46 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1914–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Thurman v. Trimgreen2 sentences2016The parol evidence rule was plainly stated in Thurman v. Trim, 206 Kan. 118 , Syl. ¶ 2, 477 P.2d 579 (1970): ‘When a contract is complete, unambiguous and free of uncertainty, parol evidence of a prior or contemporaneous agreement or understanding, tending to vary or substitute a new and different contract for the one evidenced by the writing is inadmissible.” The purpose of tire parol evidence rule is to prohibit evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements from being used to define, interpret, or contradict unambiguous terms of a written contract. 2016The parol evidence rule was plainly stated in Thurman v. Trim, 206 Kan. 118 , Syl. ¶ 2, 477 P.2d 579 (1970): ‘When a contract is complete, unambiguous and free of uncertainty, parol evidence of a prior or contemporaneous agreement or understanding, tending to vary or substitute a new and different contract for the one evidenced by the writing is inadmissible.” The purpose of tire parol evidence rule is to prohibit evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements from being used to define, interpret, or contradict unambiguous terms of a written contract. | 2 | 4 |
State v. Hoodgreen2 sentences2020See State v. Hood, 255 Kan. 228, 236 , 873 P.2d 1355 (1994). "[T]he parol evidence rule prevents a party to a written contract from attempting to vary its terms by relying on oral representations, be they characterized as negotiations or promises, made in discussions leading up to the agreement. 2020See State v. Hood, 255 Kan. 228, 236 , 873 P.2d 1355 (1994). "[T]he parol evidence rule prevents a party to a written contract from attempting to vary its terms by relying on oral representations, be they characterized as negotiations or promises, made in discussions leading up to the agreement. | 2 | 2 |
Edwards v. Phillips Petroleum Co.green2 sentences1969This, we believe, brings the case within the spirit of the rule stated in Edwards v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 187 Kan. 656 , 360 P. 2d 23 : “Where an oral promise is made contemporaneously with the execution of a written contract, to the promisee’s knowledge directly at variance with the written contract, the oral promise is merged in the written contract, and the promisee cannot invoke the rule that fraud may be predicated upon a promise made without the intention of performance.” (Syl. ¶ 1.) Broadly stated, the parol evidence rule excludes evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements 1969This, we believe, brings the case within the spirit of the rule stated in Edwards v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 187 Kan. 656 , 360 P. 2d 23 : “Where an oral promise is made contemporaneously with the execution of a written contract, to the promisee’s knowledge directly at variance with the written contract, the oral promise is merged in the written contract, and the promisee cannot invoke the rule that fraud may be predicated upon a promise made without the intention of performance.” (Syl. ¶ 1.) Broadly stated, the parol evidence rule excludes evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements | 1 | 4 |
Bouton v. Byersgreen2 sentences2017To the extent Harvey contends that the DPOA itself precludes parol evidence of subsequent oral authority, he errs, as the parol evidence rule precludes only a "'prior or contemporaneous oral agreement.'" See Branstetter, 209 Kan. at 334 . "[T]he parol evidence rule prevents a party to a written contract from attempting to vary its terms by relying on oral representations, be they characterized as negotiations or promises, made in discussions leading up to the agreement. [Citation omitted.] A written 8 contract, in most instances, subsumes earlier oral discussions or agreements." Bouton v. Byer 2017To the extent Harvey contends that the DPOA itself precludes parol evidence of subsequent oral authority, he errs, as the parol evidence rule precludes only a “prior or contemporaneous oral agreement.’” See Branstetter, 209 Kan. at 334 . “[T]he parol evidence rule prevents a party to a written contract from attempting to vary its terms by relying on oral representations, be they characterized as negotiations or promises, made in discussions leading up to the agreement. [Citation omitted.] A written contract, in most instances, subsumes earlier oral discussions or agreements.” Bouton v. Byers, | 1 | 2 |
