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90 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1910–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
First Data POS, Inc. v. Willisgreen2 sentences2021Auth. v. Soft Comdex, Inc., 250 Ga. App. 461, 464 (1) (b) ( 550 SE2d 704 ) (2001) (holding that under the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” the list of “Facilities Licensed” in the contract is presumed to exclude any facility not specifically listed). 28 See First Data POS, Inc. v. Willis, 273 Ga. 792, 794 (1) ( 546 SE2d 781 ) (2001) (“It has long been the law of this State that the parol evidence rule prohibits the consideration of evidence of a prior or contemporaneous oral agreement to alter, vary or change the unambiguous terms of a written contract.” (punctuation omitted)); C 2021Auth. v. Soft Comdex, Inc., 250 Ga. App. 461, 464 (1) (b) ( 550 SE2d 704 ) (2001) (holding that under the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” the list of “Facilities Licensed” in the contract is presumed to exclude any facility not specifically listed). 28 See First Data POS, Inc. v. Willis, 273 Ga. 792, 794 (1) ( 546 SE2d 781 ) (2001) (“It has long been the law of this State that the parol evidence rule prohibits the consideration of evidence of a prior or contemporaneous oral agreement to alter, vary or change the unambiguous terms of a written contract.” (punctuation omitted)); C | 3 | 4 |
Cooper v. Vaughangreen2 sentences1992This is more easily understood when it is remembered that the parol evidence rule [OCGA § 24-6-1] is “a rule of substantive law.” Cooper v. Vaughan, 81 Ga. App. 330, 337 ( 58 SE2d 453 ) (1950). 1992This is more easily understood when it is remembered that the parol evidence rule [OCGA § 24-6-1] is “a rule of substantive law.” Cooper v. Vaughan, 81 Ga. App. 330, 337 ( 58 SE2d 453 ) (1950). | 2 | 3 |
Dolanson Co. v. Citizens & Southern National Bankgreen2 sentences2025See Dolanson Co., 242 Ga. at 683 (1) (b); County of Walton, 94 Ga. at 646 . 1994Bank, 242 Ga. 681, 683 (1) (b) ( 251 SE2d 274 ) (1978). [W]here, upon its face, a written contract ... is legal, parol evidence is inadmissible, in an action to enforce the contract, to show [a] private understanding [of performance] in some illegal manner. . . . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Cookegreen2 sentences2014App. 2008) (“We hold that evidence outside of the terms of the promissory note was properly admitted [because] . . . the parol evidence rule does not apply to criminal proceedings . . . [and] a long-standing and well-recognized exception to the parol evidence rule is that it has no application to situations where an agreement is induced or procured by fraud.”); State v. Cooke, 371 P2d 39, 42 (Wa. 1962) (holding that “although a ‘merger clause’ may bar one from asserting false oral representations in an action upon a written contract entered into at arm’s length, it does not prevent the state f 2014App. 2008) (“We hold that evidence outside of the terms of the promissory note was properly admitted [because]... the parol evidence rule does not apply to criminal proceedings . . . [and] a long-standing and well-recognized exception to the parol evidence rule is that it has no application to situations where an agreement is induced or procured by fraud.”); State v. Cooke, 371 P2d 39, 42 (Wa. 1962) (holding that “although a‘merger clause’ may bar one from asserting false oral representations in an action upon a written contract entered into at arm’s length, it does not prevent the state from | 2 | 2 |
Albany Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Hendersongreen2 sentences2014Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Henderson, 198 Ga. 116, 143 ( 31 SE2d 20 ) (1944). 31 It is worth noting that even in the context of civil litigation, “[p]arol evidence is admissible to establish fraud in the inducement, even though there is an entirety or merger clause in the written contract, where the complaining party does not elect to stand on the contract but proceeds on fraud.” Judge v. Wellman, 198 Ga. App. 782, 783 ( 403 SE2d 76 ) (1991); accord City Dodge, Inc. v. Gardner, 232 Ga. 766 , 768 15 agreement in a written contract, our law deems their pre-contractual negotiations irrelevant.32 For ob 2014Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Henderson, 198 Ga. 116, 143 ( 31 SE2d 20 ) (1944). 31 It is worth noting that even in the context of civil litigation, “[p]arol evidence is admissible to establish fraud in the inducement, even though there is an entirety or merger clause in the written contract, where the complaining party does not elect to stand on the contract but proceeds on fraud.” Judge v. Wellman, 198 Ga. App. 782, 783 ( 403 SE2d 76 ) (1991); accord City Dodge, Inc. v. Gardner, 232 Ga. 766 , 768 15 agreement in a written contract, our law deems their pre-contractual negotiations irrelevant.32 For ob | 2 | 2 |
