9 | 9 |
Schron v. Troutman Sanders LLPgreen2 sentences2026Where, as here, a contract contains a merger clause, the parties have agreed to require the "full application of the parol evidence rule in order to bar the introduction of extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the terms of the writing" (<i>Schron v Troutman Sanders LLP</i>, 20 NY3d 430, 436 [internal quotation marks omitted]; <i>see</i> <i>Albert v Afanador</i>, 237 AD3d 1012 , 1014).</p> <p>The Supreme Court properly dismissed the second cause of action, which sought specific performance of the alleged oral promise to convey to Xu a one-third ownership interest in Foster Gasoline. 2026Where, as here, a contract contains a merger clause, the parties have agreed to require the "full application of the parol evidence rule in order to bar the introduction of extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the terms of the writing" ( Schron v Troutman Sanders LLP , 20 NY3d 430, 436 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Albert v Afanador , 237 AD3d 1012, 1014). | 8 | 10 |
Chimart Associates v. Paulgreen2 sentences2026"Because the thrust of a reformation claim is that a writing does not set forth the actual agreement of the parties, generally neither the parol evidence rule nor the [s]tatute of [f]rauds applies to bar proof, in the form of parol or extrinsic evidence, of the claimed agreement" ( Chimart Assoc. v Paul , 66 NY2d at 573 [citations omitted]; accord Iskalo Elec. 2026"Because the thrust of a reformation claim is that a writing does not set forth the actual agreement of the parties, generally neither the parol evidence rule nor the [s]tatute of [f]rauds applies to bar proof, in the form of parol or extrinsic evidence, of the claimed agreement" ( Chimart Assoc. v Paul , 66 NY2d at 573 [citations omitted]; accord Iskalo Elec. | 7 | 17 |
Primex International Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.green2 sentences2018Its purpose is to require full application of the parol evidence rule ( Id. ). 2018Its purpose is to require full application of the parol evidence rule ( Id. ). | 6 | 15 |
Danann Realty Corp. v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2025The law is, however, also equally clear that "where the complaint states a cause of action for fraud, the parol evidence rule is not a bar to showing the fraud" unless the agreement between the parties expressly disclaims reliance on the particular misrepresentation underlying the fraud claim ( see Danann Realty Corp v Harris , 5 NY2d 317, 320 [1959]; International Bus. 2025The law is, however, also equally clear that "where the complaint states a cause of action for fraud, the parol evidence rule is not a bar to showing the fraud" unless the agreement between the parties expressly disclaims reliance on the particular misrepresentation underlying the fraud claim ( see Danann Realty Corp v Harris , 5 NY2d 317, 320 [1959]; International Bus. | 6 | 11 |
SAA-A, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.green2 sentences2018However, the parol evidence rule, coupled with the October 25, 2011 written agreement between the parties, bars defendant's testimony that she reached an oral agreement with decedent that precedes and varies from the written agreement ( see SAA-A, Inc. v Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. , 281 AD2d 201, 203 [1st Dept 2001]; see also Laskey v Rubel Corp. , 303 NY 69, 71 [1951]). 2006“The parol evidence rule bars admission of antecedent or contemporaneous oral representations to vary or add to the terms of [the] written [document]” (SAA-A, Inc. v Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 281 AD2d 201, 203 [2001]; see Holland v Ryan, 307 AD2d 723, 724 [2003]). | 5 | 5 |
Thomas v. . Scuttgreen2 sentences2023"The parol evidence rule generally operates to preclude evidence of a prior or contemporaneous communication during negotiations of an agreement that contradicts, varies, or explains a written agreement which is clear and unambiguous in its terms and expresses the parties' entire agreement and intentions" ( Hoeg Corp. v Peebles Corp. , 153 AD3d 607, 608 [2d Dept 2017]; see Braten v Bankers Trust Co. , 60 NY2d 155, 161-162 [1983], rearg denied 61 NY2d 670 [1983]; Thomas v Scutt , 127 NY 133, 137 [1891]). 2007Further, there is no merit to their contention that such evidence is admissible under the exception to the parol evidence rule for agreements that are incomplete (see Thomas v Scutt, 127 NY 133, 138-140 [1891]; see also Laskey v Rubel Corp., 303 NY 69 [1951]; Henrich v Phazar Antenna Corp., 33 AD3d 864 [2006]; Ahava Dairy Prods. | 4 | 25 |
