47 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1922–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Estate of Parker v. Dorchakgreen2 sentences2025“The parol evidence rule is one of substantive law rather than of evidence.” Turner v. Terry, 799 So. 2d 25, 32 (Miss. 2001) (citing Fontenot v. Dorchak (In re Est. of Parker), 673 So. 2d 1379, 1383 (Miss. 1996)). 2005"The parol evidence rule is one of substantive law rather than evidence." Turner v. Terry, 799 So.2d 25, 32 (¶ 16) (Miss.2001) (citing Estate of Parker v. Dorchak, 673 So.2d 1379, 1383 (Miss.1996)). | 5 | 5 |
Turner v. Terrygreen2 sentences2025“The parol evidence rule is one of substantive law rather than of evidence.” Turner v. Terry, 799 So. 2d 25, 32 (Miss. 2001) (citing Fontenot v. Dorchak (In re Est. of Parker), 673 So. 2d 1379, 1383 (Miss. 1996)). 2005"The parol evidence rule is one of substantive law rather than evidence." Turner v. Terry, 799 So.2d 25, 32 (¶ 16) (Miss.2001) (citing Estate of Parker v. Dorchak, 673 So.2d 1379, 1383 (Miss.1996)). | 3 | 6 |
Epperson v. Southbankgreen2 sentences2025See Epperson, 93 So. 3d at 16-17 (“The parol evidence rule ‘provides that where a document is incomplete parol evidence is admissible to explain the terms but, in no event, to contradict them.’” (quoting Busching v. Griffin, 542 So. 2d 860, 865 (Miss. 1989)). 2018As this Court said in Epperson , the parol evidence rule "provides that where a document is incomplete parol evidence is admissible to explain the terms but, in no event, to contradict them." Epperson , 93 So.3d at 17 (citation omitted). ¶ 23. | 2 | 2 |
HEARTSOUTH, PLLC v. Boydgreen2 sentences2008See also HeartSouth, PLLC v. Boyd, 865 So.2d 1095, 1107-08 (Miss.2003). 2007See also Heartsouth, PLLC v. Boyd, 865 So. 2d 1095, 1107-08 (Miss. 2003). 8 future conduct” and as such is “not such a representation as will support recovery under a theory of negligent misrepresentation.” Bank of Shaw v. Posey, 573 So. 2d 1355, 1360 (Miss. 1990); see also Moran v. Fairley, 919 So. 2d 969 (Miss. | 2 | 2 |
Moran v. Fairleygreen2 sentences2008The trial court ruled that Holland’s claim of negligent misrepresentation failed because a promise to lend money is not a past or present existing fact but a “promise of future conduct” and as such is “not such a representation as will suppoi’t recovery under a theory of negligent misrepresentation.” Bank of Shaw v. Posey, 573 So.2d 1355, 1360 (Miss. 1990); see also Moran v. Fairley, 919 So.2d 969 (Miss.Ct.App.2005). 2007See also Heartsouth, PLLC v. Boyd, 865 So. 2d 1095, 1107-08 (Miss. 2003). 8 future conduct” and as such is “not such a representation as will support recovery under a theory of negligent misrepresentation.” Bank of Shaw v. Posey, 573 So. 2d 1355, 1360 (Miss. 1990); see also Moran v. Fairley, 919 So. 2d 969 (Miss. | 2 | 2 |
Bank of Shaw v. Poseygreen2 sentences2008The trial court ruled that Holland’s claim of negligent misrepresentation failed because a promise to lend money is not a past or present existing fact but a “promise of future conduct” and as such is “not such a representation as will suppoi’t recovery under a theory of negligent misrepresentation.” Bank of Shaw v. Posey, 573 So.2d 1355, 1360 (Miss. 1990); see also Moran v. Fairley, 919 So.2d 969 (Miss.Ct.App.2005). 2007See also Heartsouth, PLLC v. Boyd, 865 So. 2d 1095, 1107-08 (Miss. 2003). 8 future conduct” and as such is “not such a representation as will support recovery under a theory of negligent misrepresentation.” Bank of Shaw v. Posey, 573 So. 2d 1355, 1360 (Miss. 1990); see also Moran v. Fairley, 919 So. 2d 969 (Miss. | 2 | 2 |
Kelso v. McGowangreen2 sentences2004Kelso v. McGowan, 604 So.2d 726, 731 (Miss.1992). ¶ 22. 2004Kelso v. McGowan, 604 So.2d 726, 731 (Miss.1992). | 2 | 2 |
McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., Inc.green2 sentences2003See McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., 626 So.2d 603 (Miss.1993); Housing Auth., City of Laurel v. Gatlin, 738 So.2d 249 (Miss.Ct.App.1998). 2002See McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., 626 So.2d 603 (Miss. 1993); Housing Auth., City of Laurel v. Gatlin, 738 So.2d 249 (Miss. | 2 | 2 |
