54 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2026 17 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Barbergreen2 sentences2023Defendant concedes that the jury instruction at issue is a definitional instruction and not an instruction on an essential element. {21} To determine whether the absence of the definition of “amount of damages” constituted fundamental error, “we evaluate whether a reasonable juror would have been confused or misdirected by the jury instruction.” State v. Rodarte, 2011-NMCA- 067, ¶ 10, 149 N.M. 819 , 255 P.3d 397 (text only); Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 19 (holding that whether a failure to provide a definitional instruction is fundamental error “begins at the same place as our analysis for revers 2023Defendant concedes that the jury instruction at issue is a definitional instruction and not an instruction on an essential element. {21} To determine whether the absence of the definition of “amount of damages” constituted fundamental error, “we evaluate whether a reasonable juror would have been confused or misdirected by the jury instruction.” State v. Rodarte, 2011-NMCA- 067, ¶ 10, 149 N.M. 819 , 255 P.3d 397 (text only); Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 19 (holding that whether a failure to provide a definitional instruction is fundamental error “begins at the same place as our analysis for revers | 10 | 16 |
State v. Mascarenasgreen2 sentences2024See State v. Mascareñas, 2000-NMSC-017 , ¶ 19, 129 N.M. 230 , 4 P.3d 1221 (stating that failure to give a definitional instruction on a term is not failure to instruct on an essential element of a crime). 2024See State v. Mascareñas, 2000-NMSC-017 , ¶ 19, 129 N.M. 230 , 4 P.3d 1221 (stating that failure to give a definitional instruction on a term is not failure to instruct on an essential element of a crime). | 7 | 11 |
State v. Munozgreen2 sentences2022See State v. Munoz, 2006-NMSC-005, ¶ 22 , 139 N.M. 106 , 129 P.3d 142 (concluding that there was no reversible error for the failure to give a definitional instruction when the jury instructions, considered as a whole, did not confuse or mislead the jury); see also State v. Watchman, 2005-NMCA-125, ¶ 11 , 138 N.M. 488 , 122 P.3d 855 (observing that, when reviewing the propriety of jury instructions, we consider “whether a reasonable juror would have been confused or misled by the instruction”). 2022See State v. Munoz, 2006-NMSC-005, ¶ 22 , 139 N.M. 106 , 129 P.3d 142 (concluding that there was no reversible error for the failure to give a definitional instruction when the jury instructions, considered as a whole, did not confuse or mislead the jury); see also State v. Watchman, 2005-NMCA-125, ¶ 11 , 138 N.M. 488 , 122 P.3d 855 (observing that, when reviewing the propriety of jury instructions, we consider “whether a reasonable juror would have been confused or misled by the instruction”). | 4 | 4 |
State v. Rodartegreen2 sentences2023Defendant concedes that the jury instruction at issue is a definitional instruction and not an instruction on an essential element. {21} To determine whether the absence of the definition of “amount of damages” constituted fundamental error, “we evaluate whether a reasonable juror would have been confused or misdirected by the jury instruction.” State v. Rodarte, 2011-NMCA- 067, ¶ 10, 149 N.M. 819 , 255 P.3d 397 (text only); Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 19 (holding that whether a failure to provide a definitional instruction is fundamental error “begins at the same place as our analysis for revers 2023Defendant concedes that the jury instruction at issue is a definitional instruction and not an instruction on an essential element. {21} To determine whether the absence of the definition of “amount of damages” constituted fundamental error, “we evaluate whether a reasonable juror would have been confused or misdirected by the jury instruction.” State v. Rodarte, 2011-NMCA- 067, ¶ 10, 149 N.M. 819 , 255 P.3d 397 (text only); Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 19 (holding that whether a failure to provide a definitional instruction is fundamental error “begins at the same place as our analysis for revers | 3 | 4 |
