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16 California opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lawson v. Lowengartgreen2 sentences1978In Lawson v. Lowengart, 251 Cal.App.2d 98, 110 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 186 ], it was said, “The actual or symbolic delivery of the securities was essential to complete the inter vivos trust.” (See also Beebe v. Coffin, 153 Cal. 174, 177-178 [ 94 P. 766 ].) Within this definitional framework, the nature of the deposit here made must be examined. 1978In Lawson v. Lowengart, 251 Cal.App.2d 98, 110 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 186 ], it was said, “The actual or symbolic delivery of the securities was essential to complete the inter vivos trust.” (See also Beebe v. Coffin, 153 Cal. 174, 177-178 [ 94 P. 766 ].) Within this definitional framework, the nature of the deposit here made must be examined. | 2 | 2 |
Beebe v. Coffingreen2 sentences1978In Lawson v. Lowengart, 251 Cal.App.2d 98, 110 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 186 ], it was said, “The actual or symbolic delivery of the securities was essential to complete the inter vivos trust.” (See also Beebe v. Coffin, 153 Cal. 174, 177-178 [ 94 P. 766 ].) Within this definitional framework, the nature of the deposit here made must be examined. 1978In Lawson v. Lowengart, 251 Cal.App.2d 98, 110 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 186 ], it was said, “The actual or symbolic delivery of the securities was essential to complete the inter vivos trust.” (See also Beebe v. Coffin, 153 Cal. 174, 177-178 [ 94 P. 766 ].) Within this definitional framework, the nature of the deposit here made must be examined. | 2 | 2 |
Cheal v. El Camino Hospitalgreen1 sentence2015As this court has previously noted, evidence of a statement whose proponent contends that the statement was false when made simply cannot satisfy the definitional requirement for a hearsay objection, i.e., that the statement be “offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.” (See Cheal v. EI Camino Hospital (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 736, 747, fn.6 [error to exclude as hearsay plaintiff’s account of supervisor’s assertedly false accusation: “A statement offered for such a purpose can never offend the rule against hearsay.”].) Since this applies to all of the statements on which 24/7 relies to e | 1 | 1 |
People v. Brasuregreen1 sentence2012Defendant’s second penalty phase retrial began on January 19, 1999. 7 In March 2000, the language of the lying-in-wait special circumstance was changed to delete the word “while” and substitute the phrase “by means of.” (Stats. 1998, ch. 629, § 2, pp. 4163, 4165; see People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 512, fn. 25 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 181 P.3d 947 ].) 8 Because the words “aggravating” and “mitigating” are commonly understood terms, a definitional instruction is not required. {People v. Brasure, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1066.) 9 The trial court instructed: “You shall now retire and select o | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2012Defendant’s second penalty phase retrial began on January 19, 1999. 7 In March 2000, the language of the lying-in-wait special circumstance was changed to delete the word “while” and substitute the phrase “by means of.” (Stats. 1998, ch. 629, § 2, pp. 4163, 4165; see People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 512, fn. 25 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 181 P.3d 947 ].) 8 Because the words “aggravating” and “mitigating” are commonly understood terms, a definitional instruction is not required. {People v. Brasure, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1066.) 9 The trial court instructed: “You shall now retire and select o 2012Defendant’s second penalty phase retrial began on January 19, 1999. 7 In March 2000, the language of the lying-in-wait special circumstance was changed to delete the word “while” and substitute the phrase “by means of.” (Stats. 1998, ch. 629, § 2, pp. 4163, 4165; see People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 512, fn. 25 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 , 181 P.3d 947 ].) 8 Because the words “aggravating” and “mitigating” are commonly understood terms, a definitional instruction is not required. {People v. Brasure, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1066.) 9 The trial court instructed: “You shall now retire and select o | 1 | 1 |
Maupin v. Widlinggreen2 sentences2010In analyzing which proximate cause instruction should have been given, we concluded that CALJIC Nos. 3.40 and 3.41 both correctly define proximate causation and, because the evidence suggested more than one cause of death, the trial court should have given an instruction similar to CALJIC No. 3.41 along with an instruction such as CALJIC No. 3.40. ( Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 335-338; see also People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135 ] [there was no merit to the claim that giving both CALJIC Nos. 3.40 and 3.41 in the same case improperly lessened the prosecution 2010In analyzing which proximate cause instruction should have been given, we concluded that CALJIC Nos. 3.40 and 3.41 both correctly define proximate causation and, because the evidence suggested more than one cause of death, the trial court should have given an instruction similar to CALJIC No. 3.41 along with an instruction such as CALJIC No. 3.40. ( Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 335-338; see also People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135 ] [there was no merit to the claim that giving both CALJIC Nos. 3.40 and 3.41 in the same case improperly lessened the prosecution | 1 | 1 |