People v. Frankfortgreen2 sentences2014Cir. 1959) (holding that “[t]he people prosecuting for a crime committed in relation to a contract are not parties to the contract and are not bound by it.”) (punctuation and citation omitted); People v. Frankfort, 251 P2d 401, 414 (Ca. 2014Cir. 1959) (holding that “[t]he people prosecuting for a crime committed in relation to a contract are not parties to the contract and are not bound by it”) (citation and punctuation omitted); People v. Frankfort, 251 P2d 401, 414 (Ca. | 2 | 2 |
Reininger v. O'Neillgreen2 sentences2014Furthermore, when a contract includes an entire agreement clause, the clause “operates as a disclaimer, establishing that the written agreement completely and comprehensively represents all the parties’ agreement.” (Footnote omitted.) Reininger v. O’Neill, 316 Ga. App. 477, 482-483 (2) (a) ( 729 SE2d 587 ) (2012). 2014Furthermore, when a contract includes an entire agreement clause, the clause “operates as a disclaimer, establishing that the written agreement completely and comprehensively represents all the parties’ agreement.” (Footnote omitted.) Reininger v. O’Neill, 316 Ga. App. 477, 482-483 (2) (a) ( 729 SE2d 587 ) (2012). | 2 | 2 |
Abrams v. Massellgreen2 sentences2014“Thus, the parol evidence rule bars any attempt to contradict, vary or supplement the consideration stated in an integrated contract.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Abrams v. Massell, 262 Ga. App. 761, 767 (5) ( 586 SE2d 435 ) (2003). 2014“Thus, the parol evidence rule bars any attempt to contradict, vary or supplement the consideration stated in an integrated contract.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Abrams v. Massell, 262 Ga. App. 761, 767 (5) ( 586 SE2d 435 ) (2003). | 2 | 2 |
Heath v. Boston Capital Corporate Tax Credit Fundgreen2 sentences2013See Heath, 253 Ga. App. at 538 ; Lovell v. Georgia Trust Bank, 318 Ga. App. 860, 863 (2) ( 734 SE2d 847 ) (2012). 2013See Heath, 253 Ga. App. at 538 ; Lovell v. Georgia Trust Bank, 318 Ga. App. 860, 863 (2) ( 734 SE2d 847 ) (2012). | 2 | 2 |
Lovell v. Georgia Trust Bankgreen2 sentences2013See Heath, 253 Ga. App. at 538 ; Lovell v. Georgia Trust Bank, 318 Ga. App. 860, 863 (2) ( 734 SE2d 847 ) (2012). 2013See Heath, 253 Ga. App. at 538 ; Lovell v. Georgia Trust Bank, 318 Ga. App. 860, 863 (2) ( 734 SE2d 847 ) (2012). | 2 | 2 |
Coleman v. ARRINGTON AUTO SALES & RENTALSgreen2 sentences2012See Trendmark Homes, Inc. v. Bank of North Georgia, 314 Ga.App. 886, 888 ( 726 SE2d 138 ) (2012) (debtor did not allege any ambiguity in loan documents or modification in writing, and negotiations regarding lowered payoff amount, which were not reduced to writing, did not alter the written promissory notes or their enforceability); see also Coleman v. Arrington Auto Sales & Rentals, 294 Ga. App. 247, 249 (2) ( 669 SE2d 414 ) (2008) (testimony intended to contradict or vary the clear and unambiguous terms of the promissory note and installment contracts was inadmissible under the parol evidence 2012See Trendmark Homes, Inc. v. Bank of North Georgia, 314 Ga.App. 886, 888 ( 726 SE2d 138 ) (2012) (debtor did not allege any ambiguity in loan documents or modification in writing, and negotiations regarding lowered payoff amount, which were not reduced to writing, did not alter the written promissory notes or their enforceability); see also Coleman v. Arrington Auto Sales & Rentals, 294 Ga. App. 247, 249 (2) ( 669 SE2d 414 ) (2008) (testimony intended to contradict or vary the clear and unambiguous terms of the promissory note and installment contracts was inadmissible under the parol evidence | 2 | 2 |