State v. Carnesgreen2 sentences2000The Court in Carnes held that the trial court’s refusal to accept defendant’s tendered instruction defining the term “hostage” in connection with kidnapping charges did not mandate reversal because the term was not a technical term and because “jurors could properly apply the common meaning of hostage ... and the application of the common meaning did not prejudice defendant.” Carnes, 97 N.M. at 79 , 636 P.2d at 898 (internal citation omitted). “[A] failure to give a definitional instruction is not a failure to instruct on an essential element.” State v. Allen, 2000-NMSC-002, ¶ 76 , 128 N.M. 48 2000The Court in Carnes held that the trial court’s refusal to accept defendant’s tendered instruction defining the term “hostage” in connection with kidnapping charges did not mandate reversal because the term was not a technical term and because “jurors could properly apply the common meaning of hostage ... and the application of the common meaning did not prejudice defendant.” Carnes, 97 N.M. at 79 , 636 P.2d at 898 (internal citation omitted). “[A] failure to give a definitional instruction is not a failure to instruct on an essential element.” State v. Allen, 2000-NMSC-002, ¶ 76 , 128 N.M. 48 | 2 | 3 |
State v. Jernigangreen2 sentences2023See Jernigan, 2006-NMSC-003, ¶ 21 ; State v. Sotelo, 2013-NMCA-028, ¶ 9 , 296 P.3d 1232 (stating that a successful application of the test in State v. Meadors, 1995-NMSC-073 , 121 N.M. 38 , 908 P.2d 731 , “entitles a defendant to a lesser[]included offense instruction when the evidence supports the lesser[]included offense”). {7} The State also does not persuade us that no rational jury could find that careless driving was the highest offense committed. [Amended MIO 12-13] For the reasons stated in our second notice, we remain persuaded that Defendant demonstrated his entitlement to a lesser i 2011Further, we find no support in the record that would allow us to conclude that the district court understood that Defendant wanted a definitional instruction clarifying the term “intent to defraud.” See id. (“[I]f the record reflects that the judge clearly understood the type of instruction the [defendant wanted and understood the tendered instruction needed to be modified to correctly state the law, then the issue is deemed preserved for appellate review.”). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Ervingreen2 sentences2000We find it instructive that in State v. Ervin, upon which Carnes relies, the Court stated, “The defendant did not make a tender nor was there evidence which would make this amplification a critical determination.” 96 N.M. 366, 367 , 630 P.2d 765, 766 (1981) (no evidence presented that the failure to define “dwelling” in connection with a burglary charge was a critical determination). 2000We find it instructive that in State v. Ervin, upon which Carnes relies, the Court stated, “The defendant did not make a tender nor was there evidence which would make this amplification a critical determination.” 96 N.M. 366, 367 , 630 P.2d 765, 766 (1981) (no evidence presented that the failure to define “dwelling” in connection with a burglary charge was a critical determination). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Benallygreen2 sentences2019Benally, 2001-NMSC-033, ¶ 12 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {14} In light of the foregoing, “[w]e are satisfied that, even under a constructive possession theory, it was not fundamental error for the district court to fail to provide the jury with the optional ‘proximity’ language of [the definitional instruction for possession].” Jimenez, 2017-NMCA-039, ¶ 61 . 2017The Trial Court Did Not Fundamentally Err by Failing to Give a Portion 11 of the Constructive Possession Jury Instruction 12 {54} Defendant argues that the district court committed fundamental error when it 13 failed to include optional language from UJI 14-130, the definitional instruction for 14 “possession.” We disagree. 15 {55} “The standard of review we apply to jury instructions depends on whether the 16 issue has been preserved.” State v. Benally, 2001-NMSC-033, ¶ 12 , 131 N.M. 258 , 17 34 P.3d 1134 . | 1 | 4 |
