6 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Beasley v. Stategreen1 sentence2018There was no mention of the forbidden mens rea of “knowingly” in the trial court’s definitional instruction. 5 In his reply brief, Edwards notes that our supreme court has held that “‘where the trial court lists the elements of attempted murder and includes an incorrect mens rea, this error cannot be cured by another instruction.’” Clark v. State, 668 N.E.2d 1206, 1210 (Ind. 1996) (quoting Beasley v. State, 643 N.E.2d 346, 348 (Ind. 1994)). | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. Stategreen1 sentence2018There was no mention of the forbidden mens rea of “knowingly” in the trial court’s definitional instruction. 5 In his reply brief, Edwards notes that our supreme court has held that “‘where the trial court lists the elements of attempted murder and includes an incorrect mens rea, this error cannot be cured by another instruction.’” Clark v. State, 668 N.E.2d 1206, 1210 (Ind. 1996) (quoting Beasley v. State, 643 N.E.2d 346, 348 (Ind. 1994)). | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Stategreen1 sentence2013See Davis v. State, 835 N.E.2d 1102, 1107-1111 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the trial court did not commit fundamental error in failing to give an instruction in light of all of the relevant information provided to the jury), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Buttsgreen1 sentence2009Young v. Butts, 685 N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ind.Ct.App.1997). [3] Neither party addresses this definitional requirement in its "advance payments" argument. [4] American Family relies heavily on the Wineinger decision in its argument a setoff was proper, but it does not address or mention the Wineinger statement about the inapplicability of the advance payment statute in a case where there are two defendantsthe tortfeasor and the uninsured motorist carrier. | 1 | 1 |
Monroe v. Streckergreen1 sentence2009No Indiana decisions were found where the advance payment statute was applied in an action involving more than one defendant. [5] American Family does offer a citation to " Monroe v. Strecker, 355 N.E.2d 418, 171 (Ind.Ct.App.1976)" in support of its assertion the purpose of the statute is to "prevent an injured party from being reimbursed twice for the same item of damage." (Appellee's Br. at 10.) There is, of course, no page 171 in the Monroe decision, which starts on page 418. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Buckner v. Hudspeth
green
2 sentences1987In Horosko v. Mount Pleasant Township School District (1939), 335 Pa. 369, 372 , 6 A.2d 866, 868 , cert. denied, 308 U.S. 553 , 60 S.Ct. 101 , 84 L.Ed. 465 (1939), the court defined immorality as "not essentially confined to a deviation from sex morality; it may be such a course of conduct as offends the morals of the community and is a bad example to the youth whose ideals a teacher is supposed to foster and to elevate." Obviously, disputes arising under such a general concept, which is subject to varying interpretations based on shifting social attitudes, must be resolved on the facts and ci 1987In Horosko v. Mount Pleasant Township School District (1939), 335 Pa. 369, 372 , 6 A.2d 866, 868 , cert. denied, 308 U.S. 553 , 60 S.Ct. 101 , 84 L.Ed. 465 (1939), the court defined immorality as "not essentially confined to a deviation from sex morality; it may be such a course of conduct as offends the morals of the community and is a bad example to the youth whose ideals a teacher is supposed to foster and to elevate." Obviously, disputes arising under such a general concept, which is subject to varying interpretations based on shifting social attitudes, must be resolved on the facts and ci | 1 | 1987–1987 |
General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Fisk Rubber Corp.
