115 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1930–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jurgensengreen2 sentences2007Foley v. Huntington Co., 42 Conn. App. 712, 733 , 682 A.2d 1026 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 931 , 683 A.2d 397 (1996). 1997"The parol evidence rule prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the terms of an integrated written contract." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Foley v. Huntington Company, 42 Conn. App. 712 , 733 , 682 A.2d 1026 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 931 , 683 A.2d 397 (1996). | 2 | 4 |
Lawson v. Whitey's Frame Shopgreen2 sentences2007Foley v. Huntington Co., 42 Conn. App. 712, 733 , 682 A.2d 1026 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 931 , 683 A.2d 397 (1996). 1997"The parol evidence rule prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the terms of an integrated written contract." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Foley v. Huntington Company, 42 Conn. App. 712 , 733 , 682 A.2d 1026 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 931 , 683 A.2d 397 (1996). | 2 | 4 |
Foley v. Huntington Co.green2 sentences1997"The parol evidence rule prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the terms of an integrated written contract." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Foley v. Huntington Company, 42 Conn. App. 712 , 733 , 682 A.2d 1026 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 931 , 683 A.2d 397 (1996). 1997"The parol evidence rule prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the terms of an integrated written contract." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Foley v. Huntington Company, 42 Conn. App. 712 , 733 , 682 A.2d 1026 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 931 , 683 A.2d 397 (1996). | 2 | 4 |
Schilberg Integrated Metals Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.green2 sentences2013See Schilberg Integrated Materials Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 263 Conn. 245, 277 , 819 A.2d 773 (2003). 2013See Schilberg Integrated Materials Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 263 Conn. 245, 277 , 819 A.2d 773 (2003). | 2 | 3 |
TIE Communications, Inc. v. Koppgreen2 sentences2000The parol evidence rule "prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the terms of an integrated written contract." TIE Communications, Inc. v. Kopp , 218 Conn. 281 , 287-88 (1991). 1993The parol evidence rule is a substantive rule of contract law that “prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the terms of an integrated written contract.” TIE Communications, Inc. v. Kopp, 218 Conn. 281, 287-88 , 589 A.2d 329 (1991); see also General Statutes § 42a-2-202 (Uniform Commercial Code). | 1 | 15 |
Security Equities v. Giambagreen2 sentences2002Because the parol evidence rule is not an exclusionary rule of evidence, however, but a rule of substantive contract law; Security Equities v. Giamba, 210 Conn. 71, 78 , 553 A.2d 1135 (1989); Damora v. Christ-Janer, 184 Conn. 109, 113 , 441 A.2d 61 (1981); the defendants’ claim involves a question of law to which we afford plenary review. 2002Because the parol evidence rule is not an exclusionary rule of evidence, however, but a rule of substantive contract law; Security Equities v. Giamba, 210 Conn. 71, 78 , 553 A.2d 1135 (1989); Damora v. Christ-Janer, 184 Conn. 109, 113 , 441 A.2d 61 (1981); the defendants’ claim involves a question of law to which we afford plenary review. | 1 | 8 |
Jay Realty, Inc. v. Ahearn Development Corporationgreen2 sentences1999Parol evidence offered solely to vary or contradict the written terms of an integrated contract is, therefore, legally irrelevant. [S]uch evidence may still be relevant `(1) to explain an ambiguity appearing in the instrument; [or] (2) to prove a collateral oral agreement which does not vary the terms of a writing. . . .'" (Emphasis in original.) TIE Communications, Inc. v. Kopp , 218 Conn. 281 , 288-89 , 589 A.2d 329 (1991), quoting Jay Realty, Inc. v. Ahearn Development Corp. , 189 Conn. 52 , 55-56 , 453 A.2d 771 (1983). 1999Parol evidence offered solely to vary or contradict the written terms of an integrated contract is, therefore, legally irrelevant. [S]uch evidence may still be relevant `(1) to explain an ambiguity appearing in the instrument; [or] (2) to prove a collateral oral agreement which does not vary the terms of a writing. . . .'" (Emphasis in original.) TIE Communications, Inc. v. Kopp , 218 Conn. 281 , 288-89 , 589 A.2d 329 (1991), quoting Jay Realty, Inc. v. Ahearn Development Corp. , 189 Conn. 52 , 55-56 , 453 A.2d 771 (1983). | 1 | 5 |
Jarvis v. Cunliffegreen2 sentences1981Harris v. Clinton, 142 Conn. 204, 210 , 112 A.2d 885 [1955]; Jarvis v. Cunliffe, 140 Conn. 297, 299 , 99 A.2d 126 [1953]; 3 Corbin, Contracts § 573. . . . 1981Harris v. Clinton, 142 Conn. 204, 210 , 112 A.2d 885 [1955]; Jarvis v. Cunliffe, 140 Conn. 297, 299 , 99 A.2d 126 [1953]; 3 Corbin, Contracts § 573. . . . | 1 | 4 |