State v. Oronagreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., State v. Orona, 1979- 1 NMSC-011, ¶ 36, 92 N.M. 450 , 589 P.2d 1041 (holding “[t]he [s]tate made no 2 attempt whatsoever to overcome [the] presumption”); Hovey, 1986-NMSC-069 , ¶ 3 14 (concluding the state’s argument that the responses were accurate did not 4 demonstrate the jury’s verdict was not affected); McClure, 1980-NMCA-067 , ¶ 9 5 (holding there was no showing an additional definitional instruction was not 6 prejudicial); State v. Brugger, 1972-NMCA-102 , ¶¶ 5, 8, 84 N.M. 135 , 500 P.2d 420 7 (explaining the state failed to establish the jury had arrived at its verdict prior 2026See, e.g., State v. Orona, 1979- 1 NMSC-011, ¶ 36, 92 N.M. 450 , 589 P.2d 1041 (holding “[t]he [s]tate made no 2 attempt whatsoever to overcome [the] presumption”); Hovey, 1986-NMSC-069 , ¶ 3 14 (concluding the state’s argument that the responses were accurate did not 4 demonstrate the jury’s verdict was not affected); McClure, 1980-NMCA-067 , ¶ 9 5 (holding there was no showing an additional definitional instruction was not 6 prejudicial); State v. Brugger, 1972-NMCA-102 , ¶¶ 5, 8, 84 N.M. 135 , 500 P.2d 420 7 (explaining the state failed to establish the jury had arrived at its verdict prior | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bruggergreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., State v. Orona, 1979- 1 NMSC-011, ¶ 36, 92 N.M. 450 , 589 P.2d 1041 (holding “[t]he [s]tate made no 2 attempt whatsoever to overcome [the] presumption”); Hovey, 1986-NMSC-069 , ¶ 3 14 (concluding the state’s argument that the responses were accurate did not 4 demonstrate the jury’s verdict was not affected); McClure, 1980-NMCA-067 , ¶ 9 5 (holding there was no showing an additional definitional instruction was not 6 prejudicial); State v. Brugger, 1972-NMCA-102 , ¶¶ 5, 8, 84 N.M. 135 , 500 P.2d 420 7 (explaining the state failed to establish the jury had arrived at its verdict prior 2026See, e.g., State v. Orona, 1979- 1 NMSC-011, ¶ 36, 92 N.M. 450 , 589 P.2d 1041 (holding “[t]he [s]tate made no 2 attempt whatsoever to overcome [the] presumption”); Hovey, 1986-NMSC-069 , ¶ 3 14 (concluding the state’s argument that the responses were accurate did not 4 demonstrate the jury’s verdict was not affected); McClure, 1980-NMCA-067 , ¶ 9 5 (holding there was no showing an additional definitional instruction was not 6 prejudicial); State v. Brugger, 1972-NMCA-102 , ¶¶ 5, 8, 84 N.M. 135 , 500 P.2d 420 7 (explaining the state failed to establish the jury had arrived at its verdict prior | 1 | 1 |
State v. Barrerasgreen1 sentence2025See Barreras, 2007-NMCA-067, ¶ 9 ; see also Fernandez, 2015-NMCA-091 , ¶ 9 (“In some cases, . . . the facts may clearly establish that the replacement cost would exceed the cost of repair and no additional evidence or testimony may be required; nonetheless, the replacement cost remains part of the [s]tate’s burden.”). {10} Defendant next argues that it was reversible error for the district court to omit part of the definitional instruction on “amount of damage” from the instructions provided to the jury. [BIC 19-23] “The standard of review we apply to jury instructions depends on whether the i | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fernandezgreen1 sentence2025See Barreras, 2007-NMCA-067, ¶ 9 ; see also Fernandez, 2015-NMCA-091 , ¶ 9 (“In some cases, . . . the facts may clearly establish that the replacement cost would exceed the cost of repair and no additional evidence or testimony may be required; nonetheless, the replacement cost remains part of the [s]tate’s burden.”). {10} Defendant next argues that it was reversible error for the district court to omit part of the definitional instruction on “amount of damage” from the instructions provided to the jury. [BIC 19-23] “The standard of review we apply to jury instructions depends on whether the i | 1 | 1 |