In Re Estate of Goffgreen2 sentences1996See In re Estate of Goff, 191 Kan. 17, 29 , 379 P.2d 225 (1963). 1996See In re Estate of Goff, 191 Kan. 17, 29 , 379 P.2d 225 (1963). | 1 | 2 |
J. B. Colt Co. v. Kochergreen2 sentences1994See Colt Co. v. Kocher, 123 Kan. 286 , 255 Pac. 48 (1927). 1994See Colt Co. v. Kocher, 123 Kan. 286 , 255 Pac. 48 (1927). | 1 | 2 |
Phipps v. Union Stock Yards National Bankgreen2 sentences2020App. 2d at 672 ; see Phipps v. Union Stock Yards National Bank, 140 Kan. 193, 197 , 34 P.2d 561 (1934). 2020App. 2d at 672 ; see Phipps v. Union Stock Yards National Bank, 140 Kan. 193, 197 , 34 P.2d 561 (1934). | 1 | 1 |
Waste Connections of Kansas, Inc. v. Ritchie Corp.green2 sentences2017See Waste Connections of Kansas, Inc. v. Ritchie Corp., 296 Kan. 943 , Syl. ¶ 3, 298 P.3d 250 (2013) (when a court finds the written contract language is ambiguous, parol evidence may be introduced to ascertain the intent of the parties). 2017See Waste Connections of Kansas, Inc. v. Ritchie Corp., 296 Kan. 943 , Syl. ¶ 3, 298 P.3d 250 (2013) (when a court finds the written contract language is ambiguous, parol evidence may be introduced to ascertain the intent of the parties). | 1 | 1 |
Branstetter v. Coxgreen2 sentences2017To the extent Harvey contends that the DPOA itself precludes parol evidence of subsequent oral authority, he errs, as the parol evidence rule precludes only a "'prior or contemporaneous oral agreement.'" See Branstetter, 209 Kan. at 334 . "[T]he parol evidence rule prevents a party to a written contract from attempting to vary its terms by relying on oral representations, be they characterized as negotiations or promises, made in discussions leading up to the agreement. [Citation omitted.] A written 8 contract, in most instances, subsumes earlier oral discussions or agreements." Bouton v. Byer 2017To the extent Harvey contends that the DPOA itself precludes parol evidence of subsequent oral authority, he errs, as the parol evidence rule precludes only a “prior or contemporaneous oral agreement.’” See Branstetter, 209 Kan. at 334 . “[T]he parol evidence rule prevents a party to a written contract from attempting to vary its terms by relying on oral representations, be they characterized as negotiations or promises, made in discussions leading up to the agreement. [Citation omitted.] A written contract, in most instances, subsumes earlier oral discussions or agreements.” Bouton v. Byers, | 1 | 1 |
Barbara Oil Co. v. Kansas Gas Supply Corp.green2 sentences2014See Barbara Oil Co. v. Kansas Gas Supply Corp., 250 Kan. 438, 452 , 827 P.2d 24 (1992). 2014See Barbara Oil Co. v. Kansas Gas Supply Corp., 250 Kan. 438, 452 , 827 P.2d 24 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
Eikmeier v. Eikmeiergreen1 sentence2004See Eikmeier, 174 Kan. 71 , Syl. ¶ 1; Tompkins, 195 Kan. at 474 . | 1 | 1 |
Hall v. Mullengreen2 sentences2001See Hall v. Mullen, 234 Kan. 1031, 1037 , 678 P.2d 169 (1984) (where parol evidence was not in conflict with the provisions of a quitclaim deed, it is held that evidence was properly considered to interpret the effect of the quitclaim deed). 2001See Hall v. Mullen, 234 Kan. 1031, 1037 , 678 P.2d 169 (1984) (where parol evidence was not in conflict with the provisions of a quitclaim deed, it is held that evidence was properly considered to interpret the effect of the quitclaim deed). | 1 | 1 |
Sims v. Honda Motor Co.green2 sentences2000See, e.g., Neves, 769 P.2d at 1054; Sims v. Honda Motor Co., 225 Conn. 401 , 623 A.2d 995, 1003 (1993). 2000See, e.g., Neves, 769 P.2d at 1054; Sims v. Honda Motor Co., 225 Conn. 401 , 623 A.2d 995, 1003 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kirk v. First National Bank
green
2 sentences1969(In re Estate of Goff, supra; Hummel v. Wichita Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 190 Kan. 43 , 372 P. 2d 67 ; Kirk v. First National Bank, 132 Kan. 404 , 295 Pac. 703 .) Furthermore, the parol evidence rule was not violated, as defendant contends, by the admission of alleged fraudulent representations made by defendant to the plaintiffs leading up to the parties’ entering into contract. 1969(In re Estate of Goff, supra; Hummel v. Wichita Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 190 Kan. 43 , 372 P. 2d 67 ; Kirk v. First National Bank, 132 Kan. 404 , 295 Pac. 703 .) Furthermore, the parol evidence rule was not violated, as defendant contends, by the admission of alleged fraudulent representations made by defendant to the plaintiffs leading up to the parties’ entering into contract. | 3 | 1962–1969 |
Boxer v. Watchorn Oil & Gas Co.