green
2 sentences1987In Horosko v. Mount Pleasant Township School District (1939), 335 Pa. 369, 372 , 6 A.2d 866, 868 , cert. denied, 308 U.S. 553 , 60 S.Ct. 101 , 84 L.Ed. 465 (1939), the court defined immorality as "not essentially confined to a deviation from sex morality; it may be such a course of conduct as offends the morals of the community and is a bad example to the youth whose ideals a teacher is supposed to foster and to elevate." Obviously, disputes arising under such a general concept, which is subject to varying interpretations based on shifting social attitudes, must be resolved on the facts and ci 1987In Horosko v. Mount Pleasant Township School District (1939), 335 Pa. 369, 372 , 6 A.2d 866, 868 , cert. denied, 308 U.S. 553 , 60 S.Ct. 101 , 84 L.Ed. 465 (1939), the court defined immorality as "not essentially confined to a deviation from sex morality; it may be such a course of conduct as offends the morals of the community and is a bad example to the youth whose ideals a teacher is supposed to foster and to elevate." Obviously, disputes arising under such a general concept, which is subject to varying interpretations based on shifting social attitudes, must be resolved on the facts and ci | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Horosko v. Mt. Pl't Twp. S. Dist
green
2 sentences1987In Horosko v. Mount Pleasant Township School District (1939), 335 Pa. 369, 372 , 6 A.2d 866, 868 , cert. denied, 308 U.S. 553 , 60 S.Ct. 101 , 84 L.Ed. 465 (1939), the court defined immorality as "not essentially confined to a deviation from sex morality; it may be such a course of conduct as offends the morals of the community and is a bad example to the youth whose ideals a teacher is supposed to foster and to elevate." Obviously, disputes arising under such a general concept, which is subject to varying interpretations based on shifting social attitudes, must be resolved on the facts and ci 1987In Horosko v. Mount Pleasant Township School District (1939), 335 Pa. 369, 372 , 6 A.2d 866, 868 , cert. denied, 308 U.S. 553 , 60 S.Ct. 101 , 84 L.Ed. 465 (1939), the court defined immorality as "not essentially confined to a deviation from sex morality; it may be such a course of conduct as offends the morals of the community and is a bad example to the youth whose ideals a teacher is supposed to foster and to elevate." Obviously, disputes arising under such a general concept, which is subject to varying interpretations based on shifting social attitudes, must be resolved on the facts and ci | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Lawrence v. State
green
2 sentences1981Lawrence v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 330 , 375 N.E.2d 208 ; Hash v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 692 , 284 N.E.2d 770 . 1981Lawrence v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 330 , 375 N.E.2d 208 ; Hash v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 692 , 284 N.E.2d 770 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Hash v. State
green
2 sentences1981Lawrence v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 330 , 375 N.E.2d 208 ; Hash v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 692 , 284 N.E.2d 770 . 1981Lawrence v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 330 , 375 N.E.2d 208 ; Hash v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 692 , 284 N.E.2d 770 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Coonan v. State
green
2 sentences1981Whether to give a definitional instruction is a matter that remains vested within the trial court’s discretion, Coonan v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 578, 586 , 382 N.E.2d 157, 163-64 , cert. denied (1979), 440 U.S. 984 , 99 S.Ct. 1798 , 60 L.Ed.2d 246 ; McPherson v. State (1978), Ind.App., 383 N.E.2d 403, 413 , and that discretion should be exercised when a definitional instruction “is necessary to dispel jury confusion.” Stevens v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 396, 409-10 , 354 N.E.2d 727, 736 , reh. granted on other grounds, 265 Ind. 410 , 357 N.E.2d 245 . 1981Whether to give a definitional instruction is a matter that remains vested within the trial court’s discretion, Coonan v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 578, 586 , 382 N.E.2d 157, 163-64 , cert. denied (1979), 440 U.S. 984 , 99 S.Ct. 1798 , 60 L.Ed.2d 246 ; McPherson v. State (1978), Ind.App., 383 N.E.2d 403, 413 , and that discretion should be exercised when a definitional instruction “is necessary to dispel jury confusion.” Stevens v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 396, 409-10 , 354 N.E.2d 727, 736 , reh. granted on other grounds, 265 Ind. 410 , 357 N.E.2d 245 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Stevens v. State
green
2 sentences1981Whether to give a definitional instruction is a matter that remains vested within the trial court’s discretion, Coonan v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 578, 586 , 382 N.E.2d 157, 163-64 , cert. denied (1979), 440 U.S. 984 , 99 S.Ct. 1798 , 60 L.Ed.2d 246 ; McPherson v. State (1978), Ind.App., 383 N.E.2d 403, 413 , and that discretion should be exercised when a definitional instruction “is necessary to dispel jury confusion.” Stevens v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 396, 409-10 , 354 N.E.2d 727, 736 , reh. granted on other grounds, 265 Ind. 410 , 357 N.E.2d 245 . 1981Whether to give a definitional instruction is a matter that remains vested within the trial court’s discretion, Coonan v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 578, 586 , 382 N.E.2d 157, 163-64 , cert. denied (1979), 440 U.S. 984 , 99 S.Ct. 1798 , 60 L.Ed.2d 246 ; McPherson v. State (1978), Ind.App., 383 N.E.2d 403, 413 , and that discretion should be exercised when a definitional instruction “is necessary to dispel jury confusion.” Stevens v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 396, 409-10 , 354 N.E.2d 727, 736 , reh. granted on other grounds, 265 Ind. 410 , 357 N.E.2d 245 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