W.W.W. Associates, Inc. v. Giancontierigreen2 sentences2006Moreover, plaintiffs’ allegation of an oral or tacit agreement by defendant is barred by the parol evidence rule, which precludes a party from introducing extrinsic evidence to add to or vary a complete written contract (see W.W.W Assoc. v Giancontieri, 77 NY2d 157, 162 [1990]; Marine Midland Bank-S. v Thurlow, 53 NY2d 381, 387 [1981]). 2004Assocs., Inc. v. Giancontieri , supra at 160. "[T]he purpose of a merger clause is to require the full application of the parol evidence rule in order to bar the introduction of extrinsic evidence to alter, vary or contradict the terms of the writing." Jarecki v. Shung Moo Louie , 95 N.Y. 2d 665, 669 (2001), citing , Matter of Primex Intern. | 4 | 9 |
Transcan Sys., Inc. v. Seldat Distrib., Inc.green2 sentences2026Under the parol evidence rule, "where the parties have reduced their agreement to an integrated writing," courts may not consider extrinsic evidence of "prior or contemporaneous negotiations between the parties offered to contradict or modify the terms of their writing" (<i>Marine Midland Bank-S. v Thurlow</i>, 53 NY2d 381, 387 ; <i>see</i> <i>Transcan Sys., Inc. v Seldat Distrib., Inc.</i>, 209 AD3d 911, 913 ). 2026Under the parol evidence rule, "where the parties have reduced their agreement to an integrated writing," courts may not consider extrinsic evidence of "prior or contemporaneous negotiations between the parties offered to contradict or modify the terms of their writing" ( Marine Midland Bank-S. v Thurlow , 53 NY2d 381, 387; see Transcan Sys., Inc. v Seldat Distrib., Inc. , 209 AD3d 911, 913). | 4 | 4 |
Fogelson v. Rackfay Construction Co.green2 sentences2020Moreover, the retainer agreement contains a no-oral-modification clause ( see id. at 340 ["the merger clause . . . furnishes still additional reason for applying the parol evidence rule"] [internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added]). 1961Co., ( 300 N. Y. 334 ) the Court of Appeals reversed the courts below which had granted an injunction requiring a landlord to carry out an oral promise to furnish free bus service to schools and subways, because the written lease had not so provided, and the parol evidence rule forbade the alteration of the lease on a matter vital to the tenancy, in spite of the undenied fact that the landlord had supplied the bus service for some 19 years. | 3 | 20 |
Braten v. Bankers Trust Co.green2 sentences2023"The parol evidence rule generally operates to preclude evidence of a prior or contemporaneous communication during negotiations of an agreement that contradicts, varies, or explains a written agreement which is clear and unambiguous in its terms and expresses the parties' entire agreement and intentions" ( Hoeg Corp. v Peebles Corp. , 153 AD3d 607, 608 [2d Dept 2017]; see Braten v Bankers Trust Co. , 60 NY2d 155, 161-162 [1983], rearg denied 61 NY2d 670 [1983]; Thomas v Scutt , 127 NY 133, 137 [1891]). 2001Where there is a written agreement which purports to express the parties’ entire agreement, extrinsic evidence that contradicts, varies, or explains the agreement is generally barred by the parol evidence rule (see, Broten v Bankers Trust Co., 60 NY2d 155 ; Furey v Guard ian Life Ins. | 3 | 10 |
Oxford Commercial Corp. v. Landaugreen2 sentences2025Contrary to plaintiffs' contention, even though White Management was not a party to the leases, the parol evidence rule prohibits it from relying on the Remodel/Drive-Through Agreement to vary the terms of the KFC leases concerning the same subject matter ( see generally Oxford Commercial Corp. v Landau , 12 NY2d 362, 365-366 [1963]). 2025Contrary to plaintiffs' contention, even though White Management was not a party to the leases, the parol evidence rule prohibits it from relying on the Remodel/Drive-Through Agreement to vary the terms of the KFC leases concerning the same subject matter ( see generally Oxford Commercial Corp. v Landau , 12 NY2d 362, 365-366 [1963]). | 3 | 7 |
Annis v. Phillipsgreen2 sentences2017The parol evidence rule generally operates to preclude evidence of a prior or contemporaneous communication during negotiations of an agreement that contradicts, varies, or explains a written agreement which is clear and unambiguous in its terms and expresses the parties’ entire agreement and intentions (see Annis v Phillips, 256 AD2d 531 [1998]; Stone v Schulz, 231 AD2d 707 [1996]; Katz v American Tech. 2015Moreover, the parol evidence rule operates to preclude evidence of a prior or contemporaneous communication during negotiations of the agreement that contradicts, varies, or explains a written agreement which is clear and unambiguous in its terms and expresses the parties’ entire agreement and intentions (see Annis v Phillips, 256 AD2d 531, 531 [1998]; Stone v Schulz, 231 AD2d 707, 707 [1996]; Katz v American Tech. | 3 | 4 |
