definitional instruction in Illinois

1992A definitional instruction on self-defense was tendered to the jury stating: “A person is justified in the use of force when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself ***.” (Emphasis in original.) ( 72 Ill. 2d at 128 , 378 N.E.2d at 515 .) An IPI instruction defining “reasonably believes” as “acting as a reasonable man, believes that the described fact exists” was neither tendered nor read to the jury by the court sua sponte.

1992A definitional instruction on self-defense was tendered to the jury stating: “A person is justified in the use of force when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself ***.” (Emphasis in original.) ( 72 Ill. 2d at 128 , 378 N.E.2d at 515 .) An IPI instruction defining “reasonably believes” as “acting as a reasonable man, believes that the described fact exists” was neither tendered nor read to the jury by the court sua sponte.

1988(People v. Thurman (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 326, 329-30 , 472 N.E.2d 415 ; People v. Roberts (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 1, 14 , 387 N.E.2d 331 .) In Roberts, the court considered whether a definitional instruction for murder in an attempted murder case, which erroneously incorporated the alternative mental states of murder other than an intent to kill (see Ill.

1988(People v. Thurman (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 326, 329-30 , 472 N.E.2d 415 ; People v. Roberts (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 1, 14 , 387 N.E.2d 331 .) In Roberts, the court considered whether a definitional instruction for murder in an attempted murder case, which erroneously incorporated the alternative mental states of murder other than an intent to kill (see Ill.

2017The mere fact that a tent is ordinarily portable does not alter the fact that when the structure is erected and is in use as a habitat or shelter, it achieves a degree of permanence regardless of whether such use extends for a single night or for a longer period. *** Rather we conclude that the provision was intended to secure the person or property of a tent-dweller or camper in the use of his tent to the same extent it secures that of an owner in the use of his house, church or shop.” Id. at 75 .

2017The mere fact that a tent is ordinarily portable does not alter the fact that when the structure is erected and is in use as a habitat or shelter, it achieves a degree of permanence regardless of whether such use extends for a single night or for a longer period. *** Rather we conclude that the provision was intended to secure the person or property of a tent-dweller or camper in the use of his tent to the same extent it secures that of an owner in the use of his house, church or shop.” Id. at 75 We see no reason to depart from our rationale in Netznik in the present case and decline to conclu

2002As we have previously discussed, the definitional instruction is no longer “nonmandatory.” Third, the Carey court relied on People v. Koshiol, 45 Ill. 2d 573 , 262 N.E.2d 446 (1970), another “attempt” case.

2002As we have previously discussed, the definitional instruction is no longer “nonmandatory.” Third, the Carey court relied on People v. Koshiol, 45 Ill. 2d 573 , 262 N.E.2d 446 (1970), another “attempt” case.

1993(People v. Harris (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 16, 27 , 377 N.E.2d 28, 33 .) In this case, the jury was given a definitional instruction for murder, over defense counsel’s objection, that included alternative mental states.

1993(People v. Harris (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 16, 27 , 377 N.E.2d 28, 33 .) In this case, the jury was given a definitional instruction for murder, over defense counsel’s objection, that included alternative mental states.

2019The court noted that IPI instruction on involuntary manslaughter “specifically refers to the definitional instruction of ‘recklessness,’ which should accompany it.” Howard, 232 Ill.

1998Defendant cites People v. Howard, 232 Ill.

2018The court in Thurman found it insufficient that the phrase “without lawful justification” appeared in the definitional instruction for the offense, “for unless similar language appears in the issues instruction for that offense[,] a prudent juror could easily conclude that the absence of self-defense need not be found before returning a guilty verdict.” Thurman, 104 Ill. 2d at 331 .

2017The court in Thurman found it insufficient that the phrase "without lawful justification" appeared in the definitional instruction for the offense, "for unless similar language appears in the issues instruction for that offense[,] a prudent juror could easily conclude that the absence of self-defense need not be found before returning a guilty verdict." Thurman , 104 Ill. 2d at 331 , 84 Ill.Dec. 454 , 472 N.E.2d 414 .

2004It found no plain error because “the definitional instruction omitted was not so basic to the given instructions on solicitation and conspiracy that under the facts of this case the failure of the trial court to sua sponte give it resulted in an unfair trial.” Carey , 94 Ill.

2004It found no plain error because “the definitional instruction omitted was not so basic to the given instructions on solicitation and conspiracy that under the facts of this case the failure of the trial court to sua sponte give it resulted in an unfair trial.” Carey, 94 Ill.