neutral
2 sentences1994Boxer v. Watchorn Oil & Gas Company, 120 Kan. 278, 280 , 243 Pac. 316 (1926); Edwards v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 187 Kan. 656 , 360 P.2d 23, 26 (1961). 1994Boxer v. Watchorn Oil & Gas Company, 120 Kan. 278, 280 , 243 Pac. 316 (1926); Edwards v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 187 Kan. 656 , 360 P.2d 23, 26 (1961). | 2 | 1935–1994 |
Stapleton v. Hartman
green
2 sentences1969Closer examination, however, leads us to believe defendant is really attempting, through use of the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule (see, Stapleton v. Hartman, 174 Kan. 468 , 257 P. 2d 113 ; Stegman v. Professional & Business Men's Life Ins. 1969Closer examination, however, leads us to believe defendant is really attempting, through use of the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule (see, Stapleton v. Hartman, 174 Kan. 468 , 257 P. 2d 113 ; Stegman v. Professional & Business Men's Life Ins. | 2 | 1969–1992 |
Temmen v. Kent-Brown Chevrolet Co.
green
2 sentences1987Temmen v. Kent-Brown Chevrolet Co., 217 Kan. 223 , Syl. ¶ 3, 535 P.2d 873 (1975); McBride Electric, Inc. v. Putt’s Tuff, Inc., 9 Kan. 1987Temmen v. Kent-Brown Chevrolet Co., 217 Kan. 223 , Syl. ¶ 3, 535 P.2d 873 (1975); McBride Electric, Inc. v. Putt’s Tuff, Inc., 9 Kan. | 2 | 1984–1987 |
Edward Thompson Co. v. Foster
neutral
2 sentences1974(Thompson Co. v. Foster, 101 Kan. 14 , 165 Pac. 841 . 1974(Thompson Co. v. Foster, 101 Kan. 14 , 165 Pac. 841 . | 2 | 1967–1974 |
Hazelton v. Chaffin
neutral
2 sentences1967(Colt Co. v. Kocher, 123 Kan. 286 , 255 Pac. 48 ; and Hazelton v. Chaffin, 109 Kan. 175 , 197 Pac. 870 .)” (p. 424.) Here, there is nothing to indicate from the record that Floyd objected to the introduction of any of the parol or extrinsic evidence. 1967(Colt Co. v. Kocher, 123 Kan. 286 , 255 Pac. 48 ; and Hazelton v. Chaffin, 109 Kan. 175 , 197 Pac. 870 .)” (p. 424.) Here, there is nothing to indicate from the record that Floyd objected to the introduction of any of the parol or extrinsic evidence. | 2 | 1930–1967 |
Handrub v. Griffin
green
2 sentences1963(See, also, Kirk v. First National Bank, 132 Kan. 404 , 295 Pac. 703 .) The parol evidence rule is not violated when such evidence tends to show the relation of the parties and the circumstances under which the instruments were executed. ( Handrub v. Griffin, 127 Kan. 732 , 275 Pac. 196 .) The appellants contend it was error for the trail court to strike from its original answer the defense that the widow (Mary C. 1963(See, also, Kirk v. First National Bank, 132 Kan. 404 , 295 Pac. 703 .) The parol evidence rule is not violated when such evidence tends to show the relation of the parties and the circumstances under which the instruments were executed. ( Handrub v. Griffin, 127 Kan. 732 , 275 Pac. 196 .) The appellants contend it was error for the trail court to strike from its original answer the defense that the widow (Mary C. | 2 | 1962–1963 |
Estate of Boller v. Boller
green
2 sentences1963The family agreement had nothing whatever to do with the manner in which Katherine was to dispose of her estate. *26 "Concerning the general rule to the effect that a written contract is deemed to merge into itself all prior negotiations with reference to the subject matter, this court said in In re Estate of Boller, 173 Kan. 30 , 244 P.2d 678 : "`We recognize the general rule contended for, but there are exceptions to it, and among them is one that the parol evidence rule does not preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence of a valid prior parol agreement which is separate both in form and 1963The family agreement had nothing whatever to do with the manner in which Katherine was to dispose of her estate. *26 "Concerning the general rule to the effect that a written contract is deemed to merge into itself all prior negotiations with reference to the subject matter, this court said in In re Estate of Boller, 173 Kan. 30 , 244 P.2d 678 : "`We recognize the general rule contended for, but there are exceptions to it, and among them is one that the parol evidence rule does not preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence of a valid prior parol agreement which is separate both in form and | 2 | 1954–1963 |
Mayse v. Grieves
green
2 sentences1962Neither of the parties has cited any decision factually analogous to the case before us, but in Mayse v. Grieves, 130 Kan. 96 , 285 Pac. 630 , after discussing the force and effect of the parol-evidence rule, it was said: “. . . but there is a wide distinction between an attempt to contradict the terms of a written instrument and to explain the circumstances and conditions under which it was executed and delivered. 1962Neither of the parties has cited any decision factually analogous to the case before us, but in Mayse v. Grieves, 130 Kan. 96 , 285 Pac. 630 , after discussing the force and effect of the parol-evidence rule, it was said: “. . . but there is a wide distinction between an attempt to contradict the terms of a written instrument and to explain the circumstances and conditions under which it was executed and delivered. | 2 | 1957–1962 |
In re Estate of Moore – Gardner – Affirmed – Cowley
green
1 sentence2020This principle, which courts call the parol-evidence rule, is "not a rule of evidence but of substantive law whose applicability is for the court to determine." 53 Kan. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Estate of Stephens