People v. Autrygreen2 sentences2010In analyzing which proximate cause instruction should have been given, we concluded that CALJIC Nos. 3.40 and 3.41 both correctly define proximate causation and, because the evidence suggested more than one cause of death, the trial court should have given an instruction similar to CALJIC No. 3.41 along with an instruction such as CALJIC No. 3.40. ( Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 335-338; see also People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135 ] [there was no merit to the claim that giving both CALJIC Nos. 3.40 and 3.41 in the same case improperly lessened the prosecution 2010In analyzing which proximate cause instruction should have been given, we concluded that CALJIC Nos. 3.40 and 3.41 both correctly define proximate causation and, because the evidence suggested more than one cause of death, the trial court should have given an instruction similar to CALJIC No. 3.41 along with an instruction such as CALJIC No. 3.40. ( Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 335-338; see also People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135 ] [there was no merit to the claim that giving both CALJIC Nos. 3.40 and 3.41 in the same case improperly lessened the prosecution | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Gonzalesgreen2 sentences2010In analyzing which proximate cause instruction should have been given, we concluded that CALJIC Nos. 3.40 and 3.41 both correctly define proximate causation and, because the evidence suggested more than one cause of death, the trial court should have given an instruction similar to CALJIC No. 3.41 along with an instruction such as CALJIC No. 3.40. ( Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 335-338; see also People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135 ] [there was no merit to the claim that giving both CALJIC Nos. 3.40 and 3.41 in the same case improperly lessened the prosecution 2010In analyzing which proximate cause instruction should have been given, we concluded that CALJIC Nos. 3.40 and 3.41 both correctly define proximate causation and, because the evidence suggested more than one cause of death, the trial court should have given an instruction similar to CALJIC No. 3.41 along with an instruction such as CALJIC No. 3.40. ( Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 335-338; see also People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 363 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135 ] [there was no merit to the claim that giving both CALJIC Nos. 3.40 and 3.41 in the same case improperly lessened the prosecution | 1 | 1 |
Fare v. Tony C.green2 sentences1987The California Supreme Court has found a detention whenever an officer accosts an individual on suspicion that the person “may be personally involved in some criminal activity . . . .” (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 895 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 366 , 582 P.2d 957 ].) More recently, the California Supreme Court in Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 790 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 671 , 670 P.2d 325 ], adopted the definitional standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544 [ 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 ]: “[A] person has been ‘seiz 1987The California Supreme Court has found a detention whenever an officer accosts an individual on suspicion that the person “may be personally involved in some criminal activity . . . .” (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 895 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 366 , 582 P.2d 957 ].) More recently, the California Supreme Court in Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 790 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 671 , 670 P.2d 325 ], adopted the definitional standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544 [ 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 ]: “[A] person has been ‘seiz | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1987The California Supreme Court has found a detention whenever an officer accosts an individual on suspicion that the person “may be personally involved in some criminal activity . . . .” (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 895 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 366 , 582 P.2d 957 ].) More recently, the California Supreme Court in Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 790 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 671 , 670 P.2d 325 ], adopted the definitional standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544 [ 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 ]: “[A] person has been ‘seiz 1987The California Supreme Court has found a detention whenever an officer accosts an individual on suspicion that the person “may be personally involved in some criminal activity . . . .” (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 895 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 366 , 582 P.2d 957 ].) More recently, the California Supreme Court in Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 790 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 671 , 670 P.2d 325 ], adopted the definitional standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544 [ 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 ]: “[A] person has been ‘seiz | 1 | 1 |