| Denenberg v. Schaeffergreen | 3 | 3 |
Laskey v. Rubel Corp.green2 sentences2018However, the parol evidence rule, coupled with the October 25, 2011 written agreement between the parties, bars defendant's testimony that she reached an oral agreement with decedent that precedes and varies from the written agreement ( see SAA-A, Inc. v Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. , 281 AD2d 201, 203 [1st Dept 2001]; see also Laskey v Rubel Corp. , 303 NY 69, 71 [1951]). 2007Further, there is no merit to their contention that such evidence is admissible under the exception to the parol evidence rule for agreements that are incomplete (see Thomas v Scutt, 127 NY 133, 138-140 [1891]; see also Laskey v Rubel Corp., 303 NY 69 [1951]; Henrich v Phazar Antenna Corp., 33 AD3d 864 [2006]; Ahava Dairy Prods. | 2 | 8 |
Hicks v. Bushgreen2 sentences1995Lockwood’s assertion that, prior to the execution of the financing documents, Scarsdale had agreed to be an equity participant in the project is barred by the parol evidence rule (see, Hicks v Bush, 10 NY2d 488, 491 ; Bank of Suffolk County v Kite, 49 NY2d 827 ). 1995While the condition at bar is written into the contract and only arguably ambiguous, the observation made in Hicks v Bush ( 10 NY2d 488, 491 ) is pertinent: "the parol evidence rule does not bar proof of every orally established condition precedent, but only of those which in a real sense contradict the terms of the written agreement.” Defendants have identified the affidavit of Nicholas Davidge as the particular parol evidence upon which they rely and have thus established grounds to defeat plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment (Sutton v East Riv. | 2 | 8 |
Vivir of L I, Inc. v. Ehrenkranzgreen2 sentences2024Corp. v Wal-Mart Stores , 89 NY2d 594, 599 ; Vivir of L I, Inc. v Ehrenkranz , 127 AD3d 962, 964 ). 2022"Where a contract contains a merger clause, a court is obliged to require full application of the parol evidence rule in order to bar the introduction of extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the terms of the writing" ( Vivir of L I v Ehrenkranz , 127 AD3d 962, 964 ; see Schron v Troutman Sanders LLP , 20 NY3d 430, 436 ). | 2 | 4 |
Stone v. Schulzgreen2 sentences2017The parol evidence rule generally operates to preclude evidence of a prior or contemporaneous communication during negotiations of an agreement that contradicts, varies, or explains a written agreement which is clear and unambiguous in its terms and expresses the parties’ entire agreement and intentions (see Annis v Phillips, 256 AD2d 531 [1998]; Stone v Schulz, 231 AD2d 707 [1996]; Katz v American Tech. 2015Moreover, the parol evidence rule operates to preclude evidence of a prior or contemporaneous communication during negotiations of the agreement that contradicts, varies, or explains a written agreement which is clear and unambiguous in its terms and expresses the parties’ entire agreement and intentions (see Annis v Phillips, 256 AD2d 531, 531 [1998]; Stone v Schulz, 231 AD2d 707, 707 [1996]; Katz v American Tech. | 2 | 4 |
Greenleaf v. Lachmangreen2 sentences2015As applied in our cases, including those cited by the majority, this limited exception applies only where a party alleges that a document, although appearing to be a contract, was never intended by the parties to operate as such (see Paolangeli v Cowles, 208 AD2d at 1175 [parol evidence admissible where "not offer[ed] . . . to vary the terms of [a] promissory note, but rather to show that the note was never intended to take effect"]; Kamp v Fiumera, 69 AD3d 1168 , 1170 -7- 518956 [2010] [parol evidence may be considered when offered "not merely to contradict the express terms of [a] note, but 2015As applied in our cases, including those cited by the majority, this limited exception applies only where a party alleges that a document, although appearing to be a contract, was never intended by the parties to operate as such (see Paolangeli v Cowles, 208 AD2d at 1175 [parol evidence admissible where “not offer(ed) ... to vary the terms of (a) promissory note, but rather to show that the note was never intended to take effect”]; Kamp v Fiumera, 69 AD3d 1168, 1170 [2010] [parol evidence may be considered when offered “not merely to contradict the express terms of (a) note, but ... to demonst | 2 | 4 |
| Harris v. Hallberggreen | 2 | 3 |
| Hylan Ross, LLC v. 2582 Hylan Blvd. Fitness Group, LLCgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Stevens & Thompson Paper Co. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.green | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Evansgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Eastern Savings Bank, FSB v. Sassounigreen | 2 | 2 |