Trendmark Homes, Inc. v. Bank of North Georgiagreen2 sentences2012See Trendmark Homes, Inc. v. Bank of North Georgia, 314 Ga.App. 886, 888 ( 726 SE2d 138 ) (2012) (debtor did not allege any ambiguity in loan documents or modification in writing, and negotiations regarding lowered payoff amount, which were not reduced to writing, did not alter the written promissory notes or their enforceability); see also Coleman v. Arrington Auto Sales & Rentals, 294 Ga. App. 247, 249 (2) ( 669 SE2d 414 ) (2008) (testimony intended to contradict or vary the clear and unambiguous terms of the promissory note and installment contracts was inadmissible under the parol evidence 2012See Trendmark Homes, Inc. v. Bank of North Georgia, 314 Ga.App. 886, 888 ( 726 SE2d 138 ) (2012) (debtor did not allege any ambiguity in loan documents or modification in writing, and negotiations regarding lowered payoff amount, which were not reduced to writing, did not alter the written promissory notes or their enforceability); see also Coleman v. Arrington Auto Sales & Rentals, 294 Ga. App. 247, 249 (2) ( 669 SE2d 414 ) (2008) (testimony intended to contradict or vary the clear and unambiguous terms of the promissory note and installment contracts was inadmissible under the parol evidence | 2 | 2 |
Sullins v. Bishopgreen2 sentences1984Kellos v. Parker-Sharpe, Inc., 245 Ga. 130, 132 ( 263 SE2d 138 ) (1980). 1983OCGA § 24-6-1 (Code Ann. § 38-501); Kellos v. Parker-Sharpe, Inc., 245 Ga. 130, 132 ( 263 SE2d 138 ) (1980). | 2 | 2 |
Jenkins v. Lanegreen2 sentences1965Code § 108-108; Jenkins v. Lane, 154 Ga. 454 (3) ( 115 SE 126 ). 1965Code § 108-108; Jenkins v. Lane, 154 Ga. 454 (3) ( 115 SE 126 ). | 1 | 3 |
Evans v. Hensongreen2 sentences1978Elyea-Austell Co. v. Jackson Garage, 13 Ga. App. 182 ( 79 SE 38 ); Evans v. Henson, 73 Ga. App. 494, 498 ( 37 SE2d 164 ). 1978Elyea-Austell Co. v. Jackson Garage, 13 Ga. App. 182 ( 79 SE 38 ); Evans v. Henson, 73 Ga. App. 494, 498 ( 37 SE2d 164 ). | 1 | 2 |
Supreme Lodge of the Masons' Annuity v. Gardnergreen2 sentences1952See also Supreme Lodge v. Gardner, 19 Ga. App. 58 (4) ( 90 S. E. 986 ); Swanson v. Mobley, 33 Ga. App. 791 ( 127 S. E. 806 ); Commercial Credit Co. v. Lewis, 59 Ga. App. 144 (4) ( 200 S. E. 566 ); Wheelwright & Co. v. Aiken, 92 Ga. 394 (3) ( 17 S. E. 610 ); Walters v. Americus Jewelry & Music Co., 114 Ga. 564 ( 40 S. E. 803 ); Horton v. Wilkerson, 192 Ga. 508 ( 16 S. E. 2d, 8 ). 1952See also Supreme Lodge v. Gardner, 19 Ga. App. 58 (4) ( 90 S. E. 986 ); Swanson v. Mobley, 33 Ga. App. 791 ( 127 S. E. 806 ); Commercial Credit Co. v. Lewis, 59 Ga. App. 144 (4) ( 200 S. E. 566 ); Wheelwright & Co. v. Aiken, 92 Ga. 394 (3) ( 17 S. E. 610 ); Walters v. Americus Jewelry & Music Co., 114 Ga. 564 ( 40 S. E. 803 ); Horton v. Wilkerson, 192 Ga. 508 ( 16 S. E. 2d, 8 ). | 1 | 2 |
Scales v. Textron Financial Corp.green2 sentences2023Corp., 276 Ga. App. 232, 233 ( 622 SE2d 903 ) (2005) (“In the absence of contrary public policy, our courts normally will enforce a contractual choice of law provision, as the parties by contract may stipulate that the laws of another jurisdiction will govern the transaction.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2023Corp., 276 Ga. App. 232, 233 ( 622 SE2d 903 ) (2005) (“In the absence of contrary public policy, our courts normally will enforce a contractual choice of law provision, as the parties by contract may stipulate that the laws of another jurisdiction will govern the transaction.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Wallace v. Bockgreen2 sentences2023See Wallace v. Brock, 279 Ga. 744, 745-746 (1) ( 620 SE2d 820 ) (2005) (“all prior oral negotiations and agreements pertaining to the same subject-matter are merged into the writing and superseded by the writing”) (citations and punctuation omitted). 8 Nevertheless, Jordan argues that he was permitted to occupy the room until April 27, either because the parties made a mutual mistake as to his check-out date in the written reservation agreement or because they subsequently modified that reservation agreement. 2023See Wallace v. Brock, 279 Ga. 744, 745-746 (1) ( 620 SE2d 820 ) (2005) (“all prior oral negotiations and agreements pertaining to the same subject-matter are merged into the writing and superseded by the writing”) (citations and punctuation omitted). 8 Nevertheless, Jordan argues that he was permitted to occupy the room until April 27, either because the parties made a mutual mistake as to his check-out date in the written reservation agreement or because they subsequently modified that reservation agreement. | 1 | 1 |