Freeman v. Hewitgreen2 sentences1986I, § 8, cl. 3.) As the United States Supreme Court has long emphasized, “‘[t]he Commerce Clause, even without implementing legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the power of the States.’” (Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n (1977) 429 U.S. 318, 328 [ 50 L.Ed.2d 514, 523 , 97 S.Ct. 599 ], quoting Freeman v. Hewit (1946) 329 U.S. 249, 252 [ 91 L.Ed. 265, 271 , 67 S.Ct. 274 ].) In this respect, the commerce clause resembles the supremacy clause in that it, albeit indirectly, “defines the relative powers of states and the federal government.” (Gianturco, supra, 457 F.Supp. at p. 290 1986I, § 8, cl. 3.) As the United States Supreme Court has long emphasized, “‘[t]he Commerce Clause, even without implementing legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the power of the States.’” (Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n (1977) 429 U.S. 318, 328 [ 50 L.Ed.2d 514, 523 , 97 S.Ct. 599 ], quoting Freeman v. Hewit (1946) 329 U.S. 249, 252 [ 91 L.Ed. 265, 271 , 67 S.Ct. 274 ].) In this respect, the commerce clause resembles the supremacy clause in that it, albeit indirectly, “defines the relative powers of states and the federal government.” (Gianturco, supra, 457 F.Supp. at p. 290 | 1 | 1 |
Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commissiongreen2 sentences1986I, § 8, cl. 3.) As the United States Supreme Court has long emphasized, “‘[t]he Commerce Clause, even without implementing legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the power of the States.’” (Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n (1977) 429 U.S. 318, 328 [ 50 L.Ed.2d 514, 523 , 97 S.Ct. 599 ], quoting Freeman v. Hewit (1946) 329 U.S. 249, 252 [ 91 L.Ed. 265, 271 , 67 S.Ct. 274 ].) In this respect, the commerce clause resembles the supremacy clause in that it, albeit indirectly, “defines the relative powers of states and the federal government.” (Gianturco, supra, 457 F.Supp. at p. 290 1986I, § 8, cl. 3.) As the United States Supreme Court has long emphasized, “‘[t]he Commerce Clause, even without implementing legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the power of the States.’” (Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n (1977) 429 U.S. 318, 328 [ 50 L.Ed.2d 514, 523 , 97 S.Ct. 599 ], quoting Freeman v. Hewit (1946) 329 U.S. 249, 252 [ 91 L.Ed. 265, 271 , 67 S.Ct. 274 ].) In this respect, the commerce clause resembles the supremacy clause in that it, albeit indirectly, “defines the relative powers of states and the federal government.” (Gianturco, supra, 457 F.Supp. at p. 290 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Roberts v. Ford Aerospace and Communications Corp.green2 sentences1991But see Roberts v. Ford Aerospace & Communications Corp. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 793, 804 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 139 ].) Southwest requested a definitional instruction which closely resembled the definition of “clear and convincing” which, in Weaver, this court stated should be given. 1991But see Roberts v. Ford Aerospace & Communications Corp. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 793, 804 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 139 ].) Southwest requested a definitional instruction which closely resembled the definition of “clear and convincing” which, in Weaver, this court stated should be given. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Cain
green
1 sentence2026For the same reason, defendant’s related claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to request a definitional instruction is also unavailing.” (People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 44 .) So too here. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Lopez
green
2 sentences2025B.L. asserts that that condition “lacks sufficient detail to provide [him] with fair warning of what activities are prohibited.” B.L.’s assertion is unavailing because he fails to recognize the definitional framework provided by condition No. 26 for “the words gang and gang-related activity.” Considering condition No. 21 together with condition No. 26, we conclude condition No. 21 is not unconstitutionally vague with respect to its restrictions on B.L.’s participation in “any gang activity” and his visits to “an area of gang-related activity.” (See In re Oswaldo R. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 409 , 2025B.L. asserts that that condition “lacks sufficient detail to provide [him] with fair warning of what activities are prohibited.” B.L.’s assertion is unavailing because he fails to recognize the definitional framework provided by condition No. 26 for “the words gang and gang-related activity.” Considering condition No. 21 together with condition No. 26, we conclude condition No. 21 is not unconstitutionally vague with respect to its restrictions on B.L.’s participation in “any gang activity” and his visits to “an area of gang-related activity.” (See In re Oswaldo R. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 409 , | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Oswaldo R.
green
1 sentence2025B.L. asserts that that condition “lacks sufficient detail to provide [him] with fair warning of what activities are prohibited.” B.L.’s assertion is unavailing because he fails to recognize the definitional framework provided by condition No. 26 for “the words gang and gang-related activity.” Considering condition No. 21 together with condition No. 26, we conclude condition No. 21 is not unconstitutionally vague with respect to its restrictions on B.L.’s participation in “any gang activity” and his visits to “an area of gang-related activity.” (See In re Oswaldo R. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 409 , | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc.