Marine Midland Bank-Southern v. Thurlowgreen2 sentences2017"Briefly, absent fraud or mutual mistake, where the parties have reduced their agreement to an integrated writing, the parol evidence rule operates to exclude evidence of all prior or contemporaneous negotiations between the parties offered to contradict or modify the terms of their writing." Marine Midland Bank-Southern v. Thurlow , 53 N.Y.2d 381 , 387, 442 N.Y.S.2d 417 , 425 N.E.2d 805 (1981). 2017"Briefly, absent fraud or mutual mistake, where the parties have reduced their agreement to an integrated writing, the parol evidence rule operates to exclude evidence of all prior or contemporaneous negotiations between the parties offered to contradict or modify the terms of their writing." Marine Midland Bank-Southern v. Thurlow , 53 N.Y.2d 381 , 387, 442 N.Y.S.2d 417 , 425 N.E.2d 805 (1981). | 1 | 3 |
Greene v. Scottgreen2 sentences2015As noted by the defendant, the parol evidence rule requires that ‘‘[w]hen two par- ties have made a contract and have expressed it in a writing to which they have both assented as the com- plete and accurate integration of that contract, evi- dence, whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent understandings and negotiations will not be admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the writing.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Greene v. Scott, 3 Conn. App. 34, 36 , 484 A.2d 474 (1984). 2015As noted by the defendant, the parol evidence rule requires that ‘‘[w]hen two par- ties have made a contract and have expressed it in a writing to which they have both assented as the com- plete and accurate integration of that contract, evi- dence, whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent understandings and negotiations will not be admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the writing.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Greene v. Scott, 3 Conn. App. 34, 36 , 484 A.2d 474 (1984). | 1 | 3 |
Medical Device Solutions, LLC v. Aferzongreen2 sentences2022We begin with the applicable standard of review. ‘‘Because the parol evidence rule is not an exclusionary rule of evidence . . . but a rule of substantive contract law . . . the [defendant’s] claim involves a question of law to which we afford plenary review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Medical Device Solutions, LLC v. Aferzon, 207 Conn. App. 707, 728 , 264 A.3d 130 , cert. denied, 340 Conn. 911 , 264 A.3d 94 (2021). 2022Because the parol evidence rule is not an exclusionary rule of evidence, however, but a rule of substantive contract law . . . the [seller’s] claim involves a ques- tion of law to which we afford plenary review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Colliers, Dow & Condon, Inc. v. Schwartz, 77 Conn. App. 462, 466 , 823 A.2d 438 (2003); see also Medical Device Solutions, LLC v. Afer- zon, 207 Conn. App. 707, 728 , 264 A.3d 130 , cert. denied, 340 Conn. 911 , 264 A.3d 94 (2021). ‘‘The parol evidence rule is premised upon the idea that when the parties have deliberately put their engage- ments in | 1 | 2 |
| Conn Acoustics, Inc. v. Xhema Construction, Inc.green | 1 | 2 |
| McLaughlin v. Thomasgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Capp Industries, Inc. v. Schoenberggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Langston v. Commissioner of Correctiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Capp Industries, Inc. v. Schoenberggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Devinegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Adler & Shaykin v. Wachnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| In the Matter of the Arbitration Between Tempo Shain Corporation Neptune Plus Corporation v. Bertek, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Warman v. Delaneygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Crowley v. Pendletongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Telecom International America, Ltd. v. At & T Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cohn v. Dunn
green
2 sentences1930In Cohn v. Dunn, 111 Conn. 342 , 149 Atl. 851 , we recently discussed the parol evidence rule, and no good purpose would be served by repeating what we said. 1930In Cohn v. Dunn, 111 Conn. 342 , 149 Atl. 851 , we recently discussed the parol evidence rule, and no good purpose would be served by repeating what we said. | 13 | 1930–2000 |
Damora v. Christ-Janer
green
2 sentences2002Because the parol evidence rule is not an exclusionary rule of evidence, however, but a rule of substantive contract law; Security Equities v. Giamba, 210 Conn. 71, 78 , 553 A.2d 1135 (1989); Damora v. Christ-Janer, 184 Conn. 109, 113 , 441 A.2d 61 (1981); the defendants’ claim involves a question of law to which we afford plenary review. 2002Because the parol evidence rule is not an exclusionary rule of evidence, however, but a rule of substantive contract law; Security Equities v. Giamba, 210 Conn. 71, 78 , 553 A.2d 1135 (1989); Damora v. Christ-Janer, 184 Conn. 109, 113 , 441 A.2d 61 (1981); the defendants’ claim involves a question of law to which we afford plenary review. | 9 | 1989–2002 |
Alstom Power, Inc. v. Balcke-Durr, Inc.