Allen v. Allengreen2 sentences1981This case would thus appear to fit under the parol evidence rule that: `[I]f the writing is complete on its face and unambiguous, parol evidence is not admissible to contradict, vary, alter, add to, or detract from, the instrument... . `in the absence of fraud or mistake.'" Allen et al. v. Allen et al., 175 Miss. 735, 741 , 168 So. 658, 659 (1936). 1981This case would thus appear to fit under the parol evidence rule that: `[I]f the writing is complete on its face and unambiguous, parol evidence is not admissible to contradict, vary, alter, add to, or detract from, the instrument... . `in the absence of fraud or mistake.'" Allen et al. v. Allen et al., 175 Miss. 735, 741 , 168 So. 658, 659 (1936). | 2 | 2 |
Fuqua v. MILLSgreen2 sentences1981"In Fuqua v. Mills, 221 Miss. 436 , 73 So.2d 113 (1954), this Court, in again defining the parol evidence rule, quoted with approval from Kendrick v. Robertson, 145 Miss. 585 , 111 So. 99 (1927): `[T]he rule that the terms of a written contract or conveyance cannot be varied or added to by parol evidence is not merely a rule of evidence, but is one of substantive law, and, in measuring the rights of the parties to a written contract or conveyance, which, on its face, is unambiguous and expresses an agreement complete in all of its essential terms, the writing will control. 1981"In Fuqua v. Mills, 221 Miss. 436 , 73 So.2d 113 (1954), this Court, in again defining the parol evidence rule, quoted with approval from Kendrick v. Robertson, 145 Miss. 585 , 111 So. 99 (1927): `[T]he rule that the terms of a written contract or conveyance cannot be varied or added to by parol evidence is not merely a rule of evidence, but is one of substantive law, and, in measuring the rights of the parties to a written contract or conveyance, which, on its face, is unambiguous and expresses an agreement complete in all of its essential terms, the writing will control. | 1 | 3 |
Sullivan v. Estate of Easongreen2 sentences2023Sullivan itself reckoned with this argument but held fast to “the general rule that the parol evidence rule applies only to controversies between parties to the agreement.” Sullivan, 558 So. 2d at 832 . 1999Sullivan v. Estate of Eason, 558 So.2d 830, 832 (Miss.1990). | 1 | 2 |
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF LAUREL v. Gatlingreen2 sentences2003See McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., 626 So.2d 603 (Miss.1993); Housing Auth., City of Laurel v. Gatlin, 738 So.2d 249 (Miss.Ct.App.1998). 2003In Frierson v. Delta Outdoor, Inc., 794 So.2d 220, 224 (Miss. 2001) and Cooper v. Crabb, 587 So.2d 236, 241 (Miss.1991), this Court held that the rule against the admissibility of parol evidence when a contract is unambiguous is "not merely a rule of evidence, but is one of substantive law." Lastly, in Housing Auth., City of Laurel v. Gatlin, 738 So.2d 249, 251 (Miss.Ct.App.1998), held that the parol evidence rule precludes the consideration of evidence which purports to show an oral modification of an employment contract. | 1 | 2 |
Busching v. Griffingreen1 sentence2025See Epperson, 93 So. 3d at 16-17 (“The parol evidence rule ‘provides that where a document is incomplete parol evidence is admissible to explain the terms but, in no event, to contradict them.’” (quoting Busching v. Griffin, 542 So. 2d 860, 865 (Miss. 1989)). | 1 | 1 |
Collins v. Schneidergreen2 sentences2012Collins v. Schneider, 187 Miss. 1 , 192 So. 20, 22 (1939). . 2012Collins v. Schneider, 187 Miss. 1 , 192 So. 20, 22 (1939). . | 1 | 1 |
BC Rogers Poultry, Inc. v. Wedgeworthgreen1 sentence2012Rogers Poultry, Inc. v. Wedgeworth, 911 So.2d 483, 490 (Miss.2005) (“the parol evidence rule ... precludes the enforcement of inconsistent or prior agreements in a finalized contract”). . | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. JONES CTY. COMMUNITY HOSPITALgreen1 sentence2008As firmly established as the parol evidence rule is, and its exception for ambiguities, it is also firmly rooted in this state's judicial precedent that "public boards speak only through their minutes and their actions are evidenced solely by entries on their minutes." Thompson v. Jones County Cmty. Hosp., 352 So.2d 795, 796 (Miss.1977); Burdsal v. Marshall County, 937 So.2d 45 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App. 2006). | 1 | 1 |