| Pimpinello v. Swift & Co.green | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Petriegreen | 2 | 2 |
| Long Island Trust Co. v. International Institute for Packaging Education, Ltd.green | 2 | 2 |
| Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co.green | 2 | 2 |
| Transammonia, Inc. v. Enron Capital & Trade Resources Corp.green | 2 | 2 |
| R/S Associates v. New York Job Development Authoritygreen | 2 | 2 |
Citibank, N. A. v. Plapingergreen2 sentences1997Courts and commentators addressing the substantive and procedural aspects of New York commercial litigation agree that the purpose of a general merger provision, typically containing the language found in the clause of the parties’ 1995 Agreement that it "represents the entire understanding between the parties,” is to require full application of the parol evidence rule in order to bar the introduction of extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the terms of the writing (see, Citibank v Plapinger, 66 NY2d 90, 94-95 ; Judnick Realty Corp. v 32 W. 32nd St. 1994Because the note contains an unambiguous repayment term directly contradicting the alleged oral misrepresentation, evidence of that alleged oral misrepresentation is barred by the parol evidence rule (see, Citibank v Plapinger, 66 NY2d 90, 95-96 ; DH Cattle Holdings Co. v Reno, 196 AD2d 670 ; Curwil Constr. | 1 | 8 |
Higgs v. De Maziroffgreen2 sentences2011It is consistent with the parol evidence rule — a rule of substantive law (see Higgs v de Maziroff, 263 NY 473, 477 [1934]) — which “defin[es] the limits of the contract to be construed [and] forbids proof of an oral agreement to add to or vary the writing” (Fogelson v Rackfay Constr. 1986The parol evidence rule is one of substantive contract law rather than merely a rule of evidence (Higgs v De Maziroff, 263 NY 473, 477 ) and, therefore, may properly afford the basis for summary judgment (Accord Farmers Co-op. v Levine, 36 AD2d 656 ). | 1 | 6 |
Rose v. Spa Realty Associatesgreen2 sentences2004The plaintiffs’ assertion of a breach of an alleged oral agreement was barred by the statute of frauds (see General Obligations Law § 5-701 [a] [1]; § 15-301 [1]; Rose v Spa Realty Assoc., 42 NY2d 338, 339 [1977]; Fairchild Warehouse Assoc. v United Bank of Kuwait, 285 AD2d 444, 445 [2001]) and the parol evidence rule (see Ahava Dairy Prods. 2002Moreover, evidence of the waiver of the mortgage debt is not barred by the parol evidence rule where, as here, the oral agreement has been acted upon to completion (see Rose v Spa Realty Assoc., 42 NY2d 338 ). | 1 | 5 |
Katz v. American Technical Industries, Inc.green2 sentences2017Indus., 96 AD2d 932 [1983]). 2015Indus., 96 AD2d 932, 933 [1983]). | 1 | 4 |
| Namad v. Salomon Inc.green | 1 | 4 |
| National Bank v. ESI Group, Inc.green | 1 | 3 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mitchill v. Lath
green
2 sentences1992The Supreme Court correctly ruled that the parol evidence rule bars proof of an oral condition precedent which, as here, is expressly contradicted by the written loan agreement (Mitchill v Lath, 247 NY 377 ). 1980With respect to Glassman and Terminal, the provisions of the alleged oral agreement are not intimately connected nor contradictory to the written agreements (see Mitchill v Lath, 247 NY 377, 380-381 ), so proof of that agreement would not be barred by the parol evidence rule. | 15 | 1928–1997 |
Folinsbee v. . Sawyer
green
2 sentences1971In the most recent case on this issue the Court of Appeals stated: “ Although it is sometimes broadly observed that the parol evidence rule has no application to any except parties to the instrument (see, e.g., Robert v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 240 N. Y. 474, 478 ; Folinsbee v. Sawyer, 157 N. Y. 196, 198-199 ), it is clear that in the case of a fully integrated agreement, where parol evidence is offered to vary its terms, the rule operates to protect all whose rights depend upon the instrument even though they were not parties to it.” (Oxford Commercial Corp. v. Landa 1963Although it is sometimes broadly observed that the parol evidence rule has no application to any except parties to the instrument (see, e.g., Robert v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 240 N. Y. 474, 478 ; Folinsbee v. Sawyer, 157 N. Y. 196, 198-199 ), it is clear that in the case of a fully integrated agreement, where parol evidence is offered to vary its terms, the rule operates to protect all whose rights depend upon the instrument even though they were not parties to it. | 9 | 1925–1981 |
Newburger v. American Surety Co.
