historical analysis in Arizona

2005Similarly, in State v. Briggs, 666 N.W.2d 573 (Iowa 2003), the Iowa Supreme Court undertook a similar historical analysis of the phrase “sufficient sureties,” which also appears in Iowa’s constitutional bail provision.

2005Similarly, in State v. Briggs, 666 N.W.2d 573 (Iowa 2003), the Iowa Supreme Court undertook a similar historical analysis of the phrase "sufficient sureties," which also appears in Iowa's constitutional bail provision.

2012Presley, 558 U.S. at 215-16 , 130 S.Ct. at 725 .

2012Presley, 558 U.S. at 215-16 , 130 S.Ct. at 725 .

2008It thus concluded the Religion Clause was not intended to place a blanket prohibition on the channeling of public funds to religious institutions, but rather to prohibit “assistance in any form whatsoever which would encourage or tend to encourage the preference of one religion over another, or religion per se over no religion.” Id. at 454 , 432 P.2d at 466 . ¶ 10 More recently, in Kotterman , the court considered a constitutional challenge, under both the United States and Arizona Constitutions, to a statute authorizing a state tax credit for donations to school tuition organizations. 4 193 A

2008It thus concluded the Religion Clause was not intended to place a blanket prohibition on the channeling of public funds to religious institutions, but rather to prohibit “assistance in any form whatsoever which would encourage or tend to encourage the preference of one religion over another, or religion per se over no religion.” Id. at 454 , 432 P.2d at 466 . ¶ 10 More recently, in Kotterman , the court considered a constitutional challenge, under both the United States and Arizona Constitutions, to a statute authorizing a state tax credit for donations to school tuition organizations. 4 193 A

1985The Court justified this procedure, with an historical analysis: «* * * before and since the American colonies became a nation, *402 courts in this country and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law.” (footnote omitted) 337 U.S. at 246 , 69 S.Ct. at 1082 , 93 L.Ed. at 1341 .

1985The Court justified this procedure, with an historical analysis: «* * * before and since the American colonies became a nation, *402 courts in this country and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law.” (footnote omitted) 337 U.S. at 246 , 69 S.Ct. at 1082 , 93 L.Ed. at 1341 .

1978In 1969, the Arizona Supreme Court held in Boyes v. State, 105 Ariz. 34 , 459 P.2d 86 (1969) that the transportation of pulpwood logs by one who also harvested those logs was not a private carrier and that the transportation was not merely an incident of the commercial enterprise of harvesting and thus was not entitled to an exemption from the tax imposed. *291 The following year, the legislature amended the statute so as to specifically provide that the transportation of pulpwood logs was to be considered as “incidental” to the commercial enterprise of pulpwood harvesting, thus entitled to an

1978In 1969, the Arizona Supreme Court held in Boyes v. State, 105 Ariz. 34 , 459 P.2d 86 (1969) that the transportation of pulpwood logs by one who also harvested those logs was not a private carrier and that the transportation was not merely an incident of the commercial enterprise of harvesting and thus was not entitled to an exemption from the tax imposed. *291 The following year, the legislature amended the statute so as to specifically provide that the transportation of pulpwood logs was to be considered as “incidental” to the commercial enterprise of pulpwood harvesting, thus entitled to an

1970The only place where there is specific mention of bail in the Constitution is the Eighth Amendment which reads as follows: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” In Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 , 72 S.Ct. 525 , 96 L.Ed. 547 (1952), we find a historical analysis of the bail provision including the following statement: “The bail clause wás lifted with slight changes from the English Bill of Rights Act.

1970The only place where there is specific mention of bail in the Constitution is the Eighth Amendment which reads as follows: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” In Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 , 72 S.Ct. 525 , 96 L.Ed. 547 (1952), we find a historical analysis of the bail provision including the following statement: “The bail clause wás lifted with slight changes from the English Bill of Rights Act.