definitional instruction in Texas

2025See 28 S.W.3d 570 , 573 29 In Geesa v. State, this Court determined that a defendant was entitled to “a full definitional instruction to the jury on reasonable doubt” and expressly adopted a six-paragraph instruction to be “submitted to the jury in all criminal cases, even in the absence of an objection or request by the State or the defendant.” 820 S.W.2d 154, 162 (Tex. Crim.

2021App. 2015) (holding that trial court erred by giving jury-charge instructions that defined terms “penetration” and “female sexual organ” in prosecution for aggravated sexual assault of child). 6 In Geesa v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that a defendant was entitled to “a full definitional instruction to the jury on reasonable doubt” and expressly adopted a six-paragraph instruction to be “submitted to the jury in all criminal cases, even in the absence of an objection or request by the State or the defendant.” 820 S.W.2d 154, 162 (Tex. Crim.

2007See Colbert v. State , 108 S.W.3d 316, 318 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003).

2007See Colbert v. State , 108 S.W.3d 316, 318 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003).

2003However, if both the State and the defense were to agree to give the Geesa instruction to the jury, "it would not constitute reversible error for the trial court to acquiesce in their agreement." Id. ; cf. Colbert v. State , 56 S.W.3d 857, 860 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. granted) ("If the State and defendant do not agree to the Geesa instruction, it constitutes reversible error for the trial court to submit the definitional instruction.").

2002In Colbert v. State , 56 S.W.3d 857, 860 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2001, pet. filed), the court applied the Paulson decision and held that, if the State and defendant do not agree to the Geesa instruction, it constitutes reversible error for the trial court to submit the definitional instruction. (4) In Paulson , the Court of Criminal Appeals overruled the requirement to submit (to the jury) a definition of reasonable doubt as established by Geesa , stating the definition was "useless," "ambiguous," and "fallacious." Paulson , 28 S.W.3d at 572 .

2025See 28 S.W.3d 570 , 573 29 In Geesa v. State, this Court determined that a defendant was entitled to “a full definitional instruction to the jury on reasonable doubt” and expressly adopted a six-paragraph instruction to be “submitted to the jury in all criminal cases, even in the absence of an objection or request by the State or the defendant.” 820 S.W.2d 154, 162 (Tex. Crim.

2003However, if both the State and the defense were to agree to give the Geesa instruction to the jury, "it would not constitute reversible error for the trial court to acquiesce in their agreement." Id. ; cf. Colbert v. State , 56 S.W.3d 857, 860 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. granted) ("If the State and defendant do not agree to the Geesa instruction, it constitutes reversible error for the trial court to submit the definitional instruction.").

2004Kieschnick v. State, 911 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex.App.-Waco 1995) (op'n on reh'g) ("Kieschnick did not object to the charge in the trial court or raise the court's use of an erroneous charge as a point of error in his brief.

2004Kieschnick v. State, 911 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex.App.-Waco 1995) (op’n on reh’g) (“Kieschnick did not object to the charge in the trial court or raise the court’s use of an erroneous charge as a point of error in his brief.

1991We find (1) that the analytical construct is not valid in light of this Court's earlier decision to abrogate the circumstantial evidence charge, see Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (opinion on rehearing); and (2) that a definitional instruction on "reasonable doubt" is required in light of our decision to abandon the analytical construct.

1991We find (1) that the analytical construct is not valid in light of this Court’s earlier decision to abrogate the circumstantial evidence charge, see Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (opinion on rehearing); and (2) that a definitional instruction on “reasonable doubt” is required in light of our decision to abandon the analytical construct.

1997The court has since held that this definitional instruction is “an absolute systemic requirement” that must be submitted to the jury “in all cases where the burden of proof requires the jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the failure to submit such an instruction is automatic reversible error.” Reyes v. State, 938 S.W.2d 718 , 721 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).

1997In fact, in one paragraph of a footnote, the Court disregarded the Almanza analysis. 2 Instead, the Court chose to rely on Geesa "(believing) that . . . the Geesa Court intended to create an absolute systematic requirement that every charge, when the burden of proof required by the jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, contain the definitional instruction on reasonable doubt." Reyes, 938 S.W.2d at 720 .

1995HARM ANALYSIS A harm analysis is not required. 1 See Stine v. State, 908 S.W.2d 429, 430 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (violation of mandatory, non-waivable constitutional requirement that district court sit at county seat does not require harm analysis). 2 CONCLUSION Because the court erred in omitting the definitional instruction on reasonable doubt, we grant the motion for rehearing, set aside our judgment, reverse the judgment of conviction, and remand the cause to the trial court for a new trial. .