2024Id. at 753 .

2024Id. at 753 . ¶ 40 A vital part of a trial is the trial court’s reading of instructions to the jury at the close of arguments.

2019The definitional instruction for aggravated kidnapping provided to the jury mirrored IPI Criminal 4th No. 8.04 and was as follows: “A person who kidnaps another commits the offense of aggravated kidnapping when he kidnaps for the purpose of obtaining ransom or he inflicts great bodily harm upon the victim or he does so while armed with a dangerous weapon.” The jury was not provided with the instruction for “kidnapping.” ¶ 45 We find the cases of People v. McClendon, 197 Ill.

2018The definitional instruction for aggravated kidnapping provided to the jury mirrored IPI Criminal No. 8.04 (approved Oct. 17, 2014) and was as follows: "A person who kidnaps another commits the offense of aggravated kidnapping when he kidnaps for the purpose of obtaining ransom or he inflicts great bodily harm upon the victim or he does so while armed with a dangerous weapon." The jury was not provided with the instruction for "kidnapping." ¶ 45 We find the cases of People v. McClendon , 197 Ill.

2018Similarly, the court in Getter remarked: “Where three of the four charged offenses included a self-defense instruction, but the remaining aggravated discharge instruction did not, a rational juror employing elementary rules of logic could—in fact, should—find that omission to be meaningful.” Getter, 2015 IL App (1st) 121307, ¶ 41 .

2017Similarly, the court in Getter remarked: "Where three of the four charged offenses included a self-defense instruction, but the remaining aggravated discharge instruction did not, a rational juror employing elementary rules of logic could-in fact, should-find that omission to be meaningful." Getter , 2015 IL App (1st) 121307 , ¶ 41, 389 Ill.Dec. 301 , 26 N.E.3d 391 .

2016People v. Watt, 2013 IL App (2d) 120183, ¶ 30 , 1 N.E.3d 1145 (citing Parker, 223 Ill. 2d at 501 , 861 N.E.2d at 939 ). ¶ 84 Here, defendant was charged with committing armed robbery while carrying a “firearm,” but the definitional instruction given to the jury discussed being armed with a “dangerous weapon.” See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 14.05 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter, IPI Criminal 4th No. 14.05) (noting that a “person commits the offense of armed robbery when he, while carrying on or about his person, or while otherwise armed with a dangerous weapon” takes property

2015People v. Watt, 2013 IL App (2d) 120183, ¶ 30 , 1 N.E.3d 1145 (citing Parker, 223 Ill. 2d at 501 , 861 N.E.2d at 939 ). ¶ 78 Here, defendant was charged with committing armed robbery while carrying a "firearm," but the definitional instruction given to the jury discussed being armed with a "dangerous weapon." See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 14.05 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter, IPI Criminal 4th No. 14.05) ("A person commits the offense of armed robbery when he, while carrying on or about his person, or is otherwise armed with a dangerous weapon ***.").

2016People v. Watt, 2013 IL App (2d) 120183, ¶ 30 , 1 N.E.3d 1145 (citing Parker, 223 Ill. 2d at 501 , 861 N.E.2d at 939 ). ¶ 84 Here, defendant was charged with committing armed robbery while carrying a “firearm,” but the definitional instruction given to the jury discussed being armed with a “dangerous weapon.” See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 14.05 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter, IPI Criminal 4th No. 14.05) (noting that a “person commits the offense of armed robbery when he, while carrying on or about his person, or while otherwise armed with a dangerous weapon” takes property

2016People v. Watt, 2013 IL App (2d) 120183, ¶ 30 , 1 N.E.3d 1145 (citing Parker, 223 Ill. 2d at 501 , 861 N.E.2d at 939 ). ¶ 84 Here, defendant was charged with committing armed robbery while carrying a “firearm,” but the definitional instruction given to the jury discussed being armed with a “dangerous weapon.” See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 14.05 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter, IPI Criminal 4th No. 14.05) (noting that a “person commits the offense of armed robbery when he, while carrying on or about his person, or while otherwise armed with a dangerous weapon” takes property

2016People v. Watt, 2013 IL App (2d) 120183, ¶ 30 , 1 N.E.3d 1145 (citing Parker, 223 Ill. 2d at 501 , 861 N.E.2d at 939 ). ¶ 84 Here, defendant was charged with committing armed robbery while carrying a “firearm,” but the definitional instruction given to the jury discussed being armed with a “dangerous weapon.” See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 14.05 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter, IPI Criminal 4th No. 14.05) (noting that a “person commits the offense of armed robbery when he, while carrying on or about his person, or while otherwise armed with a dangerous weapon” takes property