green
2 sentences2015Because the parol evidence rule is not an exclusionary rule of evidence, however, but a rule of substantive contract law . . . the [plaintiff’s] claim involves a question of law to which we afford plenary review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alstom Power, Inc. v. Balcke-Durr, Inc., 269 Conn. 599, 609 , 849 A.2d 804 (2004). ‘‘A promissory note is a written contract for the pay- ment of money, and, as such, contract law applies.’’ Antonino v. Johnson, 113 Conn. App. 72, 75 , 966 A.2d 261 (2009). ‘‘The standard of review for the issue of contract interpretation is well established. 2015Because the parol evidence rule is not an exclusionary rule of evidence, however, but a rule of substantive contract law . . . the [plaintiff’s] claim involves a question of law to which we afford plenary review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alstom Power, Inc. v. Balcke-Durr, Inc., 269 Conn. 599, 609 , 849 A.2d 804 (2004). ‘‘A promissory note is a written contract for the pay- ment of money, and, as such, contract law applies.’’ Antonino v. Johnson, 113 Conn. App. 72, 75 , 966 A.2d 261 (2009). ‘‘The standard of review for the issue of contract interpretation is well established. | 8 | 2005–2016 |
Associated Catalog Merchandisers, Inc. v. Chagnon
green
2 sentences2021If the evidence, however, does not indicate that the writing is intended as an integration, i.e., a final expres- sion of one or more terms of an agreement . . . then the agreement is said to be unintegrated, and the parol evidence rule does not apply.’’ (Citations omitted; inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Associated Catalog Mer- chandisers, Inc. v. Chagnon, 210 Conn. 734 , 739–40, 557 A.2d 525 (1989). 2021If the evidence, however, does not indicate that the writing is intended as an integration, i.e., a final expres- sion of one or more terms of an agreement . . . then the agreement is said to be unintegrated, and the parol evidence rule does not apply.’’ (Citations omitted; inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Associated Catalog Mer- chandisers, Inc. v. Chagnon, 210 Conn. 734 , 739–40, 557 A.2d 525 (1989). | 6 | 1992–2021 |
Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania
green
2 sentences1999"Although the parol evidence rule `prohibits the introduction of evidence that varies or contradicts an exclusive written agreement'; Ruscito v. F-Dyne Electronics Co. , 177 Conn. 149 , 160 , 411 A.2d 1371 (1979); that rule `does not bar the use of extrinsic evidence to aid in the interpretation of contractual language.' Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania , 231 Conn. 756 , 781 n. 22, 653 A.2d 122 (1995). . . ." (Citation omitted.) Hare v. McClellan , 234 Conn. 581 , 596-97 , 662 A.2d 1242 (1995). 1999"Although the parol evidence rule `prohibits the introduction of evidence that varies or contradicts an exclusive written agreement'; Ruscito v. F-Dyne Electronics Co. , 177 Conn. 149 , 160 , 411 A.2d 1371 (1979); that rule `does not bar the use of extrinsic evidence to aid in the interpretation of contractual language.' Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania , 231 Conn. 756 , 781 n. 22, 653 A.2d 122 (1995). . . ." (Citation omitted.) Hare v. McClellan , 234 Conn. 581 , 596-97 , 662 A.2d 1242 (1995). | 5 | 1995–2013 |
Harris v. Clinton
green
2 sentences2013When deciding whether the parol evidence rule operates to prevent the trier of fact from considering certain evidence to interpret the contract, “[t]he fundamental question is . . . the intent of the parties.” Harris v. Clinton, 142 Conn. 204, 210 , 112 A.2d 885 (1955). 2013When deciding whether the parol evidence rule operates to prevent the trier of fact from considering certain evidence to interpret the contract, “[t]he fundamental question is . . . the intent of the parties.” Harris v. Clinton, 142 Conn. 204, 210 , 112 A.2d 885 (1955). | 5 | 1963–2013 |
Giorgio v. Nukem, Inc.