State v. Montoyagreen1 sentence2025“We do not evaluate the evidence to determine whether some hypothesis could be designed which is consistent with a finding of innocence, and we do not weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the fact[-]finder so long as there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict.” Montoya, 2015-NMSC-010, ¶ 52 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Candelariagreen1 sentence2024See Rule 12-231(B)(2)(c); see also State v. Candelaria, 2019-NMSC-004 , ¶ 31, 434 P.3d 297 (reviewing purported error in jury instructions for fundamental error because it was not raised at trial). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sloangreen2 sentences2024Counsel and the district court then discussed whether a definitional instruction had been omitted and concluded that no uniform jury instruction (UJI) defined the term. [1 RP] The district court then sent a note to the jury stating, “The law governing this case [is] contained in the instructions you were given.” [1 RP 227, 238] {3} Defendant argues that the district court violated his constitutional and statutory right to be present at critical stages of the proceedings against him by reading and responding to questions from the jury while he was absent from the courtroom and that his attorney 2024Counsel and the district court then discussed whether a definitional instruction had been omitted and concluded that no uniform jury instruction (UJI) defined the term. [1 RP] The district court then sent a note to the jury stating, “The law governing this case [is] contained in the instructions you were given.” [1 RP 227, 238] {3} Defendant argues that the district court violated his constitutional and statutory right to be present at critical stages of the proceedings against him by reading and responding to questions from the jury while he was absent from the courtroom and that his attorney | 1 | 1 |
State v. Watchmangreen2 sentences2022See State v. Munoz, 2006-NMSC-005, ¶ 22 , 139 N.M. 106 , 129 P.3d 142 (concluding that there was no reversible error for the failure to give a definitional instruction when the jury instructions, considered as a whole, did not confuse or mislead the jury); see also State v. Watchman, 2005-NMCA-125, ¶ 11 , 138 N.M. 488 , 122 P.3d 855 (observing that, when reviewing the propriety of jury instructions, we consider “whether a reasonable juror would have been confused or misled by the instruction”). 2022See State v. Munoz, 2006-NMSC-005, ¶ 22 , 139 N.M. 106 , 129 P.3d 142 (concluding that there was no reversible error for the failure to give a definitional instruction when the jury instructions, considered as a whole, did not confuse or mislead the jury); see also State v. Watchman, 2005-NMCA-125, ¶ 11 , 138 N.M. 488 , 122 P.3d 855 (observing that, when reviewing the propriety of jury instructions, we consider “whether a reasonable juror would have been confused or misled by the instruction”). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Belangergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Saizred | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Stephensgreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Contrerasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stucky v. City of San Antoniogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Romerogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jiminezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Magbygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Talleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gonzalesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Rodriguezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lytle v. Jordangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Ramosgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Tarangogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Price Waterhouse v. Hopkinsred | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Crain
green