George L. Smith II Georgia World Congress Center Authority v. Soft Comdex, Inc.green2 sentences2021Auth. v. Soft Comdex, Inc., 250 Ga. App. 461, 464 (1) (b) ( 550 SE2d 704 ) (2001) (holding that under the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” the list of “Facilities Licensed” in the contract is presumed to exclude any facility not specifically listed). 28 See First Data POS, Inc. v. Willis, 273 Ga. 792, 794 (1) ( 546 SE2d 781 ) (2001) (“It has long been the law of this State that the parol evidence rule prohibits the consideration of evidence of a prior or contemporaneous oral agreement to alter, vary or change the unambiguous terms of a written contract.” (punctuation omitted)); C 2021Auth. v. Soft Comdex, Inc., 250 Ga. App. 461, 464 (1) (b) ( 550 SE2d 704 ) (2001) (holding that under the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” the list of “Facilities Licensed” in the contract is presumed to exclude any facility not specifically listed). 28 See First Data POS, Inc. v. Willis, 273 Ga. 792, 794 (1) ( 546 SE2d 781 ) (2001) (“It has long been the law of this State that the parol evidence rule prohibits the consideration of evidence of a prior or contemporaneous oral agreement to alter, vary or change the unambiguous terms of a written contract.” (punctuation omitted)); C | 1 | 1 |
| City of Demorest v. Roberts & Dunahoo Properties, LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
Speed v. Muhannagreen2 sentences2021Auth. v. Soft Comdex, Inc., 250 Ga. App. 461, 464 (1) (b) ( 550 SE2d 704 ) (2001) (holding that under the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” the list of “Facilities Licensed” in the contract is presumed to exclude any facility not specifically listed). 28 See First Data POS, Inc. v. Willis, 273 Ga. 792, 794 (1) ( 546 SE2d 781 ) (2001) (“It has long been the law of this State that the parol evidence rule prohibits the consideration of evidence of a prior or contemporaneous oral agreement to alter, vary or change the unambiguous terms of a written contract.” (punctuation omitted)); C 2021Auth. v. Soft Comdex, Inc., 250 Ga. App. 461, 464 (1) (b) ( 550 SE2d 704 ) (2001) (holding that under the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” the list of “Facilities Licensed” in the contract is presumed to exclude any facility not specifically listed). 28 See First Data POS, Inc. v. Willis, 273 Ga. 792, 794 (1) ( 546 SE2d 781 ) (2001) (“It has long been the law of this State that the parol evidence rule prohibits the consideration of evidence of a prior or contemporaneous oral agreement to alter, vary or change the unambiguous terms of a written contract.” (punctuation omitted)); C | 1 | 1 |
| Gerdes v. Russell Rowe Communications, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Cheeley Investments, Lp v. John Zambettigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Devine v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Futch v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Granger v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jones v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| McBee v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Judge v. Wellmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| City Dodge, Inc. v. Gardnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Baker v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| ESI Companies, Inc. v. Fulton Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Haas v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carey v. Houston Oral Surgeons, LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kreimer v. Kreimergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Miami Heights LT, LLC v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Hickey v. Kostas Chiropractic Clinics, P.A.green | 1 | 1 |
| Martin v. Hamilton State Bankgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lackey v. McDowellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Posey v. Medical Center-West, Inc.