green
1 sentence2021Plaintiffs’ Causes of Action Treat Salesforce as a Publisher or Speaker of Information Provided by Someone Other than Salesforce Having determined that the Second Amended Complaint alleges that Salesforce is the provider of an interactive computer service, we must now consider whether the alleged causes of action treat Salesforce as the publisher or speaker of information provided by another information content provider, as required for immunity under section 230(c)(1). ( Delfino, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at pp. 804-805.) Here, the plaintiffs allege they were injured by online advertising, place | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc.
green
1 sentence2021Plaintiffs allege Salesforce provided Backpage with software that included tools that allowed Backpage to “contact and procure customers,” “identif[y] and categoriz[e] sales opportunities,” “gather[ ] and manag[e] information from Backpage’s traffickers and pimps’ public social media activity,” and “collect[ ] and manag[e] traffickers’ and pimps’ data across multiple sources and channels.” (SAC ¶¶ 147, 150.) In other words, plaintiffs allege that Salesforce is “a provider of . . . enabling tools that . . . transmit, receive, display, forward . . . search, . . . organize, [or] reorganize . . . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Brown v. Smith
green
1 sentence2020And while he admits he had no objection to the wording of CACI No. 418, Teed asserts the trial court should have clarified the accompanying instruction defining “contractor” by giving his proposed Special Jury Instruction No. 2, entitled, “Construction managers are not required to be licensed under California law.” The trial court did not err in rejecting Teed’s proposed definition of “contractor.” 23 “In general, ‘[i]nstructions in the language of a statute should only be given “ ‘if the jury would have no difficulty in understanding the statute without guidance from the court.’ ” [Citations. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Quang Minh Tran
green
1 sentence2013Ruiz argues such an objection would have succeeded, and that, absent the evidence of his prior offense, the result of his second trial would have been more favorable. 11 The court’s subsequent instructions to the jury included an instruction that the gang enhancement required proof of a pattern of criminal gang activity, and included this definitional instruction: “A pattern of criminal gang activity, as used here, means . . . [¶] [t]he commission of or conviction of: (1) assault with a semiautomatic firearm in violation of Penal Code section 245, (2) prohibited possession of a firearm as set | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Kirkpatrick
green
2 sentences2008As we have previously held, however, such a definitional instruction is not required for these commonly understood terms. ( People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1018 , 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818 , 874 P.2d 248 ; People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 55 , 252 Cal.Rptr. 525 , 762 P.2d 1249 .) Because the trial court's choice of its own instruction over CALJIC No. 8.88 did not result in the jurors being misled as to their sentencing discretion and responsibility, we also reject defendant's claim the court's instruction denied him his rights under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U 2008As we have previously held, however, such a definitional instruction is not required for these commonly understood terms. ( People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1018 , 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818 , 874 P.2d 248 ; People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 55 , 252 Cal.Rptr. 525 , 762 P.2d 1249 .) Because the trial court's choice of its own instruction over CALJIC No. 8.88 did not result in the jurors being misled as to their sentencing discretion and responsibility, we also reject defendant's claim the court's instruction denied him his rights under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U | 1 | 2008–2008 |
People v. Malone
green
2 sentences2008As we have previously held, however, such a definitional instruction is not required for these commonly understood terms. ( People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1018 , 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818 , 874 P.2d 248 ; People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 55 , 252 Cal.Rptr. 525 , 762 P.2d 1249 .) Because the trial court's choice of its own instruction over CALJIC No. 8.88 did not result in the jurors being misled as to their sentencing discretion and responsibility, we also reject defendant's claim the court's instruction denied him his rights under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U 2008As we have previously held, however, such a definitional instruction is not required for these commonly understood terms. ( People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1018 , 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818 , 874 P.2d 248 ; People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 55 , 252 Cal.Rptr. 525 , 762 P.2d 1249 .) Because the trial court's choice of its own instruction over CALJIC No. 8.88 did not result in the jurors being misled as to their sentencing discretion and responsibility, we also reject defendant's claim the court's instruction denied him his rights under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Quigley v. Pet, Inc.