2 sentences2000The Court in Carnes held that the trial court’s refusal to accept defendant’s tendered instruction defining the term “hostage” in connection with kidnapping charges did not mandate reversal because the term was not a technical term and because “jurors could properly apply the common meaning of hostage ... and the application of the common meaning did not prejudice defendant.” Carnes, 97 N.M. at 79 , 636 P.2d at 898 (internal citation omitted). “[A] failure to give a definitional instruction is not a failure to instruct on an essential element.” State v. Allen, 2000-NMSC-002, ¶ 76 , 128 N.M. 48 2000The Court in Carnes held that the trial court’s refusal to accept defendant’s tendered instruction defining the term “hostage” in connection with kidnapping charges did not mandate reversal because the term was not a technical term and because “jurors could properly apply the common meaning of hostage ... and the application of the common meaning did not prejudice defendant.” Carnes, 97 N.M. at 79 , 636 P.2d at 898 (internal citation omitted). “[A] failure to give a definitional instruction is not a failure to instruct on an essential element.” State v. Allen, 2000-NMSC-002, ¶ 76 , 128 N.M. 48 | 4 | 1999–2003 |
State v. Dominguez
green
2 sentences2023See Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 20 (agreeing 17 generally that the failure to give a definitional instruction that is mandated by a use 18 note is not fundamental error); State v. Dominguez, 2014-NMCA-064, ¶ 18 , 327 P.3d 19 1092 (stating that the “failure to give a mandatory instruction” does not 20 “automatically” require the “reversal or modification of an otherwise valid 8 1 conviction,” but rather, “it is the failure to give a mandatory instruction on the law 2 essential for a conviction that constitutes reversible error”). 2023See Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 20 (agreeing generally that the failure to give a definitional instruction that is mandated by a use note is not fundamental error); State v. Dominguez, 2014-NMCA-064, ¶ 18 , 327 P.3d 1092 (stating that the “failure to give a mandatory instruction” does not “automatically” require the “reversal or modification of an otherwise valid conviction,” but rather, “it is the failure to give a mandatory instruction on the law essential for a conviction that constitutes reversible error”). | 2 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Luna
green
2 sentences2023Defendant concedes that the jury instruction at issue is a definitional instruction and not an instruction on an essential element. {21} To determine whether the absence of the definition of “amount of damages” constituted fundamental error, “we evaluate whether a reasonable juror would have been confused or misdirected by the jury instruction.” State v. Rodarte, 2011-NMCA- 067, ¶ 10, 149 N.M. 819 , 255 P.3d 397 (text only); Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 19 (holding that whether a failure to provide a definitional instruction is fundamental error “begins at the same place as our analysis for revers 2021We are guided by State v. Luna, which elaborates that the “failure to give a definitional instruction when the term being defined has a legal meaning different from the commonly understood lay interpretation of the term may result in jury confusion that could place the verdict in doubt.” 2018- NMCA-025, ¶ 22, 458 P.3d 457 (emphasis added) (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). | 2 | 2021–2023 |
State v. Doe
green
2 sentences2019State v. Doe, 1983-NMSC-096 , ¶ 8, 100 N.M. 481 , 672 P.2d 654 (holding that failure to follow a use note does not automatically require reversal absent a defendant’s request or objection); see also State v. Stephens, 1979-NMSC-076 , ¶ 20, 93 N.M. 458 , 601 P.2d 428 (concluding that the failure to give an unrequested instruction required by a use note is not fundamental error even though the use note requires it whenever causation is in issue), overruled on other grounds by State v. Contreras, 1995-NMSC-056 , 120 N.M. 486 , 903 P.2d 228 ; State v. Padilla, 1977-NMCA-055 , ¶ 5, 90 N.M. 481 , 56 2019State v. Doe, 1983-NMSC-096 , ¶ 8, 100 N.M. 481 , 672 P.2d 654 (holding that failure to follow a use note does not automatically require reversal absent a defendant’s request or objection); see also State v. Stephens, 1979-NMSC-076 , ¶ 20, 93 N.M. 458 , 601 P.2d 428 (concluding that the failure to give an unrequested instruction required by a use note is not fundamental error even though the use note requires it whenever causation is in issue), overruled on other grounds by State v. Contreras, 1995-NMSC-056 , 120 N.M. 486 , 903 P.2d 228 ; State v. Padilla, 1977-NMCA-055 , ¶ 5, 90 N.M. 481 , 56 | 2 | 1987–2019 |