Carter v. CITIGROUP INC.green2 sentences2008It is a well-settled principle of contract law that “as an evidentiary matter, parol evidence to vary the terms of a written contract is inadmissible.” Carter v. Citigroup, Inc., 938 So.2d 809, 818 (1141) (Miss.2006) (quoting Stephens v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the United States, 850 So.2d 78, 82 (¶ 14) (Miss.2003)). 2008It is a well-settled principle of contract law that "as an evidentiary matter, parol evidence to vary the terms of a written contract is inadmissible." Carter v. Citigroup, Inc., 938 So.2d 809, 818 (¶ 41) (Miss.2006) (quoting Stephens v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 850 So.2d 78, 82 (¶ 14) (Miss.2003)). | 1 | 1 |
Stephens v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of USgreen2 sentences2008It is a well-settled principle of contract law that “as an evidentiary matter, parol evidence to vary the terms of a written contract is inadmissible.” Carter v. Citigroup, Inc., 938 So.2d 809, 818 (1141) (Miss.2006) (quoting Stephens v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the United States, 850 So.2d 78, 82 (¶ 14) (Miss.2003)). 2008It is a well-settled principle of contract law that "as an evidentiary matter, parol evidence to vary the terms of a written contract is inadmissible." Carter v. Citigroup, Inc., 938 So.2d 809, 818 (¶ 41) (Miss.2006) (quoting Stephens v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 850 So.2d 78, 82 (¶ 14) (Miss.2003)). | 1 | 1 |
| Marlar v. Castillo-Ruizgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Frierson v. Delta Outdoor, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Cooper v. Crabbgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McClellan v. McCauleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Eastline Corp. v. Marion Apartments, Ltd.green | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Falkegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Noble v. Logan-Dees Chevrolet-Buick, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Lane v. Pfeifergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Byrd v. Rees
green
2 sentences1985In Byrd v. Rees, 251 Miss. 876 , 171 So.2d 864 (1965), this Court set forth the same rule above but allowed extrinsic evidence to clear up an ambiguity and explain the language: "the plan of the operation heretofore in effect." There the Court stated: The parol evidence rule does not preclude the reception of parol evidence with reference to a matter evidenced by the writing, where such evidence relates to a matter in pais, or is of such a character that it does not tend to vary or contradict the written instrument. 1985In Byrd v. Rees, 251 Miss. 876 , 171 So.2d 864 (1965), this Court set forth the same rule above but allowed extrinsic evidence to clear up an ambiguity and explain the language: "the plan of the operation heretofore in effect." There the Court stated: The parol evidence rule does not preclude the reception of parol evidence with reference to a matter evidenced by the writing, where such evidence relates to a matter in pais, or is of such a character that it does not tend to vary or contradict the written instrument. | 4 | 1966–1985 |
Kendrick v. Robertson
green