green
2 sentences2000Giorgio v. Nukem, Inc., 31 Conn. App. 169, 173-74 , 624 A.2d 896 (1993); see also 2 Restatement (Second), Contracts § 213 (1981).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Foley v. Huntington Co., 42 Conn. App. 712, 733 , 682 A.2d 1026 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 931 , 683 A.2d 397 (1996). 2000Giorgio v. Nukem, Inc., 31 Conn. App. 169, 173-74 , 624 A.2d 896 (1993); see also 2 Restatement (Second), Contracts § 213 (1981).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Foley v. Huntington Co., 42 Conn. App. 712, 733 , 682 A.2d 1026 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 931 , 683 A.2d 397 (1996). | 5 | 1996–2000 |
Sims v. Honda Motor Co.
green
2 sentences2019"The parol evidence rule is a substantive rule of contract law that prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the terms of an integrated written contract." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sims v. Honda Motor Co. , 225 Conn. 401 , 416, 623 A.2d 995 (1993). "[O]ne purpose of the parol evidence rule is to secure business stability." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 416-17 , 623 A.2d 995 . 2019"The parol evidence rule is a substantive rule of contract law that prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the terms of an integrated written contract." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sims v. Honda Motor Co. , 225 Conn. 401 , 416, 623 A.2d 995 (1993). "[O]ne purpose of the parol evidence rule is to secure business stability." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 416-17 , 623 A.2d 995 . | 4 | 2000–2019 |
Ruscito v. F-Dyne Electronics Co.
green
2 sentences1999"Although the parol evidence rule `prohibits the introduction of evidence that varies or contradicts an exclusive written agreement'; Ruscito v. F-Dyne Electronics Co. , 177 Conn. 149 , 160 , 411 A.2d 1371 (1979); that rule `does not bar the use of extrinsic evidence to aid in the interpretation of contractual language.' Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania , 231 Conn. 756 , 781 n. 22, 653 A.2d 122 (1995). . . ." (Citation omitted.) Hare v. McClellan , 234 Conn. 581 , 596-97 , 662 A.2d 1242 (1995). 1999"Although the parol evidence rule `prohibits the introduction of evidence that varies or contradicts an exclusive written agreement'; Ruscito v. F-Dyne Electronics Co. , 177 Conn. 149 , 160 , 411 A.2d 1371 (1979); that rule `does not bar the use of extrinsic evidence to aid in the interpretation of contractual language.' Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania , 231 Conn. 756 , 781 n. 22, 653 A.2d 122 (1995). . . ." (Citation omitted.) Hare v. McClellan , 234 Conn. 581 , 596-97 , 662 A.2d 1242 (1995). | 4 | 1984–2006 |
Lester v. Resort Camplands International, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001“The parol evidence rule does not apply, however, if the written contract is not completely integrated.” Lester v. Resort Camplands International, Inc., 27 Conn. App. 59, 65 , 605 A.2d 550 (1992). 2001“The parol evidence rule does not apply, however, if the written contract is not completely integrated.” Lester v. Resort Camplands International, Inc., 27 Conn. App. 59, 65 , 605 A.2d 550 (1992). | 4 | 1993–2001 |
Maier v. Arsenault
green
2 sentences1992In Maier v. Arsenault, 140 Conn. 364 , 367-368 , (citation omitted), the court outlined the parol evidence rule: It is, of course, fundamental, as a matter of substantive law, that the terms of a written contract which is intended by the parties to set forth their entire agreement may not be varied by parol evidence. (citations omitted) It is equally fundamental, however, that when the words used in a written contract are uncertain or ambiguous, parol evidence of conversations between the parties or other circumstances antedating the contract may be used as an aid in the interpretation of the 1979It contends that there was nothing in paragraph 14 to indicate that there were or would be any documents outside of the agreement itself and that paragraph 14 contains no reference to payment of interest or attorney’s fees in ease of default. *160 In Maier v. Arsenault, 140 Conn. 364, 367-68 , 100 A.2d 403 (1953), this court outlined the parol evidence rule: “It is, of course, fundamental, as a matter of substantive law, that the terms of a written contract which is intended by the parties to set forth their entire agreement may not be varied by parol evidence. | 4 | 1979–1992 |