State v. Padilla
green
2 sentences2019State v. Doe, 1983-NMSC-096 , ¶ 8, 100 N.M. 481 , 672 P.2d 654 (holding that failure to follow a use note does not automatically require reversal absent a defendant’s request or objection); see also State v. Stephens, 1979-NMSC-076 , ¶ 20, 93 N.M. 458 , 601 P.2d 428 (concluding that the failure to give an unrequested instruction required by a use note is not fundamental error even though the use note requires it whenever causation is in issue), overruled on other grounds by State v. Contreras, 1995-NMSC-056 , 120 N.M. 486 , 903 P.2d 228 ; State v. Padilla, 1977-NMCA-055 , ¶ 5, 90 N.M. 481 , 56 2019State v. Doe, 1983-NMSC-096 , ¶ 8, 100 N.M. 481 , 672 P.2d 654 (holding that failure to follow a use note does not automatically require reversal absent a defendant’s request or objection); see also State v. Stephens, 1979-NMSC-076 , ¶ 20, 93 N.M. 458 , 601 P.2d 428 (concluding that the failure to give an unrequested instruction required by a use note is not fundamental error even though the use note requires it whenever causation is in issue), overruled on other grounds by State v. Contreras, 1995-NMSC-056 , 120 N.M. 486 , 903 P.2d 228 ; State v. Padilla, 1977-NMCA-055 , ¶ 5, 90 N.M. 481 , 56 | 2 | 1980–2019 |
State v. Moss
green
2 sentences2018See id. (approving of plain meaning interpretation of 5 “hostage”); see also State v. Munoz, 2006-NMSC-005, ¶ 24 , 139 N.M. 106 , 129 6 P.3d 142 (same as to “protracted period of time” (emphasis omitted)); Gonzales, 7 1991-NMSC-075 , ¶ 30 (same as to “help,” “cause,” and “encourage”); State v. 8 Aguirre, 1972-NMSC-081 , ¶ 36, 84 N.M. 376 , 503 P.2d 1154 (same as to “held to 9 service”); State v. Romero, 2009-NMCA-012, ¶ 25 , 145 N.M. 594 , 203 P.3d 125 10 (same as to “right to custody”); State v. Lucero, 1994-NMCA-129 , ¶ 16, 118 N.M. 11 696, 884 P.2d 1175 (same as to “sexual actions”); State 2018See id. (approving of plain meaning interpretation of 5 “hostage”); see also State v. Munoz, 2006-NMSC-005, ¶ 24 , 139 N.M. 106 , 129 6 P.3d 142 (same as to “protracted period of time” (emphasis omitted)); Gonzales, 7 1991-NMSC-075 , ¶ 30 (same as to “help,” “cause,” and “encourage”); State v. 8 Aguirre, 1972-NMSC-081 , ¶ 36, 84 N.M. 376 , 503 P.2d 1154 (same as to “held to 9 service”); State v. Romero, 2009-NMCA-012, ¶ 25 , 145 N.M. 594 , 203 P.3d 125 10 (same as to “right to custody”); State v. Lucero, 1994-NMCA-129 , ¶ 16, 118 N.M. 11 696, 884 P.2d 1175 (same as to “sexual actions”); State | 2 | 1986–2018 |
State v. Anderson
green
2 sentences2018See State v. Mascareñas, 2000-NMSC-017 , 21 ¶¶ 20-21, 129 N.M. 230 , 4 P.3d 1221 (holding that the district court fundamentally 22 erred by failing to include a definition of “reckless disregard” in a case where failure 18 1 to provide the definitional instruction “had the potential effect of confusing the jury 2 as to the proper standard of negligence to apply”); Anderson, 2016-NMCA-007 , ¶¶ 8- 3 19 (holding in a case involving a claim of self-defense that there was fundamental 4 error where the district court failed to provide the jury with the “no-retreat” 5 instruction because there was ev 2017See State v. Mascareñas, 2000-NMSC-017 , 19 ¶¶ 20-21, 129 N.M. 230 , 4 P.3d 1221 (holding that the district court fundamentally 20 erred by failing to include a definition of “reckless disregard” in a case where failure 21 to provide the definitional instruction “had the potential effect of confusing the jury 22 as to the proper standard of negligence to apply”); Anderson, 2016-NMCA-007 , ¶¶ 8- 18 1 19 (holding in a case involving a claim of self-defense that there was fundamental 2 error where the district court failed to provide the jury with the “no-retreat” 3 instruction because there was | 2 | 2017–2018 |
State v. Aguirre
green
