parol evidence rule in Indiana

2019"The parol evidence rule prohibits courts from considering parol or extrinsic evidence for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of a written contract." Millner v. Mumby, 599 N.E.2d 627 , 629 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).

2019"The prohibition against the use of parol evidence is by no means complete; in fact, parol evidence may be considered as long as it has not been offered to vary the terms of the written contract." Id.

2019Thus, Sellers asserted that the email was admissible as an exception to the parol evidence rule because it “shed light upon the circumstances under which the parties entered into the written contract.” See Krieg, 802 N.E.2d at 944 . [13] On appeal, Sellers contend that, when it excluded the email from the evidence, the trial court misapplied the parol evidence rule.

2015Sees, 839 N.E.2d at 162 ; cf. Krieg v. Hieber, 802 N.E.2d 938, 943-44 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (noting that, even when the parol evidence rule does apply, there are numerous exceptions, such as using extrinsic evidence to show a mistake in the formation of a contract or “to apply the terms of a contract to its subject matter”). [16] Accordingly, whether the parties here considered the model year of the vehicle to be a term material, to their agreement must be resolved by considering evidence extrinsic to the deposit agreement, including the original advertisement.

2017We, however, find no error. [20] The parol evidence rule is not a procedural rule that excludes evidence; it is a rule of preference: “[t]he written word is preferred as evidence because it is not subject to the vicissitudes of human memory.” Franklin v. White, 493 N.E.2d 161, 166 (Ind. 1986).

2017“Generally, where parties have reduced an agreement to writing and have stated in an integration clause that the written document embodies the complete agreement, between the parties, the parol evidence rule prohibits courts from considering extrinsic evidence for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of the written, contract.” Id. (citing I.C.C.

2009Co. v. Y/G Ind., L.P., 762 N.E.2d at 180 (quoting Urschel Farms, Inc. v. Dekalb Swine Breeders, Inc., 858 F.Supp. 831, 840 (N.D.Ind.1994) (citations omitted)).

2008Co. v. Y/G Ind., L.P., 762 N.E.2d 176, 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) ("An exception to the parol evidence rule applies, however, in the case of fraud in the inducement, where a party was `induced' through fraudulent representations to enter a contract."), trans. denied.

2015Sees, 839 N.E.2d at 162 ; cf. Krieg v. Hieber, 802 N.E.2d 938, 943-44 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (noting that, even when the parol evidence rule does apply, there are numerous exceptions, such as using extrinsic evidence to show a mistake in the formation of a contract or “to apply the terms of a contract to its subject matter”). [16] Accordingly, whether the parties here considered the model year of the vehicle to be a term material, to their agreement must be resolved by considering evidence extrinsic to the deposit agreement, including the original advertisement.

2015Sees, 839 N.E.2d at 162 ; cf. Krieg v. Hieber, 802 N.E.2d 938, 943-44 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (noting that, even when the parol evidence rule does apply, there are numerous exceptions, such as using extrinsic evidence to show a mistake in the formation of a contract or “to apply the terms of a contract to its subject matter”). [16] Accordingly, whether the parties here considered the model year of the vehicle to be a term material, to their agreement must be resolved by considering evidence extrinsic to the deposit agreement, including the original advertisement.

2020Nelson Living Trust, 49 N.E.3d 1046, 1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (explaining that the parol evidence rule bars admission of such evidence, that is, “extrinsic evidence ... to add to, vary, or explain the terms of a written instrument [where] the terms of the instrument are clear and unambiguous.”). [20] The mortgage unambiguously requires Super Petroleum to pay real estate taxes assessed against the property.

2017Nelson Living Trust, 49 N.E.3d 1046, 1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

2012People’s Bank & Trust Co. v. Price, 714 N.E.2d 712, 717 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.

2012People’s Bank & Trust Co. v. Price, 714 N.E.2d 712, 717 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied.

2009Co. v. Y/G Ind., L.P., 762 N.E.2d at 180 (quoting Urschel Farms, Inc. v. Dekalb Swine Breeders, Inc., 858 F.Supp. 831, 840 (N.D.Ind.1994) (citations omitted)).

2002We have here the case of "a party with the capacity and opportunity to read a written contract, who hafs] execute[d] it, not under any emergency, and whose signature was not obtained by trick or artifice;" such a party, if the parol evidence rule is to retain vitality, "cannot later claim fraud in the inducement." Urschel Farms, 858 F.Supp. at 840 (citations omitted).

2009Depew v. Burkle, 786 N.E.2d 1144, 1148 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), trans. denied.

2009Depew v. Burkle, 786 N.E.2d 1144, 1148 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), trans. denied.

2005Co. v. Y/G Ind., L.P., 762 N.E.2d 176, 179 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied; Paulison v. Centier Bank, 704 N.E.2d 482, 492 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied; Tincher v. Greencastle Fed.