green
2 sentences2019Cf. Estate of Stephens, 28 Cal. 4th 665, 681 , 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 , 49 P.3d 1093 (2002) (Kennard, J., dissenting) ("Any swindler who signs an aging and infirm relative's name to a deed without the relative's permission can easily defeat the presumption of invalidity by falsely testifying that the relative asked the swindler to sign as an amanuensis."). 26 I suspect that many readers, especially those attorneys whose practice involves estate planning and real estate transactions, will immediately recognize the mischief that will be facilitated by the majority's abandonment of the formalities 2019Cf. Estate of Stephens, 28 Cal. 4th 665, 681 , 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 , 49 P.3d 1093 (2002) (Kennard, J., dissenting) ("Any swindler who signs an aging and infirm relative's name to a deed without the relative's permission can easily defeat the presumption of invalidity by falsely testifying that the relative asked the swindler to sign as an amanuensis."). 26 I suspect that many readers, especially those attorneys whose practice involves estate planning and real estate transactions, will immediately recognize the mischief that will be facilitated by the majority's abandonment of the formalities | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Cude v. Tubular & Equipment Services, LLC
neutral
2 sentences2019"The purpose of the parol evidence rule is to prohibit evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements from being used to define, interpret, or contradict unambiguous terms of a written contract." Cude v. Tubular & Equipment Services , 53 Kan. 2019App. 2d 287 , 291, 388 P.3d 170 (2016). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Bowen
green
2 sentences2017State v. Bowen, 299 Kan. 339, 348-49 , 323 P.3d 853 (2014). 7 Generally, the parol evidence rule provides that oral testimony of a prior agreement cannot be used to vary the terms of a written instrument. 2017State v. Bowen, 299 Kan. 339, 348-49 , 323 P.3d 853 (2014). 7 Generally, the parol evidence rule provides that oral testimony of a prior agreement cannot be used to vary the terms of a written instrument. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
In Re Estate of Tompkins
green
1 sentence2004See Eikmeier, 174 Kan. 71 , Syl. ¶ 1; Tompkins, 195 Kan. at 474 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Oak Industries, Inc. v. Foxboro Co.
green
1 sentence1996Further, the parol evidence rule should never be used to shield fraud. 596 F. Supp. at 607-08 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Kelly v. Tillotson-Pearson, Inc.
green
1 sentence1996Rutledge’s reliance on Edwards v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 187 Kan. 656 , 360 P.2d 23 (1961), and Kelly v. Tillotson-Pearson, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 935 (D.R.I. 1994), is misplaced. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Souder v. Tri-County Refrigeration Co. green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Sunflower Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Tomlinson Oil Co.
green
1 sentence1992KG&E next claims gas contracts are contracts for the sale of goods and thus are governed by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), and Chapter 84 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, citing Sunflower Electric Coop., Inc. v. Tomlinson Oil Co., 7 Kan. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Cline v. Angle green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| McBride Electric, Inc. v. Putt's Tuff, Inc. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Robertson v. McCune green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| State Bank of Parsons v. First National Bank in Wichita green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| In Re Estate of Hauck green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Beckett v. Miller neutral | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Talbott v. Nibert green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| First Construction Co. v. Gallup green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Hawthorn-Mellody, Inc. v. Driessen green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Rice v. Rice neutral | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Culp v. Bloss green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Prophet v. Builders, Inc. green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Lawrence v. Sloan neutral | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Oaks v. Hill neutral | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Mastic Tile Division, Ruberoid Co. v. Moore Associates of Topeka, Inc. neutral | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Hummel v. Wichita Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Stegman v. Professional & Business Men's Life Insurance green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Farmers State Bank v. Aubyn neutral | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Cuilini v. Northern Trust Co. green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Commerce Trust Co. v. Watts green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Brewer v. Schammerhorn green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| In Re Estate of Hupp neutral | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.