definitional analysis in Virginia

2009Though McMillan testified that he carried the knife for protection, this statement does not change the physical characteristics of the knife he possessed or its method of operation such that it becomes a weapon. 4 See Thompson, 277 Va. at 291 , 673 S.E.2d at 474 (stating that “as we explained in Farrakhan , ‘[subsequent use or circumstances may not be considered in the definitional analysis of “weapon.” ’ ” (citation omitted)).

2009Though McMillan testified that he carried the knife for protection, this statement does not change the physical characteristics of the knife he possessed or its method of operation such that it becomes a weapon. 4 See Thompson, 277 Va. at 291 , 673 S.E.2d at 474 (stating that “as we explained in Farrakhan , ‘[subsequent use or circumstances may not be considered in the definitional analysis of “weapon.” ’ ” (citation omitted)).

2009Because the “[subsequent use or circumstances may not be considered in the definitional analysis of [a] ‘weapon,’ ” Farrakhan, 273 Va. at 182 , 639 S.E.2d at 230 , we must, therefore, continue to engage in an ad hoc comparison of the knife in question with weapons that are today primarily found in museums and knife collections.

2009Because the “[subsequent use or circumstances may not be considered in the definitional analysis of [a] ‘weapon,’ ” Farrakhan, 273 Va. at 182 , 639 S.E.2d at 230 , we must, therefore, continue to engage in an ad hoc comparison of the knife in question with weapons that are today primarily found in museums and knife collections.

2016This Court will “interpret statutory language, whenever possible, to avoid rendering other statutory language superfluous.” Epps v. Commonwealth, 59 Va.App. 71, 80 , 717 S.E.2d 151, 155 (2011) (citing Cook v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 111, 114 , 597 S.E.2d 84, 86 (2004); Zhou v. Zhou, 38 Va.App. 126, 136 , 562 S.E.2d 336, 340 (2002) (basic canons of statutory construction proscribe interpreting statutory language in a way that renders other statutory language superfluous)).

2016This Court will “interpret statutory language, whenever possible, to avoid rendering other statutory language superfluous.” Epps v. Commonwealth, 59 Va.App. 71, 80 , 717 S.E.2d 151, 155 (2011) (citing Cook v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 111, 114 , 597 S.E.2d 84, 86 (2004); Zhou v. Zhou, 38 Va.App. 126, 136 , 562 S.E.2d 336, 340 (2002) (basic canons of statutory construction proscribe interpreting statutory language in a way that renders other statutory language superfluous)).

2016This Court will “interpret statutory language, whenever possible, to avoid rendering other statutory language superfluous.” Epps v. Commonwealth, 59 Va.App. 71, 80 , 717 S.E.2d 151, 155 (2011) (citing Cook v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 111, 114 , 597 S.E.2d 84, 86 (2004); Zhou v. Zhou, 38 Va.App. 126, 136 , 562 S.E.2d 336, 340 (2002) (basic canons of statutory construction proscribe interpreting statutory language in a way that renders other statutory language superfluous)).

2016This Court will “interpret statutory language, whenever possible, to avoid rendering other statutory language superfluous.” Epps v. Commonwealth, 59 Va.App. 71, 80 , 717 S.E.2d 151, 155 (2011) (citing Cook v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 111, 114 , 597 S.E.2d 84, 86 (2004); Zhou v. Zhou, 38 Va.App. 126, 136 , 562 S.E.2d 336, 340 (2002) (basic canons of statutory construction proscribe interpreting statutory language in a way that renders other statutory language superfluous)).

2016This Court will “interpret statutory language, whenever possible, to avoid rendering other statutory language superfluous.” Epps v. Commonwealth, 59 Va.App. 71, 80 , 717 S.E.2d 151, 155 (2011) (citing Cook v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 111, 114 , 597 S.E.2d 84, 86 (2004); Zhou v. Zhou, 38 Va.App. 126, 136 , 562 S.E.2d 336, 340 (2002) (basic canons of statutory construction proscribe interpreting statutory language in a way that renders other statutory language superfluous)).

2016This Court will “interpret statutory language, whenever possible, to avoid rendering other statutory language superfluous.” Epps v. Commonwealth, 59 Va.App. 71, 80 , 717 S.E.2d 151, 155 (2011) (citing Cook v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 111, 114 , 597 S.E.2d 84, 86 (2004); Zhou v. Zhou, 38 Va.App. 126, 136 , 562 S.E.2d 336, 340 (2002) (basic canons of statutory construction proscribe interpreting statutory language in a way that renders other statutory language superfluous)).

2009In doing so, I am concerned that we are forgetting that a “statute or ordinance [must] be sufficiently precise and definite to give fair warning to an actor that contemplated conduct is criminal.” Tanner v. City of Virginia Beach, 277 Va. 432, 439 , 674 S.E.2d 848, 852 (2009) (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 , 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)).

2009In doing so, I am concerned that we are forgetting that a “statute or ordinance [must] be sufficiently precise and definite to give fair warning to an actor that contemplated conduct is criminal.” Tanner v. City of Virginia Beach, 277 Va. 432, 439 , 674 S.E.2d 848, 852 (2009) (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 , 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858 , 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 , 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)).

2005In discharging his obligation to give “appropriate instructions telling the jury the law applicable to . . . the case,” the judge must be mindful that “each party may employ language of its own choosing so long as it ‘is in keeping with the law.’” Banner v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 640, 645-46 , 133 S.E.2d 305, 309 (1963).

2005In discharging his obligation to give “appropriate instructions telling the jury the law applicable to . . . the case,” the judge must be mindful that “each party may employ language of its own choosing so long as it ‘is in keeping with the law.’” Banner v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 640, 645-46 , 133 S.E.2d 305, 309 (1963).

2004Under this test, if the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with the whole situation as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment, then it arises ‘out of the employment.” Id. at 335 , 196 S.E. at 686 (citation omitted).

2004Under this test, if the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with the whole situation as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment, then it arises ‘out of the employment.” Id. at 335 , 196 S.E. at 686 (citation omitted).

1986Cf. Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201, 211 , 257 S.E.2d 784, 790-91 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980).

1977Similarly, in United States v. Pui Kan Lam, 483 F.2d 1202, 1206 (2d Cir. 1973), the court stated that the statutory definition of “oral communication,” with its requirement of justifiable expectation of noninterception, “tracks” the Fourth Amendment 4 concept of right to privacy.