2 sentences2018See id. (approving of plain meaning interpretation of 5 “hostage”); see also State v. Munoz, 2006-NMSC-005, ¶ 24 , 139 N.M. 106 , 129 6 P.3d 142 (same as to “protracted period of time” (emphasis omitted)); Gonzales, 7 1991-NMSC-075 , ¶ 30 (same as to “help,” “cause,” and “encourage”); State v. 8 Aguirre, 1972-NMSC-081 , ¶ 36, 84 N.M. 376 , 503 P.2d 1154 (same as to “held to 9 service”); State v. Romero, 2009-NMCA-012, ¶ 25 , 145 N.M. 594 , 203 P.3d 125 10 (same as to “right to custody”); State v. Lucero, 1994-NMCA-129 , ¶ 16, 118 N.M. 11 696, 884 P.2d 1175 (same as to “sexual actions”); State 2018See id. (approving of plain meaning interpretation of 5 “hostage”); see also State v. Munoz, 2006-NMSC-005, ¶ 24 , 139 N.M. 106 , 129 6 P.3d 142 (same as to “protracted period of time” (emphasis omitted)); Gonzales, 7 1991-NMSC-075 , ¶ 30 (same as to “help,” “cause,” and “encourage”); State v. 8 Aguirre, 1972-NMSC-081 , ¶ 36, 84 N.M. 376 , 503 P.2d 1154 (same as to “held to 9 service”); State v. Romero, 2009-NMCA-012, ¶ 25 , 145 N.M. 594 , 203 P.3d 125 10 (same as to “right to custody”); State v. Lucero, 1994-NMCA-129 , ¶ 16, 118 N.M. 11 696, 884 P.2d 1175 (same as to “sexual actions”); State | 2 | 1986–2018 |
State v. Allen
green
2 sentences2000The Court in Carnes held that the trial court’s refusal to accept defendant’s tendered instruction defining the term “hostage” in connection with kidnapping charges did not mandate reversal because the term was not a technical term and because “jurors could properly apply the common meaning of hostage ... and the application of the common meaning did not prejudice defendant.” Carnes, 97 N.M. at 79 , 636 P.2d at 898 (internal citation omitted). “[A] failure to give a definitional instruction is not a failure to instruct on an essential element.” State v. Allen, 2000-NMSC-002, ¶ 76 , 128 N.M. 48 2000The Court in Carnes held that the trial court’s refusal to accept defendant’s tendered instruction defining the term “hostage” in connection with kidnapping charges did not mandate reversal because the term was not a technical term and because “jurors could properly apply the common meaning of hostage ... and the application of the common meaning did not prejudice defendant.” Carnes, 97 N.M. at 79 , 636 P.2d at 898 (internal citation omitted). “[A] failure to give a definitional instruction is not a failure to instruct on an essential element.” State v. Allen, 2000-NMSC-002, ¶ 76 , 128 N.M. 48 | 2 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Slade
green
1 sentence2024Now having considered the brief in chief, answer brief, and reply brief, we reverse for the following reasons. {2} Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for criminal damage to property in an amount exceeding $1,000. [BIC 1] Specifically, Defendant claims that the State failed to produce any evidence about the amount of damages, including that the damages exceeded $1,000. [BIC 1] Defendant also argues that it was fundamental error for the district court to omit the definitional instruction on “amount of damages” from the instructions provided to the jur | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Roybal
green
2 sentences2024Without [the victim’s] statements, it is unclear whether the images [showing bruises and scratches on the victim’s neck and bite marks on her finger] submitted as exhibits would have supported strangulation on their own.” [Id.] However, as the brief in chief acknowledges, the testimony of the victim alone is sufficient to affirm his conviction. [Id.] See, e.g., State v. Roybal, 1992-NMCA-114 , ¶ 9, 115 N.M. 27 , 846 P.2d 333 . {5} The victim in this case testified that Defendant put his arm around her neck and told her to die, squeezed her neck hard enough that she urinated on herself and was 2024Without [the victim’s] statements, it is unclear whether the images [showing bruises and scratches on the victim’s neck and bite marks on her finger] submitted as exhibits would have supported strangulation on their own.” [Id.] However, as the brief in chief acknowledges, the testimony of the victim alone is sufficient to affirm his conviction. [Id.] See, e.g., State v. Roybal, 1992-NMCA-114 , ¶ 9, 115 N.M. 27 , 846 P.2d 333 . {5} The victim in this case testified that Defendant put his arm around her neck and told her to die, squeezed her neck hard enough that she urinated on herself and was | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Padilla