2015People v. Watt, 2013 IL App (2d) 120183, ¶ 30 , 1 N.E.3d 1145 (citing Parker, 223 Ill. 2d at 501 , 861 N.E.2d at 939 ). ¶ 78 Here, defendant was charged with committing armed robbery while carrying a "firearm," but the definitional instruction given to the jury discussed being armed with a "dangerous weapon." See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 14.05 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter, IPI Criminal 4th No. 14.05) ("A person commits the offense of armed robbery when he, while carrying on or about his person, or is otherwise armed with a dangerous weapon ***.").

2015“Very slight evidence upon a given theory of a case will justify the giving of an instruction.” Jones, 175 Ill. 2d at 132 (citing People v. Bratcher, 63 Ill. 2d 534, 540 (1976)). ¶ 83 Here, defendant offered slight evidence contesting whether codefendant committed the robbery with a firearm, which would justify the giving of the definitional instruction on firearms.

2015"Very slight - 37 - No. 1-12-3496 evidence upon a given theory of a case will justify the giving of an instruction." Jones, 175 Ill. 2d at 132 (citing People v. Bratcher, 63 Ill. 2d 534, 540 (1976)). ¶ 83 Here, defendant offered slight evidence contesting whether codefendant committed the robbery with a firearm, which would justify the giving of the definitional instruction on firearms.

2005App. 3d 252 , 555 N.E.2d 1055 (1990), for the proposition that it was not error to refuse a definitional instruction for the term “highest degree of care.” The Lockett instruction given, however, did not include the word “negligence,” while the given instruction in the instant case does.

2005The majority relies on our opinion in Lockett v. Board of Education for School District No. 189, 198 Ill.App.3d 252 , 144 Ill.Dec. 536 , 555 N.E.2d 1055 (1990), for the proposition that it was not error to refuse a definitional instruction for the term "highest degree of care." The Lockett instruction given, however, did not include the word "negligence," while the given instruction in the instant case does.

2003See People v. Carlson , 79 Ill. 2d 564, 584-85 , 404 N.E.2d 233 (1980); People v. Lake , 298 Ill.

2003See People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564, 584-85 , 404 N.E.2d 233 (1980); People v. Lake, 298 Ill.

2000He compares the error in this case to the one committed by the trial court in People v. Jenkins, 69 Ill. 2d 61, 63 , 370 N.E.2d 532 (1977), where the Illinois Supreme Court held defendant was denied a fair trial because the jury was given contradictory issues instructions.

2000He compares the error in this case to the one committed by the trial court in People v. Jenkins, 69 Ill. 2d 61, 63 , 370 N.E.2d 532 (1977), where the Illinois Supreme Court held defendant was denied a fair trial because the jury was given contradictory issues instructions.

1981(People v. Harris (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 16 , 377 N.E.2d 28 ; People v. Trinkle (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 198 , 369 N.E.2d 888 .) As we have discussed, the jury in this case was informed in the definitional instruction for attempt murder that proof of defendant’s “intent to kill” was required, yet was also told in the issue instruction that “intent to commit murder” need be proven.

1981(People v. Harris (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 16 , 377 N.E.2d 28 ; People v. Trinkle (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 198 , 369 N.E.2d 888 .) As we have discussed, the jury in this case was informed in the definitional instruction for attempt murder that proof of defendant’s “intent to kill” was required, yet was also told in the issue instruction that “intent to commit murder” need be proven.

1987Mette v. Feltgen (1894), 148 Ill. 357 , 36 N.E. 81 ; Tak Cheong Hau v. Moyer (N.D.

1987Mette v. Feltgen (1894), 148 Ill. 357 , 36 N.E. 81 ; Tak Cheong Hau v. Moyer (N.D.

1982The court initially noted that in People v. Davis (1966), 74 Ill.

1981App. 3d 677 , 373 N.E.2d 694 , and People v. Davis (1966), 74 Ill.

1982App. 3d 669, 682 , aff'd (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 300 , the trial court failed to give an instruction delineating the elements of rape although it had given the definitional instruction of rape.

1977This was brought out in People v. Jones, 60 Ill. 2d 300 , 325 N.E.2d 601 , which stated: “The manner of instructing which is written into IPI-Criminal is that each offense is defined twice.