green
2 sentences2013One not a party to the release may not object to the external evidence under the parol evidence rule.”31 In Lackey,32 the Court took the “opportunity to modify Posey, so as to provide a clearer rule: Only those parties named in the release will be discharged by that instrument.”33 And by “named,” the Court meant “being identified either by proper name or such other description as leaves no question of the identity of the party released.”34 The Court reasoned that this clearer rule “should eliminate the need to inquire as to the intent of the parties to 29 Carey v. Houston Oral Surgeons, 265 Ga 2013One not a party to the release may not object to the external evidence under the parol evidence rule.”31 In Lackey,32 the Court took the “opportunity to modify Posey, so as to provide a clearer rule: Only those parties named in the release will be discharged by that instrument.”33 And by “named,” the Court meant “being identified either by proper name or such other description as leaves no question of the identity of the party released.”34 The Court reasoned that this clearer rule “should eliminate the need to inquire as to the intent of the parties to 29 Carey v. Houston Oral Surgeons, 265 Ga | 3 | 1992–2013 |
Stonecypher v. Georgia Power Co.
green
2 sentences1976The court held that the alleged oral agreement violated the parol evidence rule in that it sought to vary the terms stated in the deed, saying ( 183 Ga. at 504 ): "It is true that as between the parties to the contract the consideration of a deed can generally be inquired into whenever the principles of justice require it. 1971We regard as controlling here the decisions of Stonecypher v. Ga. Power Co., 183 Ga. 498 ( 189 SE 13 ); Cottle v. Tomlinson, 192 Ga. 704 , supra; Awtrey v. Awtrey, 225 Ga. 666 ( 171 SE2d 126 ) and the principles they enunciate. | 3 | 1964–1976 |
Bullard v. Brewer
green
2 sentences1916In ruling upon the plaintiff’s demurrer thereto and in the judgment dismissing the answer, the court held, as we think, correctly, that "said answer as a whole constitutes no valid defense at law.” The notes in question recited that they were given "for value received.” Omitting what is said in Dinkler v. Baer, 92 Ga. 432 ( 17 S. E. 953 ), touching this point, we refer to an apt statement 'of the parol-evidence rule, given in Bullard v. Brewer, 118 Ga. 918 ( 45 S. E. 711 ), as follows: “Where parties have reduced to writ ing what appears to be a complete and certain agreement, it will, in the 1916In ruling upon the plaintiff’s demurrer thereto and in the judgment dismissing the answer, the court held, as we think, correctly, that "said answer as a whole constitutes no valid defense at law.” The notes in question recited that they were given "for value received.” Omitting what is said in Dinkler v. Baer, 92 Ga. 432 ( 17 S. E. 953 ), touching this point, we refer to an apt statement 'of the parol-evidence rule, given in Bullard v. Brewer, 118 Ga. 918 ( 45 S. E. 711 ), as follows: “Where parties have reduced to writ ing what appears to be a complete and certain agreement, it will, in the | 3 | 1910–1920 |
Kellos v. Parker-Sharpe, Inc.