green
2 sentences2024Counsel and the district court then discussed whether a definitional instruction had been omitted and concluded that no uniform jury instruction (UJI) defined the term. [1 RP] The district court then sent a note to the jury stating, “The law governing this case [is] contained in the instructions you were given.” [1 RP 227, 238] {3} Defendant argues that the district court violated his constitutional and statutory right to be present at critical stages of the proceedings against him by reading and responding to questions from the jury while he was absent from the courtroom and that his attorney 2024Counsel and the district court then discussed whether a definitional instruction had been omitted and concluded that no uniform jury instruction (UJI) defined the term. [1 RP] The district court then sent a note to the jury stating, “The law governing this case [is] contained in the instructions you were given.” [1 RP 227, 238] {3} Defendant argues that the district court violated his constitutional and statutory right to be present at critical stages of the proceedings against him by reading and responding to questions from the jury while he was absent from the courtroom and that his attorney | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Sotelo
green
1 sentence2023See Jernigan, 2006-NMSC-003, ¶ 21 ; State v. Sotelo, 2013-NMCA-028, ¶ 9 , 296 P.3d 1232 (stating that a successful application of the test in State v. Meadors, 1995-NMSC-073 , 121 N.M. 38 , 908 P.2d 731 , “entitles a defendant to a lesser[]included offense instruction when the evidence supports the lesser[]included offense”). {7} The State also does not persuade us that no rational jury could find that careless driving was the highest offense committed. [Amended MIO 12-13] For the reasons stated in our second notice, we remain persuaded that Defendant demonstrated his entitlement to a lesser i | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Meadors
green
2 sentences2023See Jernigan, 2006-NMSC-003, ¶ 21 ; State v. Sotelo, 2013-NMCA-028, ¶ 9 , 296 P.3d 1232 (stating that a successful application of the test in State v. Meadors, 1995-NMSC-073 , 121 N.M. 38 , 908 P.2d 731 , “entitles a defendant to a lesser[]included offense instruction when the evidence supports the lesser[]included offense”). {7} The State also does not persuade us that no rational jury could find that careless driving was the highest offense committed. [Amended MIO 12-13] For the reasons stated in our second notice, we remain persuaded that Defendant demonstrated his entitlement to a lesser i 2023See Jernigan, 2006-NMSC-003, ¶ 21 ; State v. Sotelo, 2013-NMCA-028, ¶ 9 , 296 P.3d 1232 (stating that a successful application of the test in State v. Meadors, 1995-NMSC-073 , 121 N.M. 38 , 908 P.2d 731 , “entitles a defendant to a lesser[]included offense instruction when the evidence supports the lesser[]included offense”). {7} The State also does not persuade us that no rational jury could find that careless driving was the highest offense committed. [Amended MIO 12-13] For the reasons stated in our second notice, we remain persuaded that Defendant demonstrated his entitlement to a lesser i | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| State v. Smith green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Rojo green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Chavez green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Jimenez green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Romero green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Mankiller green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Lucero green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Reyes green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| State v. Clark green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Osborne green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Zurla v. State green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 96,516 United States of America v. David M. Carman green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| State v. Aragon green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.