2 sentences1983This rule, which is known as the parol evidence rule, is one of substantive law and not merely one of evidence; and it obtains in equity as well as at law." In the case of Kendrick v. Robertson, 145 Miss. 585 , 111 So. 99, 101 , the Court * * * said: "* * * the rule that the terms of a written contract or conveyance cannot be varied or added to by parol evidence is not merely a rule of evidence, but is one of substantive law, and, in measuring the rights of the parties to a written contract or conveyance, which, on its face, is unambiguous and expresses an agreement complete in all of its esse 1983This rule, which is known as the parol evidence rule, is one of substantive law and not merely one of evidence; and it obtains in equity as well as at law." In the case of Kendrick v. Robertson, 145 Miss. 585 , 111 So. 99, 101 , the Court * * * said: "* * * the rule that the terms of a written contract or conveyance cannot be varied or added to by parol evidence is not merely a rule of evidence, but is one of substantive law, and, in measuring the rights of the parties to a written contract or conveyance, which, on its face, is unambiguous and expresses an agreement complete in all of its esse | 4 | 1954–1983 |
Coffman v. Provost ★ Umphrey Law Firm, L.L.P.
green
2 sentences2005However, the integration clause does not necessarily require the conclusion that Plaintiff's claims for breach of the 1994 and 1996 Partnership Agreements fall within the scope of the arbitration clause. 161 F.Supp.2d at 728 . ¶ 22. 2000However, the integration clause does not necessarily require the conclusion that Plaintiff's claims for breach of the 1994 and 1996 Partnership Agreements fall within the scope of the arbitration clause. 161 F. Supp. 2d at 728 . ¶22. | 2 | 2000–2005 |
Edrington v. Stephens
green
2 sentences1992The Court in Edrington v. Stephens, 148 Miss. 583 , 114 So. 387 (1927) stated: Certain portions of the testimony tending to establish the oral agreement ... were admitted without objection on the part of the appellants, but this is of no consequence in deciding the question now presented, for ... this court [has] held that the rule that the terms of a written contract or conveyance cannot be varied or added to by parol evidence is not merely a rule of evidence, but is one of substantive law, and, in measuring the rights of the parties to a written contract or conveyance which, on its face, is 1992The Court in Edrington v. Stephens, 148 Miss. 583 , 114 So. 387 (1927) stated: Certain portions of the testimony tending to establish the oral agreement ... were admitted without objection on the part of the appellants, but this is of no consequence in deciding the question now presented, for ... this court [has] held that the rule that the terms of a written contract or conveyance cannot be varied or added to by parol evidence is not merely a rule of evidence, but is one of substantive law, and, in measuring the rights of the parties to a written contract or conveyance which, on its face, is | 2 | 1983–1992 |
Sharpsburg Farms, Inc. v. Williams
green
2 sentences1981Jones, Commentaries on Evidence, Vol. 3, par. 434; Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 4, pars. 2400 and 2425.' 221 Miss. at 450 , 73 So.2d at 119 . 363 So.2d at 1355 . *1103 II. 1980In support of this contention, appellants rely upon Sharpsburg Farms, Inc. v. Williams, 363 So.2d 1350 (Miss. 1978), where this Court defined the parol evidence rule as follows: "[T]he rule that the terms of a written contract or conveyance cannot be varied or added to by parol evidence is not merely a rule of evidence, but is one of substantive law, and, in measuring the rights of the parties to a written contract or conveyance, which, on its face, is unambiguous and expresses an agreement complete in all of its essential terms, the writing will control. | 2 | 1980–1981 |
Valley Mills, Division of Merchants Co. v. Southeastern Hatcheries
green
2 sentences1966The notation was incomplete and informal, and under the circumstances of this case, the application of the parol evidence rule would be “unreasonably rigid and harsh.” Valley Mills et al. v. Southeastern Hatcheries, 245 Miss. 71 , 145 So.2d 698 (1962). 1966The notation was incomplete and informal, and under the circumstances of this case, the application of the parol evidence rule would be “unreasonably rigid and harsh.” Valley Mills et al. v. Southeastern Hatcheries, 245 Miss. 71 , 145 So.2d 698 (1962). | 2 | 1966–1978 |
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.