green
1 sentence1991There is no credible or persuasive California authority which supports a Seaman's cause of action on either the first or third of these examples. [21] As noted, we have previously expressed a similar view. ( Careau, supra, 222 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1397-1398, fn. 22.) [22] Radell, involving a dispute between partners, noted that there was an apparent split of authority (between Quigley v. Pet, Inc., supra, 162 Cal. App.3d 877 and Multiplex Ins. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Livermore v. Waite
green
1 sentence1991A “revision” denotes a change that is qualitatively or quantitatively extensive, affecting the “underlying principles upon which [the Constitution] rests” or the “substantial entirety of the instrument.” (Livermore v. Waite, supra, 102 Cal. at p. 118 .) By contrast, an “amendment” denotes a change that is qualitatively and quantitatively limited, making a modification “within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better cany out the purpose for which it was framed.” (Id. at pp. 118-119.) 2 I now turn to the question whether Proposition 140 amounts to an unconst | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Forte
green
2 sentences1989(Id., at p. 135.) The Court of Appeal concluded that CALJIC Nos. 3.01, 14.50, and 3.31 do not adequately inform the jury of the necessary elements for convicting the defendant as an aider and abettor to burglary. (190 Cal.App.3d at pp. 135, 137.) Specifically, the court noted that CALJIC No. 3.01 is “the source of the ambiguity” (id., at p. 137) because it “does not inform the jury when the ‘commission’ of the burglary is over; it does not say at what point the putative aider and abettor must gain the knowledge of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose.” (Id., at p. 135.) When given with CALJIC No 1989(Id., at p. 135.) The Court of Appeal concluded that CALJIC Nos. 3.01, 14.50, and 3.31 do not adequately inform the jury of the necessary elements for convicting the defendant as an aider and abettor to burglary. (190 Cal.App.3d at pp. 135, 137.) Specifically, the court noted that CALJIC No. 3.01 is “the source of the ambiguity” (id., at p. 137) because it “does not inform the jury when the ‘commission’ of the burglary is over; it does not say at what point the putative aider and abettor must gain the knowledge of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose.” (Id., at p. 135.) When given with CALJIC No | 1 | 1989–1989 |
United States v. Mendenhall
green
2 sentences1987The California Supreme Court has found a detention whenever an officer accosts an individual on suspicion that the person “may be personally involved in some criminal activity . . . .” (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 895 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 366 , 582 P.2d 957 ].) More recently, the California Supreme Court in Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 790 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 671 , 670 P.2d 325 ], adopted the definitional standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544 [ 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 ]: “[A] person has been ‘seiz 1987The California Supreme Court has found a detention whenever an officer accosts an individual on suspicion that the person “may be personally involved in some criminal activity . . . .” (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 895 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 366 , 582 P.2d 957 ].) More recently, the California Supreme Court in Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 790 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 671 , 670 P.2d 325 ], adopted the definitional standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544 [ 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 ]: “[A] person has been ‘seiz | 1 | 1987–1987 |
San Diego Unified Port District v. Gianturco
green
2 sentences1986I, § 8, cl. 3.) As the United States Supreme Court has long emphasized, “‘[t]he Commerce Clause, even without implementing legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the power of the States.’” (Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n (1977) 429 U.S. 318, 328 [ 50 L.Ed.2d 514, 523 , 97 S.Ct. 599 ], quoting Freeman v. Hewit (1946) 329 U.S. 249, 252 [ 91 L.Ed. 265, 271 , 67 S.Ct. 274 ].) In this respect, the commerce clause resembles the supremacy clause in that it, albeit indirectly, “defines the relative powers of states and the federal government.” (Gianturco, supra, 457 F.Supp. at p. 290 1986I, § 8, cl. 3.) (5) As the United States Supreme Court has long emphasized, "`[t]he Commerce Clause, even without implementing legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the power of the States.'" ( Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n (1977) 429 U.S. 318, 328 [ 50 L.Ed.2d 514, 523 , 97 S.Ct. 599 ], quoting Freeman v. Hewit (1946) 329 U.S. 249, 252 [ 91 L.Ed. 265, 271 , 67 S.Ct. 274 ].) In this respect, the commerce clause resembles the supremacy clause in that it, albeit indirectly, "defines the relative powers of states and the federal government." ( Gianturco, supra, 457 F. Supp. at | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.