Panaroni v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1978The parol evidence rule as a rule of substantive law; Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn. 92 , 106 ; does not permit written contracts to be varied by parol. 1978The parol evidence rule as a rule of substantive law; Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn. 92, 106 ; does not permit written contracts to be varied by parol. | 4 | 1974–1981 |
Nagel v. Modern Investment Corporation
green
2 sentences1976“The parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive law rather than a rule of evidence, and the essence of an objection under it is that even if the evidence objected to is admitted, it would be ineffective, and thus immaterial, because it could not legally affect the rights of the parties as defined in the writing.” Shelton Yacht & Cabana Club, Inc. v. Suto, supra, 255 , citing Nagel v. Modern Investment Corporation, 132 Conn. 698, 700 , 46 A.2d 605 . 1976“The parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive law rather than a rule of evidence, and the essence of an objection under it is that even if the evidence objected to is admitted, it would be ineffective, and thus immaterial, because it could not legally affect the rights of the parties as defined in the writing.” Shelton Yacht & Cabana Club, Inc. v. Suto, supra, 255 , citing Nagel v. Modern Investment Corporation, 132 Conn. 698, 700 , 46 A.2d 605 . | 4 | 1952–1979 |
Hare v. McClellan
green
2 sentences2018Regardless, "[a]lthough the parol evidence rule prohibits the introduction of evidence that varies or contradicts an exclusive written agreement ... that rule does not bar the use of extrinsic evidence to aid in the interpretation of contractual language." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hare v. McClellan , 234 Conn. 581 , 596, 662 A.2d 1242 (1995). 2018Regardless, "[a]lthough the parol evidence rule prohibits the introduction of evidence that varies or contradicts an exclusive written agreement ... that rule does not bar the use of extrinsic evidence to aid in the interpretation of contractual language." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hare v. McClellan , 234 Conn. 581 , 596, 662 A.2d 1242 (1995). | 3 | 1997–2018 |
Benvenuti Oil Co. v. Foss Consultants, Inc.
green
2 sentences2017The parol evidence rule does not apply, however, if the written contract is not completely integrated." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Benvenuti Oil Co. v. Foss Consultants, Inc. , 64 Conn.App. 723 , 727, 781 A.2d 435 (2001). 2017The parol evidence rule does not apply, however, if the written contract is not completely integrated." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Benvenuti Oil Co. v. Foss Consultants, Inc. , 64 Conn.App. 723 , 727, 781 A.2d 435 (2001). | 3 | 2001–2017 |
Bead Chain Manufacturing Co. v. Saxton Products, Inc.
green
2 sentences1995Co. v. Saxton Products, Inc., 183 Conn. 266, 272-73 , 439 A.2d 314 (1981); we disagree that this principle applies to the facts of this particular case. 1995Co. v. Saxton Products, Inc., 183 Conn. 266, 272-73 , 439 A.2d 314 (1981); we disagree that this principle applies to the facts of this particular case. | 3 | 1989–1995 |
Shelton Yacht & Cabana Club, Inc. v. Suto
green
2 sentences1993A review of the case law from both Connecticut and New York confirms the trial court’s determination that regardless of which state’s substantive law is applied, the result in this case is the same because both jurisdictions would have applied the parol evidence rule. 3 The parol evidence rule “prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the terms of an integrated written contract.” TIE Communications, Inc. v. Kopp, 218 Conn. 281, 287-88 , 589 A.2d 329 (1991); Lester v. Resort Camplands International, Inc., 27 Conn. App. 59, 65 , 605 A.2d 550 (1992); Mastrangelo v. Kidder, Pe 1993A review of the case law from both Connecticut and New York confirms the trial court’s determination that regardless of which state’s substantive law is applied, the result in this case is the same because both jurisdictions would have applied the parol evidence rule. 3 The parol evidence rule “prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the terms of an integrated written contract.” TIE Communications, Inc. v. Kopp, 218 Conn. 281, 287-88 , 589 A.2d 329 (1991); Lester v. Resort Camplands International, Inc., 27 Conn. App. 59, 65 , 605 A.2d 550 (1992); Mastrangelo v. Kidder, Pe | 3 | 1967–1993 |
