definitional standard in New Jersey

1998See People Express, supra, 100 N.J. at 260, 262, 263 , 495 A. 2d 107 ; see also Clohesy, supra, 149 N.J. at 513 , 694 A. 2d 1017 (holding that liability can be imposed on supermarket for failing to provide security in its parking lot as long as "specificity and strictness [ ] are infused into the definitional standard of foreseeability") (internal quotation and citation omitted); Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 109 , 642 A. 2d 372 (1994) (determining that it was appropriate to allow unmarried cohabitant to recover against defendant motorist under theory of bystander liability because she repres

1998See People Express, supra, 100 N.J. at 260, 262, 263 , 495 A. 2d 107 ; see also Clohesy, supra, 149 N.J. at 513 , 694 A. 2d 1017 (holding that liability can be imposed on supermarket for failing to provide security in its parking lot as long as "specificity and strictness [ ] are infused into the definitional standard of foreseeability") (internal quotation and citation omitted); Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 109 , 642 A. 2d 372 (1994) (determining that it was appropriate to allow unmarried cohabitant to recover against defendant motorist under theory of bystander liability because she repres

1998See People Express, supra, 100 N.J. at 260, 262, 263 , 495 A. 2d 107 ; see also Clohesy, supra, 149 N.J. at 513 , 694 A. 2d 1017 (holding that liability can be imposed on supermarket for failing to provide security in its parking lot as long as "specificity and strictness [ ] are infused into the definitional standard of foreseeability") (internal quotation and citation omitted); Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 109 , 642 A. 2d 372 (1994) (determining that it was appropriate to allow unmarried cohabitant to recover against defendant motorist under theory of bystander liability because she repres

1998See People Express, supra, 100 N.J. at 260, 262, 263 , 495 A. 2d 107 ; see also Clohesy, supra, 149 N.J. at 513 , 694 A. 2d 1017 (holding that liability can be imposed on supermarket for failing to provide security in its parking lot as long as "specificity and strictness [ ] are infused into the definitional standard of foreseeability") (internal quotation and citation omitted); Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 109 , 642 A. 2d 372 (1994) (determining that it was appropriate to allow unmarried cohabitant to recover against defendant motorist under theory of bystander liability because she repres

1998See People Express, supra, 100 N.J. at 260, 262, 263 , 495 A. 2d 107 ; see also Clohesy, supra, 149 N.J. at 513 , 694 A. 2d 1017 (holding that liability can be imposed on supermarket for failing to provide security in its parking lot as long as "specificity and strictness [ ] are infused into the definitional standard of foreseeability") (internal quotation and citation omitted); Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 109 , 642 A. 2d 372 (1994) (determining that it was appropriate to allow unmarried cohabitant to recover against defendant motorist under theory of bystander liability because she repres

1998See People Express, supra, 100 N.J. at 260, 262, 263 , 495 A. 2d 107 ; see also Clohesy, supra, 149 N.J. at 513 , 694 A. 2d 1017 (holding that liability can be imposed on supermarket for failing to provide security in its parking lot as long as "specificity and strictness [ ] are infused into the definitional standard of foreseeability") (internal quotation and citation omitted); Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 109 , 642 A. 2d 372 (1994) (determining that it was appropriate to allow unmarried cohabitant to recover against defendant motorist under theory of bystander liability because she repres

1980The Appellate Division below also believed that a threshold in this amount would accomplish a constitutionally sound result. 155 N.J.Super. at 231.

1980The Appellate Division below also believed that a threshold in this amount would accomplish a constitutionally sound result. 155 N.J.

2023Importantly however, the court’s examination must be “based not on the absence of factors found in prior judicial decision, but rather on the presence of unique contact that distinguish the instant case and indicate a taxable presence . . . , it is not only a quantitative but also a qualitative examination of the nature and extent of plaintiff's business activities that determines if the definitional factors of ‘doing business’ have been met.” Id. at 33-34 .

2010Rather, it is only by close scrutiny of all the facts of the case, taken as a whole, that a final determination can be made.” Thomson-Leeds Co. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 8 N.J.Tax 24, 32 (Tax 1985)(citing Ringgold Coal Mining Co. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 4 N.J.Tax 321, 332 (Tax 1982)). “[I]t is not only a quantitative but also a qualitative examination of the nature and extent of plaintiffs business activities that determines if the definitional factors of ‘doing business’ have been met.” Thomson-Leeds Co., supra, 8 N.J.Tax at 34 .

2010Rather, it is only by close scrutiny of all the facts of the case, taken as a whole, that a final determination can be made.” Thomson-Leeds Co. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 8 N.J.Tax 24, 32 (Tax 1985)(citing Ringgold Coal Mining Co. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 4 N.J.Tax 321, 332 (Tax 1982)). “[I]t is not only a quantitative but also a qualitative examination of the nature and extent of plaintiffs business activities that determines if the definitional factors of ‘doing business’ have been met.” Thomson-Leeds Co., supra, 8 N.J.Tax at 34 .

1994Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 6 N.J.Tax 547, 553 (Tax 1984) (“The broad language employed in § 6 demonstrates that the Legislature did not wish to deal with the details of this provision, but instead left to the Director the task of establishing the definitional framework with which to implement allocation.”).

1987This portion of the analysis is “attended by considerations of ‘fairness and fulfillment of reasonable expectations in light of constitutional and common law goals.’ ” Davis, supra, 68 N.J. at 81 (quoting State v. Currie, 41 N.J. 531, 539 (1964)).

1987However, this Court has rejected a mechanical application of the definitional analysis, requiring an additional, more flexible inquiry “focuspng] on the episodic fragments of the events.” Truglia, supra, 97 N.J. at 521; accord Mirault, supra, 92 N.J. at 501 ; Davis, supra, 68 N.J. at 81 .

1987However, this Court has rejected a mechanical application of the definitional analysis, requiring an additional, more flexible inquiry “focuspng] on the episodic fragments of the events.” Truglia, supra, 97 N.J. at 521; accord Mirault, supra, 92 N.J. at 501 ; Davis, supra, 68 N.J. at 81 .

1987However, this Court has rejected a mechanical application of the definitional analysis, requiring an additional, more flexible inquiry “focuspng] on the episodic fragments of the events.” Truglia, supra, 97 N.J. at 521; accord Mirault, supra, 92 N.J. at 501 ; Davis, supra, 68 N.J. at 81 .

1987However, this Court has rejected a mechanical application of the definitional analysis, requiring an additional, more flexible inquiry “focuspng] on the episodic fragments of the events.” Truglia, supra, 97 N.J. at 521; accord Mirault, supra, 92 N.J. at 501 ; Davis, supra, 68 N.J. at 81 .

1985"When words used in a statute have previously received judicial construction, the Legislature will be deemed to be using them in the sense that has been ascribed to them." In re Estate of Posey, 89 N.J.