green
2 sentences1984Kellos v. Parker-Sharpe, Inc., 245 Ga. 130, 132 ( 263 SE2d 138 ) (1980). 1983OCGA § 24-6-1 (Code Ann. § 38-501); Kellos v. Parker-Sharpe, Inc., 245 Ga. 130, 132 ( 263 SE2d 138 ) (1980). | 2 | 1983–1984 |
Awtrey v. Awtrey
green
2 sentences1976Although Code § 29-101 provides that "The consideration of a deed may always be inquired into when the principles of justice require it,” in Awtrey v. Awtrey, 225 Ga. 666 ( 171 SE2d 126 ) (1969), Code § 29-101 and § 38-501 were construed together to mean that a party may not under the guise of inquiring into the consideration of a deed (§ 29-101), contradict or vary by parol evidence the consideration expressly stated in the deed (§ 38-501). 1976Although Code § 29-101 provides that "The consideration of a deed may always be inquired into when the principles of justice require it,” in Awtrey v. Awtrey, 225 Ga. 666 ( 171 SE2d 126 ) (1969), Code § 29-101 and § 38-501 were construed together to mean that a party may not under the guise of inquiring into the consideration of a deed (§ 29-101), contradict or vary by parol evidence the consideration expressly stated in the deed (§ 38-501). | 2 | 1971–1976 |
Cleghorn v. Shields
green
2 sentences1967Thus, under the parol evidence rule, the evidence of additional specifications or requirements was without probative value (Cleghorn v. Shields, 165 Ga. 362 ( 141 SE 55 )) and, under an express disclaimer of warranty, evidence showing failure of implied warranty under Code § 96-301 (now repealed but applicable to the instant case) likewise was of no avail to the defendant. 1967Thus, under the parol evidence rule, the evidence of additional specifications or requirements was without probative value (Cleghorn v. Shields, 165 Ga. 362 ( 141 SE 55 )) and, under an express disclaimer of warranty, evidence showing failure of implied warranty under Code § 96-301 (now repealed but applicable to the instant case) likewise was of no avail to the defendant. | 2 | 1962–1967 |
Sawyer v. Birrick
green
2 sentences1952See also Supreme Lodge v. Gardner, 19 Ga. App. 58 (4) ( 90 S. E. 986 ); Swanson v. Mobley, 33 Ga. App. 791 ( 127 S. E. 806 ); Commercial Credit Co. v. Lewis, 59 Ga. App. 144 (4) ( 200 S. E. 566 ); Wheelwright & Co. v. Aiken, 92 Ga. 394 (3) ( 17 S. E. 610 ); Walters v. Americus Jewelry & Music Co., 114 Ga. 564 ( 40 S. E. 803 ); Horton v. Wilkerson, 192 Ga. 508 ( 16 S. E. 2d, 8 ). 1935Swanson v. Mobley, 33 Ga. App. 791 ( 127 S. E. 806 ); Supreme Lodge v. Gardner, 19 Ga. App. 58 (4) ( 90 S. E. 986 ); 22 C. | 2 | 1935–1952 |
Stein v. Lazarus
neutral
2 sentences1952See also Supreme Lodge v. Gardner, 19 Ga. App. 58 (4) ( 90 S. E. 986 ); Swanson v. Mobley, 33 Ga. App. 791 ( 127 S. E. 806 ); Commercial Credit Co. v. Lewis, 59 Ga. App. 144 (4) ( 200 S. E. 566 ); Wheelwright & Co. v. Aiken, 92 Ga. 394 (3) ( 17 S. E. 610 ); Walters v. Americus Jewelry & Music Co., 114 Ga. 564 ( 40 S. E. 803 ); Horton v. Wilkerson, 192 Ga. 508 ( 16 S. E. 2d, 8 ). 1935Swanson v. Mobley, 33 Ga. App. 791 ( 127 S. E. 806 ); Supreme Lodge v. Gardner, 19 Ga. App. 58 (4) ( 90 S. E. 986 ); 22 C. | 2 | 1935–1952 |
Southern Envelope Co. v. Adamson Printing Co.
neutral
2 sentences1952“Where a party who is , entitled to the benefit of the rule prohibiting the admission of parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing waives the benefit thereof by allowing such evidence to be received without objection and without any effort to have it stricken and disregarded by the trial judge or the jury, he can not, after the trial has terminated and the case has been decided against him, invoke the parol-evidence rule in order to obtain a reversal of such verdict and judgment in the appellate court.” Southern Envelope Co. v. Adamson Printing Co., 51 Ga. App. 475 (2) ( 180 S. E. 770 ). 1952“Where a party who is , entitled to the benefit of the rule prohibiting the admission of parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing waives the benefit thereof by allowing such evidence to be received without objection and without any effort to have it stricken and disregarded by the trial judge or the jury, he can not, after the trial has terminated and the case has been decided against him, invoke the parol-evidence rule in order to obtain a reversal of such verdict and judgment in the appellate court.” Southern Envelope Co. v. Adamson Printing Co., 51 Ga. App. 475 (2) ( 180 S. E. 770 ). | 2 | 1938–1952 |
County of Walton v. Powell & Davenport
neutral
1 sentence2025See Dolanson Co., 242 Ga. at 683 (1) (b); County of Walton, 94 Ga. at 646 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Long v. Beach green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Bird v. State neutral | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Dickey v. Grice green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Lau's Corp., Inc. v. Haskins green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Chitwood v. Southern General Insurance green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Area v. Cagle green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| McGraw v. Trusco Leasing, Inc. green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Deckner-Willingham Lumber Co. v. Turner green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.