2002Id.; see Paulson v. Centier Bank, 704 N.E.2d 482 , 492 n. 9 (Ind.Ct.App.1998); see also Corsin On Contracts $ 580, p. 481 (1960).

1979The “logical extension,” 15 however, of the contract rules of construction (recited at pages 325, 326 of this opinion) is the parol evidence rule which states “that in the absence of fraud, mistake, ambiguity, illegality, duress or undue influence, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add to, vary or explain the terms of a written instrument if the terms of the instrument are susceptible of a clear and unambiguous construction.” Hauck v. Second National Bank of Richmond, (1972) 153 Ind.App. 245, 260 , 286 N.E.2d 852, 861 , and cases cited therein.

1979The “logical extension,” 15 however, of the contract rules of construction (recited at pages 325, 326 of this opinion) is the parol evidence rule which states “that in the absence of fraud, mistake, ambiguity, illegality, duress or undue influence, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add to, vary or explain the terms of a written instrument if the terms of the instrument are susceptible of a clear and unambiguous construction.” Hauck v. Second National Bank of Richmond, (1972) 153 Ind.App. 245, 260 , 286 N.E.2d 852, 861 , and cases cited therein.

2019As we have explained: The parol evidence rule provides that "[w]hen two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a writing to which they have both assented as the complete and accurate integration of that contract, evidence ... of antecedent understandings and negotiations will not be admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the writing." Dicen v. New Sesco, Inc. , 839 N.E.2d 684 , 688 (Ind. 2005) (quoting 6 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 573 (2002 reprint) ) (emphasis removed).

2010The parol evidence rule provides that "[wlhen two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a writing to which they have both assented as the complete and accurate integration of that contract, evidence ... of antecedent understandings and negotiations will not be admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the writing." Dicen v. New Sesco, Inc., 839 N.E.2d 684, 688 (Ind.2005) (quoting 6 Ar thur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 573 (2002 reprint)) (emphasis removed).

2005See Ruff v. Charter Behavioral Health Sys. of Northwest Indiana, 699 N.E.2d 1171, 1175 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied.

2002Id.

2019Sellers cite our opinion in Sho-Pro of Ind., Inc. v. Brown, 585 N.E.2d 1357, 1360 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), for the principle that the parol evidence rule presumes a valid written agreement between the parties and for its holding that the rule does not operate to exclude evidence of contract formation.

2019In Sho-Pro, we concluded that the parol evidence rule did not apply both because “[n]o evidence was introduced . . . purporting to vary the terms of the written document offered” and because “the question was whether there was a meeting of the minds between the parties.” Id. [14] Here, unlike in Sho-Pro, the proffered evidence purported to vary a specific term of the settlement agreement.

2019Cook v. Whitsell- Sherman, 796 N.E.2d 271, 277 (Ind. 2003).

2017Hinkel v. Sataria Distrib. & Packaging, Inc., 920 N.E.2d 766, 769 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

2015Proe.Code § 1856 and Cal. Civ.Code § 1625) (stating “when parties enter an integrated written agreement, extrinsic evidence may not be relied upon to alter or add to the terms of the writing”); Denver Found. v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 163 P.3d 1116, 1126 (Colo.2007) (en banc) (stating “intent must be determined from contract language itself, and an unambiguous document cannot be explained by extrinsic evidence so as to dispute its plain meaning”); Daines v. Vincent, 190 P.3d 1269, 1277-78 (Utah 2008) (stating “there can be no ambiguity where evidence is offered in an attempt to obscure otherwise

2015Proe.Code § 1856 and Cal. Civ.Code § 1625) (stating “when parties enter an integrated written agreement, extrinsic evidence may not be relied upon to alter or add to the terms of the writing”); Denver Found. v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 163 P.3d 1116, 1126 (Colo.2007) (en banc) (stating “intent must be determined from contract language itself, and an unambiguous document cannot be explained by extrinsic evidence so as to dispute its plain meaning”); Daines v. Vincent, 190 P.3d 1269, 1277-78 (Utah 2008) (stating “there can be no ambiguity where evidence is offered in an attempt to obscure otherwise

2015Proe.Code § 1856 and Cal. Civ.Code § 1625) (stating “when parties enter an integrated written agreement, extrinsic evidence may not be relied upon to alter or add to the terms of the writing”); Denver Found. v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 163 P.3d 1116, 1126 (Colo.2007) (en banc) (stating “intent must be determined from contract language itself, and an unambiguous document cannot be explained by extrinsic evidence so as to dispute its plain meaning”); Daines v. Vincent, 190 P.3d 1269, 1277-78 (Utah 2008) (stating “there can be no ambiguity where evidence is offered in an attempt to obscure otherwise