green
2 sentences2017The Smith Court reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the court had erred in failing to consider “undisputed parol facts entitled to be considered by the [c]ourt.” Smith found that the first driver constituted a stranger to the contract, and “the parol evidence rule is operative as to parties to the document and not a stranger to the release.” Id. at 1047 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 401 U.S. 321, 347 , 91 S. Ct. 795, 810 , 28 L. 2017The Smith Court reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the court had erred in failing to consider “undisputed parol facts entitled to be considered by the [c]ourt.” Smith found that the first driver constituted a stranger to the contract, and “the parol evidence rule is operative as to parties to the document and not a stranger to the release.” Id. at 1047 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 401 U.S. 321, 347 , 91 S. Ct. 795, 810 , 28 L. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Thornhill v. Chapman
green
1 sentence2012She cited Thornhill v. Chapman, 748 So.2d 819 (Miss.Ct.App.1999), for the proposition that the chancellor should not have allowed Graphia to testify about how much he paid for the property, as that was a violation of the parol-evidence rule. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
AUSTIN DEVELOPMENT v. Bank of Meridian
green
1 sentence2010In reviewing the trial court’s determination of whether Bancorp-South waived its affirmative defenses of waiver and merger, we consider the supreme court’s decision in Austin Development Co. v. Bank of Meridian, 569 So.2d 1209 (Miss.1990). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Hattiesburg Plumbing Co. v. Carmichael & Co.
neutral
1 sentence2008In support, Lange cites Kerl v. Smith, 96 Miss. 827 , 51 So. 3 (1910), a case in which parol evidence was considered to determine the meaning of the word "timber," and Hattiesburg Plumbing Co. v. Carmichael & Co., 80 Miss. 66 , 31 So. 536 (1901), where the supreme court found the term "artesian" ambiguous requiring extrinsic evidence to glean its meaning as used in the contract. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Kerl v. Smith
neutral
2 sentences2008In support, Lange cites Kerl v. Smith, 96 Miss. 827 , 51 So. 3 (1910), a case in which parol evidence was considered to determine the meaning of the word "timber," and Hattiesburg Plumbing Co. v. Carmichael & Co., 80 Miss. 66 , 31 So. 536 (1901), where the supreme court found the term "artesian" ambiguous requiring extrinsic evidence to glean its meaning as used in the contract. 2008In support, Lange cites Kerl v. Smith, 96 Miss. 827 , 51 So. 3 (1910), a case in which parol evidence was considered to determine the meaning of the word "timber," and Hattiesburg Plumbing Co. v. Carmichael & Co., 80 Miss. 66 , 31 So. 536 (1901), where the supreme court found the term "artesian" ambiguous requiring extrinsic evidence to glean its meaning as used in the contract. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Rankins v. State
green
1 sentence2008As firmly established as the parol evidence rule is, and its exception for ambiguities, it is also firmly rooted in this state's judicial precedent that "public boards speak only through their minutes and their actions are evidenced solely by entries on their minutes." Thompson v. Jones County Cmty. Hosp., 352 So.2d 795, 796 (Miss.1977); Burdsal v. Marshall County, 937 So.2d 45 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App. 2006). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Reeves v. Reeves green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| SMALLEY v. Rogers green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| First Money, Inc. v. Frisby green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Keppner v. Gulf Shores, Inc. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| National Cash Register Co. v. Webb green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Renfroe v. Aswell neutral | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Stirling v. Logue neutral | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Equitable Discount Corp. v. Trotter neutral | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Loe v. McHargue green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Paymaster Oil Mill Company v. Mitchell green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Aaronson v. McGowan neutral | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Fornewall v. State neutral | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Reed v. Reed green | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Hightower v. Henry neutral | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.