W. G. Maltby, Inc. v. Associated Realty Co.
green
2 sentences1992Maltby, Inc. v. Associated Realty Co., 114 Conn. 283 , 289 . (other citations omitted) The court finds that, despite the omissions in Exhibit "A", the parties conducted their affairs and tracked the provisions of the document as though it were an effective lease. 1981General Statutes §§ 42a-2-202 and 42a-1-103; Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn. 92, 106 , 256 A.2d 246 (1969); Maier v. Arsenault, 140 Conn. 364, 368 , 100 A.2d 403 (1953); Maltby, Inc. v. Associated Realty Co., 114 Conn. 283, 289 , 158 A. 548 (1932); 3 Corbin, Contracts §579 (1960); Restatement (Second), Contracts §240 (c) (1973). | 3 | 1946–1992 |
Colliers, Dow & Condon, Inc. v. Schwartz
green
2 sentences2022Because the parol evidence rule is not an exclusionary rule of evidence, however, but a rule of substantive contract law . . . the [seller’s] claim involves a ques- tion of law to which we afford plenary review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Colliers, Dow & Condon, Inc. v. Schwartz, 77 Conn. App. 462, 466 , 823 A.2d 438 (2003); see also Medical Device Solutions, LLC v. Afer- zon, 207 Conn. App. 707, 728 , 264 A.3d 130 , cert. denied, 340 Conn. 911 , 264 A.3d 94 (2021). ‘‘The parol evidence rule is premised upon the idea that when the parties have deliberately put their engage- ments in 2022Because the parol evidence rule is not an exclusionary rule of evidence, however, but a rule of substantive contract law . . . the [seller’s] claim involves a ques- tion of law to which we afford plenary review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Colliers, Dow & Condon, Inc. v. Schwartz, 77 Conn. App. 462, 466 , 823 A.2d 438 (2003); see also Medical Device Solutions, LLC v. Afer- zon, 207 Conn. App. 707, 728 , 264 A.3d 130 , cert. denied, 340 Conn. 911 , 264 A.3d 94 (2021). ‘‘The parol evidence rule is premised upon the idea that when the parties have deliberately put their engage- ments in | 2 | 2021–2022 |
| Aillon v. State green | 2 | 2008–2008 |
| Harold Cohn & Co. v. Harco International, LLC green | 2 | 2003–2004 |
| Mitchell v. Guardian Systems, Inc. green | 2 | 2003–2004 |
| Harold Cohn & Co. v. Harco International, LLC green | 2 | 2003–2004 |
| HLO Land Ownership Associates Ltd. Partnership v. City of Hartford green | 2 | 2000–2003 |
| Presta v. Monnier green | 2 | 1970–2002 |
| State v. Clay green | 2 | 2001–2001 |
| State v. Perrelli green | 2 | 2001–2001 |
| L & R Realty v. Connecticut National Bank green | 2 | 2001–2001 |
| State ex rel. Commission for Higher Education v. Wethersfield School of Law, Inc. neutral | 2 | 1978–1978 |
| Johnson v. Vita Built, LLC green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Zhou v. Zhang neutral | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Ravenswood Construction, LLC v. F. L. Merritt, Inc. neutral | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Munroe v. Great American Insurance green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Lynch v. Davis green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Gabriele v. Brino neutral | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Hall v. Bergman green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Wayland Investment Fund, LLC v. Millenium Seacarriers, Inc. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Wardell v. State neutral | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Miller v. Steloff green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| First International Bank of Israel, Ltd. v. L. Blankstein & Son, Inc. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.