1995HARM ANALYSIS A harm analysis is not required. [1] See Stine v. State, 908 S.W.2d 429, 430 (Tex. Crim.App.1995) (violation of mandatory, non-waivable constitutional requirement that district court sit at county seat does not require harm analysis). [2] *164 CONCLUSION Because the court erred in omitting the definitional instruction on reasonable doubt, we grant the motion for rehearing, set aside our judgment, reverse the judgment of conviction, and remand the cause to the trial court for a new trial.

1996Geesa, 820 S.W.2d at 154 . [10] The State argues that absolute systemic requirements cannot be judicially created but rather can be created only by the Legislature, see Marin, supra , or by the Constitution, see Stine, supra .

1995See Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 279.

2025See Love v. State, 706 S.W.3d 584 , 606 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, pet. ref’d) (finding no harm where intent or knowledge was not a contested issue at trial); Taylor v. State, No. 05-01-00197-CR, 2003 WL 22449157 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 29, 2003, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (refusing to find harm in failure to define mental state in relation to conduct element where the contested issue at trial was identity and not intent); Saldivar v. State, 783 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1989, no pet.) (noting erroneous submission of mental state definitions did not

2021See Toler v. State, 546 S.W.2d 290 , 293–94 (Tex. Crim.

2013See Medford v. State, 13 S.W.3d 769, 771-72 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).

2002Compare Colbert v. State, 56 S.W.3d 857, 860 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 2001, pet. granted) (holding “if the State and defendant do not agree to the Geesa instruction, it constitutes reversible error for the trial court to submit the definitional instruction”), with Dooley v. State, 65 S.W.3d 840, 844 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2002, pet. refd) (noting "merely giving a reasonable doubt instruction [does not constitute] reversible error”).

1999See Paulson, 991 S.W.2d at 915-16 (indicating that the court had “difficulty recognizing” that either case “implicated the requirement of a full definitional instruction to the jury on reasonable doubt” (quoting Geesa, 820 S.W.2d at 161 )).

1999Martinez v. State, 969 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, pet. granted). 5 This Court has recently decided in the context of an article 37.07, section 3(a) reasonable doubt instruction that “[w]hen the term ‘reasonable doubt’ is used in the charge at the punishment phase, the court need not define that *806 term if it was previously defined in the guilt-innocence charge.” Coleman v. State, 979 S.W.2d 438, 444 (Tex.App.—Waco 1998, no pet. h.).

1999Martinez v. State, 969 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, pet. granted). 5 This Court has recently decided in the context of an article 37.07, section 3(a) reasonable doubt instruction that “[w]hen the term ‘reasonable doubt’ is used in the charge at the punishment phase, the court need not define that *806 term if it was previously defined in the guilt-innocence charge.” Coleman v. State, 979 S.W.2d 438, 444 (Tex.App.—Waco 1998, no pet. h.).

1996See also, Lohmuller v. State, 921 S.W.2d 457, 462 (Tex.App.-Waco 1996) ("The right to a definitional instruction on reasonable doubt is an absolute right which [the appellate court] must implement.").

1996See also, Lohmuller v. State, 921 S.W.2d 457, 462 (Tex.App.—Waco 1996) (“The right to a definitional instruction on reasonable doubt is an absolute right which [the appellate court] must implement.”).

1991Until today the Court consistently rejected the same invitation; now sua sponte it mandates "a definitional instruction." Opinion, at 161-162. [14] For a "construct" used by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in ordering relief from a burglary conviction in a habeas corpus action from Texas, see, e.g., Clark v. Procunier, 755 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.1985), viz: "If the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence of the crime charged, then a reasonable jury must necessaril

1991For a "construct” used by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in ordering relief from a burglary conviction in a habeas corpus action from Texas, see, e.g., Clark v. Procunier, 755 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.1985), viz: "If the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence of the crime charged, then a reasonable jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt.” Id., at 396 , quoting Cosby v. Jones, 682 F.2d 1373, 1383 (11th Cir.1982); citing also Turner v. McKaskle, 721 F.2d

1991Until today the Court consistently rejected the same invitation; now sua sponte it mandates "a definitional instruction." Opinion, at 161-162. [14] For a "construct" used by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in ordering relief from a burglary conviction in a habeas corpus action from Texas, see, e.g., Clark v. Procunier, 755 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.1985), viz: "If the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence of the crime charged, then a reasonable jury must necessaril

1991For a "construct” used by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in ordering relief from a burglary conviction in a habeas corpus action from Texas, see, e.g., Clark v. Procunier, 755 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.1985), viz: "If the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence of the crime charged, then a reasonable jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt.” Id., at 396 , quoting Cosby v. Jones, 682 F.2d 1373, 1383 (11th Cir.1982); citing also Turner v. McKaskle, 721 F.2d