McPherson v. State
green
2 sentences1981Whether to give a definitional instruction is a matter that remains vested within the trial court’s discretion, Coonan v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 578, 586 , 382 N.E.2d 157, 163-64 , cert. denied (1979), 440 U.S. 984 , 99 S.Ct. 1798 , 60 L.Ed.2d 246 ; McPherson v. State (1978), Ind.App., 383 N.E.2d 403, 413 , and that discretion should be exercised when a definitional instruction “is necessary to dispel jury confusion.” Stevens v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 396, 409-10 , 354 N.E.2d 727, 736 , reh. granted on other grounds, 265 Ind. 410 , 357 N.E.2d 245 . 1981Whether to give a definitional instruction is a matter that remains vested within the trial court's discretion, Coonan v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 578, 586 , 382 N.E.2d 157, 163-64 , cert. denied (1979), 440 U.S. 984 , 99 S.Ct. 1798 , 60 L.Ed.2d 246 ; McPherson v. State (1978), Ind. App., 383 N.E.2d 403, 413 , and that discretion should be exercised when a definitional instruction "is necessary to dispel jury confusion." Stevens v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 396, 409-10 , 354 N.E.2d 727, 736 , reh. granted on other grounds, 265 Ind. 410 , 357 N.E.2d 245 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Burns v. Estelle
green
2 sentences1981Whether to give a definitional instruction is a matter that remains vested within the trial court’s discretion, Coonan v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 578, 586 , 382 N.E.2d 157, 163-64 , cert. denied (1979), 440 U.S. 984 , 99 S.Ct. 1798 , 60 L.Ed.2d 246 ; McPherson v. State (1978), Ind.App., 383 N.E.2d 403, 413 , and that discretion should be exercised when a definitional instruction “is necessary to dispel jury confusion.” Stevens v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 396, 409-10 , 354 N.E.2d 727, 736 , reh. granted on other grounds, 265 Ind. 410 , 357 N.E.2d 245 . 1981Whether to give a definitional instruction is a matter that remains vested within the trial court's discretion, Coonan v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 578, 586 , 382 N.E.2d 157, 163-64 , cert. denied (1979), 440 U.S. 984 , 99 S.Ct. 1798 , 60 L.Ed.2d 246 ; McPherson v. State (1978), Ind. App., 383 N.E.2d 403, 413 , and that discretion should be exercised when a definitional instruction "is necessary to dispel jury confusion." Stevens v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 396, 409-10 , 354 N.E.2d 727, 736 , reh. granted on other grounds, 265 Ind. 410 , 357 N.E.2d 245 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Givens v. Maryland
green
2 sentences1981Whether to give a definitional instruction is a matter that remains vested within the trial court’s discretion, Coonan v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 578, 586 , 382 N.E.2d 157, 163-64 , cert. denied (1979), 440 U.S. 984 , 99 S.Ct. 1798 , 60 L.Ed.2d 246 ; McPherson v. State (1978), Ind.App., 383 N.E.2d 403, 413 , and that discretion should be exercised when a definitional instruction “is necessary to dispel jury confusion.” Stevens v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 396, 409-10 , 354 N.E.2d 727, 736 , reh. granted on other grounds, 265 Ind. 410 , 357 N.E.2d 245 . 1981Whether to give a definitional instruction is a matter that remains vested within the trial court's discretion, Coonan v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 578, 586 , 382 N.E.2d 157, 163-64 , cert. denied (1979), 440 U.S. 984 , 99 S.Ct. 1798 , 60 L.Ed.2d 246 ; McPherson v. State (1978), Ind. App., 383 N.E.2d 403, 413 , and that discretion should be exercised when a definitional instruction "is necessary to dispel jury confusion." Stevens v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 396, 409-10 , 354 N.E.2d 727, 736 , reh. granted on other grounds, 265 Ind. 410 , 357 N.E.2d 245 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Cudjo v. Oklahoma
green
2 sentences1981Whether to give a definitional instruction is a matter that remains vested within the trial court’s discretion, Coonan v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 578, 586 , 382 N.E.2d 157, 163-64 , cert. denied (1979), 440 U.S. 984 , 99 S.Ct. 1798 , 60 L.Ed.2d 246 ; McPherson v. State (1978), Ind.App., 383 N.E.2d 403, 413 , and that discretion should be exercised when a definitional instruction “is necessary to dispel jury confusion.” Stevens v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 396, 409-10 , 354 N.E.2d 727, 736 , reh. granted on other grounds, 265 Ind. 410 , 357 N.E.2d 245 . 1981Whether to give a definitional instruction is a matter that remains vested within the trial court's discretion, Coonan v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 578, 586 , 382 N.E.2d 157, 163-64 , cert. denied (1979), 440 U.S. 984 , 99 S.Ct. 1798 , 60 L.Ed.2d 246 ; McPherson v. State (1978), Ind. App., 383 N.E.2d 403, 413 , and that discretion should be exercised when a definitional instruction "is necessary to dispel jury confusion." Stevens v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 396, 409-10 , 354 N.E.2d 727, 736 , reh. granted on other grounds, 265 Ind. 410 , 357 N.E.2d 245 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.