green
2 sentences1988Co., 242 NY 134, 142 ; Potsdam Cent. 1926The parol evidence rule as applicable to the integration of contracts is said by Wigmore (5 Evidence [2d ed.], § 2400) to be a rule of substantive law. “ The writing is the contractual act of which that which is extrinsic forms no part.” While it is subject to many exceptions (Newburger v. American Surety Co., 242 N. Y. 134, 142 ), and it has been said that “it has full application within very narrow limits” (Juilliard v. Chaffee, 92 N. Y. 529, 534 ), and that the exceptions have been so loosely applied as to threaten the integrity of the rule itself (Stowell v. Greenwich Ins. | 5 | 1926–1988 |
Fadex Foreign Trading Corp. v. Crown Steel Corp.
green
2 sentences2000Nor can parol evidence avail defendant to establish that agreement on a physical sale was a condition precedent to the effectiveness of the swap contract (see, Fadex Foreign Trading Corp. v Crown Steel Corp., 272 App Div 273 , affd 297 NY 903 ; Meadow Brook Natl. 1957It is true that the parol evidence rule is applied upon a motion for summary judgment as upon a trial (Fadex Foreign Trading Corp. v. Crown Steel Corp., 272 App. Div. 273, affd. 297 N. Y. 903 ; Ford v. Hahn, 269 App. Div. 436 ). | 4 | 1957–2000 |
| Leumi Financial Corp. v. Richter green | 4 | 1983–1999 |
| Benderson Development Co. v. Hallaway Properties, Inc. neutral | 4 | 1991–1997 |
| Jamestown Business College Assn. v. . Allen green | 4 | 1947–1985 |
| Bridger v. . Goldsmith green | 4 | 1957–1984 |
| Smith v. . Dotterweich green | 4 | 1926–1982 |
| Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Margolis green | 3 | 1987–2009 |
| Chemical Bank v. Kaufman green | 3 | 1990–1998 |
| Benderson Development Co. v. Hallaway Properties, Inc. green | 3 | 1991–1997 |
| Angerosa v. White Company green | 3 | 1957–1984 |
| Jackson v. State green | 3 | 1957–1984 |
| Jackson v. State green | 3 | 1957–1984 |
| Angerosa v. White Co. green | 3 | 1957–1984 |
| Ford v. Hahn neutral | 3 | 1957–1973 |
| Komp v. . Raymond green | 3 | 1924–1973 |
| Meyer v. . Lathrop green | 3 | 1924–1960 |
| Susquehanna Steamship Co. v. A. O. Andersen & Co. green | 3 | 1927–1960 |
| Ball v. Grady green | 3 | 1952–1960 |
| Nelkin v. Provident Loan Society neutral | 3 | 1939–1958 |
| Ruppert v. Singhi green | 3 | 1928–1934 |
| A-Pix, Inc. v. SGE Entertainment Corp. green | 2 | 2023–2023 |
| Sharon v. American Health Providers green | 2 | 2013–2013 |
| Unisys Corp. v. Hercules Inc. green | 2 | 2001–2009 |
| Ahava Dairy Products Corp. v. Trident Leasing Corp. neutral | 2 | 2004–2007 |
| Deleo v. Kaladjian green | 2 | 1996–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.